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The Economic Decolonisation of Indonesia: a Bird's-eye View

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Introduction

An oft-quoted statement by the Indonesian nationalist leader Haji Agus Salim runs as follows: 'The economic side of the Indonesian Revolution has yet to begin.' (Higgins, 1957: 102, cited in Lindblad, 2008: 2). The statement was made shortly before or shortly after the transition of sovereignty from Dutch colonial rule on 27 December 1949. At long last, the Netherlands had acknowledged that Indonesia was independent, which brought the Indonesian Revolution to its logical conclusion. But, by the conditions laid down at the Round Table Conference in The Hague in late 1949, the interests of Dutch private capital were still omnipresent in the Indonesian economy. In addition, the Indonesian government was obliged to consult the Netherlands government in matters affecting the economy until the debt of the former colony to the metropolitan mother country had been repaid in full. As Haji Agus Salim rightly stressed, economic and political decolonisation did not coincide but followed different historical trajectories.

This contribution offers an abridged account of the process of economic decolonisation as it unfolded between 1945 and 1959, from the proclamation of independence until the nationalisation of the vast majority of Dutch-owned companies that had retained operations in Indonesia after independence.[1] Four themes serve as devices to

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1   The main reference is my own monograph (Lindblad, 2008). Page references are only given when a specific location is needed. This recapitulation of the main argument has benefited from several

further our understanding of the process of economic decolonisation. These four themes, in order of appearance, are below: the new spirit in Indonesian economic life following the transfer of sovereignty; the changing climate of economic policy-making during the 1950s; the response and accommodation by remaining Dutch companies; and, finally, the concluding phase of expropriation and nationalisation.

A couple of points of departure need to be spelled out. The ideological basis of the thrust towards economic decolonisation in Indonesia was provided by a small booklet, *Ekonomi Indonesia*, which made a very timely appearance in 1949. Its subtitle, *Dari ekonomi kolonial ke ekonomi nasional*, carried an immediate appeal to contemporary public discourse, offering the briefest possible summary of what economic decolonisation in Indonesia was all about. For the remainder, the book offered very little concrete guidance (Hadinoto, 1949). A second point of departure may be traced in the international historiography on Indonesian decolonisation, notably John Sutter's voluminous PhD dissertation on domestic developments up to the general election in 1955 (Sutter, 1959). Although providing a wealth of information from government sources and press material, Sutter's survey offers little on the fate of private business enterprises; in addition, he did not consult Dutch-language sources. Yet another point of departure in our quest to better understand economic decolonisation in Indonesia is, of course, the wider international context of the Cold War. Decolonisation in Indonesia, whether political or economic, did not take place in a vacuum but was intrinsically linked to Indonesia's efforts to position itself in the tension between the Western powers and the Soviet bloc. Just as Sukarno's young republic secured American support against the returning Dutch by heavy-handedly crushing the Communist uprising in Madiun in 1948; did increasing flirtation with the Soviet bloc during the Guided Democracy period alienate Indonesia from the international

presentations in Indonesia and discussions with Indonesian scholars, including a seminar held at LIPI in Jakarta in January 2012.

community and bring flows of incoming foreign investment to a virtual standstill?

Novelties of the 1950s

The very term 'decolonisation' stresses the movement away from a society and economy no longer desired by Indonesians. Yet, economic decolonisation entailed far more than just getting rid of the Dutch. New economic initiatives were taken in the early and mid-1950s that were not necessarily connected with the reduction of retained Dutch economic influence. Such initiatives and the promises they held for future economic development have been overshadowed in the historiography by the more dramatic events in the late 1950s as well as the deterioration into a severe economic crisis in the early and mid-1960s. The overall harsh verdict of macro-economic performance during the Sukarno era easily overlooks the fact that the record of economic growth was reasonably good up to about 1957 (Booth, 1998: 55; Lindblad, 2010: 99).

As a young Minister of Trade and Industry in the Natsir cabinet, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (1917–2011) took the important step of introducing economic planning in Indonesia. The subsequent Economic Urgency Plan, often labelled the Sumitro Plan, was presented by his department in April 1951, only weeks after the Natsir coalition had been replaced by the Sukiman cabinet. The Sumitro Plan stressed industrialisation to reduce Indonesia's extreme dependence on exports of primary products to the world market, a vulnerability that had become particularly obvious during the worldwide depression of the 1930s. The plan was highly ambitious, in details drawing on ideas circulating in the Dutch colonial administration only in 1941, just months prior to the Japanese invasion. Total outlays during the first two years of implementation amounted to a staggering Rp920 million (Lindblad, 2008: 80–1). Keeping in mind the depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah in 1951, this amount corresponded to Rp2.7 billion or 28 per cent of total government revenue in 1952 (Bank Indonesia, 1955: 64). The main bottleneck was of course

money. Very little of the Sumitro plan was realised, at any rate, during the Sukarno period. Subsequent efforts at economic planning during the Old Order regime, in particular the Five-year Development Plan for the period 1956–1960 and the Eight-Year Overall Development Plan launched in 1959, bore even less resemblance to actual economic needs in Indonesia. Again, implementation stayed far short of ambition (Thee, 2003: 16–17).

The Hatta cabinet around the time of the transfer of sovereignty had taken the first step in the direction of strengthening Indonesian entrepreneurship. Initiatives were initially confined to designating particular types of import goods for trading by Indonesian nationals, but they fostered the ill-fated Benteng policy of positive discrimination, benefiting indigenous businessmen in particular, which will be discussed in due course in relation to rising economic nationalism. The combined record on three counts—sustained economic growth, economic restructuring and creation of a class of indigenous businessmen— was undeniably bleak and easily makes us overlook what *was* indeed accomplished.

The early and mid-1950s witnessed a proliferation of newly founded business enterprises in Indonesia. In a rare reference to developments in private business, Sutter estimates that some 500 new firms were set up each year in the early 1950s; indigenous businessmen accounted for 40 per cent of these ventures (Sutter, 1959: 1307). My own analysis of a comprehensive business directory in 1953 reveals that the Indonesian economy at the time counted about 4200 registered business enterprises. Significantly, the share of indigenous businessmen in corporate ownership, judging from owners' names, was scarcely different in trading as opposed to manufacturing, 40 per cent against 33 per cent (Lindblad, 2002: 62–5). More than 1500 new firms were established in Central Java (excluding the city of Yogyakarta) during the 1950s. More than half (52 per cent) had Javanese owners or managers whereas Chinese entrepreneurs accounted for almost one-third (32 per cent). Interestingly, no less than one firm in ten (10 per cent) was set up as a

joint venture between Javanese and Chinese businessmen (Lindblad, 2008: 89–90). Such statistics convey an impression of a new dynamism in Indonesian economic life during the 1950s that have been connected only loosely or not at all with official policy.

A new elite of indigenous businessmen emerged in the 1950s. The individuals in question, all men, had more often than not benefited from new opportunities for trading that had opened up during the Japanese occupation or during the Indonesian Revolution, although good political connections frequently proved useful in expanding private business undertakings. Statistics are regrettably missing altogether so that we have little choice but to rely on reconstructions done retrospectively at a far later stage. A list compiled in the 1980s by political scientist Richard Robison contains names of 21 prominent indigenous Indonesian businessmen in the 1950s. The list includes well-known figures such as Agoes Dasaad, Soedarpo Sastrosatomo, Hasjim Ning, TD Pardede, Djohan and Djohor, Eddy Kowara, and Fritz Eman (Robison, 1986: 51). The Sumatran, Hasjim Ning (1916–1995), nephew of Vice-President Mohammad Hatta, held the exclusive import agency for General Motors and was widely known as the 'Henry Ford of Indonesia'. Soedarpo (1920–2007), of Javanese descent but raised in Sumatra, collected import licences and made a fortune in shipping. TD Pardede (1916–1991), a Batak Protestant, founded a business empire in Medan and was allegedly the first one to apply the label 'Made in Indonesia' to his textile exports.

A somewhat unconventional approach to find out more about the business elite of the 1950s is to consult details on company history for the country's 200 leading conglomerates as documented around 1990. This retrospective analysis demonstrates that 40 of the 200 largest business enterprises in 1990 had operations dating from the 1950s or before. This 'old elite' was equally populated by indigenous and Chinese businessmen, about 20 conglomerates for each category. However, only five members of the indigenous business elite as constructed by Robison showed up among the 200 top conglomerates around 1990.

These five were Hasjim Ning, Soedarpo, Pardede, Eddy Kowara and Fritz Eman (Udatin). Other leading indigenous conglomerates around 1990—Bakrie, Haji Kalla, TM Gobel, Julius Tahija (Indrapura) and Arnold Baramuli (Poleko)—had, in the 1950s, apparently been in an infant or formative stage of building up their business enterprises. The adjoining list of Chinese-owned conglomerates that had started out no later than in the 1950s includes names such as Djarum, Bentoel, Lautan Luas, Gayah Tunggal, Mantrust, and, of course, the two at the very top: the Salim concern and Astra International (Lindblad, 2008: 96–101). The comparison by way of looking backward from 1990 teaches us that the new dynamism in Indonesian business during the 1950s was sometimes, yet far from always, sustained in the long run, and also that ventures by Indonesians of Chinese descent were not seriously hindered by discriminatory policies in the Sukarno era.

A change of climate

There is a tradition in the international historiography to distinguish between two opposite camps in the economic leadership in Indonesia during the 1950s (Higgins, 1957: 103; Feith, 1962: 113). The so-called 'economics-minded' pragmatic administrators held the stage throughout the early 1950s whereas the 'history-minded' nationalists predominated in the mid and late 1950s. Vice-President Hatta and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, both trained as economists in the Netherlands, belonged to the former camp and so did Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (1911–1989), who had studied law at Leiden University and who, in 1951, served as the first Indonesian president of the nation's central bank. In the opposite camp we come across Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, Minister of Economic Affairs in the first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet, known as a vigorous advocate of discrimination in favour of indigenous Indonesian entrepreneurs as institutionalised in the Benteng program; in the event, he had to resign his post because of corruption charges before the Ali cabinet had completed its term in office. Foremost among the 'history-minded' politicians was of course President Sukarno

himself, prime 'solidarity-maker' of Indonesia of his generation. A more difficult person to fit into this dichotomy is Djuanda Kartawidjaja (1911–1963), an engineer by training and ostensibly known for his lack of party affiliation while Prime Minister and head of the 'working cabinet' (kabinet kerja) that bridged the transition from constitutional democracy to the Guided Democracy period in the years 1957 to 1959.

The pragmatic economic policy-makers derived their inspiration from a mixture of classical capitalist economic theory and idealism with roots in European social democracy. Sumitro was a member of the minuscule socialist party, PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia), whereas Hatta saw the co-operative as the ideal compromise to face the huge economic challenges of the nation. A lively exchange of ideas took place, partly in Dutch-language journals. A comparison of the viewpoints of Sumitro and Sjafruddin reveals that the former, as a professional economist, probably had a more realistic grasp of the economic situation in Indonesia (Thee, 2010). The pragmatic policy-makers agreed between them that foreign capital and know-how was indispensable for economic development in Indonesia during the early post-independence period. This viewpoint was obviously not shared by the economic nationalists.

Economic decolonisation under the banner of pragmatism assumed the form of co-operation and voluntary nationalisation in a highly selective manner. Interventions only affected economic activities deemed to be of direct public or national interest such as the central bank, the national carrier, public utilities and public transport. A model of co-operation with the former colonial power evolved with the foundation of Garuda Indonesian Airways in March 1950. The airline was set up as a joint venture with the Indonesian state holding 49 per cent of the share capital and the KLM (Royal Dutch Airlines) keeping a 51 per cent majority share for the time being. A contract for management and training was concluded with KLM. After considerable parliamentary pressure, the Indonesian state in 1954 purchased all remaining shares in Garuda and expiration of the management contract was envisaged within six years. In the event, co-operation with the KLM ceased in

December 1957 when Dutch firms at large were taken over (Lindblad, 2008: 113–15).

A similar type of co-operation would have been logical in the crucial sphere of inter-island shipping, which was traditionally controlled by the Dutch-owned KPM (Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij, Royal Packet Company). Because of KPM opposition, the Garuda model could not be replicated, forcing the Indonesian government to opt for competition rather than co-operation. The subsequent state-owned shipping concern, PELNI (Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia, National Indonesian Shipping), was founded in 1952, operating a fleet of ships taken over from a national foundation to further indigenous Indonesian shipping. Competition between KPM and PELNI took place on unequal terms, the former drawing on a large fleet and much accumulated know-how and the latter only supported by government protection. Statistics on productivity during the years before and after the expulsion of KPM from Indonesian waters show that PELNI was operating far less efficiently than KPM (Marks, 2009: 170).

In 1949, it had been a rather controversial decision to choose the Dutch-managed Java Bank as the nation's central bank rather than the BNI (Bank Negara Indonesia, Indonesian National Bank), which had fulfilled this function for the Republic during the Indonesian Revolution. The purchase by the Indonesian government in 1951 of all privately held Java Bank shares in the Amsterdam Stock Exchange inaugurated a model for voluntary nationalisation in which compensation was paid at market prices. An immediate effect of the change in ownership was the appointment of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara as the bank's first Indonesian president, chairing a board of directors with the smallest possible Indonesian majority and a layer of Dutch high-level bank managers. In 1953, the bank's name was altered to Bank Indonesia and less restrictive credit policies were announced, notably to aid indigenous Indonesian entrepreneurship (Lindblad, 2008: 104–12). For international transactions, the Indonesian economy remained highly

dependent on a number of foreign-owned commercial banks, including three with Dutch owners (NHM, Escompto Bank, and Handelsbank).

Other examples of voluntary nationalisation occurred in 1954 and included public utilities such as gas and electricity companies in Jakarta and selected other regions (Cirebon, Central and East Java, Balikpapan and Ambon) as well as public transport in metropolitan Jakarta. Port facilities in Surabaya followed suit in 1956 and in 1957 there was mounting pressure to nationalise also Dutch-owned railway companies in Java and Sumatra. However, it was becoming increasingly difficult to negotiate the right price for takeover and the Indonesian state was obviously not in a position to finance a nationalisation of the numerous Dutch-owned firms in estate agriculture, mining, manufacturing and trading that were still in operation by 1957.

The shift to economic nationalism occurred gradually, from July 1953 onwards, during the first cabinet headed by Ali Sastroamidjojo. The PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia) supplied the most vocal advocates of a renewed nationalism, in particular, Minister of Economic Affairs Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, whereas the coalition partner, the Muslim party NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), exerted less of a countervailing influence than Masjumi, the other main Islamic party, had shown in earlier coalitions. One of Masjumi's leading personalities was, not coincidentally, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. Demands to speed up economic nationalisation became more outspoken, in parliament and from leftist trade unions. Meanwhile, no agreement could be reached with the Netherlands on the future status of western New Guinea (Irian Barat, now Papua) and the Indonesian government began putting the matter before an international audience, notably the United Nations.

The Benteng policy was escalated under Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, numbers of designated national importers rose to 4000 but it was widely known that a vast majority of the indigenous traders sold their licences for use by Chinese and European firms. Corruption in offices entrusted with executing the policy was rampant and the whole Benteng concept rapidly degenerated into a public scandal. Objectives, in the sense of

meeting stated targets, were not met and the policy's failure was likely to have eroded Indonesian confidence in the workings of a capitalist economy. In addition, Benteng provided a comfortable platform for overt anti-Chinese action. In 1956, the Assaat movement rallied indigenous businessmen against Chinese rivals but the commotion soon subsided. Three years later, in 1959, such actions resurfaced with the government's infamous expulsion of traders of Chinese descent from towns and villages (Thee, 2003: 12–13, 2009: 316; Lindblad, 2008: 129–36, 139–47). The Benteng policy contributed little to actual economic decolonisation, let alone the creation of a class of indigenous businessmen. Its main effect was to pave the way for more drastic measures, against the Dutch and the Chinese, whilst unintentionally widening the scope for direct state intervention in the economy.

The Dutch response

According to an oft-cited statistic, by the early 1950s, the eight leading Dutch trading corporations were still handling 60 per cent of all imports of consumer goods, which in turn corresponded to half of all goods imported to Indonesia. The group of eight included the famous 'Big Five': Borsumij, Internatio, Jacobson van den Berg, Lindeteves and Geo. Wehry (Glassburner, 1971: 78–9). It is hazardous to conjecture how much of the immediate post-independence economy of Indonesia was in fact controlled by private Dutch capital interests. Foreign, in particular, Dutch, domination was particularly strong in large parts of what one may call the 'modern' sector of the economy. It is likely that more than half of all export earnings accrued to foreign-owned production lines among which Dutch investment was still paramount (Lindblad, 2008: 38). Corporate assets had by and large been returned to Dutch owners after the Indonesian Revolution and Dutch business firms were guaranteed unhindered continued operations in Indonesia under the financial and economic agreement, Finec, preceding the transfer of sovereignty. This was a major concession on the part of the Republic and it was only matched by a vaguely worded commitment

by Dutch firms to further indonesianisasi of management by promoting Indonesian nationals to supervisory positions (Round Table Conference, 1950). Except for a limited number of firms affected by voluntary nationalisation in the early 1950s, virtually all Dutch-owned companies were in business by 1957.

Conditions of operating a private firm were dramatically different compared to the colonial period before the Pacific War. Records of Dutch business firms abound with complaints of militant trade unions, exorbitant wage demands, land occupations at estates, thefts and sabotage, strikes, and bureaucratic regulations, in particular, with respect to transmitting profits to owners in the Netherlands. There was clearly an urgent need to redefine business strategies. The chief choice was between the options of leaving Indonesia, possibly with the intention of continuing elsewhere, and accommodation through adjustment to the changing circumstances. Some firms did try to emulate their success on Indonesian soil at other locations, for instance, by trying to cultivate sugar in Ethiopia or setting up trading agencies in Africa or Latin America. Most of these ventures met with failure and only resulted in losses (Sluyterman, 2003: 220–1).

A key reason to stay on and make the best of the situation was of course the high profitability of doing business in Sukarno's Indonesia during the 1950s, a time when world market prospects were favourable for Indonesian export commodities. Profit remittances to Dutch owners are estimated at Rp1.1 billion in 1953, Rp840 million in 1954 and somewhere in the range Rp810–970 million for 1955—figures that may be offset against the total debt of the Indonesian government with Bank Indonesia in 1955, Rp6 billion (Lindblad, 2008: 159; Bank Indonesia, 1956: 68). There was increasing uneasiness among leading Dutch businessmen about the stubborn resistance by the Netherlands government to giving up western New Guinea. One group, led by Unilever executive Paul Rijkens, even approached President Sukarno in an attempt to reach a secret understanding outside the Dutch–Indonesian negotiations in Geneva in 1955 and 1956 (Meijer, 1994: 553–4).

Apart from the dismal record of ventures elsewhere and the continued high profitability, there was a third reason for Dutch business firms to choose the strategy of accommodation: the unshakable conviction that Dutch know-how was absolutely essential to economic development in Indonesia. Independent Indonesia simply could not do without Dutchmen—that was the firm belief often expressed in private (Sluyterman, 2003: 218–9; Kerkhof, 2005: 199). Such an attitude testified to a loss of touch with reality.

The commitment on the part of Dutch enterprises to improve the position of Indonesians in management, so that eventually 'the majority of the supervisory would consist of Indonesian citizens' (Round Table Conference, 1950), increasingly became a hotly debated issue in contacts between the government and Dutch firms. The record was a mixed one. Some large companies, notably Royal Dutch Shell through its subsidiary BPM (Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij, Batavian Petroleum Company), became known for a speedy implementation of policies of indonesianisasi, including training and replacement of Europeans by Indonesians in numerous higher functions. Other leading Dutch firms such as the tin-mining company Billiton only made efforts after intervention from the highest circles of government. Progress was also slow in banking, allegedly because of the acute shortage of banking skills among Indonesian employees (Lindblad, 2008: 161–6).

Monitoring the process of indonesianisasi was difficult because no targets or deadlines had been specified. In addition, there was the continuous confusion whether indonesianisasi should benefit persons with the Indonesian nationality or those of indigenous descent, a similar ambiguity as in the implementation of positive discrimination under the Benteng program. The trading firm Internatio, one of the 'Big Five', did create a new category of high-level staff but in 1957 it transpired that more than half of its members were of Chinese descent, which was not at all what the authorities had urged (Kerkhof, 2005: 194–7). A rather typical example of the slow progress is found in the agricultural estate company, LMOD (Landbouw-Maatschappij Oud-Djember, Old

Jember Agricultural Company), where Dutchmen still held 26 of 35 management positions by 1957 (Lindblad, 2008: 170). Some of the indonesianisasi that did take place after all, was in fact brought about by increasing practical problems in obtaining entry permits for expatriates and recruiting suitable Dutchmen for work in Indonesia.

It is instructive also to review the generally unimpressive record of Dutch firms with respect to indonesianisasi in a comparative perspective, in particular, by considering developments in non-Dutch foreign firms operating in Indonesia at the time. Scarce evidence, virtually only pertaining to American oil companies (Caltex and Stanvac) and to the Anglo–Dutch manufacturing firm Unilever, does suggest a greater willingness to train Indonesians and promote them to higher positions than in most Dutch-owned firms (Lindblad, 2008: 171–5). It is probable that more could have been realised in terms of indonesianisasi in Dutch-owned companies up to 1957 than actually happened. From a slightly different comparative perspective, that of British firms in Malaya/Malaysia, it can be inferred that indigenisation of higher staff rarely, if ever, took place voluntarily (Kerkhof, 2009: 191–3).

The Dutch corporate response to the changing conditions of operations in Indonesia following the transfer of sovereignty was characterised by a number of ambiguities. A stubborn belief in a long-term continuity of the task to be undertaken in Indonesia was accompanied by short-run strategies of maximising profit remittances at the expense of reinvesting gains. Accommodation and adjustment to changing circumstances took precedence over exit strategies but failed to embrace the alteration of management hierarchies to which the Dutch corporate world in Indonesia had committed itself. A crucial question is whether the limited progress in terms of indonesianisasi can be linked to the takeover and subsequent nationalisation. Whether the takeovers could have been averted altogether, more progress with indonesianisasi would surely have made it more difficult for economic nationalists in Indonesia to call for outright expropriation of Dutch companies.

The final phase

The expression 'Black Santa Claus' (Zwarte Sinterklaas) is eternally engraved in the memories of Dutchmen whose corporate premises were taken over by local trade unions all over Indonesia on 3 December 1957 and during subsequent weeks. The immediate cause was Indonesia's failure to get the conflict with the Netherlands about the status of western New Guinea on the agenda of the United Nations. Massive propaganda during preceding months had anticipated direct action against the interests of Dutch capital in the highly probable case that Indonesia would not succeed in gathering sufficient votes in the General Assembly. Therefore, it is all the more remarkable that the Dutch staff in the seized companies was apparently taken by complete surprise. Significantly, the takeovers began at the Jakarta office of the KPM, the very embodiment of retained predominance of the former colonial power in the economy of independent Indonesia. Djuanda's 'working cabinet' acted with great speed placing all expropriated Dutch-owned companies—more than 700 firms—under military command, ostensibly to prevent leftist trade unions and the Communist Party from gaining control of the nation's major productive assets (Lindblad, 2008: 181–6; Feith, 1962: 584).

There has been some discussion in the international historiography about whether the takeovers were premeditated by the government (Gardner, 1997: 142). Some stress the apparent lack of planning and co-ordination necessitating continuous improvisation by the authorities, a point also made by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, who criticised the actions and in fact stepped down as central bank president shortly afterwards (Kahin and Kahin, 1995: 11). Others discern orchestration by the government behind the systematic propaganda campaign preceding the actions and note that Sukarno himself at a later stage boasted about the takeovers as a personal achievement (Gardner, 1997: 142). A more probable theory is that the takeovers sprouted forth from the logic of a dramatic and highly volatile situation in which Dutch firms became a handy scapegoat for everything that was going wrong and the President

himself had barely survived an attempt at assassination (Kanumoyoso, 2001: 106–7). Sukarno might have sensed something was going to happen without knowing the details, and when it did happen, there was no way back (Glassburner, 1971: 92).

Throughout the year 1958 and far into 1959, most of the seized companies remained legally Dutch property, although being managed by Indonesians after the Dutch supervisory staff had been forced to leave the country. Only in December 1958 was legislation on the nationalisation of Dutch firms approved by parliament. The law was implemented in waves of nationalisation during the better part of 1959. All agricultural estates were rearranged under the umbrella of a new national organisation, PPN-Baru (Pusat Perkebunan Negara-Baru, Central [Organization of] State-owned Estates, New-styled). Some trading companies were privatised and acquired by Chinese conglomerates (Lindblad, 2008: 188–94). As a direct consequence of the change of ownership, participation by the Indonesian state in the economy was significantly increased and has remained so ever since.

The transition from takeover to formal nationalisation was a rather drawn-out one that involved a great deal of adjustment and improvisation in management and supervision. For the hastily promoted Indonesian managers, it was literally a matter of running somebody else's business. The interval between takeover and legal change of ownership hints at the possibility that the actions in December 1957 did not primarily aim at nationalisation as such but were deployed as weapons in the escalating conflict with the Netherlands. However, the necessity of accomplishing economic decolonisation ruled out a return of the seized property to the rightful owners. Here it is instructive to make a comparison with the seizure of British and American firms some years later during the so-called Konfrontasi against Malaysia (1963–1966). Firms were taken over in the context of conflict and indeed returned to owners when the Suharto government had assumed the reins of power and the conflict with Malaysia was brought to a conclusion. The actions against Dutch firms may very well have started in 1957 in much the same way as

subsequent actions during the Konfrontasi. The outcome turned out very differently because of the link with decolonisation.

Nationalisation may be conceived as the ultimate form of indonesianisasi, the final phase of economic decolonisation. Indonesian nationalisation of corporate Dutch property was recognised under international law because of the commitment to pay compensation laid down in the legislation approved by the Indonesian parliament. Actual recognition was achieved at a court case in Bremen in Germany in 1959 where one of the Dutch-owned tobacco companies in North Sumatra had formally protested against auctions of tobacco from its estate. This was without doubt an important victory for the Indonesian government, which had even mobilised former Nazi Reichsbank president, Hjalmar Schacht, to testify in its favour (Lindblad, 2008: 196–7).

Negotiations with the Netherlands about compensatory payment were slowed down by the growing tensions in Indonesia during the early 1960s. At long last, in 1966, a settlement was reached by which the Indonesian state promised to pay a total of 689 million guilders to the Dutch, consisting of 600 million guilders indemnification and accumulated interest. Payments commenced in 1973 and were completed by 2003. The amount paid was a far cry from what the Dutch firms had claimed by way of indemnification. In 1959, some 250 nationalised firms filed a collective claim of 1.5 billion guilders. Aggregate claims for all 700-odd nationalised firms approached 2.7 billion guilders which was still below the stated book value, a staggering 4.5 billion guilders (Jong and Lessing-Sutherland, 2004: 23–4; Lindblad, 2008: 198). The Indonesian side repeatedly asserted that the stated book values were gross exaggerations considering that Dutch firms by and large had undertaken very little new investment during the post-war period.

There is also some discussion in the international historiography on the effect of the takeover and nationalisation of Dutch firms on economic performance in Indonesia. An immediate dip took place in 1958, which at least partly must be attributed to the sudden transfer of management of vital economic assets from Dutch to Indonesian supervisors. Total

export revenues fell by 22 per cent, from Rp11.1 billion to Rp8.6 billion, but the downward trend was reversed in 1959. The subsequent decline, down to Rp9.6 billion in 1960, reflected falling oil prices in world markets and a drop in rubber output for estates and for smallholders. Scattered evidence also suggests that the global dimensions of estate agriculture in North Sumatra with respect to employment and planted area remained largely unaffected by the tumultuous events in 1958 and 1959 (Bank Indonesia, 1958: 128–9, 1966: 109–11 Lindblad, 2008: 200–1). Trade with the Netherlands obviously came to a complete standstill but export were diverted to other European markets as seen in the case of Sumatra tobacco auctioned in Germany in 1959. The dip in 1958, and possibly also in 1959, does not seem to have been sustained into the early 1960s. There was no direct continuity between the takeover of Dutch firms in 1957 and the severe economic crisis in the mid-1960s.

An alternative view emphasises economic and institutional damage inflicted on Indonesia by the very way in which economic decolonisation took place. Lack of managerial and technical know-how after the expulsion of the Dutch caused a long-run deterioration in terms of efficiency and productivity, as may be gathered from a comparison of the performance of PELNI with that of the preceding KPM (Marks, 2009: 171–2). A comparison with economic decolonisation in Malaysia is similarly likely to underscore the importance of how economic decolonisation was achieved. Upon gaining full independence in 1957, Malaysia immediately joined the British Commonwealth and the interests of British investment remained intact for another two decades (Lindblad, 2003: 44–8). Although the process of economic decolonisation in itself without doubt caused more damage in Indonesia than in Malaysia, it appears that the chief responsibility for the vast difference in macro-economic performance during the 1960s lay in the economic policies as pursued by the Sukarno administration during the final years.

Conclusion

A bird's-eye view of economic decolonisation in Indonesia needs to zoom in on what made the process differ from that of political decolonisation. The first observation refers to timing. Economic decolonisation was not only completed at a far later point in time than political decolonisation, fourteen years after the proclamation of independence or a full decade after the transfer of sovereignty, the process was also slower in getting started. We may identify a preliminary stage of embryonic economic decolonisation during the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian Revolution (1942–1949), which for reasons of brevity of argument has not been discussed here. Unexpected opportunities availed themselves for ambitious Indonesians to take over management tasks in expectation of the arrival of Japanese administrators or because the rightful Dutch owners had not yet gained access to their property. Yet, the accumulated know-how of such experience appears to have been limited just as was the case also with economic policy-making by the republican government prior to the transfer of sovereignty (Lindblad, 2008: 47–74).

The middle phase of economic decolonisation lasted from 1950 to 1956 and was characterised by three seemingly unrelated developments. The first one was the new dynamism in Indonesian economic life as manifested by the establishment of considerable numbers of new business enterprises, either despite or somehow, however indirectly, furthered by the failed Benteng policy of positive discrimination. The second important shift concerned the successive replacement of pragmatism by nationalism in economic policy-making, which arguably formed a precondition for speeding up the entire process. The third point refers to the response of Dutch firms retaining operations in Indonesia, inclined to remit as much profit as possible but reluctant to let Indonesians take a share in management responsibilities.

The final phase of economic decolonisation, 1956–1959, was shorter and more dramatic than the preceding one, complete with takeovers and formal nationalisation of Dutch-owned companies and a virtual

collapse of Dutch–Indonesian relations for the time being. It needs to be stressed, however, that this culmination of the process of economic decolonisation went accompanied by no violence and that compensation was eventually paid for the expropriated firms. Whether the compensation was sufficient or not, there can be no doubt that the loss of capital and know-how was very substantial. The price of economic decolonisation was very high for Indonesia and for the Netherlands.

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Flows and Movements in the Lands below the Winds[1]

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Introduction

'Lands below the winds' is a phrase I have borrowed from the title of Anthony Reid's book, *Southeast Asia in the age of commerce 1450–1680*, volume one: *The lands below the winds*. I am not very sure if there is a Malay word for this phrase because Reid quoted the phrase from ibn Muhammad Ibrahim's *The ship of Sulaiman* (translated from the Persian by J O'Kane and published by Routledge and Kegan Paul in 1972). Translating the phrase into Indonesian then perhaps will read as *tanah dibawah angin* or *wilayah/daerah yang terletak di bawah angin*. This phrase connotes a vast area known also as the Malay world that might now be called Southeast Asia.[2] The problems of language translation can have serious implication in our discussions and eventually our understanding of what constitutes the 'Malay world', 'Malay' and 'Malayness'.[3] This translation problem was recently raised by Barnard and Maier in *Contesting Malayness* (2004: x) in which they noted that 'Malay' and 'Maleis', terms that are used in English and Dutch literatures respectively, are in fact defective translations of 'Melayu'.

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1 This is a slightly revised version of an essay originally presented at the International Symposium on 'Thinking Malayness', 19–21 June 2004, organised by the Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (ILCAA), Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Fuchu, Tokyo. I would like to thank Glenn Smith and Carole Faucher for their comments and corrections on the earlier draft. In the course of time, I have published three articles in which some parts of the original version of this essay are used. These published articles are Tirtosudarmo (2005), Tirtosudarmo (2006) and Tirtosudarmo (2008).
2 According to Bastin and Benda (1968: v) the collective concept of 'Southeast Asia' was long familiar in Chinese and Japanese usage as *Nanyang* and *Nampo* — or 'the region of the Southern Seas'.
3 How will we translate 'Malayness' into Malay? Is it 'ke-Melayu-an'?

They contend that '…the three words have a different reach and have been applied to different people, customs and rituals, and to conflicting discursive formation'. Furthermore

In so far as there are correspondences at all among those three words and the world they evoke, they are based on linguistic considerations: the words are usually connected with a certain language—but then, is everybody who is speaking Malay a 'Malay' a 'Malaeier', an *orang Melayu*, and hence part of the 'Malay world', an enigmatic term that corresponds neither with the 'Maleise wereld' nor with 'alam Melayu'?

In imagining the lands below the winds, perhaps it is difficult to ignore the prevailing geographical fact that today we recognise them as Indonesia and Malaysia—two countries representing the core of the 'Malay world', an 'enigmatic term' according to Barnard and Maier (2004). Indonesia and Malaysia are two nation-states that emerged partly as a result of the process of decolonisation in the aftermath of World War II. Although Indonesia and Malaysia took different paths in achieving their independence, at present they are enjoying equal positions as sovereign nation-states and members of the United Nations. As close neighbours, Indonesia and Malaysia have shared many experiences during the course of history. In these shared, and in some instances experiences, the notion of 'Malayness' often emerged in the form of converging and diverging views from both sides. When it comes to the notion of 'Malayness', however, the Malaysians are much more assertive than the Indonesians are.[4] In this dialogue, we could perhaps say that Indonesia plays 'the Other' for Malaysia.

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4   The reason why Malaysians have been more active than Indonesians in advancing various ideas related to 'ke-Melayu-an' is perhaps related to the fact that in Indonesia 'ke-Melayu-an' practically has been submerged into the realm of *kebudayaan*. In Indonesia, particularly during the Suharto regime, *kebudayaa*n is a term that has been confined to such limited areas as arts, customs, literatures or tourism, in which the political and ideological elements of it have been eliminated or censored. 'Melayu', or 'ke-Melayu-an' in Indonesia, therefore has limited meaning and does not enjoy the central place it has in Malaysia. Anthony Reid (2004), in a broader discussion in *Understanding* Melayu *(Malay) as a source of diverse modern identities*, has shown the different paths taken by Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, and how it was only in Malaysia that 'Malayness' retained its 'core ethnic' and became a significant factor in Malay nationalism and later on in Malaysia's state ideology.

Although there are many views about what constitutes the Malay world, my view in this perplexing issue is simple. I perceive it as a socio-geographical space in which a loose inter-connectedness, which has occurred throughout its history, has made such disparate spaces converge into more or less one integrated realm.[5] It is in such an integrated realm of the Malay world that this essay will discuss the complex Indonesia–Malaysia interfaces or 'crossing points'. The 'crossing points' can also be loosely defined as sporadic but critical moments in the process of interaction that have influenced the making of not only the construction of 'ke-Melayuan', 'ke-Malaysia-an' and 'ke-Indonesia-an' but also the shaping of the region as a whole that is the Malay world.[6]Because this essay is mostly based on the abundant literature on the Malay world, it could be seen as just an additional footnote to otherstudies of this fascinating theme. This essay will began by quoting some views about what is called the Malay world from scholars who are studying it and its people. In what follows, different views will be exposed that are focused on the interaction of the two neighbouring states, Indonesia and Malaysia, particularly with regard to the history of contacts between the people,as well as the ideas of these two currently separate nation-states. At the end, this essay will touch on more recent developments and explore beyond the notion of 'Malayness'because the region is perceived as undergoing a process of unabated economic integration and globalisation. As a whole, this essay hopefully could be seen as a plea for a fresh transnational frame of mind in further research on this appealing issue.

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5   Studies of this region as a unified whole are nothing new because the region has become known as Southeast Asia. In 1968, for example, two historians, John Bastin and Harry J Benda, published *A history of modern Southeast Asia*, which places Southeast Asia into 'a broadly comparative frame of reference'. Three decades after Bastin and Benda published their book, Benedict Anderson published *The spectre of comparisons* (1998),which shows the new perspective in the study of modern Southeast Asian history that construes this region as an integrated geograhical space.

6   I should admit my bias in focusing only on Indonesia and Malaysia in this essay but we should not ignore the important contributions of other communities and states in discussion of the Malay world; particularly of Singapore and Brunei as well as Thailand and the Philippines.

What is meant by 'Malay world'?

James T Collins (1989: 235), an expert in Malay linguistics, wrote

> When European travellers and adventures began to explore the coast and islands of Southeast Asia almost five hundred years ago, they found Malay spoken in many of the ports and entrepots of the region. Indeed, today Malay remains an important indigenous language in Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Thailand and Singapore.

To support his arguments on the vast diversity of Malay dialects, Collins (1989: 235) cited Maxwell, who wrote in 1881, as follows:

> Malay is the language not of a nation, but of tribes and communities widely scattered in the East. … It is spoken in all the states of the Peninsula, in Sumatra, Sunda, Java, Borneo, Celebes, Flores, Timor and Timor Laut, the Moluccas, and the Philippines. … Siam proper has a large Malay population, descendants mainly of captives taken in war, and the language is therefore in use there in places; it is found also here and there on the coasts and rivers of Anam and Cochin-China. No other language of the Eastern Archipelago is understood over such an extensive area, and it is the common means of communication between the numerous tribes and races of the Malay family whose languages and dialects differ.

A Malay history specialist, Leonard Andaya(2002: 60), writes of*Melayu* civilisation:

> Melayu civilisation has been termed 'an expansive' ethnicity because in the past it has tended to absorb many different ethnics into its folds. Even today, the Constitution of Malaysia defines a Melayu as one who speaks Malay habitually, practices Melayu culture, and is a Muslim. In the past, the principal determinant of Melayu ethnicity was Islam because many other ethnic communities in the Straits area shared the same language and culture with the Melayu. The Melayu language gradually became the dominant language in Sumatra as a result of the importance of the kingdoms of Srivijaya and Malayu between the seventh and the fourteenth centuries.

The process of establishing a dominant language in the region resulted in the absorption of many smaller Malayic dialects. With the establishment of the prosperous kingdom of Melaka in the fifteenth century, the prominence of Melayu language and culture continued. Many groups living around the Straits of Melaka thus became bilingual in Malay and in their own language.

Another historian specialising on Indonesia, Anthony Reid(2004: 13–14), provides a slightly different feature of the ethnic group that is popularly (particularly in Malaysia) called 'Malay'.

In the cities of the Netherlands Indies a Malay-speaking urban population of mixed origins took root in the nineteenth century, for whom Malay was predominantly a lingua franca and a language for popular written expression. It had little to do with ethnicity, and was less used as label for a particular commercial diaspora than in the previous century. In fact, the majority of those who first turned modern Malay in Romanised script into a vehicle of print journalism were of mixed Chinese–Indonesian descent and generally labelled 'Chinese'. Dutch had never taken the path of the English, referring to all who spoke Malay as 'Malays'. Malay had been the lingua franca of the Dutch empire in the Archipelago since the mid-seventeenth century, and it was the principal language of the new Christianised minorities in Ambon and Minahasa. In the western Archipelago 'masuk Melayu' meant to become a Muslim, but in parts of eastern Indonesia the phrase meant becoming Christian.

The Institut Alam dan Tamadun Melayu (ATMA) [Institute of the Malay World and Civilization] at the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia constructed its own definition of the concept of Malay.[7]

Konsep 'Melayu' ATMA didasarkan kepada konsep yang dijanakan oleh UNESCO, yang menampilkan bangsa ini dalam suatu keluarga bangsa-bangsa yang tergolong dalam rumpun Melayu-Polinesia yang tersebar dalam daerah yang luas, dari Pulau Madagascar di sebelah barat hingga

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7   See www.atma.ukm.my.

Pulau Paskah di sebelah timur, Pulau Formosa dan Hawaii di sebelah utara hingga kepulauan Indonesia dan New Zealand di sebelah selatan. Dengan pengertian ini, tujahan penyelidikan institut juga merangkumi segala aspek kehidupan dan bidang ilmu yang berhubungan dengan tamadun Melayu dalam segala tahap perkembangan. Konsep 'Tamadun' yang digunakan bermaksud kemajuan pemikiran tinggi manusia dalam bidang-bidang seperti bahasa, sastera, agama, adat resam, kesenian, urusan kenegaraan, perdagangan, teknologi, sains dan perubatan tradisional.[8]

Various authoritative quotations on the so-called Malay world that been reproduced above, hopefully make clear that the Malay world is not only an imaginary world but is a real geographical area in which its people are using the Malay language. What is perhaps more important than situating the Malay world geographically is determining who exactly are the Malays? In the case of Malaysia, as Shamsul (2004: 145) has indicated, the Malay is fundamentally a colonial construction. According to Shamsul,

After the establishment of the Straits Settlements in 1824, Raffles' concept of 'Malay nation' gradually became 'Malay race', an identity that was accepted by both the colonial power and the Malays themselves, primarily as the result of the growing presence of others whose 'race' was 'European' or 'Chinese'. With the increased immigration of Chinese and Indian labourers to British Malaya in the early 1900s, a plural society was created in which the concept of Malay as a race became fixed and indelible.

From Shamsul's explanation, it is clear that demography, immigration particularly, has played an important role in the construction of 'Malayness' in Malaysia.

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8   It is interesting here to note the additional use of the term *Tamaddun* after *Alam*, a supposedly Arabic word that is meant to correspond to the word 'civilisation' in English. *Alam Melayu* (Malay world) in Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia is therefore something that does not necessarily correspond with 'civilisation'—it perhaps connotes the more material and physical forms of the Malay world. This interpretation is somewhat different from the Indonesian understanding of *alam*, as for example used by the prolific Indonesian writer—of Minangkabau origin—AA Navis in his semi-ethnographical book on Minangkabau's *adat* and society, *Alam terkembang jadi guru* (1984). The world *alam* in Navis' interpretation apparently covers issues of culture and civilisation.

Reassertion of the implications of ethno-demographic configurations in Malaysia's pluralism is also noted by Abdul Rahman Embong (2001: 60) who argued that

> Malaysian pluralism in all its dimensions—ethnic, linguistic, religious, culturaland others—was largely shaped during the colonial period, although it has roots in the pre-colonial period as well. Ethnic pluralism in contemporary Malaysia is now characterised not only by the existence of the various well-recognised ethnic groups—Malays, Chinese, Indians, Iban, Kadazan, and ethnic minorities such as Orang Asli and the Siamese—but also of less recognised, and sometimes even clandestine, Indonesian migrants. Reflecting the contradictory processes of convergence and divergence, Malaysian pluralism has no doubt been a source of tensions and conflict in the society; it remains a force for change today. The ongoing process of transnational migration, for example, is likely to have an impact on Malaysian society, a fact that indicates that Malaysian pluralism is being redefined even by forces operating beyond the borders of the nation-state.[9]

In this context, the broad definition of 'Malayness' and the encompassing goal adopted by ATMA,a national institution, is seemingly underpinned by the move to go beyond colonial constructions in the search for fresh and meaningful articulations.

The Javanese intrusion into the Malay world

In a paper presented at a conference on Java and the JavaSea in Leiden University in June 1990, Ras (1992) describes the interaction between Malay and Javanese in the Majapahit periods around the 12th and 13th centuries. Through his reading of the various texts written during this time Ras, an expert on Javanese history, shows, among other things, the Javacentric way of thinking of Javanese rulers that conceived the 'other islands' outside Java as *nusantara*,a Javanese version of the Malay

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9   The importance of immigration for Malaysian society has been a rich topic for migration studies in Malaysia. Some studies focus specifically on Indonesian migrants; see, for example, Tamrin (1987), Abdullah (1993), Kassim (1997, 2000) and Miyazaki (2000).

world. In a similar vein, Adrian Vickers (2004: 32–33), in an article originally published in RIMA (Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs) and laterincluded in *Contesting Malayness*, noted that

> Up until the late nineteenth century 'Malay' was a fluid category both for those who became 'Malay' and for Europeans. It was a category frequently combined with or used alternately with 'Javanese'. These two identities were terms in a complex of elements used to define the Pasisir or coastal world of Southeast Asia. Their valencies as meanings, however, depended as much on their usage by Europeans as on their relationships with each other.

Vickers argued that 'Malay, like Javanese, has no essence and, particularly, no national essence'. Malay is a hybrid identity formed by combinations of antipathies and interchanges predating the one-way-street view of late nineteenth-century colonialism. Vickers (2004: 54) concluded that '…throughout the earlier period the key indigenous terms that dominated the formations of identity were *Melayu* and *Jawa*. These were not exclusive or separable terms. They were foci of what might be called a civilisation of the region…'

The complex and intricate interaction between Java and Malaya before the arrival of the Europeansis explained in more detail by Houben (1999: 218).

> It is important to note that not only the 'high culture' of the Malayan Sea underwent and adapted many influences from Java and, in reverse, influences from the Malayan Sea and territories beyond were echoed in contemporary Javanese court literature: also in the oral traditions of many population groups outside Java, the theme of Java or Majapahit is a recurrent phenomenon.

Houben (1992: 222) further noted that

Nevertheless 1450 could be taken as the beginning of a new period, the 'age of commerce' as Reid (1988) has labelled it. In this period, maritime trade intensified concomitant with the rise of Islam. In the harbour towns of Central and East Java (Demak, Kudus, Japara, Pati, Lasem; Tuban, Gresik and Surabaya respectively) the leaders of the Muslim trading communities took over political power and expanded their influence both overseas and in the hinterland regions. It should be noted that the international character of maritime trade led to the creation of a mixed and heterogeneous population in the pasisir cities. Consequently the word 'Javanese' is now used to mean 'someone coming from Java' (either of Javanese, Chinese, Indian or Arab descent or a mixture of it), rather than 'someone of Javanese stock'.The pasisir area and its inhabitants were becoming well integrated within the cosmopolitan Malay-speaking coastal world.

According to Houben (1992: 234),

…although overseas activities in this period were based on trade, economic domination could be expressed in political terms. The important difference with Majapahit times is that this Java-sabrang nexus was multilateral instead of bilateral because the pasisir coastal towns did not constitute a unity or coalition and instead of relations between one Javanese court and various overseas entities, we find relations between several Javanese ports and their overseas counterparts. Demak, for instance, had special links with Palembang and Banjarmasin, Gresik with Malacca, Lombok and other places. Trade and politics had become of a different order in the period after 1450.

Unfortunately, as Houben (1992: 236) has noted, things changed markedly in the seventeenth century. 'From 1600 to 1646 Javanese maritime trade underwent a decline; from 1646 to 1680 it was gradually destroyed. This was caused by two factors: the activities of the Dutch East India Company and the rise of Mataram power over the *pasisir*. Both were characterised by strife'.

In the Java–Malaya nexus, Houben (1992: 238) noted the important concept of borrowing, which means that some specific elements of

Javanese culture were borrowed to be implemented in a local society elsewhere and to play a particular role. It should be noted, however, that the *pasisir* as a place of origin for influences in *tanah sabrang* was far from homogeneously Javanese in the period under consideration. Reid, for example, made a strong case for the Chineseness of the Islamic ports on the north coast. Also, other groups (Indian, Arab, Malay) settled there, bringing their ideas and values with them, and in this respect it is striking that the Portuguese were the first to make a sharp distinction between Malays and Javanese (*Jaos*), whereas the Arabs before that (and the Malays in their wake) called all the inhabitants of the Archipelago *orang Jawi.* Houben (1992: 239–240) also observed that

> Trade, politics and culture were linked to one another in the sense that the exchange of material goods implied the establishment of political relations and the transfer of elements of culture. Political relations were often framed in engagements of an unequal nature, which led to the sending of embassies, tribute and, in the case of disloyalty, punitive fleets. Cultural transfer took the form of borrowing by the recipient of specific cultural elements, mostly regarded as a superior quality, thus adding to the authority of local customs. In many stories that were told around the Java Sea, the Javanese are connected with migration either directly from Java or through another place outside Java.

Flows and movements of various things become very important phenomena that significantly connect the disparate places, as argued by Vickers (2004: 47).

> The situation is not one demarcated physical spaces of influence but rather of patterns of cultural overlap. These patterns go along with patterns of physical movement, movement of texts from one area to another, movements of wandering princes throughout the areas of the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Kalimantan and further afield, movements of Bugis and Makassarese throughout Southeast Asia, particularly after the fall of Gowa–Makassar to the Dutch and Arung Palaka, movements of 'pirates' and 'mercenaries' (who were often the same people as princes), marriages

across the waters, movement of the nomadic bajau or 'sea gypsies', and the numerous exchanges involved in the slave trade.

While Ras, Vickers and Houben view the interaction as a generally north-south affair, van Dijk (1992: 291–292) looks at the crossing points from a different direction.

> The spread of cultural influences may have been predominantly from west to east, but this does not preclude a dissemination of cultural traits in the opposite direction. The exploits of Buginese and Macassarese adventurers and sailors testify to that. After the fall of Macassar in 1669, they spread out over Southeast Asia, settling as far as Thailand. In their exodus they influenced political developments in a number of places and, of course, also brought their cultural heritage along.

Quoting Lineton (1975: 174–175), van Dijk argued that the Dutch occupation of Macassar caused 'a wave of conquests and infiltrations of other Malay states in Borneo, the Riau archipelago, the Malay Peninsula and elsewhere by *émigré* Bugis princes and their followers'. Their presence outside Sulawesi and the belligerent attitude they sometimes showed in their new settlements resulted in considerable trouble. Sometimes this only took the form of an abortive rebellion, as in Thailand; sometimes their political exploits were more successful, leaving an imprint on local customs and relations. The strong position they acquired in some states resulted in a special kind of a dualistic political structure: a formal paramount ruler originating from the local aristocracy and a 'junior' Buginese ruler who, in fact, could be more powerful. Van Dijk (1992: 294–295) also noted that 'It was by way of this third route that Islam spread to parts of the Philippines, from Johore at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, making these Philippine areas part of the 'Malayo–Muslim world'. This cultural link between the Philippines and the rest of maritime Southeast Asia, as argued by van Dijk, is an additional argument for looking at the area as a whole, not

just at Indonesia in isolation, when investigating the relations between sea traffic and common elements in the societies of the Malay world.

The prelude of nation-states: *Melayu Raya–Indonesia Raya*

The twentieth century shows increasing signs of crossing points in the Malay world. The Japanese military adventures in the early 1940s, apart from their devastating effects, provided critical opportunities to accelerate the decolonisation process for the region. In the Malay world, particularly that part of the region under British colonial authority, according to Milner (1992: 55),

The geographic and ethnic scope of Malayness was an especially urgent issue in a new state where loyalty to the bangsa had developed before loyalty to the nation'. Milner argued that 'narrowing the scope of Malayness appears to have been a cultural project even of the British colonial state'. It is revealing that when the colonial civil servant, Sir Richard Winstedt, wrote what has been called the first modern history of the Malays, he focussed on the Malays of the Malay Peninsula and the nearby Riau–Lingga archipelago (Winstedt, 1921: 4). This history,*Kitab tawarikh Melayu* [History of the Malay world], was published in 1921 and contrasts sharply with a *Sejarah alam Melayu* [History of the Malay world]in three volumes, by the Malay author, Abdul Hadi Haji Hasan, and written a few years later. This broader survey, which refers to Java, Borneo and Sumatra under the heading of 'Malay lands', seems to support a pan-archipelago *Melayu Raya* (Abdul Hadi Haji Hasan 1925: 43). In the post-independence period, numerous histories of Malaya have followed the Winstedt model. They stress the peninsula context of Malay history,invariably highlight the empire of Malacca, and then provide some account of the later and smaller sultanates such as Johore, Kedah, Perak and Trengganu. Occasionally the peninsula scope is made absolutely explicit. According to the political historian, Ibrahim Mahmood,'the history of UMNO (the Malay political party, which has always dominated the government of Malaya and Malaysia) is the

history of the bangsa Melayu, and the history of the bangsa Melayu is the history of Malaya itself (1992: 55).[10]

Milner (1992: 57) also noted that

The Tunku's 'Malaysia' proposal, we might surmise, arose at least partly from awareness of this imbalance in sentiment between 'Malaya' and 'Melayu'. The use of the phrase 'Melayu Raya' in some early discussions of 'Malaysia' provides a hint of the possible ethnic aspirations addressed in the proposal. Where the Tunku's policy was especially innovative was in its reformulation of the 'Melayu Raya' to signify a Greater Malaydom focussed on Kuala Lumpur rather than a pan-Java Sea unity. The ethnic aspirations which the government both addressed and fostered were those of the Peninsula-based Malays, the heirs of Hang Tuah. In creating a Peninsula-Borneo 'Melayu-Raya' the Tunku was endorsing the narrower definition of Malayness. Under this definition the Javanese president of Indonesia could no longer be seen as a more authentic Malay figure than the Malay prime minister himself.

In a book that explains the genesis of the so-called 'Konfrontasi' between Indonesia and Malaysia, Greg Poulgrain (1988: 23) noted that

The political intricacies of the inherent threat in early 1946, created by the links between Indonesia and Malaya, have not been fully explored by specialists on Indonesia or Malaya because, all too often, the subject has been delimited by colonial boundaries. In Borneo, along the contiguous land-border between Indonesian and British territory, there was strong ethnic and cultural affiliation.[11] But spanning the Malacca Straits between the Malay Peninsula and East Sumatra, in addition to racial and cultural bonds, there was an expressed willingness to share in the Indonesian

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10 Discussion and analyses around Malay nationalism and the birth of Federation of Malaya are elaborated in detail in several books; among others, are Roff's *The origins of Malay nationalism* (1967) and Omar's *Bangsa Melayu* (1993).

11 In the case of Sarawak–East Malaysia, an article by Ishikawa (2003) on the experiences of the villagers in the borderland of West Kalimantan and Sarawak during the early 1960s 'confrontation period' provides a good account of how the macro-level Southeast Asian politics closely interacts with the everyday politics at the village level that again demonstrates the 'historical crossing points' between Indonesia and Malaysia.

revolution. This revolutionary bonding and the threat it created for the British reached a climax in early 1946, when recolonisation of Malaya was already problematic. Nevertheless, as a result of deft action in East Sumatra, the British gained sufficient leeway and political leverage in Malaya to avoid the ignominy that the Netherlands faced when its colonial tenure was lost in revolution, and then prised from its grasp by American economic pressure.[12]

According to Poulgrain (1988: 23–24),

At the end of World War II, there was an essential difference between the Indonesian polity and its Malayan counterpart. In Indonesia, the Japanese occupation bequeathed a revolutionary nationalist movement with tumultuous popular support; in Malaya, the wartime occupation and assistance had taken another course, determined largely by demographic differences and the enmity between Japanese and Chinese. In demographic terms, Chinese in Malaya in 1945 comprised a far higher proportion of the population than Chinese in Indonesia, in the order of 38 per cent compared to 2 per cent. Local resistance to the Japanese in wartime Malaya and Borneo was conducted mainly by Chinese, with Malay and British participation limited to exceptional individuals. On the other hand, those who collaborated with the Japanese included radical nationalist Malays, some of whom had been arrested by the British before the war. Sukarno and many prominent Indonesian nationalists who had suffered under the Dutch similarly collaborated out of necessity. In Malaya the anti-British component of nationalist ideology lacked political bonding with the Chinese inhabitants. Consequently, the MNP (Malay Nationalist Party) was deprived of Chinese support immediately after the war, when it was most crucial to form a united anticolonial front. This situation was not addressed by the MNP until late 1946, by which time Anglo-American relations and Malayan political priorities were clarified, favouring the British rather than the MNP.

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12   See also Matthew Jones (2002) on the review of this theme.

It is interesting, as shown by Poulgrain (1988: 45), how the 'social revolution' in East Sumatra in early March 1946 had a strong repercussion on the fate and destiny of its neighbour Malaya.

> With the sultans in East Sumatra deposed and many dead, the cultural affinity with Malaya ensured that the political implications there would be profound. In the early post war period, when American anticolonialsm was a Damoclean sword over the British presence in Malaya, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) displaced the radicalism of the MNP, and so removed the precariousness of the British position. The demise of the sultans in East Sumatra drastically influenced their Malay counterparts, politically motivating them against the MNP. During March, UMNO emerged with the full support of the Malay sultans. The catastrophe which otherwise awaited their political inactivity was foreshadowed by the fate of their relatives in East Sumatra. By July, UMNO succeeded in obtaining an agreement with the British to begin negotiations for a new constitution. Negotiations continued from August to November, between British officials on the one hand, and the sultan's representatives and UMNO and the other, while the MNP was excluded.

In connection with the events surrounding the birth of the Federation of Malaya and its controversy, a paper by Soda (1998) that analyses the movement behind the idea of *Melayu Raya* through the life of its key proponent, Ibrahim Yacoob,has become very important to the understanding of this crucial moment in the history of Malaysia and Indonesia. In the conclusion of his paper, Soda argues that the idea of *Melayu Raya* or *Indonesia Raya* and that of Malaysia have some similarities. First, both ideas are based on a Greater Malay identity, which would not be confined within the Malay Peninsula but extended to the other territories in the Malay Archipelago. Second, advocacy of *Melayu Raya* and that of Malaysia are always legitimised on the basis of an ethno-cultural affinity or primordial ties as well as common history. However, Soda also shows several differences between the concepts of *Melayu Raya* and Malaysia.First, although the idea of *Melayu Raya* covers the whole Malay Archipelago, the plan of Malaysia only involves

the (former) British colonies. Second, the *Melayu Raya* concept is, to some extent, antagonistic, though not extremely, to traditional political structures or 'feudalism' in Malaya. Third, although the intended *Melayu Raya* originally had an anti-British tendency, Malaysia was partly planned through peaceful negotiations with the British. Fourth, *Melayu Raya* is not so much a vision of state (*negara*) but a vision of nation (*bangsa*). On the contrary, Soda argued, Malaysia is more a vision of a state rather than a vision of a nation.

Bastin and Benda (1968: 174–5) describe the critical moment preceding the inception of Federation of Malaya as the following:

> We saw that before the war nationalist agitation had for practical purposes been limited to members of the non-aristocratic intelligentsia; now it suddenly found vigorous spokesmen and leaders among the British-educated upper class. Significantly, the creation of the United Malays National Organizations (UMNO) in 1946 was the handiwork of Dato Onn bin Ja'afar from Johore, the most independent and most viable of the former Unfederated States. The new movement forged a close political link between rulers and subjects never before achieved. It generated an excited Malay public opinion which, together with the surprising political apathy of the Malayan Union's Chinese and Indian would-be beneficiaries, led to Britain's abandonment of the radical Union scheme.

> Two years later was born the Federation of Malaya, which reflected a clear victory for Malay interests. As it very name suggests, the new constitutional arrangement largely reverted to the basic pattern of pre-war colonial rule. It was squarely built on the supremacy of the individual Malay states (all of them entered the new Federation, which also contained the two Straits settlements, without Singapore); Malay rights and privileges were safeguarded, especially with regard to such key issues as land ownership, citizenship, access to political offices, and for that matter the national language as well as religion. (Islam was made the state religion, with adherents of other faith being guaranteed freedom of worship). The traditional rulers and sultans thus retained their prerogatives, while their English-educated descendants came to occupy positions of authority at the center, which was being progressively decolonised. In August 1957 the

Federation of Malaya, the West's last major dependency in Southeast Asia, attained independence in a peaceful transfer of power.

The pervasiveness of Malay ideology in the real politics of Malaysia was clearly to be seen, as Shamsul (2004: 146–147) has noted.

When the New Economic Policy was launched in 1971, *bumiputera* became an important ethnic category: it was officialised and became critical in the distribution of development benefits to poor people and also the entrepreneurial middle class. The *bumiputera,* the 'Malays' and their Muslim counterparts in Sarawak and Sabah, achieved political dominance throughout the country with one exception: in the 1980s the Christian Kadazan in Sabah formed their own opposition party (Parti Bersatu Sabah – PBS) that ruled the state successfully for two electoral terms. During that period, the relationship between Sabah and the federal government could be described, at best, as tense'.

The expansionist and opportunistic character of the Malay ideology is further noted by Shamsul in his observation on the election in Sabah.

In an attempt to win back Sabah, the leading party in the federal government, UMNO (the United Malays Nationalist Organisation), made a historic decision in the late 1980s when it opened itself to non-Muslim *bumiputera* so that eventually the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional ('National Front') could regain control over Sabah. These developments show that the need to define the borders and margins of a concept can have far-reaching effects on its central content: 'Malayness' as defined by the Malay nationalist movement in the 1920s and 1930s and implemented and redefined by UMNO, had to be reformulated in Sabah once again, illustrating how flexible the concept or category of 'Malay' is. It also shows that the ongoing discussions about 'Malayness' are at once both important and irrelevant: the concept can easily shift meaning, adapting itself time and again to new situation and making clear-cut statements impossible or incredible.

In Malaysia, the fragility of racial and religious coexistence, apparently one of the issues that was addressed in 1991 by the so-called Vision 2020 proposed by the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohammad, where the achievement of a *Bangsa Malaysia* is emphasised. Virginia Hooker (2004: 161), however, noted the critical problem in understanding what is meant by *Bangsa Malaysia* is that most dictionaries of Malay translate *bangsa* as 'race' and it is in this sense that it is used to describe the *Bangsa Melayu*, the Malay race. In the phrase *Bangsa Malaysia,* however, there seems to be a new element in the meaning of *bangsa*; the adding of a sense of 'nation' to that of 'race'. However, as Hooker argued (2004: 161–162), 'The rhetoric of Vision 2020 has yet to be proved in practice. It will require an enormous effort to replace the difference-driven discourse of *Melayu* with a new kind of rhetoric which constructs and sustains commonalities so that the concept of the Malaysian race/nation gains credibility and becomes a focus for national loyalty'. The embedded problems originating from the ethno-demographic divisiveness that constantly haunts the current political balance and the future nation's construction undoubtedly has been and will be one of the major contentious issues in Malaysia.[13]

Moving beyond Malayness?

During one of the discussion sessions following a panel presentation at a conference titled 'Dialog Borneo–Kalimantan VII' (30 April–2 May 2002 in Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan), a Malaysian participant gave a long comment from the floor, an apparent harsh response to another comment made by an Indonesian participant (also from the floor).[14] The Indonesian maintained that the theme of the conference overlooked the multiplicity of ethnic groups in Borneo, such as the Banjarese,

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13 The polemics and analysis among the Malaysian scholars concerning the historical precedence and the future of their 'nation' can be read in Shamsul (1996) and Omar (2004) among others.
14 The so-called 'Dialog Borneo-Kalimantan' is a series of conferences that is strongly promoted by Malaysian scholars who are working at various Malaysian government institutions, such as Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka. These conferences, as explained by Hamzah Hamdani (2003; 7), who presented a paper at the Banjarmasin dialog, are to signify 'the long-term strategy to reconstruct the Melayu–Borneo culture'.

the Dayaks, the Bugis, the Javanese and so on. This elicited a strong reaction from the Malaysian, who basically argued that all the ethnic groups from Madagascar to Polynesia were in fact one a part of the *rumpun Melayu* that belong to the *dunia Melayu* (Malay world). The two languages used at the conference were Malay (*Bahasa Malaysia*) and *Bahasa Indonesia*—differentiated languages from the same Malay language root.[15]

In my reflection, the above-mentioned event at least can be seen from two perspectives: the narrow and the broad. From the narrow perspective the event will be seen as a sort of dialogue between people who are living in the 'Malay world'. Interestingly, this dialogue, represented by two different nationalities, Malaysian and Indonesian, exposes these two different perspectives. The first perspective, from the Indonesian participant, seemingly argues that, in ethnic terms,'Malay' is just the name of an ethnic group.The second perspective, from the Malaysian participant,is clearly in disagreement with the first in that itconsiders Malay to be the name of a *rumpun*, a race that lives in the particular geographical space, stretching from Madagascar to Fiji. The Malaysian participant endorsed the theme of the conference—that Borneo is just part of the *alam Melayu*—and suggested that 'all of us' belong to one *rumpun, rumpun Melayu*.[16] What does he, or do we, mean by *rumpun*? Is there a similarity with 'race' in the English usage? If we look at the practical use in *Bahasa Indonesia* or *Melayu*, we see, for example, that *rumpun bambu* refers to a bamboo clump, implying from the same root. The root of Malayness? Well then we actually should talk about the archaeology or the genealogy of the people who are called 'the Malay' or *orang Melayu* and are currently living in this particular geographical space. Here we enter a major scientific task involving a subject that has

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15 *Bahasa Indonesia* in the eyes of Ramos Horta, who at the time was foreign minister of newly independent East Timor, 'is just a kind of Malay language'. Ramos Horta's statement was made at an IIAS annual lecture, Leiden, 2001, during his answer to a question of why East Timor chose the Portuguese language rather than *Bahasa Indonesia* or English.

16 The broader definition of 'the Malay' or the 'Malay World', as argued by the Malaysian participant at the above-mentioned event, reminds me of the observation made by Geoffrey Benjamin (2002) that 'a current Malaysian academic fashion refers to almost everything in the Malayo-Polynesian-speaking world as 'Malay''.

long been disputed by scholars from different disciplines and points of view.[17]

Although the two perspectives reflect the two different historical trajectories concerning the Malayness in Indonesia and Malaysia, the insistence by the Malaysian participant to put together the entire ethnic group into one *rumpun* is understandable because the issue of ethnicity is very problematic in Malaysia. As Vickers (2004: 27) noted: 'Legally the Malaysian state has had to balance an absolute term, 'race', against a contingent type of definition, for one might be 'Malay/*bumiputera*'in contrast to 'Chinese', but 'Dayak' in relation to the 'Malay' in Sabah politics.'

Lately, interest in 'Malayness' and what it means to be *Melayu* seems to be reviving in Indonesia.[18] The collapse of Suharto's New Order regime apparently has also been followed by increasing political demands by various groups in society as a way of ethnic mobilisation, which was suppressed previously. Yet, as Faucher (2004) noted in her study of recent local politics in Riau islands, 'the revival of ethnic sentiments can be understood as the reconfiguration of a power structure that had already been operative under the former regime'. The marginal position of the Malay *vis-à-vis* the dominant major ethnic group, the Javanese, is clearly indicated by one of her informants who lives in Kampung Melayu, in Batam, Riau:'We are Malay, not Javanese, and we should be also Malaysian. We all hope that, one day, Riau will be part of Malaysia again'.[19]If we now look from a broader lens then, the item of dispute in the above-mentioned conference perhaps can be seen as a sign of

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17 See Andaya (2004), Collins (2004), Adelaar (2004) and Benjamin (2002) to mention just a few noticed scholars who continuously dig for more evidence on the origin and genealogy of 'Malayness' in the Malay world.

18 See Faucher (2004), Ford (2003) and also Pabali (2004) and Fau (2004). In connection with the emerging interest in Malayness in Borneo studies, see, among others, Thung Ju Lan (2003) who also noticed the mobilising of the Dayak ethnic group under the loose Pan-Dayak movement.

19 Among Indonesians, *kampung Melayu* has different meanings depending on where the term is being used. Within Indonesia, *kampung Melayu* means the place where originally Malay people are living. If you are abroad, then *kampung Melayu* means the place where many Indonesians, regardless of their ethnicity, are residing. It is very common, for example, to refer to the place or suburb where many Indonesian students are living as *Kampung Melayu*.

a continuing contest as well as negotiation in which the boundaries of ethnicity as well as nationalities, among the people who live in the lands below the winds that is called the 'Malay world', is continuously in a state of flux, and shifting towards something that is not yet clear.

In a criticism of the conventional approaches to the study of South-East Asia, Jan Aart Scholte (1997: 29) argued that this region should be seen within a context of world relations.

…[G]lobalisation has been a primary fact of contemporary history in insular Southeast Asia, deeply affecting the politics, economics, culture, psychology, and ecology of the population. The growth of global networks of social relations has been most pronounced in recent decades, but the trend can be traced back at least to the middle of the nineteenth century. The Malay–Indonesian world does not today exist, and indeed has never existed, apart from wider world interconnections. The student of modern island South-East Asia, therefore, faces a task of discovering and assessing the interlinkages between international, national, and local circumstances that have shaped the course of social history in this region.

Scholte (1997: 30) further argued that

This blind spot in the study of island South-East Asia appears to reflect the power of one of the main structures of contemporary global social relations: namely, the nationality principle. As noted earlier, concurrently with the trend of globalisation over the past century and more, social life in the Malay–Indonesian world has also become heavily nationalised. That is, at the same time that global interconnections have intensified in the region, national units with boundaries of previously unknown rigidity have also emerged, in the form of 'Indonesia' and 'Malaysia'. Nationality has become a key ordering principle of world politics (e.g. in terms of national state), world economy (in regard to national currencies, national taxes, etc.), world culture (in regard to pervasive national symbols and invented national traditions), world geography (in terms of national territories), world psychology (with notions of 'national characters'), so on. The two tendencies, globalisation and nationalisation, are perhaps

not so contradictory as they may seem at first. From a world-historical perspective, the pursuit of nation-hood might be appreciated as a means by which people have attempted to maintain a sense of identity, community, and control of destiny in a globalising social circumstance that has tended to undermine pre-existing frameworks of collective identification and communal solidarity'.

Wang Gungwu (2001; 19) in a different vein also lamented the need to see the region as an integrated area rather than separating it into different entities.

> With very few exceptions, the scholars avoided portraying the local reality as integral parts of the unique border-less maritime world of the Malay Archipelago. In that world, people were mobile and migratory to a greater extent than we realised. It was a world of commerce, including trade over long distances. The trade was not only among the Malays themselves, but one that, continuously and for centuries, attracted maritime neighbouring peoples from the west and the north, including those from mainland Asia.

Wang Gungwu certainly is not alone in longing for new light to be shed on studies of this region. As Benedict Anderson (1998: 7) from a different angle has argued:

> No other region of the world–not Latin America, not the Near East, not Africa, and not South Asia–had this kind of alarming profile. The new hegemon was determined that it not be 'lost' like China. Out of this, in 1954, came SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), formed in American Manila, and later headquartered in Bangkok, which was designed to save the whole postcolonial region from the communist spectre. In the following decade, two different attempts were made by local governments in South-East Asia to create regional organisations less wholly dominated by outsiders; both proved abortive. Only in 1967, after Sukarno had been driven from power in an orgy of mass murder, was a more permanent institution created: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which recently—after a thirty-year interval—admitted Vietnam, Burma,

Laos, and will probably incorporate Hun Sen's Cambodia and Xanana Gusmao's East Timor one day.

Anderson's comments on the politics of modern Southeast Asian history are a reminder of how the region will always be an arena for global powers and their interests.

Concluding remarks

The lands below the winds that is called the 'Malay world', as poignantly noted by Barnard and Maier (2004: x), is an enigmatic reference that will be continually contested. As I have tried to show in this essay, the contestation occurred in what I call 'crossing points' in the course of this region's history. In fact, we could say that this region has been shaped through the repeated emergence of crossing points. In the light of history, what happens in Malaysia cannot be separated from the dynamics of its neighbouring countries, particularly Indonesia. In these series of crossing points, as I indicated earlier, Indonesia seems to be 'the Other' for Malaysia.In the lands below the winds, histories have shown that territoriality and authority are often invisible and people move freely, crossing the invisible borders that will always contribute to the richness of this region's civilisation. Yet, as succinctly observed by Ludden (2003),

> Modernity consigned human mobility to the dusty dark corners of archives that document the hegemonic space of national territorialism. As a result, we imagine that mobility is border crossing, as though borders came first, and mobility, second. The truth is more the other way around.

Althoughat present the nation-state boundaries seem unobstructable, in looking to the future, the relevant questions areperhaps no longer really to be concerned with the issues of 'Malayness' and either 'Melayu' or 'not Melayu'. Something beyond Malayness is perhaps emerging: a new realm connected to the process of social change that enhances a

community's sense of oneness and yet advances pluralism—as always has been the case in the lands below the winds—through various transnational activities that are now known as globalisation.

As always the case in 'Below the Winds', the posts which exist are not based on any power and authority. Everything is simply a show…[20]

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20 Ibrahim (1688: 174–7), as quoted by Reid (1988: 1).

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Is the Past Another Country? A Case Study of Rural–Urban Affinity on *Mudik Lebaran* in Central Java[1]

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Abstract

This study is to explore the relations between the urban and rural in terms of their social as well as cultural significance. Referring to the idea of David Lowenthal— (1985:39-52) who has pointed out that the connection between the past and present rests on the fact that the past has been the source of familiarity, guidance, identity, enrichment and escape—the central idea of the paper is to suggest that this notion of a 'familiar past' is a fundamental aspect of the culture of contemporary urbanised Central Javanese, who, during the Lebaran holiday, revisit their ancestral roots to retain a degree of autonomy against modernity or to return to their 'disappearing past' as 'tourists', so to speak. The cultural practice of *mudik* becomes the interaction zone (Leaf, 2008) that provides opportunities for city dwellers to keep ties with their village of origin. Finally, the paper suggests that the continuing intimate interplay between the village and town proves that neither past–present nor rural–urban dichotomies are in categorically opposed realms; metaphorically speaking, they are not in different countries.

Introduction

Each year, millions of Indonesians return to their ancestral and family homes to celebrate *Lebaran*, the end of Ramadhan, the Muslim fasting month. Not only Muslims, but all Indonesians have adopted this as

an annual ritual of reconnecting, remembering and recharging. This mass homecoming is known as *mudik Lebaran*. Typically, it involves travel from centres of employment or education, that is, cities and conurbations, where they aspire to make a life for themselves, back to rural villages or provincial towns where the family and friends that they left behind reside. The ritual typically manifests itself in chaotic traffic jams: buses, trains, motorbikes, ships and planes groan under the weight of those returning, each of whom carries presents for loved and revered ones as a proof of how much they have been missed and how much they are valued. The presents and gifts also go to show how successful the donors have been, which helps to justify their absence.

The significance of *mudik* points to how important the ties to one's village, region or province of origin continue to be, but *mudik* also clearly demonstrates that the rural–urban dichotomy remains an important fault-line dividing contemporary Indonesian society. The concern of this study is not to discuss this dichotomy but rather to explore the association of the two in terms of the social and cultural significance, and to call attention to how rurality challenges people's experience of modernity. By paying attention to these social and cultural aspects, the paper demonstrates how Indonesian people effectively engage with their rural and urban lives simultaneously. In this context, the paper is to make a contribution to studies of regional migration, as well as rural–urban interaction, which have not so far been widely studied by academics.[2],[3]

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2   Regional migration is also known as *merantau*. In a case study of the Minangkabau ethnic group in West Sumatra, Mochtar Naim (1971: 3–4) pointed out that those who voluntarily had left their homeland for cities throughout Indonesia (*merantau*) were, by and large, the skilled, the educated, the intelligent and in the economically productive age-bracket. At my research sites, especially considering the recent trends in migrating in search of work, the term *merantau* is much less used. More typical is to refer to this as *mengadu nasib* (looking for good fortune). The lower middle class, which has lower economic security, seems to comprise most of those who migrate.

3   Some studies (Lu, 2010; Rukmana, 2007; Firman, 2004; and Dieleman, 2011) have suggested that the rural–urban relation is fundamental in Indonesia. Firman (2004), for example, points out that socio economic dualism pervades Indonesian urban society and Dieleman (2011) addresses rural–urban issues through the lens of new town development.

David Lowenthal (1985: 39–52) has pointed out that the relation between the past and present is that the past has been the source of familiarity, guidance, identity, enrichment and escape from the present. The central idea of this paper is to suggest that this notion of a 'familiar past' is important to contemporary, urbanised Central Javanese, who, during the *Lebaran* holiday, return to their ancestral roots to retain a degree of autonomy from modernity, or to return to their 'disappearing past' as tourists. These two objectives represent separate and apparently contradictory aims: the former seeks to find an authentic past as a source of spiritual nourishment; the latter exploits the past as an object for consumption by transforming it to a 'different country'. In this context, the past is clearly not limited to the geography of its physical setting or territory, but rather, refers more to a sense of cultural entity, lifestyle and identity.

This analysis of the relation between the urban and the rural in terms of its social and cultural significance to urban dwellers returning to Central Java during the *Lebaran* season is a report on an ethnographic study (emphasising a participant–observer approach) of two villages in Central Java; Tegaldowo and Gandurejo in the Gemolong sub-district. Field work was conducted throughout August and September 2010 during the *Lebaran* season.

I should be very clear here to mention that the field work during the August–September 2010 *Lebaran* season was essentially home-ground anthropology. However, with regard to data collection, there is often a question about the objectivity of insider researchers who study their own society, which might lead to an inquiry about whether the values and attitudes of the society in question are being taken for granted. Nevertheless, anthropological study on home ground has value (Jackson, 1987: 8–11; Peirano, 1998; Kahotea, 2011) because it provides a grass-roots perspective (Lithman, 2004: 17). I argue that in relation to this study, the fact that I am a member of the society being investigated affords me familiarity with the day-to-day life and the social context of the people at my research sites and this gives me an understanding

of the unrecorded emotional and cultural significance of the process under investigation, which in turn enables me to identify and examine a unique aspect of Javanese life. Hence, the danger of taking things for granted is something I must be aware of. This article opens by describing peculiarities of the *Lebaran* celebration in Indonesia. It then goes on to present empirical data and concludes with analysis of research findings.

Peculiarities of Indonesian *Lebaran*

Mudik Lebaran is the annual homecoming for most Indonesians, similar to the American tradition of Thanksgiving, the Western Christmas and *Imlek* (Chinese New Year), during which people maintain an ethos of returning to or visiting family. There are at least two peculiarities that make *mudik Lebaran* in Indonesia different from other returning-to-family traditions. The first is that for Muslims and for non-Muslim minorities in Indonesia, the celebration of *Lebaran* is the occasion for everyone to ask forgiveness (*maaf lahir batin*): children of their parents, neighbours of neighbours and, on this day, business people of their customers. This tradition of asking forgiveness; a mixture of Islamic values (Sairin, 2005: 193) and Javanese and other regional customs, has become an Indonesian national tradition. Although *Lebaran* is usually associated with Islam, non-Muslims in Indonesia are also deeply engaged in this tradition. Research suggests that central to its longevity is the key motivation of reunion with one's parents and family and the revitalisation of ties to one's family's place of origin.

The second prominent characteristic of *mudik Lebaran* is with respect to the exodus before and the return from *Lebaran* homecoming. The urban exodus during the last days of Ramadhan marks the Indonesian *Lebaran* as different from *Lebaran* celebrations elsewhere in Muslim Southeast Asia, such as in Malaysia, Brunei, the southern Philippines and southern Thailand and even in the Middle Eastern Islamic countries. From year to year, those who do *merantau* (Naim, 1971; Lindquist, 2009) (a term that refers to the widespread practice of a

circular migration in which Indonesians leave home and travel to work elsewhere for a better standard of living) will return home (*mudik* or *pulang kampung*). Tens of millions of Indonesians leave Jakarta and other urban centres and embark on journeys that might take them thousands of kilometres away to their home towns or villages, using all kinds of public transport, private cars and motorbikes. In 2010, as in previous years, the *Lebaran* season traffic was the heaviest of the year. The Ministry of Transportation reporting on the traffic during *Lebaran* season in year 2010 estimated the following figures, per category, as shown in Table 1.[4]

Air transport: 4,043,629

Land transport: 5,447,046

Ferries: 2,845,890

Rail transport: 2,232,550

Sea transport: 449,106

Source: Posko angkutan tingkat nasional angkutan Lebaran terpadu tahun 2011

Table 1 is indicative of the traffic congestion that this mass exodus must necessarily create with thousands of travellers departing from cosmopolitan Jakarta and other conurbations to their home villages, generally at the same time. Months before *Lebaran*, bus and train tickets to various destinations are sold out. All this evinces the depth of passion

4   Online: http://www.dephub.go.id/lebaran/?Id=1 Accessed 2 January 2011.

and excitement of migrating people, who are constrained only by the supply of tickets, the availability of transport, and the designation of public holidays. The number of travellers, the time of their departures and their destinations, are not controlled; everybody focuses on their personal plans to return to the land of their home village or to their place of origin (*kampung halaman*) (Murphy, 2010: 121).

In 2010, *Lebaran* fell on 10–11 September, which allowed an aggregated holiday period (*libur bersama*) from 9 to 13 September. In Indonesia, this became the longest holiday period of the year. During *Lebaran* holidays, businesses in Jakarta and other urban centres typically shut down or greatly reduce staff and the services they provide. Educational institutions and offices are closed, industrial activities stop and press releases are put on hold. Everything stops as everybody, including the non-Muslim minorities and Indonesians all around the world, celebrates *Lebaran* and the Indonesian diaspora feels oriented towards Indonesia.

Images of *mudik Lebaran*, an interaction of tradition and cosmopolitanism

If we are to understand properly this annual migratory behaviour, it is of course important to keep in mind the modern images that have become associated with *mudik Lebaran*, such as the national public holidays, congested traffic and the ritual of mass consumption that present-giving generates. There is also the increasing importance of electronic devices, such as landline and mobile telephones, that allow voice and written communications; and social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, which turn communication into an interactive dialogue to help keep people in touch.

However, despite the popularity and the power of such technologies in Indonesia at large, the tradition of *mudik Lebaran* is founded on the need to go home in person to ask forgiveness from relatives, friends and neighbours and meeting face-to-face remains obligatory. Sairin (2005) argues that this is because of the belief that asking forgiveness from

others may only be done by asking in person. People go from door to door around their neighbourhood and shake hands (*Halal bihalal*) with past or previous neighbours whom they might see only once a year. Particular to my research sites, Catholics also took part in this tradition of asking forgiveness. Five to eight Catholics who lived in the same neighbourhood lined up outside the door of the local mosque and waited for their Muslim neighbours to finish performing their Eid rituals. Afterwards, men and women, looking natural and sincere, shook hands with those waiting, some of the women kissed each other on the cheek, and although several men were seen not to shake hands with women (for reasons of religious belief), this tradition of asking forgiveness was conducted within a family setting.

A special element of this tradition, unique to Central Java, is the *sungkeman* tradition, which is usually held on the second day of the *Lebaran*. The word *sungkeman* (derived from *sungkem*) refers to the act or custom of showing respect to one's parents by getting down on one's knees and bowing one's head instead of shaking hands (Sudiarno, 2003). It derives from a tradition associated with Javanese royalty, and this undoubtedly is an influential source in establishing the popularity of the 'forgiving tradition' in Java. For instance, the family of Sunarto, who still carry Solonese royal blood, held the traditional *sungkeman* ceremony on the second day of the *Lebaran*.[5] When interviewed, he mentioned that for Javanese who still hold a royal family ethos, *tradisi sungkeman* is still well maintained.

Coming back to one's place of origin, however, is also a way of demonstrating success. Returning in cars, driven by one's chauffeur, for example, or by plane or an executive train is an expression of success, prestige and, demonstrably, of modernity. For lower classes of society, the overcrowded bus or train is a choice of necessity. Typical of their experiences is that of a 25-year-old woman who recounted her agonising experience of queuing for eleven hours in Jakarta's Jatinegara railway

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5   To preserve the anonymity of my research participants and respect their confidences, the names mentioned in this paper are not real.

station to get an economy-fare train ticket home to Solo. When she finally got on board, she had to sit for fifteen hours in an overcrowded train to get to her village, Gemolong, which is 477 kilometres from Jakarta. Working as a housemaid in Bekasi, a modern suburb of Jakarta, where she earned Rp500,000 (US$55) per month, she was returning home to be with her two daughters whom she had left behind in the village, and for whose future she had gone to the city to work. In this case then, the home-coming tradition was reversed; the mother was returning to her children because economic imperatives had forced her to leave. To her, and to people like her in a similar economic position, whatever the rural village still represents, the city is a destination of hope.

Regardless of their economic circumstances, going home at present is obligatory for the persons who have left and is often expressed in extreme, even exaggerated form, as in the case of a motorbike traveller interviewed. To reduce the expense of travelling, he chose a motorbike as his transport. He travelled the 477 kilometres to his home with plastic bags stuffed with food and clothes and other *oleh-oleh* (gifts) tied to the motorbike, which had a wooden board extending from the bike's seat to fit extra luggage. For this young man, who works in Jakarta in a glue factory, it was his fifth *Lebaran* trip by motorbike. This time, however, he did not ride his own motorbike but borrowed one from his *sobat* (good friend). He did not directly admit to it but the reason for borrowing his friend's motorbike became clear when he mentioned that the Honda Tiger (a brand of Japanese motorbike) made him look more impressive.

> I prefer riding a motorbike. It is very inconvenient (*sek-sekan*) to take a bus or train. A motorbike is much more economical and of course practical. We also use it when we travel to visit our relatives in the village. We do not need to spend extra money for that. I went home alone, so it was no problem. I took a rest twice, in Cirebon and Pekalongan, for an hour or so at each stop. I rode the Tiger, so it was really fun and made me feel happy. (Interview, 14 September 2010)

Of equal importance for *mudik Lebaran* is appearance; it plays a key and immediate role by symbolising returnees' achievement of success and it also demonstrates the modernity achieved by leaving home. New clothing is worn, the use of electronic devices, such as mobile phones and iPods are openly displayed to demonstrate familiarity with 'global modernity'. When used spontaneously in the home village, it demonstrates their freedom from an identity attached to what was their former village home. In Indonesia the village is associated with informality, poverty, and the retention of rural traditions in an urban setting (Rukmana, 2007). They are considered places that are on the margin, backward and less developed. Thus, although coming home to confirm the values of family and tradition, the returnees are also concerned to demonstrate their distance, their separation from the past, their modernity and their capacity to break from tradition and bring about change in their lives.

The second dominant theme, which is closely intertwined with the display of clothing and gadgets, is a shift of language. Language is important here because in the vast mix of ethnic, linguistic and regional differences that makes up contemporary Indonesia, language or accent or word choice is the easiest way to identify a person's region of origin. In this context, the Indonesian language or *Bahasa Indonesia* represents cosmopolitanism and modernity, the language of trans-regional mobility. Javanese, in this context, becomes a regional language, and is seen as rural or backward, tied to place, to immobility and tradition. In the status stakes the most prestigious linguistic signals are those linked to the dialect of Jakarta, commonly referred to as *bahasa gaul* (Hanan, 2008: 54–69). This is illustrated in an interesting case of a young couple who proudly informed me that they have a five-year-old son who still retains his Jakarta dialect. They had migrated to Jakarta to make a living, but after experiencing the difficult commute from Bekasi (on the periphery of Jakarta) for several years, the mother finally decided to return to her village. From my informal interview (*ngobrol-ngobrol)* with this woman, Siti, it became obvious that she was upset that her son

was mixing village Javanese in his speech, showing signs that he was gradually adopting Javanese speech and loosing his Jakarta 'edge'.

> Hhhh, [sigh] we live in the village now. Our language has become mixed. It is sad. My son said *moh-moh* instead of *enggak mau* (I do not want it). What is that? His Indonesian is becoming uncool lately. Heheheh . . . [laughing]. (Interview, September 2010)

Siti's case reveals that in rural Central Java, using the Indonesian language is an expression of modernity, although for some it is a matter of practical necessity as well. From this perspective, speaking *Bahasa Indonesia* instead of Javanese is one expression of becoming modern. This observation applies equally to radio and television in Surakarta and Yogyakarta; as operators from the representative technologies of modernity, announcers try their very best to speak like Jakartans in order not to be considered *ndeso* (backward and village-like). This suggests that although *mudik Lebaran* demonstrates that in Java urban and rural life remain inseparable; there nevertheless, exists a distinct 'fault-line' dividing contemporary Indonesian society. Being able to demonstrate an association with the centre of Indonesian modernity, by speaking with a Jakartan accent, or being Jakartanised in terms of behaviour and dress is to demonstrate pride in the symbols of modernity, and by implication, distance from a rural, unmodernised past.

The Political Meanings of *Mudik Lebaran*

Besides functioning as an opportunity for family reunions, and for successful and less successful rural emigrants to show off, there are at least three more practical public functions served by *mudik Lebaran*. Most immediately, it serves to underpin the psychological and physical hardship that Indonesia's modern economy has imposed on a nation that statistically remains predominantly rural. Shirley Christie (2010) has reported that where more than 30 per cent of Indonesia's population is between 19 and 24 years old, the youth unemployment is between

7 and 8 per cent. As a consequence, migration for work has become increasingly significant in its intensity and its diversity over recent decades (Morawska, 2001; Okólski, in Wallace and Stola, 2002: 105). Jakarta becomes a perfect destination for these unemployed young villagers because it offers such an array of all possible kinds of formal and informal jobs catering to all levels of aspiration and skill to Indonesians from anywhere in the archipelago and of whatever social class. On the other hand, *Lebaran* homecomers open a way for their relatives who are also jobless in the villages. The pulling factors to them are the glamour and lure of malls, the taste of modern cuisines, the promise of work and income and the pleasure of modern recreation.[6] They hold out to their village relatives not simply the promise of material and economic gain, but also the hope of a different way of life (Warouw, 2008: 105; Hadiz, 1997: 124). For a young man I spoke to in the village of Tegaldowo, the 'urban' represents modernity which becomes an aspiration and a future (Warouw, 2008).

> It is better for me to go to Jakarta. I do not want to work (*macul*) in the paddy field (*sawah*) . . . There is no good income [in doing that]. It actually will make my skin black, heheh . . . I would accept any kind of job [in Jakarta]. First, I will help my aunt in the market (*pasar*). Later, I will see what I can do next. But to stay in the village and work in the paddy field is my last choice. (Interview statement, September 2010).

According to this, the idea of modernity is similar to the logic behind the proponents of modernisation theory, with its linear model of development (for example, Lerner, 1958; Rostow, 1960): leaving the agrarian life in favour of a modern industrialised and high-technology life.

Even though the core functions of *mudik* are to ask forgiveness and to enable family gatherings (*silaturohim*), as Fauzi (2010) states, *Lebaran*

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6   Pizza, french fries, steak, burgers and chicken nuggets are foods that are widely noted as modern food for most of my research participants.

is also the perfect time to *unjuk gigi,* that is, to show off. In his view, returnees feel that they have a 'social responsibility' to demonstrate their success by showing their new found wealth, displaying their clothing and possessions, and looking good. One interviewee, a 57-year-old man, proudly informed me that his three children drove their own cars home for *Lebaran*. It is not difficult to see how owning a car becomes a contemporary symbol of wealth and modernity that serves to bolster social prestige, particularly in the Indonesian countryside. It reflects an urban lifestyle and the owner's success and, as anywhere else in the world, social status is confirmed, if not determined, by material possessions. Some returnees admitted that using rented cars for *mudik Lebaran* has become a common practice to achieve this recognition. Car ownership or even a superior brand of motorbike can significantly increase someone's social status in the village where status is usually measured by material possessions. Conversely, for many Indonesians who choose not to return home for various social and economic reasons, the idea of *mudik* often stirs feelings of *malu*, which roughly means shame or embarrassment (Boellstorff and Lindquist; 2006: 6). They then experience a sense of feeling *malu* in their urban neighbourhood for not doing *mudik* and will feel embarrassed in front of those of their co-workers who did return home. As many of my research participants mentioned; 'returning home for *Lebaran* is a moral and cultural obligation that one must carry out to the best of one's ability'.

Consumptive behaviour is also clearly seen during this homecoming. Some informants revealed that *Lebaran* is the most extravagant and expensive time of the year. Relating to this, there is one telling instance: an informant, who earns Rp1,000,000 (US$110) a month only, mentioned that she had spent Rp2,000,000 (US$220) on clothes and gifts for her family in the village. She admitted that *Lebaran* is the one month of the year when she spends the most money. This suggests that for many, managing the social cost of an ideal *mudik Lebaran* is an impossible goal. However, this informant looked happy enough to be able to achieve the amount she did and this seems to confirm Wolf's

findings in relation to rural Javanese, women factory workers, who saw their work as a way of increasing their buying power so they could conform to a modern style (Wolf, 1992, cited in Warouw, 2008: 193).

The third meaning *mudik* has is that of a touristic moment. After having been buried under the weight of routine jobs, the *Lebaran* homecoming takes on the semblance of tourism for those whose ancestors are from villages. The rich, in particular, described later as the ones who are being spiritually exhausted, are initially described as tourists seeking relaxation from the real world by visiting the unsophisticated, primitive past of their ancestors. They are like tourists in that they leave behind their air-conditioned lives, the inevitable annual flooding, urban crime, and the reality of making money. This return home might provide a reminder of their past, the nostalgia of a much slower, carefree and happier rural life. For example, Moel, a father of two children, told me how tired he was from the industrial, capitalist disciplines and the general hardship and pressure of work in Jakarta resulting from the very bad air pollution, high crime rate, daily traffic jams and high living costs. In Warouw's (2008) study of women factory workers in Tangerang, a leading manufacturing centre close to Jakarta, he describes the high stress experienced by such urban workers who have established a relatively permanent urban existence far from their rural homeland, as a feeling of being chased (*keteteran*). To use Warouw's words, the practice of *mudik Lebaran* has become a strategy for those urbanised people for managing their alienation in the urban centres. Romanticising the thought of *mudik* and maintaining a close connection with their village of origin provides feelings of emotional security. In his study, those urban migrant workers imagine the countryside, their place of origin, as a place of natural purity; of rice fields (*sawah*), clean rivers and peace of mind (Warouw, 2008: 108–109). He has further noted that the practice of *mudik* helps preserve the ideal of rural nature and a peaceful life, despite the fact that in the countryside, rural development has diminished people's experience of nature and replaced it with urban-centred themes of modernisation (Warouw, 2008: 109).

Returning home, however, does involve a degree of adjustment. I observed that at the very beginning of their stay in the village, returnees usually grumbled about food and the lack of the facilities they were used to in the cities, such as air-conditioning and modern entertainment. They also preferred to speak *Bahasa Indonesia* rather than to revert to the intricacies of Javanese. But after some time, homecomers began to enjoy the social integration and the genuine family life in the village. Here they had a higher degree of social respect, which they rarely find in cities and, as they reintegrated with village society, gradually reverted to modes of speaking in which this respect was given and received.

Conclusion

From the findings I have presented, I would argue that *Lebaran* homecomers' experiences of the different world of their present urban life, with its different frames of meaning, does not significantly suppress their longing for, and engagement, with their former village's frames of meaning. The Jakarta returnees who originate from the villages of Tegaldowo and Gandurejo, where most of my field work was conducted, experience this type of 'simultaneity' in their lives. Although they are embedded in the social life of their current homes in the city, they are still intimately connected to their ancestral villages through the annual practice of *mudik*. In this regard, the practice of *mudik Lebaran* inverts the common understanding that the line between urban and rural is delineated independently. As I have observed, migrants do not have feelings of displacement that strip away their rural identity or their past. In this regard, they could even negotiate double or multiple identities. These issues became important for their sense of who they are. During their short visit in the village, they become again members of the village community by participating in village festivals such as *Bakdo Ketupat* or *Bakdo Sawal,* a Javanese tradition held one week after *Lebaran*. These social and cultural practices become what Michael Leaf (cited in

Tirtosudarmo, 2010: 163) terms the 'interaction zone' where urban and rural activities are juxtaposed.

Thus, the picture of *mudik Lebaran* sketched above suggests that urban–rural affinity is well managed. The cultural tradition of *mudik Lebaran* provides those who return with regular contact with their mother village (Lundström-Burghoorn, 1981: 67), with their rural identity and with the place in which they continue to belong. These facts do not support the notion that social and cultural change follows a linear path from a traditional past towards a modernised present. Referring to Lowenthal's (1985) idea of the relations between the past and present, wherein the past has been the source of familiarity, guidance, identity, enrichment and escape from the present, *mudik Lebaran* becomes a useful lens that captures the way in which urban migrants zoom back and forth between their past and present country, in order to continue managing the intimate interaction between their rural and urban lives.

My argument here shares much common ground with that put forward by Schiller (2005) and Swazey (2008) who, in their study of transnational migration, have highlighted the concept of simultaneity. Schiller argues that it is important to understand that, in living as a migrant, it is possible to become incorporated in a locality, its economy, its institutions and its forms of cultural production, while at the same time living within social networks that are intimately tied elsewhere (Schiller, 2005: 159). Swazey, writing about an Indonesian immigrant population in the Seacoast Region of southern New Hampshire, suggests that those Indonesian international migrants or transmigrants also live within two systems and that transnational experiences facilitate a reconnection with aspects of home from afar. Although they are embedded in the institutional, political and social life of their current home in the United States, they are still intimately connected to Indonesia through kinship and other social relations (Swazey, 2008: 62). The new home of the present in an urban environment does not strip away their past or rural life.

This study shows how urbanised *Lebaran* returnees are in fact living simultaneously within dual cultural and social systems: the rural and the urban, the traditional and the modern, the past and the present. As suggested by Joseph Gusfield (1967: 351) in his study of modern India, the relations between the traditional and the modern do not necessarily involve displacement, conflict or mutual exclusivity. Tradition and modernity form the bases of ideologies and movement in which such polar opposites are converted into aspirations. In her study of urban city planning in Australia, Kate Murphy (2009) situates 'rurality' as a fundamental aspect of Australian modernity and argues that the rural is just as significant a reference point as the urban in discourses about modernity. She explains that 'rurality' operated as shorthand for past certainties, for static and solid truths among an elite who displayed an inclination to look backwards, an impulse which helped to define their modernity (Murphy, 2009: 125). The same is true in this particular study. Accordingly, it must be emphasised that the binaries of the rural and the urban, the traditional and the modern, the past and the present, are neutralised within this *mudik Lebaran* setting. More precisely, this cultural practice even represents and exemplifies intimate conversations between these categories, which are widely believed to be structurally opposed in the common linear theory of social change. For these homecomers, the village life—their past—is not then a bygone age. It continues to be associated with their urban lives and entangled with the present. As Lowenthal (1985: 224) put it, these migrants want to make the past present and to make the distant near. The paper finally suggests that the continual interplay between the village and town proves neither past and present nor rural and urban are in categorically opposed realms (in different countries).

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Social Networks and the Live Reef Food Fish Trade: Examining Sustainability

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Introduction

The primary threat to nature and people today comes from centralising and monopolising power and control. Not until diversity is made the logic of production will there be a chance for sustainability, justice and peace. Cultivating and conserving diversity is no luxury in our times: it is a survival imperative.

Vandana Shiva

The term 'live reef food fish' (LRFF) refers to fish that are kept alive to preserve freshness until they can be cooked. Live reef food fishing is one of the important industries that provide incomes for many coastal and small-island communities. Johannes and Riepen (1995) estimated that Indonesia supplied half the market demand for live reef food fish for Singapore and Hong Kong, and Cesar (1996) estimated that the export of LRFF from Indonesia is between 10,000 and 20,000 tonnes per year (Bentley, 1997). One of the primary centres of the LRFF trade is the Spermonde Archipelago, South Sulawesi Province, Indonesia.

Different techniques and tools are used in live reef food fish fishing. Long-line fishing was the favoured method used by the fishermen during the beginning period of the industry in the Spermonde Archipelago in the mid-1980s, despite this method's relatively low catch rate. Some fishermen used a baited fish trap made from bamboo called a *bubu*,

which had a better catch rate. As well, many of them started to use cyanide to stun the fish, a technique that became popular because it increased their catch, despite the use of cyanide being illegal and it being a threat to the ecosystem.

On one hand, using cyanide increases the size of a fisherman's catch and consequent income, especially at times when there is a high demand from Hong Kong for fish, for example, when the Chinese New Year is celebrated. On the other hand, using cyanide has been reported to be threatening the ecosystem because it has led to overfishing. Overfishing, and the destruction of reefs, has led to declines in the populations of particular species of fish (Pet-Soede and Erdmann , 1998; Mous et al., 2000) and in the medium and long run this threatens the economic wellbeing of these fishing communities. Several species of LRFF that are caught for the commercial trade are on the Red List of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN).[1] On the IUCN's list, for example, are Humphead Wrasse, which is categorised as endangered; Spotted Coral Trout as vulnerable; Leopard Coral Trout as near threatened; and High-finned Grouper as vulnerable. Clearly, the threat of overfishing is present.

Studies of the effect on reef ecosystems of the use of cyanide in fishing have been carried out and reported by many researchers. Mous and colleagues (Mous et al., 2006) reported that the effect of cyanide fishing on the coral cover is not as threatening as usually assumed, compared with the deleterious effects from the use of explosives for fishing and with the bleaching of coral caused by global climate change. However, the depletion of fish stocks because of excessive exploitation resulting from the use of cyanide in fishing is more worrying (Mous et al., 2000).

Different projects have been established to help conserve reef ecosystems. The Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Project (COREMAP) was established in 1998 (and has three phases for a total period of 15 years) and is aimed at protecting, rehabilitating and

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1   To see the list, go to http:// www.iucnredlist.org

sustaining the utilisation of coral reefs and associated ecosystems in Indonesia. This USD18,000,000 project is funded through a loan scheme from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Global Environmental Facility and the Asian Development Bank. COREMAP is aware of the importance of community-based Marine Protected Areas management; therefore, it has designed its program to involve communities in establishing such areas (Baitoningsih, 2009). However, Baitoningsih also concluded that the establishment of No Take Areas (NTA) for conservation, one of COREMAP's goals, was not understood by the communities, which resulted in their ineffective implementation (Baitoningsih, 2009).

The LRFF trade in the Spermonde Archipelago for the Hong Kong market started in the late 1980s with the establishment of a trade partnership between an entrepreneurial boat captain and a Makassar-based businessman, who exported lobster to Hong Kong (Fougères, 2009). At the Spermonde Archipelago, the LRFF trade operates through a commodity-chain network based on credit and debt and involving many agents (Meereboer, 1998; Fougères, 2005; Fougères, 2009). Commercial and employment relations in this commodity-chain network follow the patronage system that is common in South Sulawesi communities. These relations are often more of the type that has been described as that between patron and client (Meereboer, 1998).

> The patron–client relationship can be characterised generally as an unequal (but theoretically non-binding) relationship between a superior (that is, a patron or leader) and a number of inferiors (that is, clients, retainers, or followers), based on an asymmetric exchange of services, where the de facto dependence on the patron of the clients, whose unpaid services may include economic obligations, paid or unpaid work, armed service, political support and other services, is counterbalanced by the role the patron plays as a leading figure for all the clients and by the assistance, including the monetary loans and protection, he or she provides when necessary (Pelras, 2000).

Locally, this relation is known as *punggawa–sawi*. Of this, Pelras states: 'When the patronage relationship is not primarily set in a political context, but is primarily economic in character, the terms used in South Sulawesi are *punggawa* for the patron and *sawi* for the client' (Pelras, 2000).

It has been found that this patron–client or *punggawa–sawi* relation protects and sustains the practice of cyanide fishing because the *punggawa*s, who want to be considered reliable and to continue to have a supply of fish, are willing to protect their *sawi*s' fishing operations by bribing the police. Meereboer reported similar cases of bribery of the police by *punggawa*s *darat* on one of the islands in the Spermonde Archipelago: the extent or likelihood of bribery of officials is related to the degree of closeness of *punggawa*s *darat* to their clients (Meereboer, 1998: 269). In most cases, conservationists, bureaucrats and development workers stigmatise the fishermen and the *punggawa*s *darat* as being responsible for cyanide use. In this case, the fishermen are the objects of law enforcement but fishermen and *punggawa*s *darat* are the objects of police extortion. Celia Lowe reported similar attitudes to the Sama communities in the Togean Islands, which also depend on LRFF fishing and trade (Lowe, 2000).

Celia Lowe argued that the practice of using cyanide for fishing, which results in biophysical damage as well as damage to humans, could not be logically explained as the independent acts of a few misguided fishermen. She stated that the 'Togean people are caught within the matted fibres of market, law, bureaucracy, and identity that determine the patterns of who will fish with cyanide, who will profit the most by it and who will suffer the consequences' (Lowe, 2000). Erdmann argues that corruption is the reason behind the lack of law enforcement against cyanide fishing in Indonesia. The average coastal policeman views a boat carrying cyanide as a source of 'extracurricular funding' rather than a problem of law enforcement (Erdmann, 2001).

The findings of our empirical studies from 2007 to 2010 suggest that the use of cyanide by LRFF fishermen is still prevalent in the Spermonde Archipelago. According to the fishermen and the *punggawa*s *darat*,

LRFF catches are decreasing, which pushes the fishermen to exploit other fishing grounds, mostly in the reef area of Bone Bay and Kendari in Southeast Sulawesi. This state of affairs was also reported by Meereboer about a decade earlier, although without precise information on the location of new fishing grounds (Meereboer, 1998). There is a strong probability that the practice of using cyanide has spread to the new fishing grounds.

Sustainability in LRFF fishing and trade faces big challenges; on one hand, there is a lack of integrated effort, which goes deep into the problems of fisheries management in Indonesia, although there are some conservation and development programs supported by government, non-government organisations (NGO) and various stakeholders. On the other hand, there is a lack of reliable support for research that would provide more reliable information on the state of the ecosystem, that is, the size of fish stocks and reef conditions. In this paper, the framework of sustainability proposed by Norberg and Cumming will be used.

> Sustainability is defined as the equitable, ethical and efficient use of social and natural resources. Equitable correlates with equitability among people with different economic and social status, from different geographical area of the earth or between today and future generation. Ethical means in concordance with today's (and future) human values, and efficient means that any decision made should be based on providing the least resource-greedy solution constrained by the above criteria (Norberg and Cumming, 2008).

There is a need to examine the sustainability of LRFF fishing and trade by delving deeper to find the real reasons why such unsustainable fishing practices are so widespread. The lack of understanding of the social dynamics underlying the LRFF fishing and trade, and the limited biological data and information, are the two main obstacles in the efforts to promote sustainable fishing practices.

This paper examines sustainability of reef fishing using the above framework of analysis by focusing on investigating the social networks

underlying the LRFF fishing and trade in the Spermonde Archipelago. In examining the sustainability of LRFF fishing and trade, this paper focuses on two questions: first, to what extent do social networks support the fishing of, and trade in, LRFF in the Spermonde Archipelago? And, second, to what extent do such networks influence sustainability in LRFF fishing?

This paper employs social network analysis in examining sustainability in the LRFF fishing industry in the Spermonde Archipelago. It is argued that understanding the dynamics of the social networks, which are a result of interactions between different agents with different interests influenced by diverse circumstances (among them are the market, the local social structures, climate variability, biological conditions), is important in coastal fisheries management in general. It is the purpose of this paper to portray the social networks in LRFF fishing in the Spermonde Archipelago and to demonstrate how sustainability in LRFF fishing and trade can be understood through an analysis of these networks. It is the objective of this paper to provide better frameworks for promoting sustainability in reef fishery, particularly in Indonesia, through the elaboration and examination of social networks. In this regard, this paper also aims at providing tools for better coastal and fisheries management.

Methods

The material for this paper has been collected through fieldwork, using various social science methods, by interdisciplinary research groups comprising researchers and students from different disciplines. Since 2007, a team of researchers led by social scientists has worked on issues relevant to the achievement of more sustainable development of Indonesian coastal socioecological systems (Glaser et al., 2010).

The main study area is the coral-reef-based ecosystem of the Spermonde Archipelago, South Sulawesi, Indonesia, which is between 119°6'52" E and 4°52'32" S, extends about 60 kilometres offshore, and comprises around 75 islands with fringing reefs as well as a large number of barrier

and submerged patch reefs (Krause et al., unpublished manuscript). This area is broadly known as the centre of LRFF fishing in the eastern part of Indonesia and is supported by its proximity to the city of Makassar on the Sulawesi mainland, which is the nearest gate to international markets.

The author has been involved in research that includes two, joint, ship-based research excursions to the islands of the archipelago, along with a team of about 20 Indonesian and German researchers and students of anthropology, sociology, geography, political science, planning, fisheries economics, philosophy, communication studies and reef ecology. It has been a problem-focused, interdisciplinary cooperation, which took place in March and May 2009, and involved the active participation of local residents and resource users. Fieldwork with researchers and students from the Anthropology Department, University of Hassanuddin, Makassar, started at the end of 2007 on the islands of Barrang Lompo, Barrang Caddi, Bone Tambung, Badi, Sarappo Lompo and Karanrang. The fieldwork included ethnography, role-playing games, participatory mapping, semi-structured interviews and in-depth interviews with members of local communities. There were interviews also with Makassar-based fish traders, government officials, university researchers and non-government organisations that are involved in LRFF fishing and trade issues.

At the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010, the research included social-network mapping in reef fishery (LRFF fishing and coral and ornamental fishery). There has been growing attention and interest in examining better natural resources management using social networks analysis (Lauber et al., 2008; Marin and Berkes, 2010; Crona et al., 2010; Sandström and Rova, 2010; Adger et al., 2006). Lauber and colleagues reported that there is high value in tailoring strategies for involving stakeholders to meet different needs during a collaborative, community-based natural resource management project (Lauber et al., 2008). Borgatti proposes that there are at least two interesting aspects to be examined and elaborated in social network analysis: the types of ties, which correlate with the understanding of dyadic links between two agents; and the importance of structure, which correlates with the

importance of the position of agents in the networks, where it can be seen as the function of patterns of relations among the members (the agents) or, at the individual level, the agent's outcomes and future characteristics can be seen as dependent, in part, on its position in the network structure (Borgatti, 2009). Taking these papers into account, this paper proposes the use of social networks analysis in fisheries management, especially in identifying the interests of various agents in networks in LRFF fishing and trade. In the network analysis literature, a network is formally defined as a collection of nodes and a collection of connections that join pairs of nodes, or in the language of mathematics, it is called a graph (Bohman, 2009). Hereafter, this paper will use the term 'agent' to represent the member of a social network that would be defined formally as a node.

Figure 1

Map of Indonesia

Figure 2

Study Site, Spermonde Archipelago, Indonesia

Understanding the whole picture of LRFF fishing and trade was the first step in the research and was done through literature studies as well as interviews with anthropologists, fisheries economists and coral scientists, all of whom have extensive experience of similar issues. The research is supported by observations of fishing practices and ethnographic fieldwork, as well as boat excursions involving people from different backgrounds.

Data on social networks were collected through fieldwork and interviews that used the snowball sampling approach. After obtaining data on *punggawa–sawi* systems, it is important to continue to identify which islands are the 'centres of activity' of LRFF fishing and trade, and to focus on collecting social network data (connections and relations) on particular islands. Data were also collected through interviews with Makassar-based entrepreneurs, who are known as *bos* [boss] by the

island communities and who own the storage ponds where fish are kept before they are sent to Jakarta and Hong Kong.

Results

This section elaborates findings from research on social networks in LRFF fishing and trade in the Spermonde Archipelago. First, there is a description of the fish species traded and how they are commoditised because it is important to the explanation of the social networks involved. It will be followed by an elaboration of the various types of social networks in LRFF fishing and trade, which constitute the LRFF supply chain.

The LRFF trade in the Spermonde Archipelago includes different species (see Table 1). Reports by TRAFFIC East Asia, an NGO that monitors the species traffic, has identified at least nine species of reef fish that have become commodities in Hong Kong. Our work has found that at least five of them are from the Spermonde Archipelago. Recently we were able to identify three more species that have become commodities: Red-flushed Cod (*Aethaloperca logaa*; local name, *sunu kwaci*), Spotted Coral Trout (*Plectropomus maculates*; local name, *sunu bone*) and *Plectropomus pessuliferus* (local name, *sunu merah*).

Table 1

Reef fish from the Spermonde Archipelago traded in Hong Kong

Local name	*Indonesian*	*English*	*Latin*
Napoleon	Napoleon	Napoleon Wrasse, Humphead Wrasse	*Cheilinus undulatus*
Sunu tikus	Kerapu tikus	Polkadot Grouper, High-finned Grouper, Barramundi Cod	*Cromileptes altivelis*

Sunu merah	Kerapu merah/sunu merah	Coral Trout, Leopard Grouper	*Plectropomus leopardus*
Sunu merah	Sunu pappa	Polkadot Cod	*Plectropomus areolatus*
Sunu merah	Kerapu merah/sunu merah	Violet Coral Trout	*Plectropomus pessuliferus*
Sunu kwaci	Sunu kwaci	Red-flushed Cod	*Aethaloperca logaa*
Sunu macan/ kerapu lumpur	Sunu macan	Tiger Grouper	*Epinephelus fuscoguttatus*
Sunu bone	Sunu bone	Spotted Coral Trout	*Plectropomus maculatus*

Reef fish as commodities

The LRFF that are fished and traded are categorised according to their weight, which differentiate their prices. The weight categories are 'baby', which includes all fish with a weight less than 0.6 of a kilogram (some *punggawa*s set the maximum weight for this class at 0.3 kilograms), 'super', which includes all fish with a weight between 0.6 and 1.2 kilograms, and 'ekoran' (which in English means 'individual') or 'up', which includes all fish with a weight of more than 1.2 kilograms. Pricing rules apply for these groupings, which also vary among different island-based *punggawa*s. Fish categorised as baby are priced on weight or individually, it depends on the *punggawa*. Fish in the super category fetch the highest price in terms of unit weight. Fish in the ekoran or up category are priced individually. The prices and the weight standards vary slightly according to the different *punggawa*s and *bos*es. Table 2 shows the fish categories and pricing rules of one of the island-based *punggawa*s. Different pricing and sizing rules will be elaborated in the next section. These rules are one of the reasons for any decision by island-based *punggawa*s to change their *bos*; they look for a *bos* who is not only

generous in providing social security and support but also in enabling them to have a higher income through flexible sizing and pricing rules.

Table 2

Fish categories and the prices set by island-based *punggawa*s for various reef fish species traded

	Baby (IDR/kg)	*Super* (IDR/kg)	*Ekoran* (IDR/individual)
Sunu tikus	75,000	220,000	350,000
Sunu karang	55,000	130,000	180,000 – 250,000
Sunu bone	35,000	60,000	75,000
Napoleon			350,000

The fish are caught and traded through commodity supply-chain networks, involving different agents, from the islands to the market in Hong Kong. There are three types of networks in LRFF fishing and trade: the fishing network, concerned with catching the fish; the marketing network, concerned with the transport of fish to the next agent in the chain, and the prosecution insurance network, which is to guarantee that those in the trade do not face prosecution for using cyanide, the use of which is illegal.

Fishing network

The fishing network in the LRFF trade consists of two types of agents, the *punggawa* (the patron) and the *sawi* (the client), which together form the social structure called *punggawa–sawi*. The *punggawa*s provide fishing boats and have access to information about the demand: the *sawi*s are the fishermen who sell their catches to their patrons. This structure survives through the traditional or institutional debt arrangements.

As explained previously, LRFF fishing in the Spermonde Archipelago is very much subject to the monsoonal climate. During the 'west season' [*musim barat*], from October to March each year, fishermen cannot go fishing because the sea is so dangerous. They have limited capital and their indebtedness to their *punggawa* causes them to become dependent on him. During the 'east season' [*musim timur*] from April to September, fishermen are able to fish again but they have to sell their fish to their *punggawa* at a lower than market price. The *punggawa* provides boats for his fishermen, the capital needed for fishing and, as well, provides them with a subsistence income and security, especially during the west season (the off season). The local communities sometimes refer to the *punggawa*s who live on the islands (although some live in Makassar) as *punggawa darat* [land *punggawa*], to differentiate them from a *punggawa laut* [sea patron] who is the captain of a bigger boat (locally known as a *joloro'*). The term for client of a *punggawa darat* is *paboya*, which means 'fishing fleet', so *paboya* can refer to one fisherman or to a group of fishermen in the same boat led by a *punggawa laut*. A *punggawa darat* maintains control over his *paboya* by keeping them indebted to him.

There are two types of boat used for fishing; each type corresponds to the mode of fishing and the fishing gear used, as well as defining the social networks. The small boat, called a *lepa-lepa*, is usually made of fibreglass and equipped with a small-capacity motor (24 or so horsepower) and is worked daily by a single fisherman. Fishermen who use a *lepa-lepa* forage in proximity to their home island in the Spermonde Archipelago because the boat's fuel tank has limited capacity. The boat and its equipment are on loan from the *punggawa darat* to his *sawi*, once they agree that they have a business partnership. A fibreglass *lepa-lepa* and its equipment cost the *punggawa darat* around IDR7,000,000 (USD700). It is the responsibility of a *punggawa* to provide his *sawi* (fisherman) with a subsistence allowance, which for this type of boat is around IDR100,000 (USD10) per fishing trip, and is used for fishing gear (see Table 3). The fishermen have to provide their own petrol, food, coffee and cigarettes, and for these needs they are able to borrow some more, about IDR50,000

(USD5) a day. They use a hand line but the catch rate is very low; to catch one or two fish might take three, sometimes more, days. Each day fisherman start early in the morning, around 5 o'clock, and return to their island at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon. They are obliged to sell the fish they catch to their *punggawa darat* at their agreed price (which is usually lower than the price they might get from other *punggawa*s *darat*). A *punggawa darat* deducts the amount of any loan repayment from the payment to the fisherman.

During *musim barat* or the west season, when the seas are rough, some *punggawa*s *darat* with his *sawi*s forage farther afield to other fishing grounds, like the reef areas of Kendari, South-east Sulawesi or Sinjai at Bone Bay, South Sulawesi. A *punggawa darat* takes his *sawi*s and their *lepa-lepa*s in his big carrier boat (there might be up to 30 *lepa-lepa*s) and sails to farther fishing grounds beyond Spermonde. This foraging farther afield is known as *sawakung* and refers to a venture in which a *punggawa darat* invests an amount of money (it has been observed that the amount of investment varies between IDR40,000,000 and IDR100,000,000 (USD4000 and USD10,000) to send his fleet to new fishing grounds. *Sawakung* might take several months, usually starts in October or November, and continues until February or March when the fleets return to Spermonde.

The *punggawa darat* is responsible for all his *sawi*s' needs, which include food, cigarettes and petrol, and they also provide cash for the families of his *sawi*s, who remain at home. Each *sawi*'s family receives around IDR1,000,000 to IDR2,000,000 (USD100 to USD200) during this *sawakung* period. However, it is also known that *sawakung* is also practiced in the proximity of the Spermonde Archipelago, especially during the *musim timur* or the east season. The favourite areas for *sawakung* in the Spermonde Archipelago are the reef areas of Jangang-jangangang, north-west of Makassar (see Figure 1), about five to six hours away where *sawakung* can last from several days to three weeks. Like the normal contract-fishing practice, during the *sawakung*, the *sawi*s have to sell their catch to their *punggawa*s *darat* at the agreed

price; the money they earn has an amount deducted to repay any loan (see Table 3). One *punggawa darat* said that it is his strategy to take his *paboya*s with his carrier boat to more distant fishing grounds and provide them with the equipment they need because, in this situation, the *paboya*s will not be able to return home because it is too far; they have no option but to catch more fish. A *punggawa darat* will only return to the Spermonde after having caught a planned amount of fish. *Imlek*, the Chinese New Year, which is usually at the end of January or the beginning of February, is the period when the price of fish doubles or triples. Therefore, the whole fleet will want to catch more fish at this time to meet the demand and to make a bigger profit.

Table 3

Support (loans) from *punggawa darat*s to their *sawi*s who use a *lepa-lepa*

Type of support	Amount IDR (USD)
Boat and motor	IDR7,000,000 (USD700)
Nylon	IDR 4,000 (USD0.40)
Gloves	IDR 3,000 (USD0.30)
Tymbal	IDR3,000 (USD0.30)
Hooks (1 pack)	IDR15,000 (USD1.50)
Wire	IDR20,000 (USD2.00)
Little buoy	IDR5,000 (USD0.50)
Petrol and food, coffee and cigarettes (daily)	IDR50,000 (USD5.00)

The second type of boat used in LRFF fishing is called a *joloro'*, and it has a crew of three to five and one captain (*punggawa laut*). A *joloro'* is a bigger boat that a *lepa-lepa* and is equipped with a more powerful

motor (our interviewees confirmed that the motor used has much the same capacity as an automobile). A *joloro'* with its crew can forage over larger areas and operate for three to four days at a time before returning to their island bases. *Punggawa*s *darat* provide this group with support for their fishing expeditions. Around IDR150,000 (USD15) per day is provided by *punggawa*s *darat* for fuel, food, coffee and cigarettes. The fishing gear and boats are on loan from *punggawa*s *darat* to *punggawa*s *laut*. One *joloro'* with a motor costs around IDR30,000,000 (USD3000), and is treated as a debt of a *punggawa laut* to a particular *punggawa darat*. This debt might increase significantly because usually the *punggawa*s *laut* need to borrow more for operating a *joloro'*. The fishermen on a *joloro'* use *bubu*s to catch LRFF, which requires them to be skilled divers. Using *bubu*s, fishermen might catch up to 15 fish per expedition. However, a combination of diving skills and working in a group allows other fishing methods, which enables them to increase the size of their catch. A *joloro'* is big enough for air compressors to be carried, which let the divers dive deeper and for longer. Compressors might also be used for catching *trepang* (Sea Cucumber) in the area (Mánez and Ferse, 2010). However, as described earlier, fishermen do not catch fish using *bubu*s only, they also use cyanide (potassium or sodium cyanide) (Chozin, 2008; Glaser et al., 2010a; Glaser et al., 2010b; Fougères, 2009). Using cyanide enables fishermen to catch more fish in a shorter time. As also reported by Barber and Pratt (1997), cyanide is used to catch particular fish species to supply the high end of the market, that is, those fish in high demand that fetch a high price.

One of the divers interviewed said that the use of cyanide increases the chances of catching highly valued fish like *sunu tikus*, which live at a depth of 20 metres and are hard to catch because they hide in the reef. With cyanide, it is possible to bring back about 10 to 15 such fish from a three-to-four-day expedition. There is always a risk that the catch will be confiscated by the authorities because using cyanide for fishing is illegal (see Table 4). However, using *bubu*s is the most common method

on the island of Bone Tambung; only one *punggawa darat* there uses cyanide (Deswandi, 2011).

Table 4

Comparison of *lepa-lepa* and *joloro'*

	Lepa-lepa	*Joloro'*
Number of fishermen	One.	A captain (*punggawa laut*) and a crew of three to five.
Operational costs	IDR50,000 (USD5) per day for the fuel, food, coffee and cigarettes.	IDR150,000 (USD15) per day for fuel, food, coffee and cigarettes.
Number of days per expedition	One.	Three to four.
Operational area	Reef areas near their island.	Reef area beyond their island.
Fishing gear	Hand line.	Hand line, cyanide, *bubu*s.
Supporting tools	Small capacity motor.	Larger capacity motor.
Number of fish caught (in the Spermonde area)	One or two fish after three to five days.	Fifteen fish per expedition with *bubu*s, or 15 to 20 if cyanide is used.

*Punggawa*s *darat* make decisions on which *paboya*s to support and work with during the *musim timur* and *musim barat* and they also make the decision to go to other fishing grounds during the west season and how much to invest. A *punggawa darat* is also responsible for mitigating or removing the risks faced by their crew members, including the risk of being caught by the police for using cyanide. A *punggawa darat* should be able, in whatever way, to protect his *paboya*s from having their catch

confiscated. In this and other ways, it is important for *punggawa*s *darat* to build a reputation for reliability and trustworthiness in the minds of the fishermen. *Punggawa*s *darat* choose the *punggawa*s *laut* to work with. A *punggawa laut* has the knowledge needed for LRFF fishing and trade; for example, the whereabouts of good fishing grounds that should provide more fish. *Punggawa*s *laut* are responsible for their boat's crew, who are considered to be their *sawi*s.

Because of a dispute, disagreement or other reason, a *punggawa laut* (and individual fisherman too) might sever their contract or agreement with their current *punggawa darat* and come to an agreement with another *punggawa darat*. This may be done if there is no debt attached to the contract or, if there is, that the debt be taken over by the 'new' *punggawa darat*. To break these patron–client arrangements requires that there be no debt remaining (Meereboer, 1997). Such disputes and ruptures create the dynamism in the LRFF social networks in the Spermonde Archipelago, but the basic *punggawa–sawi* structure remains. However, these changes in patron–client relations do have an influence on the sustainability of LRFF fishing; connections can be unmade quickly but it takes a while for trust and loyalty to be built in newly formed relations and without trustful, loyal patronage, the risks and consequences of using cyanide are much greater.

It has been found that there are two types of ties between a *punggawa darat* and his *paboya*. A *punggawa darat* will choose his *paboya* from within his close family (for example, a son or nephew), or extended family (based on kinship), to operate his carrier boat during the *sawakung* time to ensure strong control over his property and operations. Trust is the foundation of the choice of *paboya* by a *punggawa darat*: trust is defined as the willingness of *paboya*s always to sell their fish to their *punggawa darat* and to not cheat by selling to other *punggawa*s *darat*, even if the other's prices are better. On the other hand, a *paboya* might choose to work with a particular *punggawa darat* for at least two reasons: generosity of the *punggawa darat* in lending money and materials; and flexibility in fish sizing rules. (Fish sizing rules are explained in the next

section.) It is also known that there are different treatments by *punggawa*s *darat* of some *paboya*s that are based on performance (number of fish caught and loyalty), and these inconsistencies at some point can create competition and tension among *paboya*s. It can be seen that there is horizontal mobility among the *punggawa*s *laut* and *punggawa*s *darat*. A *bos* who has newly engaged a selected *punggawa darat* will be keen to rid the *punggawa*s *darat* of his debts from a former engagement, because he sees this new engagement as an investment that will bring a better supply of fish and greater profits. Similarly, a new *punggawa darat* will be also keen to pay off the debts of some *punggawa*s *laut* to their current *punggawa darat* because he believes it will increase his profits.

As reported by Fougères, capturing reef fish alive poses greater challenges than for other piscine commodities because fish can swim rapidly away when pursued or hide in the coral. Divers have to dive down to the reef and get close enough to the fish to squirt them with cyanide solution. Once the fish are caught, to ensure that they survive in shallow water, the *paboya*s relieve the air bladders of the fish by carefully inserting a hypodermic needle to allow air to escape (Fougères, 2008).

Marketing networks

The marketing networks in LRFF fishing comprise the various agents who interact: the *punggawa*s *darat*, who are based on the islands and are responsible for delivering fish to their *bos*; the *bos*es, who are based in the city of Makassar and responsible for delivering fish to the exporter; the exporters, who are based in Jakarta and are responsible for delivering fish to the importers; and the importers, who are based in Hong Kong and deliver fish to restaurants.

*Punggawa*s *darat* deliver their catches to their *bos* and are paid according to pricing and sizing rules. *Punggawa*s *darat* and *bos*es have various strategies to minimise the economic risk in the LRFF trade. Fish death is a big risk for *punggawa*s *darat* and for *bos*es: dead fish fetch a very low price, about one fifth of the live fish price. One of the interviewees

reported that for each dead fish, they receive IDR110,000 (USD11) per kilogram instead of around IDR400,000 (USD40) per kilogram during the normal times or IDR200,000 (USD20) per fish instead of IDR600,000 (USD60) per kilogram during *Imlek*. Fougères argues that getting LRFF from ocean to markets necessitates greater technological complexity and economic risk than for other commodities harvested for export from Indonesia's reefs because LRFF need to be kept in clean, cool, oxygen-rich seawater to survive (Fougères, 2008). After LRFF are caught, they are at risk of dying for at least two reasons: their treatment during storage, which is related to the quality of the water and the use of cyanide; and transport, that is, the time it takes to reach their destination, the treatment and handling of the fish and their packaging.

There are different strategies to minimise the chances of fish dying: reducing the time taken in handling the fish; treating the fish with different biological and chemical agents; and using special packaging when transporting the fish. Once fish have been caught, they are deposited in the *paboya* boats, transported to their *punggawa darat*'s base in the islands, classed according to species and size, and weighed. Fish are stored at the *punggawa darat*'s place for a maximum of two days (usually one day only, or overnight) for two reasons: to refresh the fish and to collect fish from other *paboya*s before transport to Makassar. To refresh them, each fish is immersed for several minutes in fresh water in which is dissolved what is known locally as *obat kuning* (sodium nifrustyrenate; an antiseptic and antibacterial agent), which is believed to prevent fish getting infections from injuries and scratches received during their catching, handling and transport. Each fish is then injected with terramycin, an antibiotic that can be bought in Makassar for IDR10,000 (USD1.00) per bottle: a bottle has enough for injecting 50 to 75 fish. *Punggawa*s *darat* and *bos*es believe that terramycin kills the bacteria in fish and that this will fortify them. Fish are then kept in ponds ready to be transported to Makassar the next morning. After being sized, and priced accordingly, *punggawa*s *darat* pay their *paboya*s. The risk of fish dying then is that of the *punggawa darat*.

At a *bos*'s place in Makassar, the same procedures apply; incoming fish are classed by species, weighed and sized. Then they are immersed in fresh water and twice injected with terramycin and vitamin B complex; in the morning when the fish arrive and in the afternoon. The *bos*es pay the *punggawa darat* directly after sizing the fish, which are kept overnight in ponds. The next morning, before being packed, the fish are anaesthetised with rotenone, a naturally occurring chemical obtained from the roots of tropical plants. Rotenone has insecticidal, acaricidal (spider killing) and piscicidal (fish killing) properties, and is classified by the World Health Organization as moderately hazardous (PAN–UK, 2001). Anaesthetised fish are stored in plastic bags filled with seawater and oxygen. Four to six fish are put in the one plastic bag and then stored inside a styrofoam box (known locally as a *koli*) with ice to keep the temperature at 18°C. Each *koli* weighs about five or six kilograms. Each Makassar-based *bos* delivers about 40 *koli*s per day. Once the fish are at the *bos*'s place, the risk of fish dying is his.

Table 5

Fish prices from various middlemen during the normal season

Species	Price at punggawa darat (IDR)	Price at Makassar (IDR)
Kwaci hitam	30,000	80,000
Kwaci merah (pongah-pongah)	50,000	100,000
Sunu merah (baby)	100,000	150,000
Sunu merah (super)	400,000	450,000
Sunu merah (up)	285,000	335,000
Pappa	70,000	100,000
Sunu tikus (super)	400,000	600,000
Sunu tikus (baby)	175,000	225,000

Sunu tikus (up)	500,000	600,000
Sunu macan (super) (sold dead)	30,000	80,000
Sunu macan (super)		50,000
Sunu macan (up)		50,000
Napoleon	275,000	325,000
Sunu bone (baby)	40,000	60,000
Sunu bone (super)	100,000	130,000
Sunu bone (up)	130,000	160,000
Sunu hitam (super)	170,000	190,000
Moso kembang or *kerapu lumpur*	20,000	30,000
Kerapu tiger	20,000	30,000

A Makassar-based *bos* is bound to his *punggawa*s *darat* on the basis of trust. He arranges different loans for each of his *punggawa*s *darat*; these can range from IDR100,000,000 (USD10,000) to IDR500,000,000 (USD50,000). One *punggawa darat* interviewed said that there are two reasons for his connecting to his Makassar-based *bos*: power, because he believes that a good *bos* is the one with power and who has links to various agents and that this will help to keep the business running despite illegal practices; and generosity, because he perceives a good *bos* as one who is generous with money and materials in his support (with loans and grants) for his *punggawa*s *darat*.

*Punggawa*s *darat* have to maintain good relations with their *bos*es by delivering the quota of fish demanded. *Bos*es treat *punggawa*s *darat* differently according to their results. Support by a *bos* to a *punggawa darat* varies in amount and type and includes money, loans, boats and machinery. One Makassar-based *bos* is known to support half of the necessary bribes by his *punggawa*s *darat* to the police in order to avoid prosecution for using cyanide in their fishing.

The exporters in Jakarta, mainly Indonesian ethnic Chinese, provide information on the demand for LRFF. They maintain their lines of communication with importers and restaurant owners in Hong Kong and China. At the beginning of the LRFF trade, the exporters, also known as bosses, provided the *punggawa*s *darat* with the necessary credit to start forming a team of fishermen to catch the fish. However, with time, some *punggawa*s *darat* managed to become independent of their creditors and to organise their business independence and to become *bos*es (Fougères, 2009). *Punggawa*s *darat* depend on their *bos*es and on Jakarta-based exporters to access the Hong Kong market. However, there is one Makassar-based *bos* who has been able to establish his own direct connections with the Hong Kong market.

The price Jakarta-based exporters charge for each kilogram of fish delivered to Hong Kong is double the price they pay to Makassar-based *bos*es. However, the exporters are also subject to the risk of the fish dying. For dead fish, the exporter is paid one fifth of the live fish per kilogram price by the Hong Kong importer.

Prosecution insurance network

High demand for LRFF from the Hong Kong market, especially during the Chinese New Year celebrations, has helped develop LRFF fishing to be the lucrative industry it is, especially for the middlemen from *punggawa*s *darat* based on the islands to the fish importers in Hong Kong.

LRFF fishing involves greater technological complexity and economic risks compared with other marine commodities. The fish in high demand are hard to catch; they live in coral reefs at different depths. Live fish need to be delivered from ocean to market quickly to minimise losses from fish dying. *Bos*es and *punggawa*s *darat* provide fishermen with air compressors, which permit them to dive longer and deeper, and this enables them to catch more fish. This encourages the fishermen to maximise their catch and to minimise the time spent so they can pay their debt to *punggawa*s *darat* and earn a higher income. The use of potassium

and sodium cyanide is prevalent in the LRFF fishing because the catch rate when using cyanide is much higher than when more environment-friendly fishing gear is used, like *bubu*s or hand lines.

The Indonesian fisheries law 31 of 2004 prohibits the use of any chemical, biological agent and explosive, or any other method or equipment that might threaten the ecosystem, and transgressions are subject to punishments of up to six years in prison or fines of IDR1.2 billion (USD120,000). The Pangkep Regency District Regulation 10 prohibits the collection and destruction of coral reefs in the area of Pangkep Regency, South Sulawesi. Punishment may include up to six months in prison or a fine of IDR5,000,000 (USD500).

The use of cyanide depends on the willingness and readiness of a *bos* to deal with the risk of prosecution through bribery. Those *bos*es who engage fishermen who use cyanide are those who have prosecution insurance networks with various authorities, mainly with the police and the navy but sometimes also with the officials from the Kementrian Kelautan dan Perikanan (Ministry of Marine and Fisheries), are the ones who engage cyanide fishermen. These networks connect the *punggawa*s *darat* and *bos*es to, mainly, the police and the Indonesian navy. *Paboya*s use cyanide when they are sure that their *punggawa darat* and *bos* will arrange bribes to protect them from having their catch confiscated by the police or navy. *Bos*es protect their *punggawa*s *darat* and *paboya*s by giving money regularly to the authorities. Two interviews with the right-hand-men of two different *bos*es in Makassar confirmed that they have to make regular payments to the police commandant, and to each of the police who regularly visit their fish ponds at Makassar. The interviewees also confirmed that they give money to the navy commandant and to each of the naval officials who regularly visit the ponds.

Table 6

Prosecution insurance expenses

Prosecution insurance agents	Amount
Water police	IDR50,000 – 100,000 (USD5 – 10) per person per visit.
Commandant of water police	IDR1,000,000 – 2,000,000 (USD100 – 200) per month.
Navy	IDR50,000 (USD5) per person per visit.
Naval commandant	IDR1,000,000 – 2,000,000 (USD100 – 200) per month.

*Paboya*s confirmed that the decision to use cyanide is theirs; there is no order from their *punggawa darat* or *bos*; however, *punggawa*s *darat* and *bos*es do not prohibit the use of cyanide. One of a *bos'*s right-hand-men reported that the fine for using cyanide when caught by the police or navy is around IDR200,000,000 (USD2000). This fine is paid collectively by *punggawa*s *darat* and *bos*es. Both use bribery to ensure that the matter goes no further than the police or naval authorities: were the case to go to court, the penalties would be greater.

*Paboya*s who catch Napoleon Wrasse are also open to having their catch confiscated. The Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture issued ministerial decision 375/Kpts/IK.250/5/95 banning the catching of Napoleon Wrasse though with some exceptions (supported by permission from the Minister of Agriculture and the Director-General of Fisheries) for research, knowledge development, and mariculture reasons, and for traditional fishermen who use non-destructive fishing gear. However, there are two *bos*es in Makassar who have obtained permission to catch Napoleon Wrasse. It is reported by the right-hand-man of one of those *bos*es that it costs hundreds of millions of rupiahs to obtain

such permission. One of the *paboya*s of an influential *bos* reported that he was caught by the police catching Napoleon Wrasse, but his *bos* 'released' him by bribing the police with IDR35,000,000 (USD3500), and that this happened twice. Local fishermen believe there is an agreement between the various agents for insurance from prosecution, that each has a particular patch or what is known locally as a *kavling* (from the Dutch, *kaveling*), which literally means parcels of land. It seems the agents have agreed not to encroach on the *kavling* of other groups, police or navy; in other words, once a bribe has been paid it will not have to paid again for the same service, although sometimes *punggawa*s *darat* and *bos*es have to pay to more than one group.

Reef Fishery Social Networks: a Graphical Model

Social networks in LRFF fishing in the Spermonde Archipelago can be drawn as a conceptual graphical model as shown in Figure 3. There are at least 15 agents involved in LRFF fishing networks, from catching the fish to when they are delivered in Hong Kong markets (see Table 7.

Table 7

Agents and their roles in LRFF fishing and trade networks

No.	Agent	Role in LRFF fishing and trade
1	Water police	Patrol fishing grounds to enforce laws that prohibit destructive fishing practices and the export of specified fish species. However, water police receive bribes from *punggawa*s *darat* and *bos*es to avoid prosecution for using cyanide and exporting Napoleon Wrasse.

| 2	Police	Patrol fishing grounds to enforce laws that prohibit destructive fishing practices and the export of specified fish species. Police receive bribes from *punggawa*s *darat* and *bos*es to avoid prosecution for using cyanide and exporting Napoleon Wrasse.
3	Navy	Patrol fishing grounds to enforce laws that prohibit destructive fishing practices and the export of specified fish species. Navy officials receive money from *punggawa*s *darat* and *bos*es to avoid prosecution for using cyanide and exporting Napoleon Wrasse.
4	Prosecutor	Prosecute those caught breaking the law. However, prosecutors can be bribed by *bos*es for those cases brought to court because of the use of cyanide.
5	Workers for *punggawa darat*	Size the fish from *paboya*s. They are important agents in determining which fish go to which size category and can be bribed by *paboya*s or *punggawa*s *laut* to loosen the sizing rules, which allows for greater profit.
6	*Punggawa darat*	Provide *paboya*s with fishing gear and monetary support. Ensure that the fish are in good condition to get a better price. Provide protection against prosecution for using cyanide or catching banned Napoleon Wrasse.
7	Makassar-based *bos*	Provide *punggawa*s *darat* with fishing gear and monetary support. Ensure that the fish are in good condition to ensure a better price. Provide protection against prosecution as the result of using the cyanide or catching Napoleon Wrasse.
8	Individual fisherman (*paboya*)	Catching fish.
9	*Punggawa laut* (*paboya*)	Skippering a boat, choosing gear, choosing fishing locations, choosing *sawi*s *laut* for expeditions and catching fish.

10	*Sawi laut* (*paboya*)	Catching fish.
11	Workers for Makassar *bos*	Size, weigh and categorise the fish received from *punggawa*s *darat*. They determine which fish go to which size category and can be bribed by *paboya*s or *punggawa*s *laut* to loosen the sizing rules, which allows for greater profit.
12	Quarantine by Kementrian Kelautan dan Perikanan (Ministry of Marine and Fisheries)	Fish sampling for biological testing for pathogens and bacteria. A *bos* has to pay between IDR5000 and 7000 (USD0.50 – 0.70) per kilogram of fish to get a clearance letter.
13	Jakarta-based exporter	Ensure that the fish are in good condition to get a better price. Ensure that fish can be exported to Hong Kong without any problem.
14	Hong Kong-based importer	Ensure that the fish may enter Hong Kong and be distributed to the restaurants.
15	Hong Kong restaurant	Provide aquariums for displaying the fish before selling them to the end consumer.

One of the important features of the social networks in LRFF fishing and trade in the Spermonde Archipelago is the increased self-esteem and higher social position that comes from making a pilgrimage to Mecca, known as going on a *Hajj*. Those who do so may, on their return, use the title *Haji*. To go on a *Hajj* is one of the five pillars of Islam and is the duty of every Muslim to do so if they are able to afford it. In Spermonde, a person titled *Haji* is considered a noble and respectable person. The late 1990s and early 2000s is the period when the a great number of people from the Spermonde Archipelago went on a *Hajj*, most of them are *punggawa*s *darat.* The cost of going on a *Hajj* ranges from IDR20,000,000 to IDR48,000,000 (USD2000 to USD4800) depending on the type of *Hajj*. The Makassar-based *bos*es especially (but not those of Chinese ethnicity), often support their *punggawa*s

darat to go on a *Hajj*. This is seen locally as a prize or reward from a *bos* to his *punggawa darat* and this generosity is a representation of the power they have. Quite a number of *punggawa*s *darat* go on a *Hajj* more then once, which give them greater cause for pride and recognition from their community.

Figure 3

Conceptual Graphical Model of Social Networks in LRFF fishing in the Spermonde Archipelago, Indonesia

Conclusion and Discussion

To what extent do social networks support the fishing of LRFF and its trade in the Spermonde Archipelago?

As argued by Fougères (2009), the biophysical forms of LRFF and their need to have, or to live in, clean, cool, oxygen-rich seawater means

that to catch and keep them alive until they reach the end-market entails complex technology and a greater economic risk compared with other marine commodities taken from reefs in the Archipelago. These conditions have caused particular social networks to develop that support LRFF fishing and trade through the establishment of debt relations, profit maximisation, and corruption. There are three types of networks in LRFF fishing and trade: fishing networks, marketing networks, and prosecution insurance networks.

Debt underlies the fishing networks because *paboya*s have limited options apart from fishing to earn a livelihood, especially during the west season. Profit maximisation is the driver in the marketing networks: *punggawa*s *darat* and *bos*es have the capacity to invest in and establish the costly and high-risk LRFF trade, which allows them to supply what the market demands. Supplying the demands of the market and making higher profits can only be achieved by exploiting more fishing grounds and increasing the size of the catch. For this reason, the illegal use of cyanide is prevalent and leads to the establishment of prosecution insurance networks that organise corruption.

To what extent do such networks influence the sustainability of reef fishery?

By examining the social networks in LRFF fishing, it can be identified that the challenges of sustainability in reef fisheries are rooted in the debt traps that characterise the fishing networks, the high profit making which characterises the marketing networks, and the corruption that is characteristic of the prosecution insurance networks. The profit maximisation from fishing and the creation of dependencies through debt have been the push factors for high exploitation, the use of cyanide, and foraging to farther fishing grounds, which is facilitated by the common practices of corruption.

The *paboya*s reported that they are having more difficulty in finding fish in the Spermonde area. The *punggawa*s *darat* are having to invest

more money to move to other fishing grounds in the area of Kendari and Bone Bay, especially during the *musim barat*. *Paboya*s and *punggawa*s *darat* reported that in the past two years, there have been changes to sizing rules. The minimum limit of super size has been changed from 1.3 kilograms to 1 kilogram. There have been fewer deliveries, that is, production has been decreasing. One of the *bos*es reported that in the past year his organisation had been able to deliver 10 to 20 *koli*s only per day to Jakarta, compared to the delivery rate three years before (up to 120 *koli*s per day). It has also been found that the notion of 'sustainability' is probably ignored by the agents in LRFF networks, especially the marketing networks, because it is understood to be an inhibiting factor that denies room to manoeuvre by *punggawa*s *darat* and *bos*es in their quest to maximise their incomes. In this paper, the term 'room to manoeuvre' relates to opportunities for agents to maximise income by establishing other income generating activities, which might be done by extending the social networks, especially to people in the government sector or the private sector. One of the *bos*es has been identified as developing his room to manoeuvre by supporting important political figures in South Sulawesi and by so doing extending his networks, which has enabled him to expand his business enterprises and move into activities related to building and construction. One of the *punggawa*s *darat* has increased his room to manoeuvre by expanding his business enterprises to property-related activities in Makassar. This paper argues that these horizontal entrepreneurial shifts to other business activities are to ensure that income does not fall away over time. This suggests that efforts to ensure the sustainability of LRFF fishery are being undermined by the belief, assumption or understanding that reef fishery cannot be relied on to generate sufficient income in the long term.

There have been various research projects focusing on LRFF fishing and trade that support efforts to promote sustainability in reef fishery but a few only have focused on understanding the underlying social networks. Our research shows that understanding these social networks

are important for ensuring its sustainability. Findings on prosecution insurance networks in reef fishery have been reported as well by different researchers (Meereboer, 1997; Erdmann, 2001; Lowe, 2000); however, little attention has been given to the importance of social networks in LRFF fishing and trade. These social networks are dynamic and involve many people over various islands of the Spermonde Archipelago. This paper only focuses on the model that represents the static type of connections in social networks of reef fishery and does not take into account their dynamics. However, findings from our research are important; they demonstrate the importance of shifting the debate away from blaming the local communities only for their destructive fishing practices as being the cause of unsustainability in reef fishery. Investigating the social networks and their components gives the bigger picture of the whole reef fishery system and takes the market and jural regimes into account, which are necessary for promoting the sustainable fisheries by taking diversified approaches instead of single, top-down conservation and development approaches.

This research offers a new perspective in examining sustainability by understanding and examining the social networks. By examining social networks it is possible to identify different interactions among agents that characterise various interests. In the reef fishery case, it is identified that the social networks attached to the resources (fishing networks) are more characterised by socioeconomic interests, where self-esteem and social prestige are present and influential. On the other hand, the social networks attached to fish marketing are more characterised by profit maximisation, and the social networks attached to the policy and administrative aspect are characterised by maximising additional income through corruption. The interplay of socioeconomic interests, profit maximisation and maximising additional income have been the foundation of the LRFF fishing and trade. It gives new insights on how to promote sustainability in fisheries better through understanding the diversity of social networks.

Further research needs to be carried out to elaborate more the dynamics of such social networks, which are important for supporting any attempt to promote sustainability in fisheries. We would like to encourage more work on the effects of corruption on sustainability, which arguably is still untouched and left out from research agendas despite of its importance. Additionally we would like to encourage as well research that employs different measures in network analysis, for example, centrality and betweenness measure in the context of sustainability. The results discussed in this paper would be a good baseline for such research.

Acknowledgement

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Research Summary
Mapping of Occupations of the Populations in Urban Poor Areas

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Background

The main employment problems for Indonesia to solve are unemployment and underemployment. The relatively high number of workers involved in unproductive work is a serious problem because it leads to a continuing increase in the numbers of the working poor. According to the ILO (2005), underemployment, work in the informal sector, and unproductive work are not to be categorised as decent work.

As stated in the Indonesian constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945), chapter 27, article 2: 'every citizen is entitled to the right of employment and dignified decent living for humanity'. Chapter 28, article 2, states: 'every citizen has a right to work with fair reward and treatment'. Indonesia has also ratified a bill of human rights, which states that every citizen has 'the right of employment, [and] the right to fair and pleasant work conditions'.

The relatively high rate of unemployment and underemployment, the high number of workers in the informal sector, and the increasing poverty rate are indications that Indonesian governments, national and regional, have failed to ensure that the basic right of all the people to decent work has been met. Another indicator of failure is the relatively high proportion of

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1   This research was by Laila Nagib with the help and cooperation of Devi Asiati, Dewi Harfina, Soewartoyo, Sumono and Deshinta Febriyanti.

workers who work overtime (work more than 35 hours per week), such as industrial workers, farmers, fishermen, traders and small entrepreneurs, all of whom live close to or below the poverty line.

There is international consensus (including Indonesia) to having plans and policies that will lead to the creation of decent work. These plans also include strategies to alleviate poverty. To achieve these goals, there are some problems to be solved that relate to the limitations of occupation mapping and of data relating to decent work, regionally as well as nationally. So far, employment policies have tended to neglect the decent work aspect. The complexities arise in the urban setting because of the variations in the definitions of formal and informal occupations.

The goal of this study is to analyse and to map the occupations of the populations in the urban poor areas, and to analyse the welfare of workers in terms of several indicators of decent work. The study uses the ILO concept of decent work, which has four aspects (with 23 indicators): the rights of workers in the workplace; employment; social protection; and social dialogue. Our study used a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, mainly surveys of households (sample size of 300) in two locations, Kelurahan Jamika (Bojongloa Kaler District) and Kelurahan Babakan Sari (Kiaracondong District).[2] Those locations were chosen using the following criteria: population density, slum areas, poverty rates and variety of occupations. Qualitative methods were used to gather information, mainly through in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, and the data obtained were used to complement the quantitative data.

Research findings

Some similar studies have shown that not all the ILO indicators are applicable in the areas where our research was conducted. The relatively

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2   The term *kelurahan* refers to a low level local government authority.

high proportion of workers in the informal sector, which has a great variety of occupations, meant that many indicators of decent work (using the ILO concept) were difficult to apply. This is mainly because the concept of decent work tends to be biased towards the assumptions and practices in the formal sectors (mainly industry) and in the developed countries. The definition of some indicators is unclear, which makes them subject to misinterpretation. Moreover, there is also no standard, or cut-off point, that would indicate whether the occupation is to be considered decent work.

Mapping of occupations

Generally, both research locations (Kelurahan Jamika and Kelurahan Babakan Sari) have an urban demographic profile; most of the population work in the informal sector as street vendors, unskilled workers, manual labourers (in the plastics and garment trades) and street musicians. In Kelurahan Jamika, there are many people who have a variety of jobs, whose work depends on orders or on short-run demand; work such as construction-site labour, motorcycle transport, electronics services and small trading operations. The many workers who have a variety of jobs shows that there is a great deal of commercial and economic activity in those areas. In addition, the increasing numbers of small grocery shops (*warung sembako*) in the research areas also demonstrates the dynamism of economic life there. There is a popular term there, *kuya*, a portmanteau word from *kumuh* (slum) and *kaya* (rich). The use of this term indicates that, even though their shelters are not proper housing, their livelihoods are quite good, at least for the basic necessities of life.

Apart from work quality, employment opportunities, particularly in the informal sector, are relatively high in both areas. Supported by the available infrastructures at the two locations, the easy access to work that is not far from their shelters also contributes to the work choices in the informal sector. The inhabitants' low level of education also plays a role but education, good or poor, is not a necessary requirement for

work in the informal sector. The attributes that are influential in the performance and success of workers in this sector are motivation, hard work and entrepreneurial skills.

Kelurahan Jamika and Kelurahan Babakan Sari, particularly in those areas along the railway line, are examples of urban environments that, to say the least, are less than adequate, with so many people in inadequate housing, best described as shelters. The high population density and the slum environment lead to increased social vulnerabilities. Many jobs in these areas provide an income but the work is not conducive to higher moral or community standards nor to personal or public safety because it involves stolen property, fraud and prostitution. By any standards, such work cannot be described as decent and is a consequence of the high rate of unemployment and underemployment. To solve these classic urban social problems, there needs to be an integrated approach to achieve a better quality of life for people in such environments.

Even though both research locations are in urban slums with a high density of population, their central location makes it easier for workers in the informal sector to find jobs—where they live and where they work are the same: little travel is involved. The availability of work and the central location means that these areas attract immigrants and these additions to the population affect employment and social structures. The population is highly mobile and few migrants are registered. This fluidity affects the research in that almost 70 per cent of the original respondents had to be replaced.

Most working people in Kelurahan Jamika and Kelurahan Babakan Sari are in the age range generally considered the most productive. The high number of available workers ensures that the labour force participation rate (tingkat partisipasi angkatan kerja [TPAK]) is also high (about 72 per cent). This high participation rate is attributed predominantly to young workers (15 to 24 years), mainly males, who prefer to work rather than to continue their studies. Many migrants, mainly from West Java (Tasikmalaya, Ciamis, and Cianjur), Central Java and East Java,

looking for permanent or temporary jobs also contribute to the high rate of participation.

Generally, the unemployment rate in both locations is quite high, about 15 per cent, which is higher than the national rate of 10 per cent) and the regional unemployment rate. The many workers aged from 15 to 29 years, along with the unavailability of employment, produces a high unemployment rate of about 31 per cent. This condition of the labour market is also contributed to by increased worker layoffs in some industries, particularly in Kelurahan Babakan Sari.

The services sector is one of the most economically significant in both these areas. Based on the survey, about 64 per cent of the labour force work in the services sector and 38 per cent of this group are traders, such as small grocery shopkeepers and street vendors. The accessibility of the locations plays an important role in the growing employment in the service sector. Based on occupation, a majority of the labour force worked in sales (26 per cent) and as production labourers (22.5 per cent). The smallest proportion were professional workers (2 per cent). In terms of sex, a majority of women worked as production labourers, in sales, in clerical and administrative positions and as professionals.

Based on work status, the proportion of unpaid women workers is quite high (13 per cent) compared with 2 per cent for men. The women in this category are usually family workers who work in the informal sector. The proportion of the labour force working as labourers is quite high (44 per cent), which indicates that a variety of jobs (formal and informal) are available in both research areas. The high proportion of labourers in both areas is a result of there being many industries nearby, of good infrastructure, and of convenient transport.

Most members of the labour force in both places work in the informal sector (54 per cent). The others work in the formal sector as labourers and employees. In terms of sex, women workers in the formal sector have better positions than men and this can be attributed to the fact that there are more women than men in professional work. Possible reasons

for this situation are that there is a preference by industry to recruit women rather than men, especially in the garment, confectionary and food industries.

Welfare of workers

The welfare of workers, which is indicated by income and education, can be considered reasonable, especially in the formal sector. Most workers have finished their junior and senior high school education (SMP and SMA), even though many of them are unskilled. However, few workers have a variety of skills, and most of these are in the formal sector. Based on working hours, most workers (men and women), especially in the informal sector, work overtime. This relates to the nature of the work in the informal sector (such as in sales and services and labour), where the hours are uncertain, which usually means working long hours.

Considering income, most women workers have relatively good incomes, especially when compared to the local minimum wage (upah minimum provinsi) in Bandung. Usually, workers in the formal sector have higher incomes than workers in the informal sector, however, women workers in the informal sector have better incomes than prescribed by local minimum wage regulations (upah minimum regional [UMR]). Poverty in the wider view is generally linked to poor education, poor quality of work, an unhealthy environment and substandard workplace conditions.

Worker protection, which can be defined as their right to job security, sustainable work, health insurance and workplace rights, is not good in either area. However, based on the indicators of working hours and workplace conditions, there is no significant difference between men and women.

In terms of social insurance, work safety and protection, most workers clearly have not benefited from various national and regional programs and policies. For workers in industry, protection is quite low, which is indicated by the many layoffs, unlimited suspensions and the unsustainability of the work. It shows that employers have almost absolute power to discharge some workers or terminate their jobs.

Based on these situations, using the ILO's criteria of decent work, many occupations in these two urban areas do not meet the ILO standards and cannot be categorised as decent work, and this state of affairs is to be found in other big cities.

Many regulations related to social security, particularly *Jamsostek*, have not affected many workers in the urban slum areas who work mostly in the informal sector.[3] Most workers do not join worker organisations (and this includes those employed in manufacturing) and most would be unaware of their rights and freedoms. This situation is also replicated in their daily life; most workers do not get involved in the social organisations in their village that are to help them to enjoy their social and welfare rights. Some people argue that this lack of interest is because of the nature of the work in the informal sector, which usually entails long working hours and a lack of education on the part of the workers. This situation implies that, generally, workers in the informal sector are relatively weak in terms of having their rights protected and benefiting from social welfare programs and, further, they are marginalised in the socio-economic and political aspects of their work.

Possibility of work based on work indicators.

Most of the occupations in the two research areas and in the city of Bandung also do not meet the criteria for decent work. This can be seen from statistical indicators such as the proportion of workers in informal sector, youth unemployment, the general unemployment rate, the proportion of women in professional jobs, average incomes and overtime worked. Work that cannot be described as decent is significant in some classes of occupation that involve high risks, are insecure and are in industries that are not sustainable.

In the areas researched and in Bandung a high proportion of workers have incomes below the regional minimum wage (UMR). The low

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3   Jamsostek is the social insurance fund for private sector employers and their employees. It provides four programs: employment injury, death, health insurance, and a provident-fund-type old-age benefit.

wages, as a rule, go to those whose work could not be described as decent. Women, in this regard, are worse of than men and proportionally fewer have work that is decent; many have incomes less that one US dollar a day, which is below the poverty line.

The high rates of youth unemployment and underemployment show that people's basic right to work has not been achieved in terms of the standards that are prescribed by national law and regulations nor by the precepts of the ILO. The obligation or necessity to work leads to some workers accepting employment that is not secure, is sometimes immoral, and can not be described as decent. On the other hand, the unemployment of young people who are comparatively well educated can lead to criminal activities and to reduce motivation to continue their studies.

Considering indicators such as labour force participation rates, paid work in industry, underemployment and incomes that are below local minimum wage rates, it can be concluded that women workers are less likely to have decent work than men. On the other hand, using the indicators unemployment and youth unemployment, we can infer that male workers enjoy fewer rights compared to female workers. (It may be that there is a possibility of underreporting work statistics quantitatively but not qualitatively.)

But the other indicators, such as women's share of professional jobs, social protection and social participation, indicate that the working conditions for women are more decent compared with conditions for men. This is because more women have more secure work as labouring in industry and in the services sector.

Recommendations

- As an autonomous region, the city government of Bandung has more opportunities to fulfil community basic rights relating to employment. The city's employment policies should be focused on the creation of more productive work and also increasing

youth education and skills. Ensuring a healthy environment in surrounding areas is also important for increasing the quality of life.

- It is has been proven that the informal sector has succeeded in absorbing a good part of the labour force, so it needs to be given more attention, especially ways to improve the quality, safety and security of work.

- The ILO indicators of decent work tend to be biased in favour of the formal sector (or assume that the formal sector is the norm) and are designed with aggregate data in mind, they do not help so much in specialised conditions. The ILO needs to develop indicators of decent work that can be implemented in informal sector, micro industries and at and individual level. For Indonesia, indicators need to be designed that take into account that most members of the labour force work in informal sector, and mostly at the micro level. Further studies are needed, particularly that can help the development of suitable indicators for informal sector.

- The concept and the core values of decent work can not only be represented in quantitative indicators. Then, qualitative indicators also should be developed that include workers perceptions of their work and what they would consider to be decent work.

- The quantitative indicators of decent work so far have no cutting edge standard; indicators need to be developed for distinguishing decent work from that which is not.

Research Summary
Information and Communication Technologies and Poverty: The Telecentre Movement in Java[1]

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This article discusses telecentre development in Indonesia but focuses on case studies of telecentres in Java. The research uses twelve indicators from Rao (UNCTAD, 2006: 186) to help illustrate telecentre development. This research, which uses qualitative methods (structured interviews), is to help shape national policies that will enable communities to prosper by benefiting from information and communication technology for poverty reduction (ICT4P). It draws on the research and experience of using ICT4P internationally, nationally and in other parts of Indonesia. ICT4P is partly a global commitment by many nations, under the auspices of the United Nations, that gathered together at the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Switzerland in 2003 and in Tunis in 2005. The global commitment is to understand the different interests between poor, third-world countries and others. Therefore, in their points of agreement, promoting information and communication technology (ICT) was one of the commitments, and Indonesia has stated its target is to have 50 per cent of its people with internet connectivity by 2015. The reaction to this program varies; Jatim Province is very positive that it will now build

telecentres using the UNDP–Bappenas design but will fund them from its own provincial and municipal budgets.[2] Other provinces did not give it much attention, but there are other civil society initiatives to build different types of telecentres suitable for local needs.

The results are several, but the main argument for building telecentres lies in a telecentre's bifurcated position as an institution for empowering citizens but also as an income generator, because they have to be self-sufficient. To do this, a telecentre needs, first, not only a person capable of meeting the demands of both requirements but also to have full-time staff. A telecentre is not easily able to survive by itself and generally would not be able to generate income enough to enable it to pay its staff a sufficient salary. Second, there is little synergy among institutions to support the telecentres and vice versa. As an example, provincial trade and industry offices are hard-pressed to support the e-business needs of the small industries based in rural areas. Third, most members of local society understand the potential of telecentres but are unable to adapt them to their economic activities. They depend on the telecentre for access to information and for it or its staff to interpret that information for them. Fourth, either the telecentre staff or the local society needs to have basic knowledge of e-management and e-business to support their economic activities. Some telecentre clients are able to upload information about their small-scale business product but have problems supplying the industrial demand. Last, there is a gap of perception between the staff and the rest of the society on the function of telecentres in rural areas. Local people see telecentres as institutions that can support the community by distributing (and receiving) information, by enabling access to finance when needed and by contributing to education and training needs. In reality, although the staff usually are more knowledgeable than the users, they need to be supported to improve their skills and knowledge to help and to satisfy their users' needs.

2　Bappenas is the portmanteau abbreviation for Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Development Planning Agency, Republic of Indonesia).

Poverty reduction and electronic communication

Information and Communication Technologies for Poverty Reduction (ICT4P) is a poverty reduction program for people or communities that lack access to computers and the internet, such as remote and rural villages. To be more specific, ICT4P is not necessarily for rural areas but for poor or marginalised communities anywhere. The general mechanism to enable such computer and internet use is by using a community access point (CAP), and telecentres are one such mechanism. The Partnership for the e-Prosperity for the Poor (PePP) is a program implemented by UNDP–Bappenas cooperation as a pilot project in Indonesia. This program is part of a commitment made by countries through a global awareness strategy at the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). The Summit itself involved several meetings in Geneva in 2003 and in Tunis in 2005, and one result was the commitment, called the Geneva Declaration Principle, to understand the need to build the information society. Not only that, the commitment also took into account the different situations and challenges of third-world countries that have a specific focus on reducing poverty.

> We are resolute to empower the poor, particularly those living in remote, rural and marginalized urban areas, to access information and to use ICTs as a tool to support their effort to lift themselves out of poverty. (Depkominfo, 2006: 19)

Nationally, Indonesia has several important handicaps to the implementation of ICT: in the Networked Readiness Index 2012, Indonesia is ranked 80 of 142 countries; in computer use it is 29 out of 44 countries; and in ICT development, using the UNCTAD–UNDP index, it is 77 of 171 countries. According to UNDP–Bappenas, in 2004, the ICT infrastructure could provide for 1 to 5 per cent only of Indonesia's population of approximately 250 million. But apart from that drawback, Indonesia has a program, titled 201550, which is to be

read to mean that by 2015, 50 per cent of Indonesia's population will be able to connect to the internet.

In a national context, Indonesia acknowledges the problem of limited access to ICT and this explains the low use of ICT.

Kesenjangan digital disebabkan oleh (a) terbatasnya daya beli (ability to pay) masyarakat terhadap sarana dan prasarana pos dan telematika; (b) masih rendahnya kemampuan masyarakat untuk memanfaatkan dan mengembangkan teknologi informasi dan komunikasi; dan (c) terbatasnya kemampuan masyarakat untuk mengolah informasi menjadi peluang ekonomi, yaitu menjadikan sesuatu mempunyai nilai tambah ekonomi.[3]

[Digital divides are caused when (a) communities have limited resources to afford access to, and the facilities of, ICT; (b) communities have insufficient capability to use and to develop ICT; and (c) communities have limited capacity to access economic information and, therefore, to use it to add value.]

Indonesia has said that the development of *ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi* (IPTEK) or science and technology should pay particular attention to ICT.

Pembangunan iptek diarahkan untuk mendukung ketahanan pangan dan energi; penciptaan dan pemanfaatan teknologi informasi dan komunikasi[4]

[The development of knowledge and technology are to support food and energy security, and to support the creativity and benefits of ICT.]

For poverty eradication, Indonesia, through Bappenas, has produced the TIK: Strategi Peduli Kemiskinan. In this document, ICT is seen as a tool to help eradicate poverty.

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3   Indonesian law 17 of 2007. [*Undang-undang Republik Indonesia nomor 17 tahun 2007 tentang rencana pembangunan jangka panjang nasional tahun 2005–2025.*]

4   This text is taken from presidential decree 5 of 2010, section 4.3.1, and was accessed on 22 August 2012 at http://www.ristek.go.id/file/upload/Referensi/2010/rpjm_bapenas/buku-ii-bab-iv.pdf.

TIK [strategi teknologi, informasi dan komunikasi] sebagai alat bantu dalam upaya mengurangi kemiskinan, bukan sebagai hasil penanggulangan kemiskinan. (Bappenas, 2006: 2)

[ICT is one way to help the efforts to lessen poverty, but the result will not be the prevention of poverty.]

The document states that the ways to implement ICT for the people, and for the poor especially, are

. . . membina hubungan erat dengan pemuka masyarakat lokal di pemerintahan dan swasta untuk membantu mereka membentuk kemitraan dalam penggunaan TIK yang diwujudkan dalam bentuk telecentre. (Bappenas, 2006: 24)

[... to have close relations with local leaders in government and private institutions, to support partnerships with them, and to use telecentres as the model for ICT.]

Therefore, the telecentre is an important means to enable people to know and to fulfil their potential. In this respect, a telecentre is not only a different type of community access point (CAP) but the telecentre itself may be thought of as suitable for eradicating poverty.

Other research is being done (Wisnu, 2008) as part of the telecentre implementation program and this research shows that the community around the telecentre, especially the younger generation, uses the telecentre's internet access and other facilities. But still a custom-made approach is important to cater for specific occupations and interests in any one community. Most telecentres have spare time at night; therefore, they need to open until late. One of the recommendations of this research is that there be more development of telecentres. The province of Jatim and the telecentres formed the Asosiasi Telecenter Jawa Timur, and they work together with Dinas Komunikasi dan Informasi (Diskominfo). The province of Jatim also has researched the development of telecentres with the UNDP–Bappenas initiatives in

mind but also it has its own distinct needs for telecentres in the regional areas of the province (Aptel, 2009).[5]

This monitoring and evaluation shows that most users are from the younger generation, and that most of the telecentres in Jawa Timur Province are able to maintain continuity, although with difficulty. But the most difficult to be implemented in the telecentre is to produce the infomobilisation. Some telecentres have financial difficulties because they need to pay for connectivity, for maintenance of equipment and for 'salaries' of their staff. Communities are accepting of the telecentres but the program has not yet shown itself to be successful.

Having said that, under the scheme of poverty policy research, this article describes the implementation of telecentres in Indonesia. For this year, the cases are from Java. The team has visited the telecentres in Lumajang, Muneng and Pabelan and used snowball sampling techniques and guided interviews to gather data. Not only that, but the team has also visited other types of community access points (CAP) to get a better picture of civil society initiatives in this kind of program. The team hopes it will be able to describe the ICTs for the people's development in Indonesia. The team uses the twelve Rao indicators to standardise the descriptions of the circumstances and challenges of the telecentres and other CAPs (UNCTAD, 2006: 186). The team wants to show the general situation of the telecentres and other CAPs and the successes of the program. By putting the scheme in global, national and local contexts, this research intends to show its significance not only on policy abut also on its implementation and on Indonesia's position in ICT development.

Program implementation

In Indonesia, the UNDP–Bappenas cooperation has pioneered a telecentre program, called Partnership for e-Prosperity for the

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5   Asosiasi Telecenter Jawa Timur, Dinas Kominfo dan Informatika Propinsi Jawa Timur, Laporan Akhir Monitoring dan Evaluasi Kinerja Telecenter Jawa Timur 2009.

Poor (PePP). To meet the specific requirements of the program, the organisation of a telecentre is complex and needs one or more staff to be manager, infomobiliser, operator, and IT administrator. The building that is used for a telecentre also has specific requirements; it needs to have an IT room, a multimedia room and meeting rooms. A telecentre is best sited in a poor community, that is, one that has at least 30 per cent of its people considered to be poor but an essential prerequisite is a reliable electricity supply. The program must also provide the telecentre's management with knowledge of what the purpose of a telecentre is and how it should be run. In reality, as the experience of the first telecentre in the Pabelan Pesantren (an Islamic school) shows, the PePP program managers and the neighbouring community need to cooperate to ensure the growth of the telecentre and that it meets local needs.

Table 1 depicts the twelve indicators of Rao that have been used as the baseline for gathering information from informants. The Rao indicators show not only the organisational needs but also the social situation of the telecentre's neighbourhood and the problems and challenges for the telecentre.

Table 1

Twelve indicators of ICT and poverty reduction program

Indicators	The issues
Connectivity	Connectivity is to do with ICT infrastructure and access and also its price. The question of connectivity is for telecentre management, local and national government and infomobiliser.
Content	Content is showing whether the information available is compatible with and accessible to the targeted group. The question of content are for infomobilisers, management, local organisations, and group members.

Indicators	The issues
Community	Who benefits and whether the targeted group is able to negotiate the program. The questions are for management, infomobiliser, local and national government and members of the target group.
Commerce	Seeking the potential of productive activity especially in business. The questions are for management, infomobiliser and members of targeted group.
Capacity	Seeking the capacity of the targeted group, telecentre organisation, and society to deal with the new demands. Questions are for management, local government and members.
Culture	Seeking the interaction with current culture and promotion of ICT education. Questions are for management, local government and infomobiliser.
Cooperation	Cooperation between different stakeholders. Questions are for management and government.
Capital	Seeking financial viability. Questions are for local government, management and infomobiliser.
Context	How to adapt to local contexts and interests. Questions are for management, local government and group members.
Continuity	Seeking the mechanism of evaluation, flexibility and potential development. Questions are for management, local government and infomobiliser.
Control	Seeking the ownership of the telecentre and accountability of the stakeholders. Questions are for management, local government and infomobiliser.
Coherency	Seeing the program's implementation and its position with regard to poverty. Questions are for government, Ministry of Communication and Information, and observers.

Table 2 shows the social environment of telecentres and CAPs. From this table it can be seen that telecentres that have a blueprint of planning for

poverty are quite ready to face the necessity to survive. The telecentre planning has given them some workshops and training to enable the managers to run the centres and to cater for community's needs. Therefore the management is trying very hard to ensure the telecentres sustainability. The number of people who work in the telecentre has been reduced since the program finished several years ago. The people who are still in the telecentre are people who are committed and accept the social situation. They have passion and spirit to make the telecentre live.

Table 2

Problems and challenges of telecentres and other CAPs

Indicators	Telecentre	Other CAPs
Connectivity	With difficulty.	According to the situation and dependent on the host.
Content	Community's goods and services, and activities.	Not accessible, only a few telecentres upload their information.
Community	Cater for community and search rational mechanism.	Cater for specific communities, such as groups or people in the surrounding area.
Commerce	Only a few users.	Not accessible.
Capacity	The management is also building or upgrading the capacity.	Not catered for.
Culture	Not accessible.	Not accessible.
Cooperation	Depending on the process of implementation.	Limited coordination, the emphasis is on their independence.
Capital	With difficulty.	With difficulty.
Contexts	Not yet.	Not yet.
Continuity	With difficulty.	According to the situation and mostly are new.

Indicators	Telecentre	Other CAPs
Control	The management and stakeholders are not always in line with each other.	Not clear.
Coherency	The management are conscious of it.	Not catering for poverty.

In fact, the process when a telecentre is first set up is very important for its survival, especially in minimising any resistance or hesitation from the community and other stakeholders. The process in East Java province has been very good because the provincial government is seen as a joint partner in the program. Therefore, instead of only one telecentre, the Smeru telecentre in Lumajang, East Java Province has two with the addition of the Muneng telecentre in Madiun. All the telecentres are still in operation, although they have had to reduce their services, especially the infomobilisation that formerly had been paid for by the UNDP–Bappenas program. Infomobilisation is responsible for the empowerment program within the community, and infomobilisers are knowledgeable persons and able to motivate people and to coordinate activities. The telecentre has to rationalise by reducing the number of staff who work there. To maintain the computers, they might have to cannibalise other computers because there are not funds enough to fix or rejuvenate or upgrade those they have. The telecentre is now accepting money from the community, but it is only enough to pay the monthly overheads, such as electricity and phone bills.

The community has already benefited from the telecentre. It has provided them with a facility to acquire information from beyond their community. The telecentre has also made it easy for the people to get digital photos printed: formerly, they would have had to go to a nearby town to a photo-developing service. Some small-scale agricultural enterprises have been enabled to take orders over the internet but they have problems meeting standards of quality and productivity volumes. It is a new experience for them. Some farmers have multiplied agriculture

profits by using information from the internet; others have been able to anticipate market prices by monitoring and anticipating supply and demand. Most of the managers of the telecentres point out that the most achieved goal is being able to educate the dropouts and peasant workers to be able to use and operate equipment at the telecentres. The managers have taken it upon themselves to provide infomobilisation services, that is, they have instructed people in how to use computers and to suggest apt terms to use for internet searches. Many of the telecentre users who need such help are those with a good education, school teachers, for example.

Not everyone agrees that the telecentres are wholly beneficial; allowing the peasant community to use computers and the internet runs against social traditions, and then there is the matter of the costs to the community of the telecentres. The use of computers and the internet is influenced by social class and it is not believed to be the prerogative of the common people: the middle and upper classes are felt to be the prime users of both, not to mention other communication technology, such as the mobile phone. For others, computers and the internet tend to be seen as bad influences because information is more easily obtainable, including pornography. Computers and the internet are also seen as a means for wealthy countries to bring their influence to bear on rural people and agricultural communities, which are usually beyond their ken.

Poverty and the Internet

The connection of CIT and poverty eradication is not at first sight obvious because there is a general assumption that computers and the internet are the preserve of the educated, urban middle classes. But promoting the internet's benefits for the poor is about the general right to economic and social development because people, whoever they are, have a right to develop to their full potential. Therefore, in this case, the

context is state intervention in using the internet as a development tool for most of the people, including those in rural and remote areas.

The other significant matter when discussing this relation of IT and poverty eradication is the use of the term 'poverty'. There are several meanings of poverty; for example, Sachs (2005) has three meanings. First, is extreme or absolute poverty; second, is moderate poverty and the third is relative poverty. People in extreme poverty live in desperation to meet their basic needs, have no access to health, education, housing, nor to decent clothes. Moderate poverty means that people can meet their basic needs. Relative poverty applies to people whose salaries are under the average of the general income, have limited access to education and other needs that are important for them to raise their living standards.

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD), there are three aspects to poverty. First, 'monetary poverty' applies to people whose income is below the poverty line; second, 'capability poverty', where people have limited access to substantive freedoms, such as health, education, political expression and more; and third, social exclusion, which applies to people who have limited ability to participate in society. This technical definition of poverty categorises people according to the situational disadvantage that prevents their full participation in society and hinders their social mobility. In this categorisation of poverty there are two ways to alleviate the condition; the first is to improve the social situation, which would enable absolute poverty to be minimised. The second is to give to the poor ways of enabling social mobility. This second path to poverty alleviation is trying to narrow the gap by redistributing social goods and reducing inequality.

Because there are many poverty definitions, this article focuses on the concept of relative poverty to give specific context to how the internet and might lead to poverty eradication. The definition of poverty is very important, especially in a third-world context, where 'poverty' is generally understood to mean absolute poverty. In the third world, the poor are ever present and their condition is one of absolute poverty. A

theme of this article would be that the implications of relative poverty tend to be put aside because those people in the communities that are in relative poverty do not meet the popular understanding of poverty. Most people would not see the concept or definition of relative poverty as important. What is bothersome in using the concept of relative (or group) poverty is that it is up against the common understanding that poverty affects individuals: to consider a group or community as a unit of poverty requires a little rethinking. In terms of absolute poverty, this individual indexing of the poor could be useful, but in using the idea of relative poverty there is some confusion in the community. Social policies based on the concept of relative poverty imply that intervention should be aimed at a community or a society as are the ICT4P programs. Telecentres cater for the poor in relative terms and tackle poverty as a community matter rather than dealing with it individually. Where there is poverty, most of the surrounding area will be still close to poverty, therefore the community or the society itself is poor in relative terms.

In Indonesia, poverty is becoming *the* political debate as can be seen from the discussion of poverty during political campaigns. The Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP) has long used 'the poor' or *wong cilik* (common people) as a specific term to identify its closeness to the situation. The Partai Demokrasi, the ruling party at present, is using *bantuan langsung tunai* (BLT) or direct help with cash as a part of its political identification. The solutions to the problem of poverty have been described using three important metaphors. The first metaphor sees the solution to poverty as one of giving fish to the poor, such as BLT; the second is giving the poor a fishing net to enable them to be independent; and the third is giving them a boat so that they can rise above the poverty line, perhaps even creating jobs for other people. In reality, dealing with absolute poverty is the more politically acceptable way of being seen to be eradicating poverty. Therefore, absolute poverty is becoming an accepted political commodification and, in the process, the matter of relative poverty is being left out of the discussion.

But how the internet is to help with the poverty problem is still under discussion. Martin Franklin (2006) uses McNamara's (1973) argument to show how ICT relates to poverty eradication programs in three ways. First, ICT is seen as tool to empower the poor; second, ICT must be given priority to support investment and development in selected areas; and, third, ICT is a way to change the mind-sets of the community, of political leaders and of the bureaucracy so they might see it as enabling a prime environment for productivity increases. Arguments such as these are compatible with the issue that development is a community right. In this sense, ICT is a development right, therefore it is a public facility that should be provided for.

The third point in the previous paragraph emphasises the need to change mind-sets because most people understand ICT to be for middle and upper classes, which are mostly urban. Therefore, to some extent, there is the need to change the mind-set so that ICT infrastructure is seen as a natural or necessary part of development, even in the remotest areas. If poverty and its eradication or its amelioration is tackled as a matter of relative poverty then this strengthens the case for ICT at village level. Relative poverty tends to show the poverty of the community rather than the poverty of the individuals in that community. In this sense, even if an individual is not poor but his environment is poor, then there is a need for investment in ICT. In reality, better educated individuals or with more experience because of his or her mobility would fit the ICT requirement. But in reality people in remote areas and in remote villages have limited possibilities to any development that ICT could support.

To view ICT as networks of infrastructure and public facilities is to see it as a part of development rights. These rights are a part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and have been emphasised throughout the 34th United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. One important point agreed at that conference is that ICT is a part of sustainable development in developing countries. Therefore, government has a responsibility to provide ICT infrastructure

to poor, marginalised people and to those who live in the remoter areas of the country.

The ideas and assumptions of society as a whole are playing an increasing part in social theory and for the poor and underprivileged to participate it is necessary that ICT be easily available. According to Manuel Castells (2000), more and more the world is reshaping as the networked society in which computers and the internet play important roles. In the networked society, more and more, economic development would be improved or retarded by the use or not of computers and the internet. Therefore a person, people, or a community that has limited access to either or both would need to put a greater effort into eradicating their poverty. The poor are marginalised in accessing knowledge and information. Therefore, poverty in the sense of relative poverty could be eradicated on the assumption that giving them access to information and information networks would enable them to avoid the poverty trap.

In terms of the networked society scheme of things, the poor are part of a global situation, to be poor is to be part of the poverty network. This perspective moves the identification of the poor from the individual to the social situation of the poor. Therefore, poverty should be seen in a wider context, such as the community or society. The networked society also makes the claim that computers and the internet play important roles in terms of access to information that can help to fight poverty. To follow this line of thinking, Indonesia should put more thought into understanding the significance of the computers and the internet.

As has been shown before, to understand the importance of computers and the internet, there needs to be a shifting of the mind-set. It is also has been shown that it is not easy to change mind-sets, let alone change the behaviour and attitudes to computers and the internet. The general acceptance and approval of ICT by the poor is hampered by the idea that computers and the internet will lead to moral degeneration, especially of the younger generation, and that ICT is for the use and benefit of educated, urban middle and upper classes. It is also thought that those

in remote areas, in isolated villages and who belong to the lower orders, are unsuited to programs that encourage the use of ICT.

> In Castells' view (1996) the space of flows is about the sequences and interactions between actors and institutions whose behaviour, strategy and policy shape spacial outcomes (Southern, 2001: 427).

If Castells' arguments are to be accepted, there is a need for countries who want to break the poverty trap to change mind-sets as well as build the infrastructure of ICT. According to Castells, to get a specific outcome using the ICT there needs to be an accepting mind-set and infrastructure support by farsighted government policies because this is a sociological structure that would push forward the changing of behaviour. This is not easy because it is a part of the digital divide in countries such as Indonesia.

The contribution ICT can make is as a tool that can enable communities, and countries, to escape the poverty trap. But ICT is not only about the people but also the technology and vice versa. It is a part of the challenge for people who want to eradicate poverty to include ICT in their scheme.

> It is much more than mere use of technology. It is more a question of working with people, giving them a sense of ownership, building partnerships with a number of experts and institutions, and creating a large and inclusive network. In the end, technology is just an enabler (Weigel and Waldburger, 2004: 215).

Weigel and Waldburger (2004: 206–227) advocate that people, in this case the Indonesian people, should be encouraged to the view that computers and access to the internet are social and economic goods that need support and sufficient funding because they are a necessary element of infrastructure. The PePP pilot project has shown the way and should be seen as a positive step not an aberration. The arguments by

those who decry the benefits from enabling computer use and internet access need to be countered by changing the common perceptions of poverty and showing how it might be mitigated by the benefits of ICT that have resulted from globalisation

Conclusion

The biggest challenge for the telecentres is their position between their function to empower the community and to cater for business needs. The empowerment is a function of the infomobilisation. Telecentres are not able to hire infomobilisation staff because of the high salaries needed, which the PePP formerly paid. The province of Jawa Timur understands the importance of infomobilisation and on their own initiative they are developing telecentres in every municipality. They understand their financial limits and therefore they have rationalised telecentre management to three important roles and functions only; management (with a capacity for infomobilisation), secretarial and operational. They maintain equipment by outsourcing, by depending on local computer repair shops or by relying on a staff member with the right skills.

But for people who believe that technology is able to distribute information far more widely and that it is an essential element of the social and commercial infrastructure for people and communities on the margins of society, this program is very important indeed. This is evidence that ICT delivers benefits. The challenge is to overcome the perception that people in remote and rural areas are incapable of using or benefiting from new technology and techniques.

The PePP is in East Java Province, which, considering the geographical extent of the Indonesian archipelago, can not be considered a remote area, but the lessons learnt and the technological possibilities exposed can be applied anywhere. The people behind the bureaucracy of this province already are able to understand the basic principles of this program, and these have to be followed by the other provinces.

Using ICT for poverty reduction should be one of the main programs to facilitate regional autonomy but political interests tend to dominate development programs. Discussion of regional autonomy and development includes social development for all classes of society, which in turn will lead to growth in productivity and employment. Enabling the economic growth of rural areas is a part of the networked society's predicament of development.

It is not easy for this program of establishing telecentres to be understood because it can be stereotyped as a rolling out of ICT, as a program to distribute modern communication technology only. For some observers, the program is a part of a neoliberal agenda to suck resources from third-world countries, a point of view that gets added credence from the known effects of the global economy. As has been shown, ICT is part of a global commitment by countries, under the United Nations, that understand the neoliberal pro and con arguments. Therefore, the commitment to counter poverty needs to be understood in terms of a network, otherwise people would protest about negative effects on third-world countries. There is a need to have an alternative to eradicating the poverty using ICT. Not to have such a strategy would put third-world countries further behind.

To some, ICT is a tool, an enabler, and it means that ICT is an important element of infrastructure. For ICT to have an effect on the eradication of poverty, it is necessary for a nation to include ICT in its infrastructure, for poverty is not an individual problem and a nation should have special strategies to fight it, in this case, to bridge the digital divide. In this line of thinking, the nation should invest in ICT infrastructure. ICT as infrastructure is also a part of development rights; therefore, a nation should provide ICT for poor, marginalised people and people in the remote areas.

The telecentres in this study have had some influence, direct and indirect. The direct influences are that the telecentre provides information on market prices, employment and other pertinent topics. The telecentres give opportunities for people to develop ICT and related skills; therefore,

there is a trickle-down effect for some people that will enable them to raise their incomes. The program needs an appropriate evaluation to view the problem in terms of digital divide indicators. This is important because the PePP program suffers from a perception that poor people are incapable of using computers and the internet. The program itself needs a longer implementation time because it should set up a solid foundation for a system of knowledge and infrastructure. In terms of poverty, the persistence of relative poverty has shown that poverty is not easy to fight and the program can not show a direct welfare effect. Some people used to see the implications of poverty as linear and that programs to eliminate it would add to the welfare of society. But in reality, poverty is mostly quite difficult to see.

As a program, it is important that ICT4P be included in government development of electronic means for economic and welfare ends. The government needs to include this program in its blueprint as a part of its commitment to the global awareness of co-opting ICT for development. ICT has made it possible for people to get information about the global demand for commodities that could be used to find and develop products for markets. But to do this, according to the experience of the PePP program, the role of infomobiliser is very important. It is quite expensive to have a specific person assigned to the role but there are several persons able to be educated for the role, such as computer operators. People in rural areas still need a person to interpret the information they need to download from the internet.

Indonesia has a grand plan for ICT implementation in its remote areas. But this grand plan might not come to much more than a long running, jargon-filled discourse instead of realising its purpose; that is, to meet the needs of society. This study is showing that people who live in rural areas at present are badly in need of other, more effective methods to enable better agricultural production. ICT, as a readily available tool, can be used to enable quicker and more certain ways to communicate to Indonesian workers about the social and legal arrangements in other countries to where they hope to emigrate. Many migrant workers have

no idea of the social situation in the countries they intend to work in. For example, ICT can help to record and to broadcast the experiences of migrant workers who have worked in foreign countries. Not only that, publicly available technology will allow cheaper and faster communication with relatives.

For the community, there is a need for internet literacy to be provided by the telecentres and educational institutions. Such literacy is needed to enable, and to protect, the people who use the new technology. ICT is a mode of communication that is quite different from what people have used previously. That computer and communication literacy is necessary to enable would-be users is to state the obvious; but is it also necessary for their protection? Yes, because computer skills and knowledge can be used for criminal purposes against naïve, complacent or ignorant users and, as well, there are privacy concerns about personal statements and the uploading of photographs.

To understand the logic of ICT use, it is important to know and understand how streams of information now extend worldwide and that connectivity is very important for those people and communities who need to tap into these streams. The network perspective used in this article has shown that poverty, relative poverty that is, will not change if access to computers and the internet is limited or not available. In this situation, people or communities that don't have access to ICT suffer more poverty than do those people or countries in which governments have enabled such access. Telecentres are different from internet cafés; they help to raise a community's level of ICT skill and knowledge, to empower it; internet cafés are for those individuals who are already skilled. There is so much to be done to provide better access to ICT with programs such as the CSR (corporate social responsibility) scheme. It only a part of the synergy among the constituents of the social situations in each community.

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Dissertation Summary
Elites and Economic Policies
in Indonesia and Nigeria, 1966-1998[1]

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This study analyses why Indonesia and Nigeria experienced contrasting development trajectories from 1966 to 1998, despite their similar socio-economic and political conditions. During this period, Indonesia was more successful than Nigeria in managing economic development. What did the Indonesian government do to successfully manage the economy that the Nigerian government did not do? Why did policy elites in the two countries choose different policies while facing similar economic challenges? The analysis focuses on these two questions. First, it examines the economic policies that led to the diverging economic performance of the two countries. Second, it examines potential factors that might explain this contrast in policy.

Unlike previous studies that analyse the divergence using an institutional approach, this study proposes an alternative view: that Nigerian policy-makers were mistaken or misguided about what was necessary to achieve sustainable and equitable economic growth. The personal background of top economic policy-makers is shown to be important for economic development in a developing country. A contrast in economic performance arose under roughly similar institutional arrangements in Indonesia and Nigeria, and the contrast arose from the response of

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1   This PhD dissertation has been publicly defended on 19 April 2012 as a requirement to obtain a doctorate degree at the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Universiteit van Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

policy-makers to institutional challenges. Without neglecting the role of institutional arrangements in shaping policy decisions, this study shows that knowledge and beliefs acquired by policy-makers through their life experience and educational training were decisive for the course of development.

Using primary data from interviews as well as written sources collected during my fieldwork in Indonesia (July 2008–March 2009) and Nigeria (March–September 2009), the analysis focuses on two points in time when the two countries started to show a divergence in economic performance. First, the late 1960s, when the Indonesian economy started to grow rapidly and continuously with the agricultural sector as the engine of growth, while the Nigerian economy failed to grow because of the neglect of agriculture. Second, the early 1980s, when, with oil prices starting to drop, Indonesia embarked on export-oriented industrialization with a series of liberalization measures, while Nigeria failed to depart from its import-substitution strategy.

In Indonesia, economic policy-makers came from a very narrow range of society and had a roughly similar background. They were similar not only in educational background, but also in terms of generation, social origins, life experience, as well as ethnicity. Meanwhile, Nigeria's policy-makers came from more diverse origins. They were appointed to the cabinet to meet requirements of ethnic, regional and religious representation designed to reflect the federal character of the state. The institutional view suggests that diversity and fragmentation of the Nigerian elite made it difficult for them to arrive at a consensus within the government, which then led to inefficient policies. This study, however, shows that there was no significant difference in development vision among Nigerian policy-makers. Regardless of their ethnicity or religion, they were all particularly interested in transforming the economy into a self-reliant, industrialized, and state-driven economy. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that regional, ethnic and religious differences in Nigeria did not lead to difficulty in forming a consensus about the overall development direction.

Along with political fragmentation, political pressure on policy-makers and regime instability have been seen as major obstacles to development in Nigeria. However, the contrasting trajectory of development in Indonesia and Nigeria suggests an alternative argument. The economic policy-makers in both countries were working under military regimes. My interviews with members of the policy elites in the two countries show that they were in fact sufficiently insulated from military and political pressure. This all supports the argument that economic policies implemented in each country reflected policy-makers' ideas and vision of development, and were not merely a result of institutional problems such as elite fragmentation or political pressure. Nigeria's policy-makers may have come from a more diverse background than Indonesian policy-makers, but their vision of development was not fragmented along the lines of diversity.

Three major policy contrasts between the two countries are highlighted: rural or urban development orientation, exchange-rate policy, and industrialization policy. Since the late 1960s, with agriculture as the engine of growth, Indonesia's economy grew rapidly, accompanied by a steady reduction in poverty. By contrast, the Nigerian economy slowed down. This was triggered in particular by the neglect of agriculture, which provided the largest contribution to the Nigerian economy. Indonesian policy-makers put rural-agricultural development as their first priority, while Nigerian policy-makers preferred industrialization at an early stage of development.

Indonesia's policy elite argued that agricultural development would increase the income of the majority of the country's population, which in turn would increase demand for the industrial sector that provided supplies needed by farmers and therefore would increase national income. Increase in domestic food production was also considered desirable in order to reduce food imports and to reduce the threat of inflation resulting from the pressure of rising food prices. Meanwhile, Nigeria's policy-makers prioritized development of the urban-manufacturing sector, which they believed would bring with it growth,

development and modernization. Without a rapid increase in value-added in the manufacturing sector and sufficient transfer of technology, Nigerian policy-makers believed that the economy would remain merely a supplier of raw materials for the developed world.

Analysis of industrialization policy in the two countries shows that Indonesia's policy-makers were very pragmatic in their way of thinking. They believed that market forces were necessary for the economy to progress, but they also realized the importance of government intervention to handle market failures. The pragmatism of Indonesian policy-makers is also shown by swings in policy from time to time. In Nigeria, the economic orientation of the policy elite did not really change much during the decades after independence. From the time of independence onward, policy-makers continued to be obsessed with promoting value-added industries through an active role of government.

In the early 1980s, the Indonesian economy embarked on an export-oriented industrialization strategy that sustained the rapid growth of the economy. A series of liberalization measures was introduced and made the manufacturing sector the engine of exports, surpassing the oil and the agricultural sectors. By contrast, Nigeria's policy-makers half-heartedly liberalized the economy and the economy deteriorated further after the 1980s; the economy grew very slowly, GDP per capita decreased, and manufacturing industries ran into difficulties. Indonesia's policy-makers were more open to the international market than Nigerian policy-makers, who preferred a regulatory nationalism with a strong role for the government. While Nigeria's policy-makers held on to a nationalist economic way of thinking, Indonesia's policy-makers pragmatically adopted market-oriented policies.

The contrast between a rural-based and an urban-based development vision, as well as between market-oriented pragmatism and regulatory nationalism, can be seen clearly in the two countries' macroeconomic, particularly exchange-rate, policies. Indonesia's policy-makers devalued the rupiah several times, which increased the competitiveness of Indonesia's exports on the world market. In contrast, Nigeria's

policy-makers maintained the overvalued naira, which caused exports to deteriorate, and further stimulated import dependence as well as reliance on oil revenue. The decision not to correct the naira to its market value jeopardized non-oil exports, making them lose competitiveness on the international market. The agricultural sector, which had previously contributed the majority of the country's exports, was priced out. Moreover, the agricultural sector, on which most of the population relied, suffered from import competition. In the early 1980s, for instance, Nigeria heavily imported food products to satisfy demand by urban consumers.

From a political economy point of view, the decision of Nigeria's policy-makers not to devalue the naira shows that they did not attach too much importance to agricultural development in rural areas. They were more concerned about how devaluation might harm the urban-industrial sector, which relied heavily on imported raw materials. A strong naira also benefited urban consumers in the short term, at the cost of ordinary Nigerian farmers. In contrast, devaluation in Indonesia helped boost the income of Indonesian farmers who produced export crops, especially in rural areas outside Java.

Without neglecting economic, political and institutional arguments, this study shows that the background of policy-makers is an important factor in the contrast between the two countries. One part of their background is their life experience. Policy elites in Indonesia and Nigeria came from a roughly similar social background. They came from middle-class families, with parents having occupations such as bureaucrats, teachers, traders and traditional rulers; only a few of them came from a peasant background. However, this does not mean that they had no experience of rural living. Most of the policy-makers during the period studied were born in the 1920s or 1930s, when agriculture was the main source of livelihood of the vast majority of the population. However, Indonesian and Nigerian policy-makers learned to perceive the agricultural sector differently. Indonesian policy-makers had learned from their family the importance of improving the lot of peasants. In contrast, Nigeria's elites

had been taught to move out of the agricultural sector to urban life in order to avoid poverty.

There is also a difference between the two countries in the perceived social and cultural divide between town and countryside. In Nigeria, this cultural divide appears to have been wider than in Indonesia, and there was a tendency to idealize urban living as the standard for modernization. Also, the greater attraction of modern urban life may be partly because development of urban areas in Nigeria is a relatively new phenomenon compared to the much earlier urbanization of Indonesia.

Policy elites in Indonesia and Nigeria also had different experiences of nationalism and struggle for independence. In Indonesia, many policy-makers during their formative years had participated in guerrilla wars, where they had to mingle with the rural population in order to disguise themselves from the colonial armed forces. Nigeria's elites did not experience a struggle for independence where they had to mingle with peasants. In contrast, during their formative years prior to Nigerian independence, they experienced an elite urban lifestyle. This does not mean that Nigeria's policy-makers were less nationalistic than Indonesia's policy-makers, but they seem to have had a different attitude toward rural life and a different vision of modern life.

This study also shows the importance of the practical experience of policy elites. The economic and political chaos during Sukarno's period provided a strong lesson for Suharto's team of economists not to make similar mistakes. Therefore, they controlled inflation, ensured food sufficiency, increased the income of the majority of the population through agricultural development, and opened the economy to the world market. They recognized that economic insulation, imprudent macroeconomic management, and neglect of the agricultural sector would only harm the Indonesian economy. In Nigeria, the nature of the economic crisis made it difficult to recognize it as policy failure. The decrease in agricultural development was slow, and Nigeria's staple foods, such as yam and cassava, remained widely available domestically. This was different to the nature of the crisis in Indonesia in

the 1960s, which could only be blamed on wrong policy. Deteriorating economic conditions in Nigeria in the 1980s could easily be blamed on decreasing oil prices. Therefore, Nigeria's policy-makers were able to keep on neglecting the agricultural sector, and maintaining regulatory nationalism at the expense of the majority of the population.

In addition, Indonesia's policy-makers had a practical understanding of the radicalism of small-scale farmers. They had experienced the ability of peasants to organize themselves, and to be organized as a socio-political force, because this had been demonstrated in the beginning of 1960s by the Indonesian Communist Party. There is a tradition of rural revolt in Indonesia, which had the potential to be dangerous for Suharto's New Order regime. In contrast, Nigeria's policy-makers lacked such experience of rural revolt.

The educational background of policy-makers is another important factor in their contrasting policies. Indonesia's policy-makers were technocrats with a policy-oriented economics background. Most of them had formal training in economics in the United States, where they learned about economic policy tools. Their background in policy-oriented economics made them pragmatic, less attached to any ideology, in their policy choices. They could at once be very liberal and also interventionist, depending on the needs of the economy. Their empirical and policy-oriented, rather than polemical and philosophical, mindset was very important in their choice of policies. Nigeria's policy-makers had been educated in a greater diversity of subjects, such as law, administration, education and politics. Although a number of Nigeria's policy-makers had also been trained in economics, it was mainly in the political economy tradition of Europe. Because of their educational background, Nigeria's policy-makers often believed that economic calculations should not take precedence over political considerations.

The differences in educational background influenced not only the mindset of the policy elites, but also their dealings with other actors in the policy arena. This can be seen in their relationship with international organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank. The shared language

of economics made it easier for Indonesia's policy-makers to build a partnership with IMF and World Bank officers. In contrast, Nigeria's policy-makers saw these international organizations as external powers representing a new form of colonialism and therefore hesitated to work with them.

This study suggests a recipe for sustainable and equitable growth. First, the government should prioritize investment in the agricultural sector. Second, the government should attempt to incorporate the majority of the population in development programs. Third, the government needs to carefully integrate the domestic economy into the world market, by providing more incentives for export-oriented industries. Fourth, macroeconomic management, particularly to keep the exchange rate realistic, is important not only for export products to be able to compete on the international market, but also to help avoid dependence on imports.

At long last, the Netherlands had acknowledged that Indonesia was independent, which brought the Indonesian Revolution to its logical conclusion. But, by the conditions laid down at the Round Table Conference in The Hague in late 1949, the interests of Dutch private capital were still omnipresent in the Indonesian economy. In addition, the Indonesian government was obliged to consult the Netherlands government in matters affecting the economy until the debt of the former colony to the metropolitan mother country had been repaid in full.

J Thomas Lindblad
"The Economic Decolonisation of Indonesia: a Bird's-eye View"

The lands below the winds that is called the 'Malay world', as poignantly noted by Barnard and Maier is an enigmatic reference that will be continually contested. The contestation occurred in what I call 'crossing points' in the course of this region's history. In fact, we could say that this region has been shaped through the repeated emergence of crossing points. In the light of history, what happens in Malaysia cannot be separated from the dynamics of its neighbouring countries, particularly Indonesia. In these series of crossing points, as I indicated earlier, Indonesia seems to be 'the Other' for Malaysia. In the lands below the winds, histories have shown that territoriality and authority are often invisible and people move freely, crossing the invisible borders that will always contribute to the richness of this region's civilisation.

Riwanto Tirtosudarmo
"Flows and Movements in the Lands below the Winds"

In the reef fishery case, it is identified that the social networks attached to the resources (fishing networks) are more characterised by socioeconomic interests, where self-esteem and social prestige are present and influential. On the other hand, the social networks attached to fish marketing are more characterised by profit maximisation, and the social networks attached to the policy and administrative aspect are characterised by maximising additional income through corruption. The interplay of socioeconomic interests, profit maximisation and maximising additional income have been the foundation of the LRFF fishing and trade.

Irendra Radjawali
"Social Networks and the Live Reef Food Fish Trade: Examining Sustainability"

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