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Articles

Introduction: Understanding Indonesia

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This special issue of the Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities (JISSH) has its origins in a series of seminars jointly sponsored in 2005 and 2006 by the Asian Studies Institute (ASI) of the Victoria University of Wellington and the Indonesian Embassy in New Zealand. Although many papers from those seminars appeared in institute proceedings, the audience remained largely confined to New Zealand, despite the presence of fine articles that have deserved wider circulation. We are pleased here to offer new versions of some of those essays, updated in the light of recent developments, along with specially commissioned contributions.

The particular theme of those joint seminars was "Understanding Indonesia," and as I write the introduction to this special issue, the apparent ambition of that title strikes me once again with diffidence. Understanding Indonesia? How can one hope to "understand" Indonesia in any meaningful sense? Was this title a foolhardy choice on our part? A phrase with the potential to be misread as an arrogant claim? The five articles here, though treating within the Indonesian context such a broad variety of topics as foreign policy and Islam, local vs. national identity, gender and democracy, popular culture and class, and economic nationalism, obviously present no more than a very limited set of partial understandings—glimpses, if you will, into a nation of enormous complexity.

Nonetheless, the title is perhaps not so unreasonable, if considered from a different perspective: modest as the ultimate result may be, this volume presents the work of specialists who are attempting at an explicit level

to dispel a common practice not only in New Zealand but further afield of "Misunderstanding Indonesia." It is fair to say, unfortunately, that Indonesia has had an image problem in many countries, New Zealand not least among them. A host of pernicious stereotypes frequently resurface in local media coverage of Indonesia, despite—or perhaps because of—Indonesia's status as New Zealand's closest Asian neighbour. Even when not succumbing to negative imagery, media treatment is often superficial and subject to bias. As then Ambassador Primo Alui Joelianto noted in his opening address for one seminar, at times it seems that the New Zealand public's understanding of Indonesia has stood in inverse relationship to its relative geographic proximity. Promoting more nuanced views of one of the world's most remarkable nations needs support.

Of course, it also must be recognised that even specialists face serious challenges in understanding Indonesia. It is difficult enough to develop a deep understanding of smaller, more homogenous social units such as an ethnic community, a city, or even a village, let alone a nation of Indonesia's diversity. If I compare Indonesia with South Korea, my primary field within Asian Studies, I would note that scholars of the latter nation often have to deconstruct totalising discourses suggesting that South Korea is a monolithic, somehow graspable entity. To be sure, the Korean peninsula existed for several centuries as an integrated political unit until its division after World War II, and, at least in some senses, contemporary South Korea functions not unlike an enormous city-state. Roughly 50 per cent of the nation's population now lives within the Seoul greater metropolitan area. Communication networks and continuing development of transport infrastructure create a ready web of links that draw the nation into an ever smaller compass. Dialects persist, but as recognisable variants of a common language. Popular consciousness has frequent recourse to the notion of a single bloodline (*tanil minjok*) for the Korean people. Little wonder that Koreanists at times must combat a belief that deeper understanding of South Korea primarily involves peeling away layers and moving towards a core essence.

Understanding Indonesia, by contrast, as often pointed out, requires appreciating the challenges faced by a nation-state containing, very literally, hundreds of languages and distinct ethnicities—an "extremely vast and complex…jigsaw puzzle", in the words of volume author Dewi Fortuna Anwar. If South Korea, rightly or not, metaphorically becomes an onion in the framework described above, then Indonesia is a mixed salad with a stunning variety of ingredients. To travel from the most remote mountain settlement in South Korea to Seoul can readily be accomplished within a day; even with plane flights, however, to travel from, say, an isolated town in Sumatra to a village in Papua might require days on the road. But even far briefer movement can entail striking shifts: one of my most memorable and illuminating experiences in Indonesia was to be invited, on consecutive days, to attend first a funeral in upland Christian-animist Tana Toraja, and then a wedding less than 100 kilometers down the road in Enrekang, whose Muslim inhabitants fall within a larger Bugis-Makassarese ethnic cluster. Each area is of course well-known for its respective celebrations of these crucial life passages, and the striking contrast within twenty-four hours brought home at a visceral level not only Indonesia's kaleidoscopic variety of cultures but also the challenges the country faces in imagining a coherent national community. As Graeme MacRae notes in his article here "If Indonesia is Too Hard to Understand, Let's Start with Bali", even for a citizen-subject, grasping Indonesia is difficult.

How indeed do the people of Indonesia make sense of their own nation? Just to cite one common strategy from my own excursions into literary translation, cultural productions can simultaneously reinforce and problematise particular notions of Indonesian identity. In "I Want to Live" (*Aku Mau Hidup*), for example, a short story set amidst the upheavals of 1998 that brought down the Soeharto regime, Indonesian author in exile Rondang Erlina Marpaung has her protagonist set forth a proud humanistic doctrine: "Tell your children that we love Indonesia, our country, that we love wisdom and democracy. Tell them the usual things: that our country holds 13,000 islands scattered over 5,000 kilometers of sea. Its inhabitants are Muslim, Christian, Hindu,

Buddhist. Tell them that we must be able to live side by side with one another in peace."[1] The words take on added resonance and no small irony, in that the speaker is a young Christian woman who has been gunned down during a demonstration and addresses these words from beyond the grave to the Muslim youth she loves.

The prismatic effects of the imagination play a determinant role in how people everywhere understand the world around them; the popular production and consumption of images engage in an ongoing dialectic that shapes discourse even as images are in turn shaped by that discourse. As mentioned above, however, understanding Indonesia becomes perhaps even more difficult, both internally and externally, because of negative images resulting from turmoil and what Dewi Fortuna Anwar terms here the " 'CNN effect' as graphic news of violence and conflicts are repeated over and over again, obscuring other realities." South Koreans may complain at times that memories of the Korean War continue to colour images of their country, and that North Korea, the South's estranged sibling, runs interference in any project of national branding; in Indonesia's case, the unfortunate repetition of terrorist incidents and sectarian clashes has an equally weighty effect on understandings of the nation, domestically and abroad.

Consider as another example the short story "Bom,"[2] which Putu Wijaya, probably Bali's most noteworthy literary figure, posted on his blog in 2009. Here the author makes an intertextual reference to his own work (an earlier short story collection by the same title), but reality itself has thrown up a much more palpable and disturbing referent than the free flights of fancy that characterized the previous tales, as its protagonists struggle to make sense of the most recent bombing at the Jakarta Marriott. Putu Wijaya's use of the blogging medium itself suggests further changes in the propagation of imagery about Indonesia in the few short years since the Understanding Indonesia seminars: although the community reached by the author's work may remain linguistically

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1   Rondang Erlina Marpaung, "I Want to Live" (*Aku Mau Hidup*) tr. By Stephen J. Epstein, *Menagerie* 6, 2004: 65.

2   http://putuwijaya.wordpress.com/2009/07/20/bom/

bounded by the use of Bahasa Indonesia, its potentially international reach signals that developments in information and communication technology will bring about further evolution in how understandings of Indonesia are determined.

Certainly even in the Web 2.0 era, global understandings of Indonesia will remain conditioned by the nation's own contested, fragmented and developing understanding of itself, and all the papers here address this internal debate over identity in one way or another. Graeme MacRae, for example, who leads off, examines how the Balinese, a smaller ethnic group that stands apart from the majority in religious terms, find their place within the nation. MacRae highlights tensions between local and national identifications and multiple and overlapping senses of community in a manner that parallels and complements Wijaya's literary approach in "Bom". Bali's own recent experience of tragic bombings and the ensuing crisis of confidence have impelled many Balinese to query their self-understanding and their relationship to the larger national context in which they find themselves. MacRae discusses in detail the *Ajeg Bali* movement, which has aimed at restoring Bali to a perceived strong, upright position. As he notes, such projects are inextricably bound up with Balinese definitions vis-à-vis the Other, which look variously towards the West, towards Jakarta, towards Java and Lombok more generally, and particularly towards poorer Muslims who have migrated to the island in great numbers concomitant with the boom in Bali's tourism industry.

MacRae concludes with a question that should be extended to this issue of *JISSH* as a whole: what can we learn from the individual understandings of Indonesia presented here? The *Ajeg Bali* movement itself is highly contingent upon context and even in the few years since MacRae first published on the topic, much has changed in response to circumstance. Does a consideration of the topic, then, lead to "understanding Indonesia", or merely contribute to "imagining multiple Indonesias"? Of course, "understanding" and "imagination" are intertwined. The moment "Indonesia" is reified as something knowable, there is a risk of serious distortion. All who attempt to understand Indonesia must

continually remind themselves that knowledge invokes constructs dependent upon one's position, and that these constructs are themselves perpetually being negotiated. This awareness must not, however, lead to a nihilistic decision to abandon the endeavor: the impulse to "understand Indonesia" remains not merely valid but necessary because of its real world consequences.

Dewi Fortuna Anwar gives a sense of precisely the real world consequences that are at stake in "Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia," in which she updates her keynote address from a Wellington seminar focusing on that trio of topics. Although, as she notes, each can be considered in isolation, the linking of the three yields useful insights. Here Anwar provides an overview of the relations between Islam and democracy in Indonesia with particular reference to their implications for Indonesian foreign policy. Consideration of these themes again evokes, inevitably, the crucial issue of Indonesia's identity and its evolution in recent years. Quoting President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, she notes the importance of anchoring Indonesia's attempts at managing its international identity in a strongly rooted internal sense of self, not least because foreign policy is an extension of domestic politics.

In an international climate that offers challenges and opportunities, Anwar argues that Indonesia has seen potential to carve out a niche for itself as a bridge between the Islamic world and the West. In its attempt to do so, Indonesia engages in a nation-branding exercise and seeks to present an example of a society in which Islam, democracy and modernity go hand in hand, but in Anwar's reading this initiative is hampered by two factors: first, acts of religious intolerance including terrorist violence have undercut Indonesia's attempts to serve as a role model, and, secondly, despite having the world 's highest population of Muslims, Indonesia's peripheral status within the wider Islamic *ummah* impede efforts to become a leader. Her analysis provides a salutary reminder that understandings of Indonesia in a broader context remain dependent on external factors such as international images of Islam,

and that a global understanding of the nation must take into account constituencies beyond the West.

In "Participating in Parliamentary Politics: Experiences of Indonesian Women 1995–2010," Sharyn Graham Davies and Nurul Ilmi Idrus move the question of understanding contemporary Indonesia in a different direction as they discuss female experience, concentrating on participation in the political sphere. By contextualising their examination of women's participatory rates in parliament within a wider consideration of female participation in politics and the public sphere more generally, their focus broadens to shed light upon several important issues in evolving gender relations from the latter years of the New Order until the present. Their analysis exposes contradictions that require unpacking: understanding Indonesia requires reconciling the significant influence that women have traditionally wielded with their low rates of participation in governmental roles.

Thee Kan Wie of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences also calls attention to the need for similarly broad perspectives in his article "Understanding Indonesia: the Role of Economic Nationalism," as he surveys the role that nationalism has played in economic policy from Independence until the present. Thee's explorations again relate to the question of identity at a fundamental level: how does Indonesia understand itself in relation to the rest of the world? How does it demarcate the boundaries of the nation? Who and what counts as foreign and how have such definitions changed over time? Thee makes a compelling case for the determining effect that these questions have had in the economic sphere. After discussing how economic nationalism in the 1950s was directed particularly at continuing Dutch economic interests, he considers how ethnic Chinese were treated, an issue complicated by the fact that the category included not only Indonesian citizens, but citizens of the PRC and those who were loyal to Taiwan and stateless. He then moves on to the Malari incident of 1974 with its anti-Japanese sentiments, and the 1990s and the desire for strategic development of industries including high-tech that would reflect Indonesia's aspirations as an emerging

power before turning in conclusion to the post-Soeharto era and critiques of IMF intervention.

Emma Baulch's article "Music for the *Pria Dewasa*: Changes and Continuities in Class and Popular Music Genres" treats identity issues from a thoroughly different perspective but becomes a surprisingly germane companion piece to Thee's in its treatment of how the normative Indonesian subject is constructed. Considering the arrival of the Indonesian version of *Rolling Stone* in terms of the intersections of media, popular music and what Baulch terms notions of "middleness", she opens up a view on the changing parameters of class in Indonesia and the role of the *pria dewasa* (adult male) within this system. In doing so, she stakes out a provocative position in running against the grain of much scholarship on the Indonesian middle class, which posits that quantifiable growth took place as a result of New Order economic policies. Baulch notes that she resists the idea that "an Indonesian middle class identity can be singularly associated with the political vision of those groups of intellectuals who supported the establishment of the regime, then became disillusioned with it." Her complex reading of Indonesian mythologies of middleness and the discursive structures that have underpinned it in popular culture provide another illuminating avenue for understanding Indonesia.

Some final remarks to conclude this brief introduction: the five years since the "Understanding Indonesia" seminar series was launched have given cause for optimism that Indonesia's image is improving in New Zealand and further afield. The period, roughly coterminous with SBY's first term, can also be seen as successful to the extent that Indonesians returned their president to office in open elections that suggested a substantial vote of confidence. The ongoing process of *Reformasi*, though requiring the balancing of pre-existing norms and the emergence of new forces, including an ever more vibrant civil society, continues apace. It is a striking mark of how far the nation has traveled from authoritarianism to democracy that it now eagerly encourages vigorous, often critical, debate, as witnessed in the Embassy's desire to partner with the Asian Studies Institute for the Understanding Indonesia series.

It remains here to thank again the embassy as well as the many speakers in the series, and the contributors here who remind us that simple acknowledgements of the nation's diversity cannot get us far without knowledge of the specific contexts in which Indonesia operates; true understanding of Indonesia will always necessitate careful, nuanced empirical studies of the sort presented by *JISSH*.

If Indonesia is Too Hard to Understand, Let's Start with Bali

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Abstract

Stereotypical representations, especially those by the media, are for most outside observers, the means and an obstacle to understanding Indonesia. One way around such stereotypes is to look at the way Indonesians themselves understand Indonesia. This essay reports and reflects on Balinese understandings of Indonesia in the wake of the political, economic and terrorist upheavals of the early years of the twenty-first century. It concludes with an epilogue and update, arguing that the real issues for understanding Indonesia are now environmental.

Understanding Indonesia

'Understanding' Indonesia is no easy matter for non-Indonesians. Looking from the outside, usually through media representations, we tend to see something large and monolithic, which we habitually apprehend through such simplifications as 'the world's most populous Muslim nation' or 'an authoritarian state in transition to democracy', or a place where nice Australian kids are imprisoned for things they say they didn't do—things we might not think are all that bad anyway. Such simplifications and stereotypes are inevitable, but they obscure a lot more than they reveal. Our job as scholars with claims to some kind of deeper understanding of Indonesia is to transcend such stereotypes and work toward deeper, more nuanced and more productive understandings.

What these stereotypes most obscure are the vast and multiple diversities in Indonesia. An example is the religious diversity not only between Islam and other religions but between the many different local and doctrinal approaches to Islam. The stereotypes also obscure the historical

process by which the nation-state called Indonesia was constructed and is maintained. When we look at this process, the labour of creating unity from diversity becomes visible and any illusions of essential unity slip away quickly. The stereotypes also obscure the consideration that understanding any place, including Indonesia, depends from where we look: Australia or America, East Malaysia or East Timor, ASEAN or the IMF, Jakarta or Jayapura.

For Indonesians themselves, the problems of understanding their own country are no doubt different but I think there is something to be learnt about Indonesia's relations with other countries by studying the ways outsiders see Indonesia. At best, some of these points of view of outsiders might even tell Indonesians something about their own country that is not so apparent to them. A first principle of anthropology is that one benefit of studying another culture is the new insights into our own culture that we derive in the process. This essay follows this principle but extends the principle a little further.

It is based on an outsider's point of view, but one in which I try to understand something about Indonesia through the way one group of Indonesians view their nation and their relationship with it. A range of understandings of Indonesia from say, Jakarta, Aceh, West Papua and Maluku, that is, from the extremities of the archipelago, would begin to provide a map of the range of these relationships and points of view. In my own case, whatever understanding I have of Indonesia comes primarily through my experience of living in Bali, among Balinese and listening and talking to them about their lives. In the process, I have learnt that they see their own country to some extent as all Indonesians do, but also from a very distinctively Balinese point of view.[1]

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1 This paper is a revised version of one first presented at a symposium in New Zealand oriented to a general New Zealand audience rather than a specialist one on Indonesia, let alone to Indonesians themselves. In this version, the lens is rotated a further turn to speak to Indonesian social scientists. It is based largely on research conducted jointly with Nyoman Darma Putra and published separately (MacRae and Darma Putra, 2007; 2008; 2009) but also on regular research in Bali dating back to 1993. This was facilitated initially by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and has been funded partly by Auckland and Massey Universities.

Indonesia? What part of Bali is that? (attributed to an Australian tourist)

Bali is in some ways very Indonesian, close to the geographical centre of the country, with a culture blending elements of the historically Indic culture of Java to the west and the more Austronesian cultures of the islands of Nusa Tenggara to the east and, as well, it has a history linked to many key moments in Indonesian history. But it is also a very atypical part of Indonesia: more affluent than most parts of the country; possessed of both an economy more closely integrated through tourism within the global economy than to the wider Indonesian economy, and a contemporary culture likewise closely integrated with tourism; a contemporary culture likewise closely integrated with tourism; an island of Hinduism surrounded by a sea of Islam; and most Balinese people in recent decades have remained fairly peripheral to national political processes.

During the enforced tranquillity of the New Order, when it seemed that tourism and economic growth would never end, the Balinese enjoyed a complacent self-confidence about their prosperity and the religious and cultural superiority on which they believed it was based. Issues of who they were and their relationship with Indonesia as a whole were not especially important, nor were they safe subjects to talk about. During the 1990s though, as the tourism economy accelerated and various consequences, such as environmental problems and outside control of development, became increasingly apparent, many Balinese became concerned about what was happening to their island (Suasta and Connor, 1999; Warren, 1998; Ramseyer and Panji Tisna, 2001). After the downfall of Soeharto in 1998, a series of upheavals shook the tourism economy and the self-confidence that went with it. In particular, after the bombing in Kuta in October 2002, Balinese society underwent a crisis of confidence about its economic future, cultural identity and relationship with Indonesia as a whole. Although things have recovered since and tourist numbers are now at their highest ever, the crisis of the early 2000s and the ways it was dealt with provide an insight into the way in which Balinese understand Indonesia, or at least their place in it.

Ajeg Bali

On 27 May 2002, at the opening of a new locally-owned television channel, the Governor of Bali proclaimed that 'the noble mission and vision of Bali TV is the promotion and *mengajegkan* of Balinese tradition and culture along with tourism' (Darma Putra, 2004b).[2] The root *ajeg* means something like 'standing strong, firm upright,' and one might render its verb form, *mengajegkan*, as roughly equivalent to the English expression to 'stand it back on its feet'. The origins of the concept are hazy, but it struck a chord; it was picked up and developed by a local media conglomerate comprising main local newspaper (the *Bali Post*), Bali TV, and a number of other magazines and radio stations.

As the initial shock of the bombings in Kuta wore off and the even more unsettling realisation set in that Bali might never be quite the same again, the Bali Post Media Group (BPMG), in August 2003, sponsored a public seminar, titled *Menuju Strategi Ajeg Bali* [Towards a strategy for *Ajeg Bali*], to which a range of intellectual, religious and business leaders were invited to present and discuss their views of the state of Bali and how best to approach the future. These discussions were published in the 55th anniversary edition of the *Bali Post* and subsequently as a book (in 2004) titled *Ajeg Bali: sebuah cita-cita* [*Ajeg Bali*: an aspiration]. A number of local intellectuals also wrote longer articles that were published in another book, *Bali menuju jagaditha: aneka perspektif* (Darma Putra, 2004).

The introductory chapter of *Ajeg Bali: sebuah cita-cita* (which was the editorial of the special issue of the *Bali Post*), written by the owner and head of BPMG, Satria Naradha, summarised a particular view of Bali, as '...identical with beauty, security, and harmony' and provided an analysis of the current problems:[3]

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2   All translations are my own; this one from '...misi dan visi Bali TV yang sangat mulia yaitu mengembangkan dan mengajegkan adat dan budaya Bali ditambah dengan pariwisata Bali...'

3   For a discussion of the pervasiveness and genealogy of this self-image in contemporary Bali, see MacRae (2004).

The people of Bali have begun to forget their sense of self. This sense of self that is based on religion and culture has begun to be pushed aside. The soil of Bali, which is a part of tradition, has begun to change hands. The culture whose breath is Hindu and which pioneered the bringing of Bali into the arena of international tourism, has begun to be replaced with outside culture.[4]

and laid out the agenda of *Ajeg Bali*:

To protect the identity, space and process of Balinese culture. This remedy will flow towards raising the capacity of Balinese people so that they do not fall subject to the hegemony of global culture.[5]

Thus far Naradha is doing little more than reiterating a refrain about the dangers of Western cultural influence, which has been sung by foreign Baliphiles since the 1920s but has now also become deeply internalised in contemporary Balinese culture (MacRae, 1992; Vickers, 1989). But he proceeds to elaborate this danger in terms of two 'burdens' (*beban*) that Bali is carrying: 'of infrastructure, which is using up the land', and of 'the invasion of people competing for "a slice of the pie"'.[6]

Ajeg Bali contains, as well as discursive articles, a number of programmatic summaries of perceptions of the problems and the strategies for dealing with them. One of these, titled *Konsep Ajeg Bali: dimaknai dalam 3 tataran* [The concept of *Ajeg Bali*: explained in three forms], lists the following 'threats' (*ancaman*):

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4   *Bali yang identik dengan keindahan, kenyamanan, dan keharmonisan sudah mulai terusik. Terusik, karena manusia Bali sudah kurang eling pada jati diri. Jati diri manusia Bali yang bedasarkan agama, adat dan budaya mulai dismapingkan. Tanah Bali yang merupakan bagian dari adat makin banyak berpinday tangah (sic). Budaya bernafaskan Hindu yang menjadi pioneer untuk mengangkat pamor Bali dikancah pariwisata internasional mulai digantikan budaya luar. (Bali Post, 2004:ii).*

5   *Untuk menjaga identitas, ruang serta proses budaya Bali. Upaya ini akan bermuara pada peningkatan kekuatan manusia-manusia Bali agar tiday jatuh di bawah penaklukkan hegemoni budaya global.* (Bali Post, 2004: ii)

6   The Indonesian phrase, '*ingin merebut kue di Bali*', is a colloquial expression, which means literally 'who want to get the sweet or cake of Bali' but corresponds in spirit to the English expression 'to get a slice of the pie'.

- the implementation of regional autonomy
- social ills such as crime, prostitution and gambling
- the 'hedonistic' mental attitude of the Balinese themselves
- the gap between the letter of the law and its implementation
- commercialisation and commodification of culture
- non-selective immigration
- the power of big capital(ism)

The sources of these threats are not made explicit but, apart from the 'hedonistic' attitude of Balinese, the other threats appear to originate from outside Bali, in either the (national) government, or wherever it might be that immigrants, capitalism or 'social ills' come from. In popular Balinese thinking, these tend to be, respectively, 'Java' in general, 'Jakarta' in particular and a generic decadent 'Western' or 'global' culture and economy.[7]

Immediately following the list of threats there are 'practical recommendations' for dealing with these problems, recommendations that emphasise the strengthening of traditional institutions, the legislative protection of Balinese religious and cultural 'space', and 'selective migration' (Bali Post, 2004: 47). Similar themes and emphases are repeated throughout the book. *Ajeg Bali* thus seems to combine two basic agendas; a strengthening of Balinese culture from the inside and self-protection against outside influences of various kinds.

This discourse spoke to deeply held concerns at all levels of Balinese society. *Ajeg Bali* become a household word overnight and was used in all sorts of contexts. It was promoted systematically through television programs, newspaper articles and billboards; all repeating similar sets of vague but compelling messages about strengthening Balinese traditions and values. What *Ajeg Bali* meant in practice to ordinary Balinese

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7   This generalisation is based on countless conversations with Balinese for over a decade as well as frequent letters to the editor of the *Bali Post*.

is less clear. People to whom I spoke, and letters to the editor of the *Bali Post* (for example, Seriana, 2005; Yastaki, 2005; Wirawan, 2005) interpreted it in a wide variety of ways to suit their own perceptions of Bali's problems. Many spoke in general terms of safety and security (*keamanan*), some of 'protection' (*membentengi, menjaga*), others more explicitly of controlling immigration, and yet others of returning to traditional cultural and religious practices.

The 'invasion' referred to is not of the nation-state of Indonesia, but of the island-province of Bali. It comes not only from foreign or Western culture but also from within Indonesia, and it comes in two forms. The first is big capital, mostly from Jakarta, which controls an increasing share of the Balinese economy. The second invasion is the thousands of immigrants, mostly from East Java, who have taken over much of the bottom end of the economy, performing the hard, dirty, dangerous and poorly paid work that Balinese, especially in the affluent tourist areas, have been increasingly reluctant to do. Many Balinese have a growing sense that they are losing control of their own economy simultaneously from the top down and the bottom up.

But this discourse also reinforces and reflects long-standing concerns that Bali is a small island of Hindu culture in a vast sea of Islam, and that this sea is not necessarily well-disposed toward them (Picard, 2005). These concerns surfaced with increasing regularity, especially in the climate of economic stress and cultural uncertainty, after the bombings of 2002. The bombings were seen as the most extreme and threatening manifestation and indeed incontrovertible proof of this threat.[8]

The common ground in the *Ajeg Bali* discourse involved reclaiming control over resources, economic activity and physical and social space, which are widely seen as having been taken over by immigrants to Bali, mostly Muslims from Java. It also meant reviving a culture that is threatened by the degrading influences of 'foreign' (that is,

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8 Readers should be reminded at this point that this discourse is not the only one purporting to represent social reality in Bali, nor is it necessarily an accurate picture of that reality. It is important to remember also that there are Muslim communities in Bali, which have lived in harmony with their Hindu neighbours for generations (see Barth, 1993).

Western) culture. This is the (sometimes obscured) core of the *Ajeg Bali* discourse, but its genius lies in its vagueness, which leaves it open to many interpretations and able to incorporate new ideas and initiatives.[9]

Although *Ajeg Bali* is presented as a practical project for identifying and fixing some current problems, it is also a way Balinese have devised for talking between themselves about themselves and this necessarily means talking about their relations with places and people outside Bali. They seem to be saying several things at once, not all entirely consistent one with the other.

1 Hindu Balinese are the only true people of Bali.

2 The Balinese feel that they are losing control of Bali.

3 This loss of control manifests in various ways; cultural, religious, economic and political, but all are linked parts of a common underlying problem.

4 This underlying problem has two faces; influences and threats impinging on Bali from outside; and internal weaknesses in Balinese character, culture and economy.

5 The practical project of *Ajeg Bali* addresses these problems from both ends by simultaneously 'strengthening' Balinese culture from within and 'protecting' it against threats from outside.[10]

I want to concentrate now on what Balinese see as the main external influences and threats, because they tell us something about how one community of Indonesians understands its place in Indonesia and the world.

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9   For a similar, but more comprehensive discussion of *Ajeg Bali* discourse, see Allen and Palermo (2005) and on Balinese fears about 'outsiders', see Schulte Nordholt (2007)...

10 For a similar analysis of the concept of 'Balinese culture' in the period immediately before the *Ajeg Bali* movement, see Santikarma (2001: 31).

Outside Ownership

...many outsiders are only in Bali for the profits, their contribution to Bali is very minimal.

AA Puspayoga, Mayor of Denpasar[11]

During the 1980s, tourism in Bali grew from small beginnings into a major earner of foreign exchange not only for Bali but for Indonesia as a whole. This growth attracted investors from all over Indonesia and, during the 1990s, a series of increasingly large and expensive hotel, resort and golf course projects were built in Bali. Many were built by big investors from Jakarta, often in partnership with major international hotel chains. These projects required not only big capital but large amounts of land and various government permits (Warren, 1998).

Some Balinese were prepared to sell their land at the relatively high prices that the projects offered, others were not. The latter were offered inducements and encouragement, gentle at first, then not so gentle. If all else failed, the investors called on the government for help. These investors were often close associates of the Soeharto family, and were thus able to exert influence from the top down. They were also in a financial position to make the lives of Balinese government officials much easier. They were also able to make the lives of ordinary people less easy—some of those not prepared to sell their land had it compulsorily appropriated in the name of 'development'. These same political and economic forces were used to expedite the grant of permits that in many cases should never have been granted at all. The hotels and resorts were built and many smaller, Balinese-owned hotels have increasingly struggled to be commercially viable ever since.

In the main tourism centres, especially Kuta, not only big international hotel, restaurant and retail chains, such as such as McDonald's and Hard Rock Café, but also Jakarta-based national enterprises have taken

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11 In the *Bali Post* of 18 May 2005.

over the main streets, pushing smaller, locally-owned businesses into less desirable locations. Those of the original Kuta community who still remain live mostly on the proceeds of the sale or rent of their land. By the turn of the twenty-first century, it was estimated that 85 per cent of the tourism economy was in non-Balinese hands (Bali Post, 9 February 2005). As well as this shift of ownership of the tourism economy, the non-tourist sectors of the economy, especially farming, have been increasingly marginalised (MacRae, 2005).

In early 2005, Satria Naradha announced, with considerable fanfare, the formation of a new institution called *Koperasi Krama Bali* (KKB). *Koperasi* is a familiar term, referring to the mostly government-run cooperatives that have been a part of the Indonesian economic landscape for decades. They are most prominent in rural areas where they provide supplies to farmers, often on credit, but also small loans for various purposes. They have long been bedevilled by mismanagement and corruption and have suffered a considerable loss of public confidence. In recent years, with the liberalisation of the economy, they have waned in importance. At one level KKB seemed like just another *koperasi* but owned by the Balinese people (*krama Bali*) instead of the government. But the name also had a grander ring, along the lines of 'The Balinese People Inc.'—an umbrella for the collective advance of the Balinese economy along distinctly Balinese lines.

On 16 May 2005, the Governor of Bali, DM Beratha, signed as the first member and expressed his hope that KKB would promote the survival of the 'people's economy' (*ekonomi masyarakat*) by empowering small businesses and providing capital for farmers (Bali Post, 17 May 2005). Satria Naradha, as chairperson, as well as founder and primary sponsor of KKB, explained that it had been established to 'gather the strength of the Balinese people's economy' and would provide capital and advice to the (economically) weak. He also expressed the hope that the strong would help those less fortunate.

A day later, when a pair of candidates for the mayoralty of Denpasar joined, one of them, IBRD Mantra, said that the 'people's economy' economy' of Indonesia had begun to be 'pushed aside and taken over by

the capitalist class' and that he saw KKB as a 'form of people's economy with the capacity to combat the growing strength of the capitalist class in Bali. The capitalist economy is not at all appropriate in Bali because it is only controlled by a minority of people, unlike the people's economy which has prevailed until recently'. His partner, AA Puspayogya, said KKB 'originated from the Balinese people, for the Balinese people' and described it as a 'bulwark' or 'fortress' (*benteng*) around the Balinese *ekonomi*. He added that many outsiders only came to Bali looking for profit and contributed little to Bali and that many Balinese assets had fallen into hands outside Bali (Bali Post, 18 May 2005).[12]

What this discourse shows is, with some justification, the remnants of a traditional small-scale Balinese economy in need of protection from big fish from Jakarta. What it ignores and obscures is the current extent of the integration of Bali with the global economy through tourism, exports and foreign businesses. This reality is, however, clearly acknowledged in much of the discussion that followed the 2002 bombings. This contradiction suggests that although Balinese in some respects understand themselves as Indonesian, in economic terms they do not—instead they identify themselves in terms at once inescapably global and assertively local.

Immigration

Ada gula, ada semut. [Where there is honey, there are ants]

Indonesian proverb

It is not only big capital that has been attracted to Bali by the tourism bonanza. Since the 1980s, an increasing flow of people from other parts of Indonesia, especially the relatively poor neighbouring provinces of East Java and Lombok, has come to Bali in search of work and a better

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12 'Fortress' metaphors were common in *Ajeg Bali* discourse. For a broader discussion of this 'fortress mentality' see Schulte Nordholt (2007).

life. By the mid-1990s, most of the hard, heavy, dirty, dangerous work in South Bali, especially building and road construction, was being done by immigrant men, many of them young and single. They also dominated the informal economy of street stalls, door-to-door sales of household goods, as well as scavenging for recyclable materials from rubbish. Javanese contract teams have also taken over much of the rice harvesting in the western half of Bali.

Such migrants are attractive for employers because they have a justified reputation for working longer and harder for lower wages. They also do not require the irregular but frequent time off work that Balinese employees expect for attendance at ceremonies. Balinese readily concur with this judgement and see little virtue in working as the Javanese do but are concerned about the immigration for other reasons. Although many migrants, especially in the tourism heartland of Kuta, left Bali after the bombing because of loss of employment and subsequent 'sweepings' by Balinese vigilante militias, many remained and more have arrived since.

Under national law, all citizens of the Republic of Indonesia are free to travel and settle wherever they choose provided they have employment, notify the local authorities and are registered as temporary residents (*penduduk sementara*). But their very presence presents a problem for the Balinese communities in which they live, because membership of such communities presupposes religious as well as social, economic and political participation. To be a community member also presupposes a state of marriage. Non-Balinese, and single people, cannot therefore become full members of local communities. So they live in a kind of social and especially religious limbo on the margins of Balinese communities. Such status is, however, less of a problem in urbanised areas, where communities are already mixed and much temporary rental accommodation is available, but in such urban communities it produces the opposite problem, that of immigrant neighbourhoods (*kampung pendatang*) in which Balinese feel like strangers.

Some immigrants flout the laws and arrive unregistered and invisible but also ripe for exploitation by unscrupulous employers. Even those

who arrive legally are vulnerable to subsequent dismissal from their jobs at the whim of employers and the (not infrequent) financial difficulties of development projects. If this happens, they are stranded far from home without the safety net of family and community support; prostitution and petty crime become options of last resort for some. Thefts, rapes and other violent crimes are reported in lurid detail in the Balinese media, and non-Balinese names appear frequently among these reports.[13] There is a widespread belief among Balinese that most, if not all, such crimes are committed by outsiders (*pendatang*), and more specifically by Javanese (*orang Jawa*). Local informal responses to crimes against property and person in Bali is immediate, collective, violent and often deadly.[14] When crimes are committed, it is usually assumed the perpetrators are Javanese, and innocent Javanese have been known to find themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time.[15]

Hinduism and Islam

In June 2005, a document, titled *Akhirnya Bali dalam genggaman* [At last Bali is in our grip], was widely circulated in Bali.[16] It supposedly appeared mysteriously in local community halls (*balai banjar*) all over the island and was framed as a speech to the people of Bali from the head of the main mosque in Kuta at a date five years in the future. It outlines a scenario in which (immigrant) Muslims constitute half the population of Bali, are already a majority in the capital Denpasar and have at least two large mosques in each other city as well as controlling the tourism economy. The real authorship, origin and intent of this document are subjects of speculation, but it articulates with chilling clarity a fear that has been widely held in Bali for a very long time.[17]

The Indonesian state is essentially secular, but among the fundamentals

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13 I have no way of knowing how consistently or selectively these crimes are reported.

14 The crime page in the *Bali Post* contains frequent reports of alleged thieves being caught in the act, pursued by a mob of outraged locals and beaten or burnt to death.

15 For an account of a vigilante inspection, see Santikarma (2001).

16 I am grateful to M Blongoh of Banjar Taman, Ubud, for a copy of this document and his views of its significance.

17 On Balinese fears of being overrun by Islam, see Schulte Nordholt (2007).

it requires of its citizens is 'belief in (the one) God'. It also specifies five religions through which this belief may be legitimately channelled, including Islam and Hinduism. But within this seemingly liberal and egalitarian framework, the reality is that some religions are more equal than others. The vast majority (around 86 per cent) of Indonesians are (at least nominally) Muslim, and Islamic concerns have, from the beginnings of the republic, been strongly represented in the political process; indeed, the whole official structure of religion in Indonesia is in important respects modelled on Islam. Although the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims subscribe to moderate interpretations of Islam, often deeply mixed with older Hindu or animist beliefs and practices, a minority would like to see Islam expand and even for Indonesia to become an Islamic state. Followers of religions other than Islam have at times been subjected to various forms of systematic disadvantage and marginalisation.[18]

Bali is one of the main exceptions to this pattern. Over 90 per cent of Balinese people are Hindu and they see their culture and local customs as inseparable from Hinduism. When most of Java was converted to Islam in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Balinese resisted fiercely and were never invaded nor converted. Small Muslim communities have, however, existed in Bali for centuries, coexisting harmoniously with their Hindu neighbours (Barth, 1993; Vickers, 1987).

Over the past couple of decades, however, as immigrants have flowed into Bali, they have brought their religions, which for most is Islam. Consequently there are now tens of thousands of Muslims in Bali. In some areas, especially the Kuta tourism zone and Denpasar, Muslims constitute significant minorities, sufficiently permanent to have built mosques.[19] Concerns have thus surfaced, not only about the supposedly

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18 For an example, see Hefner (1985). For general discussion of the politics of religion in relation to Hinduism in particular, see the edited volume *Hinduism in Modern Indonesia* (Ramstedt, 2004).

19 In Kuta in 1998, 13 per cent of the population were Muslim and barely three-quarters of the population Hindu (Pitana et al., 2002: 37). A more recent figure for the city of Denpasar has the Hindu population down to 67 per cent, a decline of 0.3 per cent per annum while over the same period the Islamic population grew at 0.26 per cent per annum (Rini, 2004a:27). For the whole of Bali the Hindu proportion declined from 93.3 per cent in 1980 to 87.4 per

immoral and 'criminal' tendencies of Javanese immigrants, but about hidden religious agendas and their growing capacity to undermine Hinduism and impose Islam in Bali.

These views are an open secret in Bali and common knowledge to every researcher who has worked there and, indeed, obvious to many tourists. My primary evidence lies in the unsolicited testimony of dozens, if not hundreds, of Balinese during my research in Bali since 1993. These views come from various parts of the island and from all sectors of its society. They surface most visibly in situations of stress or threat, such as the thefts during the 1990s of sacred objects from temples (Santikarma, 2001) or the statement by a national parliament minister that Megawati Soekarnoputri was not a suitable candidate for the presidency because she worshipped Hindu gods (Couteau, 2002). The laudable absence of violence in the aftermath of the bombings in 2002 was attributable less to Balinese doubts about the source and purpose of the attacks than to their respect for social order, non-violence and the rule of law. The document referred to above is merely the latest manifestation of a barely concealed discourse of long standing.

These concerns are not, however, well-documented in either local or academic literature for obvious reasons.[20] But they are visible in coded form between the lines of the *Ajeg Bali* discourse. For example, an article, ostensibly on religion (Rini, 2004a), in the *Ajeg Bali* book concludes with a 'Strategy towards *Ajeg Bali*' in the form of bullet points, of which one is 'to pay attention to the demographic factor (as a very significant factor influencing cultural development)'.

Balinese understand Indonesia as a country dominated by Muslims and themselves as a vulnerable non-Muslim minority, as do other non-Muslim minorities throughout Indonesia. Although they know they are citizens of Indonesia protected by its constitution, they believe that at

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cent in 2000 (Rini, 2004b: 33).

20 There are still laws in Indonesia, albeit less rigorously enforced than during the Soeharto era, restricting discussion of SARA, an acronym (for *suku, agama, ras, antar-golongan*) for differences of ethnicity, religion and class, which might be mobilised to cause division and conflict. Since the end of the New Order, there have been some scholarly references to Balinese views of Islam, for example, Santikarma (2001), as well as in the local press.

least some of the Muslim majority have hostile intentions toward them, and they are not confident of either the commitment or the ability of the government, national or even local, to protect their religion and culture. In this sense, Balinese understandings of Indonesia overlap on one hand with those of other minority populations in Indonesia (see, for example, Chauvel, 2009) but also, perhaps ironically, with certain aspects of Western, especially American and Australian, understandings.[21]

The State

During the 1990s, until the last days of Soeharto's New Order, most Balinese were, if asked, at pains to identify themselves as patriotic Indonesians first and Balinese second. There were obvious reasons, mentioned above, for this. But their everyday speech and actions made it clear that at other levels they saw themselves as Balinese first and Indonesian in specific respects only. So although they obediently flew flags on Independence Day, recited the principles of Pancasila readily, and deferred to government advice and direction in matters ranging from agriculture to religious practice, they were also, in private conversations, between the lines of everyday speech and in media such as *wayang kulit* (shadow puppet) performances and cartoons, critical of the government of the day if not the state itself (Warren, 1993).

This ambivalence became increasingly evident at the height of tourism growth in the 1990s, as frustration over a perceived gap between the economic benefits accruing to (especially central) government from tourism and those accruing to Bali. This occurred directly through taxation and indirectly through the ownership of tourism facilities. The two main taxes involved were a land tax (*pendapatan asli daerah* or PAD) and a special tax on the takings of hotels and restaurants (*pajak hotel dan restoran* or PHR), the latter is by far the larger source of tax

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21 I am referring here to widespread Western perceptions post 9/11 of a monolithic and threatening 'Islamic world' dominated by sentiments of the kind articulated by Osama bin Laden. This perception was fed by the Western media and was most pronounced in countries such as the UK and Australia that are most closely aligned with the USA's 'war on terror'.

revenue in South Bali. Revenue from both taxes increased enormously with tourism growth as hotel and restaurant takings increased and as land values rose. Revenue generated by PHR is distributed more to local than to central levels of government (MacRae, 1997) but there was a widespread perception among the Balinese that their tourism industry was being used as a cash cow by governments and that they were bearing the costs with little recompense.

The large development projects referred to above were initiated and carried out by Jakarta-based capital but were made possible only by the active cooperation of all levels of government. In the early 1990s, a series of the projects received unusually quick permits from the relevant departments at all levels of government and, where necessary, local communities were induced or coerced to give up land for the projects to proceed. This sparked unprecedented protests at all levels of Balinese society and reflected a growing loss of confidence in the commitment of government to Balinese interests (Suasta and Connor, 1999).

This confidence ebbed further as the legitimacy of Soeharto's New Order slipped away and, in the economic and political chaos after his regime's demise in 1998, there were calls all over Indonesia for decentralisation or regional autonomy. In Aceh and West Papua these calls have been for total independence. Balinese have stopped short of this but many believe that they need much greater control over various aspects of the destiny of their island. The autonomy that has been granted has been to the local (*kabupaten*) levels than that of Bali as a whole (provincial level). The thrust of *Ajeg Bali*, however, emphasised the unity of Bali as much as its differentiation from the rest of Indonesia.

Foreign Influences

Balinese culture has, since the Dutch took over in the early twentieth century, been inseparable from its representations in various Western media, which in turn are closely linked to tourism, as cause and as effect. The Balinese people have taken readily to the economic benefits of this relationship but their attitude to the cultural effects has been

more ambivalent.

Many aspects of Balinese culture, from the arts to consumption habits, have embraced elements of Western origin enthusiastically but selectively. Nonetheless, they have retained a wariness about Western cultural, especially moral, influences. When issues arise, such as abuse of alcohol or new drugs, prostitution or paedophilia, there is a tendency to label them 'non-Balinese,' 'foreign' or even 'Western'. This line of thinking has been evident in local reactions to the recent well-publicised cases of Australians arrested, charged and convicted for drug offences in Bali (MacRae, 2006).

This perception is to some extent not just Balinese, but reflects a more general ambivalence throughout Indonesia about foreign or Western cultural influence. For instance, the recent escalation of the use of various drugs at many levels of Indonesian society has given rise to widespread public concern. Because it is a relatively new phenomenon in most people's experience, it is seen as having come from elsewhere and when foreigners are caught importing, dealing or using drugs, it is interpreted as evidence that such practices are foreign (MacRae, 2006; see also Avonius, 2009).[22]

In May 2005, *Tempo*, a national news magazine, published a special report on the activities of foreign paedophiles in Bali. Although the report stopped short of describing it as a Western cultural practice, it did say that paedophilia was a problem 'brought by tourism' (see also Lanus, 2001). Likewise, *Tempo* gleefully seized the opportunity, presented by the delivery of envelopes of mysterious white powder to the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra, in the wider context of Australian public and media reaction to an Australian tourist, Schapelle Corby, being found guilty of importing drugs to Bali. Hitting the terrorism ball back into Australia's court, *Tempo*, on the cover of its edition of 12 June 2005, printed the headline 'Aksi teror di Australia: Jamaah Corbyah'

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22 This interpretation is not withstanding the large numbers of Indonesians also convicted of drug offences and ignores the wider social and economic context in which drug abuse occurs.

['Terror action in Australia: Jamaah Corbyah'].[23]

Balinese generally see Western tourists as essentially non-threatening economic assets, even as friends with a common interest in a particular vision of Bali. They also see Western culture as having much to offer but harbour deep fears about aspects of foreign cultural influence, as something they need to protect themselves against. In this respect they see themselves as sharing a generically Asian or Eastern culture with the rest of Indonesia, even if in other ways they prefer to distance themselves from Indonesia.[24]

Understanding Indonesia? Or Imagining Indonesia?

What can we understand about Indonesia from these particular Balinese understandings of Indonesia? First, and most obviously, what we call Indonesia is clearly not a political and cultural monolith, but is complex, multi-faceted and in a constant process of change, so we can not realistically expect to understand it in any formulaic way. Indeed any simplistic metaphors or models, such as 'the world's largest Muslim nation' are likely to perpetuate potentially dangerous misunderstandings. Second, understanding Indonesia depends on the position of the viewer: from within or without; from the point of view of the government, the military or the people; from an Islamic, Hindu or Christian perspective; from Jakarta or Bali or Aceh or West Papua. Third, if we take Bali as an example, it is clear that Indonesians themselves understand Indonesia in complex and sometimes contradictory ways: Balinese people see themselves as Indonesians but also as Balinese; they are proud of this nation, which their grandfathers fought and died for, but they have mixed feelings about its central government and some of its people.

When Benedict Anderson (1983) coined his famous description of nationalisms as 'imagined communities', it was based largely on his experience of Indonesia. Since then it has been argued that whole regions

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23 For a range of discussions of the Corby case, see Noszlopy (2006).
24 For a local analysis of the ambivalence and contradictions in Balinese responses to drugs and prostitution, see Lanus (2001).

such as 'Southeast Asia' or the 'Asia–Pacific' are also the product of imaginings, often supported by specific political and economic agendas (Acharya, 1999; Nonini, 1993). The struggle of my own country, New Zealand, to imagine and re-imagine itself as a nation—clean, green and nuclear free; liberal in ideology but neo-liberal in practice; part monocultural and part multicultural behind an official veneer of 'biculturalism'; European by descent, language and culture but located in the Pacific; 'part of Asia' according to its politicians, but in many segments of society profoundly and wilfully ignorant about Asia— reminds us that this imagining of community and identity is ongoing in perhaps every nation and is not without its contradictions.

I suggest that any attempt to understand Indonesia will necessarily be partial (in both senses of the word). Understandings from the outside will be through the various lenses we unavoidably use to simplify complex realities. And what gets lost in top-down, national-level understandings of another country are the millions of ordinary people whose understandings of their own nation are as confused as those of outsiders. In the case of Indonesia, they are perhaps the reality we understand least but have most need to.

After *Ajeg Bali*: Bali, Indonesia and the World

The discussion above is a snapshot taken at a critical moment when the Balinese experienced their relationship with the Indonesian nation in a particular and intensified way, and from which we can learn something. Since then, much has changed. Internationally, images of political instability and terrorism in Indonesia have been replaced by those of tsunamis, earthquakes and mudflows. The extraordinary growth booms in China and India have been much celebrated but Indonesia too has been quietly rebuilding economically. Politically, it has rebuilt quietly too, with the political instability of the post-Soeharto years giving way to the relatively stable and moderate Yudhoyono presidency.

In Bali, tourism has bounced back to unprecedented levels, employment and prosperity are increasing again and the concerns about immigration

and Islam expressed above have receded.[25] *Ajeg Bali* has virtually disappeared from public discourse. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but the most obvious one is simply that the crisis that *Ajeg Bali* was responding to has passed and the issues it sought to address are no longer critical.

Nationally, *Reformasi* of the political and administrative systems has proceeded steadily, especially in terms of regional autonomy. Elections of local leaders (especially for *bupati*, the heads of districts, and for *gubernur*, the heads of provinces) occur regularly throughout the country (Erb and Sulistiyanto, 2009). In Bali these have been the focus of considerable public interest but have largely been orderly. This has not resulted in a widespread sense of control over their own lives but Balinese people do at least know that the politicians controlling their lives are themselves Balinese, with some understanding of Balinese concerns. Electoral politics in Bali have turned not on specific policies, let alone national issues, but largely on perceptions of the sensibilities and sensitivities of candidates to generically Balinese concerns (MacRae and Darma Putra, 2007; 2008; 2009). In the 2008 elections for governor however, two of the three candidates emphasised familiar themes: protection of traditional culture and security and one candidate was disadvantaged by accusations of being too open to Islam. The winning candidate, Made Mangku Pastika, was in fact the police chief responsible for catching the Bali bombers and one of the heroes of the *Ajeg Bali* movement. In this way, although the *Ajeg Bali* discourse has faded away, some of its main ideas have been incorporated in the formal political process.

As a result of all this, understanding Indonesia has not suddenly become easier, but the absence of dramatic events means at least that the stereotypical views, which dominated the first half of the decade, are less of an obstacle. This opens a space for us to refocus on the real issues in need of understanding. Nationally, the residual issue most

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25 Ironically, this paper will be published at a time close to the date referred to in the inflammatory document mentioned above but its predictions have turned out to be somewhat overstated.

widely seen as undermining the gains of *reformasi, desentralisasi* and *demokratisasi,* is the persistence of corruption. Once the exclusive privilege of the elite, it is now referred to as having been 'democratised' and 'decentralised' to all levels of government and business.[26]

In Bali, corruption is also an issue but, in the context of a new era of tourism, prosperity and development, it is but one factor exacerbating a range of more visible side-effects of the boom. The most obvious of these consequences is environmental. Already motor vehicle traffic, pollution, water and waste are significant problems and all the indications are that they will increase, threatening the island's reputation as a tourist destination. The most vocal group concerned about these problems comprises foreigners living in Bali, but the environmental matters are also being discussed more in the local media as well as concerning ordinary Balinese (Bali Blog, 2007; Bali Times, 2007; Bali Post, 2008a,b; 2009; Carroll, 2004; Gies, 2009).

The return of capital-intensive development projects, drawn once again by the new boom, is an additional cause of these problems. But these development sites are also the sites where local environmental issues intersect with Jakarta capital and national corruption problems (Bali Post, 2008a). Although the problems are local, the pattern and the capital are national; but the devolution of decision-making and the accompanying corruption to more local levels, makes it harder for Balinese to blame outsiders for the problems. In an economic sense, Bali has already been largely 're-*Ajeg*-ed' but in another sense the problems *Ajeg Bali* sought to address have been so internalised into Balinese political and administrative processes, that there is no longer any outside threat to give meaning to a discourse of *Ajeg*.

If we return to a national viewpoint, variations on this set of problems are evident all over the country; the infamous Lapindo mudflow scandal the most spectacular and best-known case. From an international perspective, the economic growth of India and, especially, China are

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26 This generalisation is based on many conversations with ordinary Indonesians, as well as an endless stream of high-profile cases and discussion in local, national and international media (for example, Bloomberg, 2010).

widely seen as models to be emulated by other developing countries (Huang and Khanna, 2003). Much less widely discussed are the massive environmental consequences associated with this growth, let alone the price to be paid by the less privileged citizens of these countries. Similarly with Indonesia; Bali may usefully be seen, like Jakarta, as a laboratory for exploring the costs and benefits of unsustainable development and the options for sustainable development. It is the urgent task and responsibility of the social sciences, and especially in Indonesia, to study such developments, within and beyond the archipelago, as lenses through which to understand the options for the future of Indonesia. Those outside Indonesia would do well to remember that the issues confronting Indonesia are, in rather concentrated form, the issues we will all face sooner or later.

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Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia

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Abstract

The relations between Islam and Democracy in Indonesia and their implications for the country's foreign policy have attracted considerable attention in recent years. In the early years of his first presidential term, Susilo Bambang Yudhono introduced the concept of Indonesia's international identity, that is, as a country in which Islam, democracy and modernity go hand in hand. In the post-9/11 international context, in which perceptions of Islam are largely negative, Indonesia's special attributes as the largest Muslim-majority country and the world's third largest democracy have special values. The international community, especially Western countries, has looked to Indonesia to provide an alternative face of Islam in the midst of rising religious extremism and terrorism. Indonesia, however, still faces many challenges in realising its aspirations to be a bridge between the Islamic world and the West, and as an alternative model within the Islamic world. Frequent acts of religious intolerance have marred Indonesia's claim as a moderate Islamic force while Indonesia has generally been perceived to lie in the periphery of the Islamic world.

Introduction

Since its relatively successful transition to democracy, Indonesia's political leaders in recent years have been quick to tout and capitalise on the country's credentials as the largest Muslim nation, and the world's third largest democracy that has an open, outward-looking modern society. Although Indonesia for decades has been home to the largest number of Muslims on the planet, it is only recently that this fact has gained a new saliency after being put in tandem with Indonesia's new democratic credentials, which are regarded as unique and noteworthy. This is clearly a reflection that, notwithstanding well-grounded arguments that Islam and democracy are not in conflict but actually

support each other, democratic polities are still a rarity among Muslim-majority countries. This paper focuses on the theme of foreign policy in the context of Islam and democracy in Indonesia, and was originally presented as a keynote speech at a conference on these specific topics in New Zealand in 2006.[1]

The issues of 'foreign policy', 'Islam' and 'democracy' cover three very important and quite distinct subjects, each of which needs to be studied and discussed separately in its own right, which can actually be done without too much reference to the others. Nevertheless, by juxtaposing these three distinct subjects under the overarching theme of understanding Indonesia today, it is to be hoped that one sees not merely a few pieces of the vast and extremely complex Indonesian jigsaw puzzle, but also the link between the different parts. In a modest attempt to provide a coherent framework for these subjects, the writer would like to look briefly at the relations between foreign policy, Islam and democracy in Indonesia, past, present and future.

Indonesia's Foreign Policy Formulation

Foreign policy is basically an extension of domestic politics. Even though the influence of the external environment cannot be discounted, Indonesia's foreign policy has for the most part been determined by domestic priorities.[2] Although the basic doctrine of Indonesia's foreign policy has remained the same, that is, to be free and active, its articulation and implementation have evolved, depending upon the political constellations, the world view of the leaders and the priorities of the government at any given time. Rizal Sukma noted in an article that, in its historical evolution, Indonesia's free and active foreign policy doctrine has manifested one of its three key components at different times,

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1   An earlier version of this paper was delivered as the keynote speech at a seminar: 'Understanding Indonesia 2006: Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy', organised by the Indonesian Embassy, the Asian Studies Institute (VUW), the Asia Forum and the Asia New Zealand Foundation. Wellington, New Zealand, 1 May 2006.
2   For a classic analysis of the domestic imperatives of Indonesian foreign policy, which examined the radical change in Indonesia's foreign policy between Soekarno and Soeharto, see Weinstein (1976).

namely anti-colonialism, independence and pragmatism, depending on the context and needs of a particular period. Nonetheless, successive Indonesian governments have steadfastly adhered to this basic free and active foreign policy doctrine since it was first enunciated in 1948 (Sukma, 1995).

In his first major foreign policy speech in 2005, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono argued that an independent and active foreign policy 'entails independence of judgment' and 'freedom of action'. Yudhoyono used the metaphor of 'navigating a turbulent ocean' to describe the challenges currently faced by Indonesian foreign policy, comparing it with the metaphor used by Vice-President Hatta in 1948 to describe the challenges of the Cold War that required Indonesia's foreign policy to have the ability to 'row between two reefs'. According to Yudhoyono, Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy should have a constructive approach, prevent Indonesia from entering into military alliances and be characterised by connectivity, compelling Indonesia to have a healthy engagement with the outside world.

Equally importantly, as stated by President Yudhoyono, an independent and active foreign policy should project Indonesia's national identity: Indonesia's international identity 'must be rooted in a strong sense of who we are. We cannot be all things to all people. We must know who we are and what we believe in, and project them in our foreign policy'. President Yudhoyono went on to further define Indonesia's identity as follows: 'We are the fourth most populous nation in the world. We are home to the world's largest Muslim population. We are the world's third largest democracy. We are also a country where democracy, Islam and modernity go hand in hand'.[3] This foreign policy statement by the President can be seen as part of the efforts being made to transform Indonesia's international image in line with the new national identity that is now being forged.

Throughout most of Soeharto's New Order period, Indonesia, although criticised in some quarters for being undemocratic and a violator of

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3   Speech by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono before the Indonesian Council on World
     Affairs (ICWA). Jakarta, 20 May 2005.

human rights, nevertheless enjoyed a relatively positive international image. Indonesia was regarded as an anchor for stability in Southeast Asia and a first among equals among the member states of ASEAN (Anwar, 1991). During the Cold War period, Western governments and other non-communist countries saw Indonesia as an important partner in containing international communism and particularly as a bulwark against Communist China. President Soeharto himself, as a founder of ASEAN, was viewed and treated as an elder statesman in the region. Indonesia's success in developing its economy and advancing its human resources enabled President Soeharto to reassert Indonesia's leadership position among the developing countries, such as within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) towards the later years of his rule. Indonesia was chairman of NAM in 1992–95 and was credited for transforming it from a primarily political organisation that tended to be anti-West into a more development-oriented organisation that espoused cooperation with the West. Indonesia's role within the wider Asia–Pacific region was also notable, such as its chairmanship of APEC (Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation), which produced the Bogor Declaration of 1994, laying down the future directions of APEC.

With the onset of the economic crisis in mid-1997, however, followed by the fall of Soeharto and a period of political instability and social upheaval marked by rioting, communal conflicts, lawlessness, separatist movements and a general decline in the people's welfare, Indonesia was seen by many as in danger of becoming a failed state. The international image of Indonesia changed virtually overnight from that of a strong state with a robust economy and a key player in various regional and international forums to that of an ailing state which had great difficulties in keeping its own house in order. Far from being able to contribute to regional and international peace, Indonesia's weakness was seen as posing a problem not just to itself but also to the wider region. The Indonesian government's lack of capacity to enforce law and order and protect its territories contributed to the increase in terrorist attacks at home and pirate attacks in Indonesian waters.[4] Nevertheless, although

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4 Indonesia has been the target of several major terrorist attacks causing great numbers

the difficulties faced by Indonesia were and are real, the image problems besetting the country have been even more damaging, causing it to suffer from what we may term the 'CNN effect', as graphic news of violence and conflicts are repeated over and over again, obscuring other realities.

Democratic Consolidation against All Odds

Despite the litany of bad news coming from Indonesia, there were and are, in fact, other realities. Against all odds, Indonesians succeeded in transforming the long-entrenched authoritarian political system into a more democratic system within a very short time and almost without bloodshed. Rejecting the earlier relativism of the New Order, Indonesia has now eagerly embraced universal values of human rights, including the much contested civil and political rights.[5] Freedom of expression and association are recognised and protected by law, and in 2004 Indonesians elected the president and vice-president directly for the first time in the country's history, followed by the second direct presidential–vice-presidential election in 2009. All of the provincial governors, regents and mayors throughout the vast archipelago are now also elected directly. A radical decentralisation policy has been put in place to ensure more equitable relations between the central government and the regions and address regional grievances, which in certain areas had led to demands for independence. Indonesia continues to face many difficult challenges, particularly in the economic field and in the area of governance, but it is certainly not a failed or a failing state, or one that is in danger of disintegration.

There is every reason to be optimistic that Indonesia will evolve into a mature plural democracy and that, unlike in the late 1950s, when

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of deaths and injuries carried out by a regional terrorist network, the Jamaah Islamiyah, believed to be associated with the global terrorist organisation, Al-Qaeda. The first major bomb attack took place in Bali in October 2002, which mostly targeted foreign tourists, in which over 200 people died, mostly Australians. Subsequent terrorist attacks using bombs occurred twice in Jakarta and another one in Bali, which again primarily targeted foreigners, though most of the victims were Indonesians.

5   The 1945 Constitution has been amended four times and it now incorporates the principles of human rights and democracy amongst its articles.

parliamentary democracy eventually gave way to a 'guided democracy', this time democracy will be consolidated and sustained over time. In the 1950s, when Indonesia experimented with liberal democracy, the political fragmentation based on the *aliran*[6] was still very deep and wide because at that time there was no national consensus about the ultimate ideological foundation or form of the state, while at the same time the country was wracked by regional rebellions and armed insurgencies. Sharp ideological cleavages between the secular nationalists, the Islamists and the communists, who espoused very different visions of Indonesia, made political compromises more difficult to achieve. After cabinets rose and fell in quick successions and Jakarta was unable to deal with regional grievances, many people became disillusioned with democracy and thus welcomed Soekarno's call to bury the parties and end the 50 per cent plus one democracy and replace it with the so-called 'Guided Democracy'.[7] Now, it is believed that Indonesians have become more mature politically and, more important, there is already a national consensus in place regarding the foundation and form of the state, as well the existence of a vibrant civil society, so that political differences would not be so divisive as to threaten the existence of the state or jeopardise national unity. Recent controversy about the Bank Century bailout, which pitted the DPR (House of Representatives) against the government, is a case in point. Despite its heated nature and even concerns that the DPR might find wrongdoing committed by senior elements in the government that could open the way for the impeachment of the vice-president or even the president, the whole process has in general simply been seen as a democratic exercise of the DPR's role that should not cause undue alarm (Noor, 2010). The government has been able to function as normally as it could under such

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6 *Aliran* literally means "stream". Its use here refers to religious or social identities around which Indonesian political organisations were grouped in the past so that political differences tended to be primordial in nature, such as between *santri* (devout Muslims) and *abangan* (nominal Muslims).

7 For the best analysis of why Indonesia's first democratic experiment in the immediate post-independence years was very short-lived and which later opened the way for four decades of authoritarian rule under Soekarno and Soeharto, see Feith (1962).

conditions and the Indonesian economy has continued to grow, albeit sluggishly, given the prevailing global economic malaise.

Islam and Foreign Policy in Indonesia

The second theme of this paper is the position and role of Islam in Indonesian politics, particularly in relation to the conduct of Indonesian foreign policy. The way that Islam had spread and developed in Indonesia has undoubtedly contributed to the distinctive characteristics of Indonesian Muslims, which are quite different from those of Middle Eastern Muslims. Islam in Indonesia is generally regarded as moderate, tolerant and outward-looking. Although nearly 90 per cent of Indonesians are Muslims, Indonesia is not an Islamic state, nor is Islam the official religion of the state. To strike a compromise between those who wanted to establish an Islamic state and those who opposed it, in 1945, *Pancasila* was adopted as the ideology of the state. *Pancasila* is neither a fully secular nor a religious ideology. The first principle of *Pancasila* is Belief in One God, without specifying adherence to any particular religion. In recognition of Indonesia's religious pluralism, the Indonesian government currently gives recognition to five religions, namely, Islam, Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism. The holidays celebrated by all of these religions are declared as national holidays. In the post-Soeharto era, recognition of a Chinese cultural identity in Indonesia has been restored and the Chinese New Year is now also celebrated as a national holiday.

The acceptance of religious, social and political pluralism by the majority of Indonesians, who are predominantly Muslim, is clearly a key to Indonesia's successful transition from authoritarianism to a pluralist democracy. It is important to note that there are now several Islamic political parties using Islam as their political platform, which under Soeharto had been forbidden, but none of these parties espouses the establishment of an Islamic state any longer. Members of the Parliament and the People's Consultative Assembly, from Islamic political parties and secular parties whose supporters are predominantly Muslims, have

amended the Constitution and passed laws that are intended to ensure that Indonesia follows the principles of democracy characterised by checks and balances of power, popular participation and government accountability, as well as respect for human rights, with equal rights for men and women and respect for the rights of minorities.

A national consensus has been reached that, although the body of the Constitution can be amended, the preamble to the Constitution, which lays down the form and the ideological foundation of the state, must never be touched. This means that *Pancasila*, which promotes and protects the concept of unity in diversity as the state ideology, has been accepted as final. Moreover, Islamic organisations, including the country's two largest social organisations, Nahdhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, associated with traditionalist and modernist Islam respectively, have greatly contributed to Indonesia's thriving civil society, a prerequisite for a viable democracy.

Indonesia's achievements in establishing democracy, which has been an important international agenda in the post-Cold War period, have not only been a cause of pride at home, but have also attracted praise from other countries, particularly from the West. The fact that Indonesia is also the largest Muslim nation attracts special attention because there is a common assumption that Islam and democracy do not go hand in hand. A history of conflict between Christianity and Islam, especially from the time of the Crusades onward, has created mutual hostilities and suspicions between these two faiths. Converging strategic interests have led to the development of close relations between a number of Islamic countries and key Western powers, but the underlying suspicions between peoples from these two groups have remained.

Popular Western perceptions of Islam have on the whole been negative, mostly shaped by events in the Middle East. Islamic societies are often portrayed as backward, intolerant, discriminatory towards women, repressive, espousing violence including terrorism and anti-Western. Popular perceptions regarding the West in Muslim countries are also generally negative. Western countries, led by the United States, are often viewed as aggressive and rapacious, wanting to dominate the rest of

the world and exploit other countries' resources for their own benefits, hypocritical and practising double standards, decadent and permissive, and anti-Islam. It is in this context that the social and political evolution of Indonesia, where, as President Yudhoyono said, democracy, Islam and modernity go hand in hand, has a special value. The new Indonesia would like to project these three characteristics as its new international identity, partly to counter the negative image that has dogged the country after the collapse of the New Order, as well as to help dispel some of the negative stereotypes of Islam.

In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States by Muslim terrorists associated with the Al-Qaeda terrorist organisation, and the subsequent US-led war against terrorism, which is widely perceived to be targeting Muslims, relations between Islam and the West have deteriorated even further. The American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have generated a strong anti-US sentiment in Muslim societies world-wide. Talk about the "clash of civilisations" is rampant, and mutual suspicion as well as mutual acts of stupidity have abounded, such as the fracas over the publication of the derogatory cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad that began in a small town newspaper in Denmark.[8]

Faced with a widening gap between Islam and the West, which has detrimental consequences for international security as a whole, a number of major Western countries are now beginning to look at Indonesia; first, as a possible alternative model for other Muslim societies, and second, as a bridge between Western countries and the rest of the Islamic world. It is, therefore, not surprising that in March and April 2006 alone Indonesia received visits from the US secretary of state, the British prime minister, the Dutch prime minister and the European Union high representative for common foreign and security policy.

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8   A cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad wearing a bomb as his turban, published in a little known Danish newspaper in 2005, sparked worldwide Muslim outrage. In Islam, the Prophet is not allowed to be presented in drawings so the cartoon was regarded as deeply offensive by Muslims. The violent acts carried out by some Muslims in protesting the cartoon, however, only served to reinforce the stereotype of the violent nature of Islam in the eyes of its critics.

Among the requests to the Indonesian government by these high-level visitors is that Indonesia play a role in helping to mediate in the conflicts in the Middle East. In subsequent years, international and Western expectations that Indonesia should act as the interlocutor for a moderate Islam have continued unabated, as evidenced from the discussions held at the Wilton Park Conference in the UK in early March 2010. As noted by Rizal Sukma (2010) who attended the conference: 'One common suggestion, especially from the international community, is for Indonesia to play a role as a global Islamic voice. It is often argued that Indonesia, as the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, should demonstrate to the world that Islam can be a 'positive' force in world affairs. Indonesia, according to this view, should demonstrate that Islam can go hand in hand with democracy'.

It is important to note, however, that the current focus on Islam as part of Indonesia's national identity, and the way it is being projected in Indonesia's foreign policy, is in fact a new development in Indonesian history, directly related to the domestic political constellations in the post-Soeharto period and to the current international environment. Despite the fact that Islam has always been the religion of most of the population of modern Indonesia, as mentioned earlier, Indonesia has not been established as an Islamic state. Yet for four decades after Indonesia's independence and acceptance of *Pancasila* as the ideology of the state, a number of Islamic parties and movements continued to struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state or, at the very least, for Muslims to be mandated to follow Islamic law (*Sharia*). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Indonesian military had to put down armed rebellions in Aceh, West Java and South Sulawesi that wanted to establish an Islamic state by force. Consequently, President Soekarno and President Soeharto both viewed political Islam with suspicion. Under Soeharto political Islam was strictly proscribed. Although Islam as a religion and a source of social values was allowed to flourish throughout the New Order period, official recognition of Islam as part of Indonesia's national identity was never openly articulated.[9]

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9   There have been many books on the subject of Islam and politics in Indonesia. Among the

Throughout most of Indonesia's history since independence, and until recently, Islam has not had much effect on Indonesia's foreign policy, except as a constraining factor on a limited number of issues. Indonesia's doctrine of a 'free and active' foreign policy, first introduced in 1948, was the response of a newly independent country to the bipolar divisions of the Cold War. Preoccupied with the struggle to complete its decolonisation from the Dutch and unwilling to subject its foreign policy to the dictates of one or the other of the super powers, Indonesia became a founder and leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement.[10]

Solidarity among developing countries took precedence over solidarity among Muslim countries as co-religionists *per se*. Indonesia's support of the Palestinian people and refusal to establish diplomatic ties with Israel until the Palestinian problem is resolved has been justified by the government not on religious grounds but on Indonesia's historical opposition to colonialism and support for self-determination. Among the Indonesian people in general, however, support for the Palestinians and opposition to Israel have mostly been because of religious sentiments. Strong public opposition to any initiatives to open links between Jakarta and Tel Aviv has been the single most important manifestation of the Islamic constraint to Indonesia's foreign policy. Because the Palestinian issue has continued to dominate Middle Eastern politics for decades, and the United States has consistently been seen as biased in favour of Israel, a number of Islamic groups in Indonesia have also viewed the United States in an unfavourable light, regardless of Indonesia's own strategic interests in developing close cooperation with the United States.[11]

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more recent publications are Effendy (2003) and Mietzner (2009).

10 Indonesia hosted the first Asia–Africa conference in Bandung in 1955, which was the first such gathering of its kind, bringing the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia together to express their determination to oppose all forms of colonialism and to chart a peaceful coexistence in the bipolar world of the Cold War. This Bandung conference was generally viewed as an antecedent for the Non-Aligned Movement, established in Belgrade in 1961, in which the members stated their determination to follow an independent course rather than being forced to choose between the two superpower blocs in the Cold War.

11 For a comprehensive discussion on this subject see Sukma (2003) and Perwita (2007).

Lately, however, the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme has also become an 'Islamic' issue in Indonesia because US-led sanctions against Iran, which is suspected of trying to develop nuclear weapons capability, are seen by many Indonesians, including a large number of legislators, as unfairly targeting a Muslim country, while the United States has turned a blind eye to Israel's undoubted nuclear weapons development. The argument that Iran as a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is suspected of violating its NPT commitment, but Israel is not a party to the NPT and is, therefore, not bound by it, carries little weight among these politicians and the general public. When Indonesia in 2007, as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), voted in favour of UNSC Resolution 1747 to impose sanctions on Iran for its suspected NPT non-compliance by continuing to enrich uranium, the DPR voted overwhelmingly to have an interpellation on the Iran Resolution. The DPR insisted on summoning the President to the DPR to explain Indonesia's support for the UNSC Resolution on Iran and when Yudhoyono sent only his ministers to the DPR, there were several weeks of stand-off between the DPR and the government as the DPR refused to meet the ministers.[12] The Indonesian government, while mindful of domestic Muslim pressure to refrain from agreeing UNSC resolutions sanctioning Iran or establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, does not colour its foreign policy in any substantively "Islamic" manner.

Under Soeharto's New Order, Indonesia's foreign policy was primarily aimed at promoting regional peace and stability through regional cooperation and at mobilising financial assistance from the major developed countries, both policies deemed critical for Indonesia's economic development. Indonesia, therefore, put priority on its relations with the ASEAN countries and a few industrialised countries, notably the United States, Japan and a number of West European nations. In contrast, Islamic countries were kept at arm's length, particularly after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, because the Soeharto government was afraid of the influence that radical Islamic ideas might have on

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12 http://www.antara.co.id/print/?i=1181017169

Indonesian Muslims. It is important to note that Indonesia refused to sign the charter and become a full member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) when it was established in 1972, on the grounds that Indonesia is not an Islamic state. Notwithstanding its strong support for the struggle of the Palestinians, Indonesia initially refused to allow the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) to set up an office in Jakarta in 1974. Indonesia's policy towards the Islamic world only began to change in the late 1980s, when President Soeharto began to court Muslim groups in Indonesia to shore up his political base during the later years of his rule.[13] The PLO was allowed to open its representative office in 1989 and Indonesia began to pay more attention to Islamic countries, including becoming a full member of the OIC. Nevertheless, this new foreign policy initiative was more an effort to find alternative markets for Indonesian exports than a reflection of Indonesia's interest in promoting Islamic solidarity as such.

Challenges Ahead

The questions are therefore whether Indonesia will be able to rise to the challenge of its own current national aspirations and international expectations, so that its status as the world's third largest democracy and the largest Muslim nation can be used as a lever in its foreign policy, either in promoting Indonesia's national interests, in mediating international conflicts where Muslim interests are involved, or in providing an alternative model of a modern Islamic society. The fact of the matter is, as a result of the relative neglect of the Islamic world in the past despite Indonesia's status as the largest Muslim nation, Indonesia's position in the OIC has so far been quite marginal. Furthermore, many Arab countries tend to look down on Indonesia's Islamic credentials, pointing out that Islam in Indonesia is not quite what it should be. More thought and effort is clearly needed before Indonesia can put

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13 Soeharto supported the establishment of ICMI (*Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim se-Indonesia* [Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals]) in 1991, led by then Minister of Science and Technology, BJ Habibie, regarded as a protégé of Soeharto and who was later in 1998 selected as vice-president by Soeharto.

substance to, and act upon, the idea already put in place by President Yudhoyono concerning Indonesia's international identity and its union of democracy, Islam and modernity. These efforts should be directed at convincing the outside world by packaging this new identity as part of a public relations exercise to improve Indonesia's international image and standing. Even more important, further homework needs to be done domestically so that the image will match the reality.

To some extent, current domestic political conditions and the international climate favour Indonesia improving its relations with Islamic countries in the Middle East on particular issues. The constraint that had existed during most of the New Order period has largely disappeared, for Indonesia seems to have more or less settled the question of relations between Islam and the state, at least at the national level. Indonesia is not, and is unlikely to become, an Islamic state, but political Islam has again found its voice and taken an active part in Indonesia's democratic transition. The entry of Islamic voices into the political mainstream has naturally also had an effect on Indonesia's foreign policy because there are now greater demands for Indonesia to pay more attention to its relations with the Islamic world, particularly with Middle Eastern countries.

It is important to note, however, that this greater interest in improving relations with Islamic countries has more to do with expected economic gains than with the issue of Islam as a common faith and the problems it faces in today's globalising world. One of the criticisms of Indonesia's foreign policy in the past was that it had not been able to forge closer economic links with the oil-rich states in the Middle East and benefit from their huge reserves of petrodollars. In this respect, Indonesia is lagging behind Malaysia. Arguments have been put forward that Indonesia should be able to capitalise more on its Islamic credentials to improve its ties with countries in the Middle East and get them to invest in Indonesia. On 25 April 2006, President Yudhoyono embarked on a ten-day visit to five Arab states, namely, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Jordan, accompanied by an entourage of 150 people, mostly businessmen, to do precisely what some had

suggested.[14] Indonesia needs huge inflows of foreign capital to finance its economic development, particularly its major infrastructure projects, and many of the Arab states need an alternative place to invest their money, particularly after the difficulties they encountered in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.

Indonesia's aspirations to play a more active role in helping to defuse the Palestinian–Israeli crisis, which would also contribute to improving Indonesia's international standing, have possibilities as well as limitations. On the one hand, Indonesia has been approached by a number of Western countries, including the United States, to approach the new Hamas government and persuade it to moderate its stance, while the Palestinians have asked Indonesia to intercede with Western donor countries on their behalf so that they would not cut off funding to Palestine after the formation of the Hamas-led government. At the urging of President Mahmoud Abbas, who made a state visit to Jakarta, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono also participated in the Annapolis meeting, which was hosted by US President George W Bush in November 2007, to discuss the Israeli–Palestinian issue.[15] On the other hand, Indonesia's ability to play a mediating role in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict is constrained by the fact that it does not have diplomatic relations with Israel. As mentioned earlier, there is very strong domestic opposition, particularly from the Islamic groups, to any suggestions that Jakarta should recognise Israel before the Palestinian state is established. Even informal contacts between representatives of the Indonesian government and Israel invite strong criticisms from Indonesia's Islamic groups. The promise of full diplomatic recognition from the world's largest Muslim nation is seen to be the only real leverage that Indonesia has over Israel.

The challenge for Indonesia is not in the instrumental use of Islam in its foreign policy, which is fairly easy once the domestic political situation

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14 http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/fokus/2006/04/25/449.html
15 'Transkripsi Press Briefing Menlu RI Hassan Wirajuda mengenai Persiapan Keikutsertaan Indonesia dalam Konferensi di Annapolis'. Jakarta, 23 November 2007. http://www.deplu. go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Transkripsi&Name2=Menteri&ID P=192&l=en

makes it possible. The real challenge is in substantiating the claim that, in Indonesia, democracy, Islam and modernity truly go hand in hand, and going on from this to establish an effective foreign policy that can have influence in the current global discourse between Islam and the West and within the Islamic world itself. For this to happen Indonesia first needs to demonstrate a record of success in transforming its society into one in which Islamic values and practices directly contribute to the consolidation of democracy and the preservation of a tolerant pluralism which is open to the outside world and embraces modernity. It is important to emphasise that democracy does not stop at elections or entail the imposition of the will of the majority on the rest of the population. Although the population of Indonesia is predominantly Muslim, respect for religious minorities, who enjoy equal rights under the Constitution in every aspect, must be one of the main characteristics of Indonesian national identity. Acts of intolerance against religious minorities, as well as passing laws that discriminate against women or eliminate cultural diversity are clearly contrary to the spirit of this national identity. The teachings of Islam should not primarily be used to regulate private morality in public places, but rather to inject a greater sense of a public morality of honesty, integrity and accountability in a country long mired in corruption. Islam is also noted for its concerns for the poor and the weak and its strong opposition to injustice and oppression, and as such Indonesia's public policy should reflect this overall concern for justice and freedom in the national and international contexts.

As foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy, the values and principles that are held dear by a nation may be expected to inform its foreign policy formulation and implementation as well, within the boundaries of acceptable international practices. It is, therefore, to be hoped that Indonesia's foreign policy will not simply be used as an instrument for satisfying its national interests or immediate strategic and material needs, but also be used to promote such universal values as democracy, tolerance and mutual respect world wide.

The most challenging task for Indonesia, however, is to establish its claim as an alternative form of Islamic society within the Islamic world. Today when people talk about Islam, the reference point is almost always the Middle East. Despite the fact that there are more Muslims living in Southeast Asia than in the Middle East, Southeast Asian Muslims have remained peripheral in Islamic affairs. Indonesia's success in maintaining national unity, consolidating democracy and developing its economy and human resources would undoubtedly attract the attention of other developing countries, including Muslim countries in the Middle East. All of these achievements, however, will not be sufficient in informing discourse within the Islamic world concerning the proper role of Islam in society, the relations of Islam and the state or the response of Islam to the challenges of globalisation. Unlike in secular Western traditions where religion and the state are now separate, though such a separation has only been achieved through successive wars not many centuries ago, in Islam such a complete separation is unknown and, to many Muslims, unacceptable. Although in the West modernity has brought secularism, in most Islamic countries, including Indonesia, modernity has been accompanied by greater religiosity. Indonesia's democratic transition takes place amidst an Islamic revival.

What is needed now is for Indonesian scholars of Islam and political science to produce authoritative writings on the empirical experience of the relations between democracy, modernity and Islam in Indonesia, and from there to construct a theoretical and conceptual framework about an alternative model of Islam and society in this global era. Such writings should not only be published in the Indonesian language, but must also be made available in English and Arabic so that they can enrich the currently available international literature on Islam. Backed by such intellectual input, it is hoped that Indonesia's foreign policy will be able to engage more fruitfully in the battle of ideas taking place between Islam and the West and within the Islamic world itself. Only then can Indonesia position itself as a bridge between the Islamic world and the West and as a possible reference point for other Muslim countries that may wish to emulate Indonesia's experience.

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Understanding Indonesia: the Role of Economic Nationalism[1]

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Abstract

In this paper it is argued that economic nationalism in Indonesia, in its various manifestations, has been an important factor in determining particular economic policies since Indonesia's independence up to the present. These economic policies particularly related to the ownership of productive assets owned by foreigners or by residents considered to be 'foreign', particularly Dutch business interests before 1957 and the ethnic Chinese, including Sino-Indonesians, and to the economic functions performed by foreigners or by 'foreign' residents. Focusing on one factor alone to understand Indonesia, specifically Indonesia's economic policies over time, is necessarily arbitrary and subjective. However, looking at Indonesia's modern economic history since independence through the prism of economic nationalism does to an important degree explain or highlight the major considerations underlying particular economic policies of the Indonesian government because they reflected Indonesia's national aspirations or national interests.

Introduction

Offering an economic perspective to understand Indonesia is necessarily speculative. Such an effort does not require specifying a rigorous economic model in which a dependent variable, say a specific economic policy, is closely associated with one or more independent variables, perhaps the economic ideas held by the main economic policy-makers or the links these policy-makers have to big business.

With these qualifications in mind, we venture to put forward one important factor, which in my view has to a large extent influenced Indonesia's economic policies and performance as well as the national psyche of the Indonesian people, namely economic nationalism. In this paper economic nationalism is broadly defined as nationalism as it affects or determines the economic policies of a particular country. Focusing on one factor alone to understand Indonesia, specifically Indonesia's economic policies over time, is necessarily arbitrary and subjective. However, looking at Indonesia's modern economic history since independence through the prism of economic nationalism does, to a greater or lesser extent, explain the considerations underlying particular economic policies of the Indonesian government.

The Importance of Economic Nationalism

A distinguished economics professor at the University of Chicago, the late professor Harry Johnson, defined economic nationalism as 'the national aspiration to acquiring and controlling property owned by foreigners and performing economic functions performed by foreigners' (Johnson, 1972: 26). This definition is particularly appropriate when trying to understand Indonesia's economic policies because the force of economic nationalism in Indonesia has been more intense, occasionally virulent, particularly during the early independence period in the 1950s. Though less strident at present, economic nationalism is to a certain extent still reflected in Indonesia's current economic policies.

During the 1950s, economic nationalism was primarily directed at the continuing economic dominance of Dutch and ethnic Chinese business interests. In the early 1990s, economic nationalism took the form of what I would call 'industrial nationalism' or 'technological nationalism', which is appropriate for an emerging great power as Indonesia is. This industrial nationalism was expressed by the aspiration to develop high-technology industries. In the late 1990s, after the Asian financial crisis, economic nationalism was directed at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for imposing its allegedly inappropriate economic recovery program on the Indonesian government.

Economic Nationalism During the 1950s

The continuing economic dominance of Dutch business

Despite hopes on the part of Indonesians and Dutchmen alike that political relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands would improve after the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia on 27 December 1949, as arranged at the Round Table Conference (RTC) in The Hague in the autumn of 1949, relations between the two countries continued to be prickly. Three contentious issues from the outset, one political and two economic, adversely affected relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The serious political issue concerned the steadfast refusal of the Netherlands to transfer West Irian (West New Guinea) to Indonesia on the grounds that Papuans were not Indonesians. But President Soekarno insisted that 'completing the national revolution' required the 'liberation of West Irian'. Soekarno's appeal was supported by the great majority of the Indonesian people because the Indonesian nationalists considered themselves the rightful inheritors of the whole territory of the Netherlands Indies.

The first economic issue that proved contentious was the demand by the Dutch delegation that Indonesia would have to take over the Netherlands Indies government's foreign debt to the Netherlands government, an amount equivalent to US$1.13 billion, much of which constituted an internal component of approximately US$800 million (three billion guilders) incurred as military expenses by the Netherlands to subdue the Indonesian Republic during Indonesia's war of independence. According to calculations by the Indonesian delegation, these military expenses amounted to about US$320 million (Kahin, 1997).

Despite strenuous objections by Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, a member of the Indonesian delegation, the delegation eventually agreed to take over the Netherlands Indies debt because it expected generous financial assistance from the United States. This expectation was encouraged by Merle Cochran, the American representative at the RTC, who suggested that American aid would be generous. However, all the USA finally

provided to Indonesia after the transfer of sovereignty was a paltry loan of US$100 million by the US Export–Import Bank, a loan that had to be repaid with interest and was only a third the size of post-World War II US Export–Import Bank credits to the Netherlands (Kahin, 1997).

The second economic issue was the guarantee given by the Indonesian government that Dutch private companies would be allowed to continue operating in Indonesia without hindrance, just as they did during the Dutch colonial period. During Indonesia's war of independence (1945–49), several Dutch companies with operations in Indonesia had come to realise that the attempt to subdue the Indonesian republic by military force was futile. Intent on restarting their profitable businesses in Indonesia as soon as possible, these companies exerted great pressure on the Dutch government to extract guarantees from the Indonesian delegation at the Round Table Conference (RTC) in The Hague in late 1949 that their business interests could continue to operate without any hindrance in independent Indonesia (Meijer, 1994).

Perhaps because the Indonesian delegation wanted to secure a quick decision from the Dutch delegation to transfer sovereignty to Indonesia, the two delegations quickly reached an agreement on this issue, as contained in the Finec agreement (*Financiele en Economische Overeenkomst* [Financial and Economic Agreement]). This agreement secured maximum economic and financial benefits for the Netherlands, specifically the Dutch private companies operating in Indonesia. Finec included a clause that stated that nationalisation would only be permitted if it would be in Indonesia's national interest and if both parties agreed. A judge would then decide on the amount of compensation to be paid to the owners on the basis of the real value of the nationalised company. Finec also included an obligation for Indonesia to consult the Netherlands whenever its fiscal and monetary policies would affect Dutch economic interests in Indonesia (Meijer, 1994). No wonder that the late Professor Henri Baudet, a conservative Dutch economic historian from the University of Groningen, stated that Finec contained the maximum attainable guarantees for the unhindered continuation of the operations of Dutch companies in Indonesia (Baudet and Fennema,

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1983). On the other hand, the Indonesian government from the outset was saddled with a foreign debt burden unprecedented in the history of decolonisation (Lindblad, 2008).

The achievement of political independence without having economic independence was a serious problem for the Indonesian government. Not being able to exert much control over important segments of the economy, particularly the modern sectors of the economy (large estates, mining companies, large-scale industries, banking and wholesale trade) was a serious constraint for Indonesia's policy-makers. For instance, pursuing an independent monetary policy would be difficult if the Java Bank, the bank of circulation serving as the country's central bank, was still owned by the Dutch. Sutan Sjahrir, Indonesia's first prime minister during the war of independence, in 1951 expressed a widely held view when he stated that it was the continuing economic dominance of the Dutch, and not West Irian, that was the real fundamental problem bedevilling the relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands (Meijer, 1994).

Indonesia's frustration with the continuing economic dominance of the large Dutch enterprises was reflected in the 1952–53 annual report of Bank Indonesia, Indonesia's central bank. The report stated that only 19 per cent of capital in the non-agrarian sectors of the Indonesian economy was owned by Indonesians. The report also stated that in 1953, of the total transfer of profits overseas, Rp449 million (or 70 per cent of the total transfer) went to the Netherlands, and social transfers (for personal savings and pensions) of Rp464 million (or 83 per cent of the total) went to the Netherlands (Meijer, 1994).

Indonesia's economic dependence on the Netherlands or the Dutch companies was clearly indicated by the inter-island shipping industry, which was almost entirely monopolised by the Dutch-owned (*Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij* [Royal Packet Company]). However, after Indonesia's independence, KPM's dominance of inter-island shipping was gradually eroded. On 28 April 1952, to counter the dominance of KPM, the Wilopo cabinet established the state-owned, limited liability company *Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia*, PELNI, the

IIndonesian national shipping company. Although KPM continued to be dominant in inter-island shipping, in the course of the 1950s, its dominant position was gradually being diminished. By 1956, one year before the Indonesian take-over of KPM, PELNI managed to carry 25 per cent of the cargo, which increased to 29 per cent in 1957 (Dick, 1987).

In the passenger trade, KPM was better able to retain its dominance with 94 per cent of the traffic. The introduction in 1956 of six new passenger ships enabled PELNI in 1957 to double the number of passengers it carried. For a company established only five years before, this was significant progress (Dick, 1987).

The above account shows that few, if any, of the newly-independent nations were left with a more crushing external financial burden and such severe restrictions on economic policy-making than those imposed on Indonesia by the provisions of the Finec agreement. The consequences were political instability resulting from sharp conflicts between moderate and radical leaders and a steadily deteriorating relationship with the Netherlands, which culminated, in the late 1950s, with the takeover and subsequent nationalisation of most of the remaining Dutch enterprises. As a consequence, Indonesia was only able to embark in earnest upon a path of independent economic development after 1966, seventeen years after the transfer of sovereignty (Thee, 2010).

Measures to counter Dutch economic dominance and foster the growth of an indigenous Indonesian business class

Like many other Indonesian nationalists, the economic policy-makers of the early independence period were strongly attracted to socialist ideals. These nationalists were averse to capitalism because it was associated with colonial rule. However, none of them, except for the communists, were attracted to Marxism-Leninism or other extreme leftist ideas. In fact, many nationalists interpreted 'socialism' as 'Indonesianisation' or 'indigenism', that is, breaking the control of foreign capital, mostly Dutch and ethnic Chinese, over the modern sectors of the economy,

which, according to an estimate by Benjamin Higgins, a United Nations economic consultant to the Indonesian government in the 1950s, accounted for about 25 per cent of Indonesia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and about 10 per cent of total employment (Higgins, 1990). However, views differed about how this should be achieved, whether by nationalisation of these foreign-owned enterprises or by fostering a strong indigenous Indonesian business class (Mackie, 1971).

Despite their unhappiness with the continuing Dutch dominance over the economy, the major economic policy-makers during the early independence period were pragmatic men who, though attracted to socialist ideals, did not adhere to any rigid ideological doctrine (Booth, 1986). Through their writings, Hatta, Sumitro and Sjafruddin in particular, were quite influential on the formation of economic policy-making in the early independence period (Rice, 1983).

They were pragmatic politicians and realised that top priority had to be given to the country's economic stabilisation and rehabilitation. Higgins characterised this group as 'economics-minded' persons (Higgins, 1957). Because a large part of the modern export industries were still owned and operated by the Dutch, these policy-makers realised that they had, whether they liked it or not, to protect the legal rights of the Dutch enterprises. Hence, the Dutch enterprises were allowed to continue operating in Indonesia, although this was strongly opposed by more radical nationalists.

Despite the constraints imposed by the provisions of Finec, the pragmatic economic policy-makers were determined to match Indonesia's hard-won political independence with meaningful economic sovereignty, though they realised it would take a long time and much effort. Indonesian nationalists viewed their national revolution as incomplete until they had transformed the colonial economy they had inherited into a national economy owned and controlled by their own nationals (Golay et al., 1969).

Under the provisions of Finec, nationalisation of some economic institutions or enterprises was allowed, albeit with conditions attached,

and the Indonesian government quickly took steps to nationalise key institutions and large enterprises. These included the nationalisation of the Java Bank in 1951, which was subsequently renamed Bank Indonesia. The nationalisation of the Java Bank proceeded relatively smoothly, because it was recognised that control of money and credit was an essential ingredient of sovereignty (Anspach, 1969).

Other measures to put key enterprises under national control included the transfer of domestic air transport from the Royal Netherlands Indies Airline (KNILM) to Garuda Indonesian Airways, Indonesia's new air transport company. The railways on Java and main public utilities were also put under control of the Indonesian government (Burger, 1975). The Central Trading Company (CTC), Indonesia's first government-owned trading company, established in Bukittinggi in 1947, was assigned by Vice-President Hatta to challenge the monopoly of the 'Big Five', the five large Dutch trading companies (Daud, 1999).

Since the early 1950s pressures for preferential treatment of indigenous Indonesian businessmen had also grown stronger. The first major program to develop a strong indigenous business class was the *Benteng* [Fortress] program, launched in April 1950 by Djuanda, then Minister of Welfare (Anspach, 1969). According to Sumitro, Minister of Trade and Industry in 1950–51, the purpose of the *Benteng* program was to set up a counter-force to Dutch economic interests (Sumitro, 1986). The *Benteng* program focused on securing national control of the import trade. Under this program, import licenses for restricted categories of easy-to-sell goods were reserved exclusively for indigenous Indonesian importers. The provisions of the program, however, did not specifically exclude ethnic Chinese businessmen who were Indonesian citizens (Mackie, 1971). In fact, however, the *Benteng* program was aimed at countering Chinese as well as Dutch economic interests. Countering the economic interests of ethnic Chinese businessmen was considered necessary because they continued to dominate the intermediate trade in the rural areas and the retail trade in the urban areas, just as in the colonial period.

The *Benteng* program's focus on the import trade was based on the consideration that it was the most susceptible to state control through the allocation of import licenses. This sector was also considered the most suitable to promote indigenous businessmen, because it required relatively small amounts of capital and corporate resources compared with other economic activities, such as manufacturing. It was hoped that through this import trade, indigenous Indonesian entrepreneurs would be able to accumulate sufficient capital to move into other sectors (Robison, 1986: 44).

On paper, the requirements needed by prospective indigenous Indonesian importers to qualify for the allocation of import licenses were fairly stringent. In practice, however, the *Benteng* program led to considerable abuses because ethnic Chinese importers, excluded from the program, were able to acquire import licences. They learned to operate through puppets, indigenous Indonesian license holders, who were referred to as 'briefcase importers' (*importir aktentas*) (Sutter, 1959; Mackie, 1971). Instead of building a strong indigenous Indonesian business class, the *Benteng* program had fostered a class of socially unproductive rent-seekers.

To its credit, the Indonesian government soon realised the adverse effects of the *Benteng* program and took steps to weed out bogus importers (Burger, 1975). Because the *Benteng* program had failed to achieve its stated purpose, the government eventually abandoned it (Anspach, 1969). Hence, the twin goals of reducing the control of import trade by the 'Big Five' Dutch general trading companies and of fostering the growth of a strong indigenous Indonesian business class were not achieved.

After the mid-1950s, relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands deteriorated rapidly because of the Dutch government's refusal to discuss the status of West Irian (now renamed Papua province). When the Indonesian government, in November 1957, failed to persuade the United Nations General Assembly to adopt a resolution calling on the Dutch government to cede West Irian to Indonesia, militant workers from leftwing trade unions took over KPM, the Dutch inter-island

shipping company, a major symbol of Dutch economic dominance. This action, which took the government by surprise, was subsequently followed by similar take-overs of the other Dutch enterprises.

In February 1959, the formal take-over of all Dutch enterprises was legalised. Altogether, 179 Dutch enterprises were nationalised. The nationalised companies were turned into state-owned enterprises (Siahaan, 1996; Dick, 2002). Hence, in one sweep the powerful Dutch business presence, which had operated in Indonesia since the second half of the nineteenth century, was eliminated.

Tackling the 'Chinese Problem'

The take-over and subsequent nationalisation of all Dutch enterprises went a long way towards satisfying Indonesia's desire for economic nationalism, but it still faced the economic dominance of the ethnic Chinese, including the Sino-Indonesians, who dominated the intermediate trade, as distributors of consumer goods (including imported consumer goods) and as collectors (or purchasers) of the agricultural produce of the indigenous Indonesian farmers and as money-lenders as well. As money-lenders the ethnic Chinese were often accused of charging usurious interest rates.

Hence, aside from taking steps to counter Dutch economic dominance, the Indonesian government also took steps to reduce Chinese economic dominance by affirmative policies to promote indigenous Indonesian entrepreneurs. However, taking measures to curtail Chinese economic activities proved to be more difficult than eliminating Dutch economic interests. For one thing, the number of ethnic Chinese was much greater than the Dutch, and their economic activities in the rural areas were much more intertwined with the economic activities of the indigenous population. Moreover, the large number of ethnic Chinese also included Indonesian citizens as well as 'foreign Chinese', citizens of the People's Republic of China, and 'stateless' ethnic Chinese who were loyal to Taiwan. It was therefore quite difficult for the Indonesian government to take measures against all ethnic Chinese because this group also

contained a large number of Sino-Indonesians, that is, Indonesians of Chinese descent. Having fought against Dutch colonialism and its implied racism, many Indonesian leaders found overly discriminatory policies against the ethnic Chinese distasteful (Coppel, 1983).

Aside from the above *Benteng* program, the Indonesian government also took other measures to curtail the economic activities of the ethnic Chinese.

The ban on ownership of some sectors by foreign citizens

As it had been during the Dutch colonial period, ethnic Chinese businessmen continued to own and control most of the rice mills in Indonesia. For instance, in 1952, no fewer than 138 of 154 rice mills in East Java were owned by Chinese businessmen (Anspach, 1969). In view of the important economic role of these rice mills, the Indonesian government issued a regulation in 1954, which stipulated that the Chinese owners of these rice mills had to transfer ownership of the mills to indigenous Indonesians by March 1955. The regulation decreed that no new licenses for operating rice mills would be issued to foreigners. However, because of the difficulties in implementing this regulation, the government still granted licences to foreign Chinese on an annual basis (Suryadinata, 1992).

Aside from rice mills, stevedoring, harbour transport and wharfage enterprises were also mostly owned by ethnic Chinese, including foreign Chinese and Sino-Indonesians. Similar to the treatment of Chinese ownership of rice mills, the government in 1954 issued a decree that all these maritime enterprises had to be transferred to indigenous Indonesians by 1956. However, because of the difficulties in implementing this decree, the deadline had to be extended to June 1956 (Anspach, 1969).

Government decree 10 of 1959

After the nationalisation of all Dutch enterprises in 1959, the ethnic

Chinese community emerged as the strongest element in the economy, aside from the government itself and its state-owned enterprises. In the rural areas the Chinese had since the Dutch colonial period acquired a strong economic position in retail trade, rice milling and rural finance (Mackie, 1971). Given this economic dominance, the steadily deteriorating economic conditions, and the general suspicion that the ethnic Chinese were not loyal citizens, it was not surprising that the ethnic Chinese would be the next target of government policy, particularly the large number of foreign Chinese who were either citizens of the People's Republic of China or 'stateless' Chinese loyal to Taiwan.

To this end, on 16 November 1959, the Indonesian government issued Government Decree 10 of 1959 (PP 10 of 1959), which stipulated that from 1 January 1960 all foreign nationals would be banned from rural trade and would have to transfer their business to Indonesian nationals (Suryadinata, 1992). The government hoped that much of the rural trade run by the foreign Chinese would be taken over by cooperatives and businesses owned and run by indigenous Indonesians.

Because neither the cooperatives nor indigenous businessmen had the skills and experience to replace the Chinese rural traders, the ban caused considerable economic disruption and hardship to the rural population it was supposed to help (Somers, 1964). As economic conditions steadily deteriorated in the early 1960s, and President Soekarno's and the army's attention were increasingly focused on reclaiming Irian Barat from the Dutch, implementation of Government Decree 10 of 1959 was temporarily suspended (Suryadinata, 1992). Although a resumption of the implementation of the decree did not take place, the decree was never officially rescinded.

Economic Nationalism During Guided Democracy

When the Constituent Assembly that was elected in 1955 failed to agree on the ideological basis of the country, specifically whether it should be the secular *Pancasila* or Islam, President Soekarno on 5 July issued

a decree that disbanded the legally elected Parliament and Constituent Assembly and reinstated the Constitution of 1945. Under the 1945 Constitution the President was head of state and head of government. Supported by the army under Army Chief of Staff General AH Nasution and the ascendant Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, PKI), President Soekarno ushered in the period (from 1959 to 1965) of Guided Democracy and Guided Economy.

Since the early 1960s, economic conditions had steadily deteriorated with hyperinflation increasing rapidly to around 100 per cent, and political developments took an increasingly radical turn. Although President Soekarno was strongly opposed to the establishment of the Malaysian federation, which he saw as a neocolonialist plot, Malaysia officially came into being as a new nation on 16 September 1963.

President Soekarno reacted with anger and launched the 'Crush Malaysia' campaign. Malaysia was supported by Britain, Australia and New Zealand as well as the USA, and Soekarno whipped up anti-Western sentiments that grew into a frenzy of xenophobia. As these anti-British and anti-American sentiments grew stronger, trade unions affiliated with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) late in 1963 started taking over British and American enterprises, followed by the take-over of other Western enterprises, including Belgian enterprises. However, the Indonesian government was careful not to nationalise these companies, as it had done with the Dutch enterprises in 1959 because this would have required expensive compensation that the government could not afford.

When the strongly anti-communist New Order government came to power in 1967, it returned all the confiscated British, American and other Western enterprises to their former owners. However, the new government did not return the nationalised Dutch enterprises but instead paid compensation to the former Dutch owners.

Economic Nationalism During the Soeharto Era

During the authoritarian rule of President Soeharto, Indonesia made rapid economic progress accompanied by a steady decline in absolute poverty from 40 per cent of the population to 11 per cent in 1996. As living standards of the people improved, the force of economic nationalism gradually weakened. Public demonstrations against foreign investment were banned, particularly after the anti-Japanese, so-called *Malari* riots of mid-January 1974.

The anti-Japanese *Malari* riots of January 1974

On 15 and 16 January 1974, a visit by Kakuei Tanaka, the then prime minister of Japan, precipitated the worst riots in Jakarta since the advent of the New Order government under Soeharto. During these *Malari* riots (from *Malapetaka Januari*, January disaster), students and poor urban youths burned about 800 Japanese cars and 100 buildings and looted many shops that had been selling Japanese products (Ricklefs, 1993).

Although the riots were caused ostensibly by the 'over-presence' of Japanese direct investment in Indonesia, a sentiment reinforced by the huge billboards in Jakarta advertising various Japanese products, economic factors were not the only issue, nor was criticism of Japan's perceived dominant role in the Indonesian economy the only economic issue (Grenville, 1974). In fact, over the previous few months there had been widespread criticism ranging from the perceived dominant role of foreign aid and foreign investment and the attendant loss of sovereignty to complaints that non-indigenous entrepreneurs (meaning ethnic Chinese) were receiving preferential treatment, for example, the disproportionate allocation of subsidised credit. (Grenville, 1974).

In response to these riots, the government clamped down harshly and by 17 January the riots had been suppressed by the military. Around 770 people were arrested, almost all of whom were released almost two years later. However, three student leaders were sentenced to longer prison terms upon doubtful evidence. Three newspapers and eight other

publications accused or suspected of being responsible for inciting the riots were banned, and one editor was also arrested (Ricklefs, 1993).

The government also responded to the *Malari* affair by introducing more restrictive measures against foreign investment and more measures in favour of indigenous (*pribumi*) Indonesian businessmen. For instance, from 1974, new foreign direct investment could only enter Indonesia in the form of joint ventures with national businessmen or companies in which indigenous businessmen held majority equity and exercised majority management control (Thee, 1995). The restrictive rules governing foreign investment were only lifted in June 1994 when the government found it necessary to deregulate the economy in order to increase investment and raise economic growth (Thee, 2006).

Economic policies against the ethnic Chinese during the Soeharto era

During the initial period of the Soeharto era, strong anti-Chinese sentiments prevailed among senior army officers. These officers suspected Chinese sympathies, if not links, with the People's Republic of China because of its alleged involvement in the attempted coup of 30 September 1965, but pragmatic considerations gained the upper hand. Because of the New Order's key policy objective of pushing economic growth (Booth, 1998), it was soon realised that the Chinese were essential to achieve this goal. To meet this objective, it was necessary to lift various restrictions on the economic activities of the Chinese that had been introduced during the Soekarno era. Although the Chinese were given wide opportunities in business, their activities in other fields, such as politics and culture, were severely curtailed (Thee, 2006).

Despite the gloomy outlook for the Chinese, including the Sino-Indonesians, at the beginning of the New Order, the government's priority of economic development opened various opportunities for the Chinese. With their long commercial experience, greater business acumen, better access to capital, managerial and technical skills, traditional business contacts with the Chinese business networks in the East Asian region,

and in some instances with their mutually profitable joint ventures with the powerful, indigenous (*pribumi*) power holders, the Chinese were able to move into a wide range of economic activities, including large-estate agriculture, manufacturing, real estate and banking, and thus prosper to a much greater degree than during the Dutch colonial period and during the Soekarno era (Thee, 2006).

During the Soeharto era, particularly during the later years, several anti-Chinese riots also took place, though generally on a small scale, but they were always supressed for fear that they could adversely affect the economy. It was only during the power vacuum just before Soeharto resigned as president in May 1998, that horrific, anti-Chinese riots took place in Solo and Jakarta, including rapes of Chinese women.

The two presidential decrees on government contracts

When the government was enjoying the windfall revenues from the two oil booms in the 1970s and early 1980s, it decided to pursue another affirmative policy to promote indigenous Indonesian entrepreneurship. To this effect, it issued two presidential decrees; one in 1979, *Keputusan Presiden* 14 of 1979, and one in 1980, *Keputusan Presiden* 14a of 1980, which stipulated that government contracts of up to Rp20 million were solely reserved for entrepreneurs from the 'economically weak groups in society' (*golongan ekonomi lemah*), a euphemism to refer to the indigenous Indonesians as distinct from the 'economically strong groups in society', that is, the ethnic Chinese. For contracts up to Rp100 million, bids had to be awarded by tender, but preferential treatment would still be given to entrepreneurs from the 'economically weak groups in society' even if their tenders were up to 10 per cent higher than the others (Daroesman, 1981).

To qualify as an entrepreneur from the 'economically weak groups', at least 50 per cent of their company would have to be owned by indigenous entrepreneurs, and more than half the members of the board of management would have to be indigenous managers. In addition, the amount of capital and net assets of the company would have to be less

than Rp25 million in the case of trade and related activities, or less than Rp100 million in the case of manufacturing and construction. Local cooperatives could also qualify as economic enterprises owned and run by members of the 'economically weak groups' (Daroesman, 1981). Unlike the unsuccessful *Benteng* program, the above two presidential decrees were more successful in nurturing a relatively large group of successful indigenous entrepreneurs, including businessmen of the Kodel group.

The appeal to help cooperatives

Increasingly concerned by the widespread discontent about the perceived economic gap between rich and poor and particularly between the ethnic Chinese minority and the indigenous majority, President Soeharto in March 1990 invited the heads of the leading business conglomerates, most of them owned and controlled by ethnic Chinese tycoons, to his Tapos cattle ranch near Bogor. Many of these conglomerates had grown rapidly during the Soeharto era because of the preferential treatment they had received from the government, notably in the allocation of large sums of subsidised credit, thanks to the personal and business relationships they had established with the indigenous power holders, particularly President Soeharto. The size of these conglomerates only became evident when they or their subsidiaries had gone public after the stock exchange boom in 1989 (Thee, 2006).

Soeharto used this meeting to reduce sensitivity about the visible role of the Chinese-owned conglomerates, and to portray himself as the defender of the 'little people' (*wong cilik*) (Elson, 2001). On national television, President Soeharto strongly appealed to the assembled business tycoons to help the development of the cooperatives, mostly owned by members of the 'economically weak groups', by transferring a quarter of their assets to cooperatives and by allowing the cooperatives to purchase shares in these private companies as a means of closing the gap between rich and poor. Equal sharing of the nation's wealth would be a constant theme in Soeharto's speeches through the 1990s (Elson, 2001).

However, beyond some token steps on the part of the conglomerates to heed Soeharto's appeal, it was, as could be expected, quite unsuccessful in reducing the economic power of the conglomerates and in increasing the role and strength of the cooperatives. In the end it was the Asian financial and economic crisis that reduced the wealth and power of the conglomerates when they had to repay their large overseas debts and their debts to the Indonesian government after it had bailed out their failed banks.

The emergence of Indonesia's industrial nationalism

Like in other emerging economies, economic nationalism in Indonesia has continued to be an important factor in determining Indonesia's economic policies. Its forms and manifestations may change over time in response to new challenges and opportunities. Since the late 1980s, economic nationalism, as a result of rapid economic growth and successful industrialisation, manifested itself as the aspiration to become a great industrial power through the establishment of a range of strategic industries, including high-technology industries, such as an aircraft industry.

Proponents of this industrial nationalism (sometimes referred to as technological nationalism) argue that a proud, developing country, such as Indonesia, with its abundant natural resources and large population should not remain content with just being a 'tailor' to the world market, exporting cheap, labour-intensive products, such as clothing and textiles. Instead, it was high time for Indonesia to develop 'strategic industries', particularly capital-intensive, high-technology industries. Professor BJ Habibie, Indonesia's State Minister for Research and Technology from 1978 up to 1998 and Indonesia's foremost proponent of this industrial nationalism, pointed out that developing state-owned, high-technology industries was imperative if Indonesia were to sustain the growth of its manufactured exports, which had become the major engine of economic growth since the late 1980s. According to Habibie, Indonesia could not continue relying on its comparative advantage in resource and labour-

intensive manufacturing in the face of strong competition from lower wage countries, such as China, Vietnam, India and Bangladesh. Because capital-intensive, high-technology industries are quite intensive in their use of human skills and sophisticated industrial technologies, Indonesia in its Second Long-Term Development Plan (1994–2019) would have to make a much greater effort in human resource development and the development of industrial technological capabilities than it had done so far (Thee, 1994).

Although industrial nationalism appeared to be in the ascendancy in the early 1990s, economic realities, notably Indonesia's large foreign debt burden and the slowdown in non-oil exports, particularly manufactured exports, which had been the major engine of growth since 1993, forced the government to continue its prudent macroeconomic policies. In the end, the more pragmatic, but no less nationalistic, policy-makers prevailed and were able to assert the primacy of sound macroeconomic policies. In fact, developments after the Asian economic crisis and the much reduced fiscal capacity of the Indonesian government spelt the end of the high-technology aircraft industry, at least for the foreseeable future.

Economic Nationalism in the Post-Soeharto Era

The Asian economic crisis of 1997–98 hit Indonesia hard, shown by the fact that, although since the early 1990s economic growth averaged more than 7 per cent per annum, the economy contracted by an unprecedented 13.1 per cent in 1998. Although positive growth resumed in 1999, economic growth remained rather sluggish and never exceeded the pre-crisis growth of 7 per cent plus, even though in 2007 it reached a post-crisis high of 6.3 per cent.

The Indonesian financial crisis started through contagion from the Thai currency crisis, which happened in July 1997. When in early October 1997, as a result of speculative pressure, the rupiah steadily depreciated by 55 per cent, and the foreign exchange reserves had dwindled to US$10.5 billion, Indonesia's Minister of Finance approached the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) to obtain financial support, hoping that the IMF good housekeeping seal would restore confidence in the rupiah.

In return for a large standby loan from the IMF, the government in its Letter of Intent to the IMF pledged to implement a comprehensive reform program, involving sound macroeconomic policies; restructuring the weak financial sector, including the closure of insolvent financial institutions; and structural reforms (Djiwandono, 2000: 54).

Market confidence, however, was not restored when, in November 1997, the government, in accordance with the IMF program, closed 16 insolvent banks to show its determination to deal decisively with financially troubled banks. This measure, however, led to a loss of confidence in the whole banking system. To prevent a panicky bank run by the public, Bank Indonesia issued a huge amount of emergency credits—referred to as Bank Indonesia's Liquidity Support (*Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia*)—to ensure that the other banks did not collapse (World Bank, 1998: 1.4–1.6). The currency crisis was now aggravated by a serious banking crisis.

Not surprisingly, several critics faulted the IMF for what they considered the unnecessarily hasty closure of the 16 banks, which destabilised the whole financial system and subsequently led to the insolvency of the entire banking system (Ramli, 2003: 11). Several economists, Indonesian and foreign, faulted President Soeharto for not faithfully implementing the comprehensive reform program agreed with the IMF. Other Indonesian economists, including Rizal Ramli and Kwik Kian Gie, severely criticised the IMF for imposing its reform program on Indonesia; they asserted that the reform program was not only overloaded, as reflected by its suggested structural reforms that had nothing to do with the currency crisis, but it was also inappropriate, as reflected by its imposition of tight fiscal policy, even though the government budget showed a surplus, unlike most of the Latin American countries that suffered a budget deficit.

According to an evaluation report by the IMF, published in 2003, the single greatest cause of the failure of the November 1997 program was the lack of a comprehensive bank restructuring strategy, which led to a rapid expansion of liquidity to support weak banks. The resulting loss of monetary control in turn contributed to a weaker exchange rate and greater distress in the corporate sector (IMF, 2003: 1–2). The crisis became intensely political when President Soeharto fell ill in early December, making crisis management even more difficult. In early January 1998, the IMF negotiated a revised program, which focused heavily on structural conditionality, to signal a clean break with the past and restore confidence. The program failed to do so because of the visible lack of political commitment on the part of President Soeharto to the policies promised and partly because of the failure to address the critical banking and corporate debt problems. However, the IMF's evaluation in 2003 suggests that its own response to the program's failure had been inadequate in many respects (IMF, 2003: 2).

Mounting public criticism of the intrusive nature of perceived IMF meddling in Indonesia's internal affairs led the Indonesian government to exit the IMF program by the end of 2003. Instead, the Indonesian government issued a White Paper outlining the government's own recovery program, which turned out to be credible and subsequently led to increased growth, reaching a post-crisis growth of 6.3 per cent in 2007. In 2007, the government dissolved the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), the aid consortium coordinated by the World Bank, stating that it would henceforth take full ownership of its development program. To the extent it needed foreign aid, it would discuss this directly with the individual donor countries, and not through the CGI.

Conclusion

In the previous pages, episodes of Indonesia's modern economic history, specifically the government's economic policies, have been described through the lens of economic nationalism. It was argued that economic nationalism, in its various manifestations, has been an important factor in

determining these policies. In the case of the take-over and nationalisation of Dutch enterprises and the affirmative policies to promote indigenous Indonesian entrepreneurship, economic nationalism was directed at foreigners or Indonesian residents deemed foreign; for instance, the ethnic Chinese, in order to gain greater ownership and control over its productive assets by indigenous Indonesian entrepreneurs or state-owned enterprises.

In the case of industrial nationalism, the idea was essentially ambitious and forward-looking but inappropriate in view of the high opportunity costs required to develop high-technology industries and the lack of highly-trained technical personnel. Instead of developing these expensive industries, the government should have focused its efforts on strengthening and upgrading the labour-intensive industries that are required to generate employment for Indonesia's large labour force, and only gradually developed its skill-intensive, high-technology industries in line with the development of highly-trained manpower, which takes time.

From the controversy surrounding the role of the IMF in helping the Indonesian government, the government as well as the IMF gained valuable experience from the mistakes. For Indonesian policy-makers the experience they gained from handling the fall-out from the Asian financial crisis proved to be valuable when they skilfully dealt with the adverse effects of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 by sticking to sound macroeconomic policies, while injecting a fiscal stimulus to keep the economy growing.

Under the pragmatic government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the force of economic nationalism is being channelled in a more constructive direction that emphasises the role of Indonesia as a responsible and constructive member of the international community. As a member state of ASEAN, of the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and of the multilateral World Trade Organisation (WTO), and a signatory to the ASEAN–China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), the Indonesian government has clearly stated its intention to meet faithfully its regional and international commitments.

However, the force of economic nationalism, more subdued and moderate now than during the Soekarno period, is in some respects still evident, as reflected by, for instance, the new Investment Law of 2007. Although the new law now provides equal legal status and treatment to domestic and foreign investors (World Bank, 2007: 21), its negative list contains a long list of fields in which foreign direct investment is either banned or subject to various equity restrictions. Aside from Indonesia's perceived unfavourable investment climate, this negative list has also deterred several potential foreign investors from investing in Indonesia.

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Participating in Parliamentary Politics: Experiences of Indonesian Women 1995–2010[1]

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Abstract

This article concerns itself with women's participation in politics and, more specifically, the representation of women in elected legislatures, in Indonesia between 1995 and 2010. The article gives readers a brief overview of the various ways that Indonesian women participate in politics. Examples are given of women being traditional rulers, having political authority, exercising power, becoming presidents and cabinet ministers, participating in protest movements, and being elected to parliament. The article then moves to focus more specifically on the election of women to the Indonesian parliament. The article analyses positive developments that have occurred in the past decade to facilitate women's entry to parliamentary politics. Although numerous positive developments have indeed taken place, the article argues that women are still hindered in their attempts to get elected to parliament. Drawing on in-depth interviews, literature reviews, statistical analysis, and long-term ethnographic research, the authors identify some of the factors limiting women's election, including the restrictive limited model of womanhood advocated in Indonesia, declining cronyism, the ineffectiveness of the thirty per cent quota, the reputation politics has of being dirty, the influence of religion, and the large sums of money candidates need to support their election campaigns.

Introduction

In 1945, Indonesian women were granted the right to vote and stand for election. Indonesian women, however, were already active in the world of politics. As early as 1820 it was noted by a foreign visitor that

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women in the Indonesian province of South Sulawesi were 'consulted by the men on all public affairs, and frequently raised to the throne, and that too when the monarchy is elective'. The visitor, John Crawfurd, continued, 'At public festivals, women appear among the men; and those invested with authority sit in their councils when affairs of state are discussed, possessing, it is often alleged, even more than their due share in the deliberations' (1820: 164). Moreover, during Indonesia's struggle for independence from the Netherlands in the 1930s and 1940s, women were exhorted to be politically active (Bessell, 2004).

For women in the Makassar area of South Sulawesi, authority in the political arena is reflected in the institution of female ada' (ada' bainé), where women act as partners to male members in the traditional governmental council (Röttger-Rössler, 2000). Makassar women may also play the role of mediator between general society and local leaders. Another factor, which might suggest the significance of Makassar women's role in the political arena, is that a husband might obtain a high-standing social position, such as a customary leader, based on the status of his wife (Röttger-Rössler, 2000).

In the spiritual domain Makassar women are also able to exert some political authority. For instance, safeguarding the sacred heirlooms (kalompoang), the possession of which is an important symbol of sociopolitical authority, is deemed to be one of the highest priorities in Makassar society. Those individuals considered best able to protect the heirlooms in some parts of South Sulawesi are women (Röttger-Rössler, 2000). This position of guardian is seen by many as the highest rank within the traditional governmental structure (Röttger-Rössler, 2000). In contrast, men are often excluded from all kalompoang rituals relating to individual belief and familial matters. Such is women's authority within the household and concerning familial affairs in Makassar, South Sulawesi, that Röttger-Rössler (2000) concludes women play significant roles alongside men in many political matters.

In Java, individual power is often contextualised in terms of being self-controlled, calm, reserved, and passive (Anderson, 1972). As such, the greater the degree of an individual's power, the less actively such power

needs to be articulated. For Handayani and Novianto (2004: 182), these former qualities are assigned more readily to femininity than to masculinity. According to Handayani and Novianto (2004), women exercise political power primarily in the private arena and indeed they suggest that power in Java is characterised within the domestic, informal and personal sphere, where women are active contributors. These authors also argue that men's overt and public power is strongly influenced by women's covert, private power. Indeed there is a Javanese saying that *apiking suami gumantung istri, apiking anak gumantung ibu*, which means that husbands and children are the representatives of the wishes of wives and mothers (Handayani and Novianto, 2004: 145, 207–208; cf. Sanday, 1981: 41). Indonesian women also actively participate in politics by undertaking such activities as voting, attending political rallies, fundraising, and lobbying parties and parliament such as during recent debates about the passing of the pornography bill.

Women's political engagement in parts of Indonesia, then, is certainly not a new phenomenon. Considering this relatively long history of political involvement, it may come as a surprise that women's rates of participation in contemporary Indonesian parliamentary politics remains low, despite numerous pro-women policies that have been implemented in the past fifteen years.

In this article we explore the contradictions apparent in women's current parliamentary participation in Indonesia. On the one hand, Indonesian women have made incredible gains in the past fifteen years in terms of their involvement in politics. Perhaps most significant, at least in terms of public recognition of the importance of women in politics, was the passing in 2003 of a quota system recommending that at least thirty per cent of candidates for lower house seats in Indonesia be women. And let us not forget that a woman became president of the world's fourth most populous nation. On the other hand, though, the number of women in lower house seats in Indonesia continues to be low. Here we want to explore some of the reasons why parliamentary participation by women remains low despite some significant advances.

We have limited discussion in this article to the years 1995 to 2010. One reason for starting in 1995 is that in that year the United Nations' Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing. At this conference all 189 member states agreed to what is now called the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPA). The BDPA committed all of the signatories, including Indonesia, to ensure that women had equal access to, and full participation in, power structures and decision making. Davies has written elsewhere specifically about the tenets of the BDPA (Davies, 2005); here we want to look more generally at how the sentiments of the BDPA and other ongoing social developments have sparked interest in Indonesian women's political participation in general and parliamentary participation specifically. The article draws on long-term observation of the Indonesian political system, in-depth interviews, and statistical and literature reviews.

Optimistic Years for Indonesian Women

The United Nations' Fourth World Conference on Women and the signing of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPA) was a boon for Indonesian women in many respects. In the years that followed the signing of the BDPA many pro-women policies were signed and affirmative activities initiated. Numerous women's groups in the archipelago used tenets of the BDPA as a rallying point for motivating other women to participate in civil society. In many respects the BDPA could not have come at a better time and although it may not be directly cited in many of the developments of the past fifteen years, it was in the background of much pro-women sentiment in Indonesia. Moreover, the BDPA provided impetus in the mid-1990s for many women to protest against the increasingly untenable policies of then President Soeharto.

After three decades as president of the Republic of Indonesia, Soeharto's power began to wane in 1995. He was desperate to consolidate his rule and tried all sorts of tactics to achieve this. One tactic was to imprison anyone who was critical of him or his government. Another he used to maintain power was to eliminate freedom of the press. The highly

popular and critical news magazine, *Tempo*, was banned because it was considered to be undermining the government and was therefore deemed disruptive to Soeharto's rule.

Rather than consolidate Soeharto's power, many of these strong-arm tactics had the reverse effect. People began taking to the streets to protest against unsatisfactory conditions. A particular event that sparked public protest was the 1997 general election where Soeharto's puppet party, Golkar, won 74 per cent of the vote. Civil unrest continued to grow throughout 1997 until Soeharto was forced to resign as president in May 1998.

The environment of open protest was supported in no small part by women. Women from all sectors of society felt empowered to speak out and demand particular rights. A newly emerging middle-class cohort of women was graduating from university and these women were equipped with the skills and nous for protest. Many women were tired of the image of conservatism that had dominated throughout Soeharto's rule and some even set up women's organisations and linked to international networks. Blackburn (2001) notes that rally cries were heard throughout Indonesia and women chanted key words such as 'participation', 'emancipation' and 'empowerment'.[2]

Women's public protests were fuelled by the crashing Indonesian economy in 1997. Daily necessities, such as rice and oil, became comparatively expensive. These price rises caused women to start

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2 Even members of *Dharma Wanita* began protesting. *Dharma Wanita* is an Indonesian organisation for the wives of civil servants. Indeed, all such wives are obliged to join this organisation. The hierarchy of *Dharma Wanita* follows that of the civil service. For instance, the wife of a senior ranking civil servant takes a corresponding role within *Dharma Wanita*. Members of *Dharma Wanita* are often considered to strategically enjoy their shadow authority and competition amongst members is fierce. For instance, women compete amongst each other to advance the position of their respective husbands because the spouse's status reflects on a woman's own character. In the late 1990s, women in *Dharma Wanita* began criticising the organisation for being out of touch with issues women faced in the real world. For instance, one senior ranking member, Dr Atiek Wardiman, publicly chastised the organisation for being too preoccupied with social events and ignoring more important matters, such as women's right to education. However, the view of many people in Indonesia is that members of *Dharma Wanita* continue to put their individual needs before the needs of women in general.

protesting because they felt they were unable to feed their families adequately. During Soeharto's rule, the state disseminated very clear models of manhood and womanhood. These models defined women as wives and mothers. Any failure of a woman to feed her family meant that she was an inadequate wife and mother. A consequence of this strong model of womanhood was that when rice prices rose and women found it increasingly difficult to feed their families, they felt justified in protesting. The Indonesian model of womanhood was created to ensure that women did not disrupt national stability, yet ironically this model became the justification for protest (McCormick, 2003).

Popular culture in Indonesia from the late 1990s onwards began to show new images of women. Women were portrayed as assertive, independent and powerful. Examples of these new images are found in films such as *Eliana, Eliana* and *Ada Apa Dengan Cinta* [What's Up with Love] and in Ayu Utami's novel, *Saman* (1998). Even women's magazines, such as *Jurnal Perempuan* [Women's Journal], showed politically active women (cf. Armando, 2000; Hatley, 2007; Suryakusuma, 2000). Not only were women playing central roles in fiction, but in real life women were also assuming key public posts.

In 2001, a woman became president of Indonesia. Megawati Soekarnoputri's victory cannot be separated from the legacy of her father (former President Soekarno) though and, moreover, Megawati was consistently painted as being merely a puppet of her husband, Taufik Kiemas. Yet despite the controversy regarding a woman becoming president, and the fact that she showed little concern for women's issues, Megawati's candidature gave women throughout the nation a particular role model that they could aspire to.[3]

Another boon for women came when the current president of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, came to power in 2004 and appointed four women to key cabinet posts. We might have expected a woman to assume the position of State Minister for the Empowerment of Women, as Dr Meutia Hatta Swasono did. We might also have expected that a

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3   See Machali (2001) for a discussion on women, Islam and Javanese culture in relation to Megawati Soekarnoputri's presidency.

woman might become the Minister of Health, as Dr Siti Fadillah Supari did. What took many people by surprise, though, was that women were appointed to two posts not traditionally considered appropriate for women. Dr Sri Mulyani Indrawati became the Minister of National Development Planning and Dr Marie Elka Pangestu became the Trade Minister.

During the 2009 national election campaign the role of women was again debated. Indeed, the vice-chairman of the Democratic Party, Achmad Mubarok, seemed to suggest that women should not be appointed to strategic positions in the government because they were not capable and because women should focus on their family responsibilities. Mubarok accepted that women could assume the portfolios of Social Affairs and Women's Empowerment, but he denied their ability to lead any other ministry (Idrus, 2009). Despite such opposition, after Yudhoyono was re-elected president in 2009, he again appointed women to key ministerial posts. Dr Indrawati took the finance portfolio and Dr Pangestu the position of Minister of Trade. Dr Endang Sedyaningsih was appointed Minister of Health, Dr Armida Alisjahbana became Minister of National Development Planning, and Linda Agum Gumelar became the Minister of Women's Empowerment (Idrus, 2009). Sadly for Indonesia though, Dr Indrawati recently resigned as Finance Minister and on the first of June 2010 took up a position as managing director of the World Bank.

In addition to these developments there was, during the period 1995–2010, a number of positive policies aimed at women. In 1995, Soeharto's government designed a National Action Plan. This plan outlined concrete steps to improve the role and status of women in Indonesia and had five main goals and thirty activities. These goals and activities have been outlined elsewhere (Davies, 2005) so here we shall just summarise them. First, the plan was to ensure that all organisations, private and public, would give more opportunities to women. The plan established a mentoring system, whereby women who had already achieved positions of respect in institutions, such as universities and government departments, would mentor women in the lower ranks. The plan also was to give women access to education, leadership, and

management programs. Finally, the plan envisaged developing good coordination between all sorts of groups, such as between government, universities and the mass media. It was hoped that such developments and collaboration would, *inter alia,* foster women's engagement in parliamentary politics.

Not only were these initiatives written into policy but they were funded. One form of funding came through Presidential Instruction 5 of 1995. Funding made available by the government enabled the construction of new offices concerned with women's affairs. For instance, the Office of the Advancement of Women was inaugurated and numerous women's studies centres were opened at universities throughout the country. These initiatives aimed in part at helping women get elected to parliament by providing them with such resources as political knowledge.[4]

A particularly important development for women trying to get elected to parliament was the implementation of the thirty per cent quota. In 2003, an election bill (Article 65 (1) UU 12 of 2003) was passed by the Indonesian government recommending that a minimum of thirty per cent of candidates for Assembly seats be women. This bill publicly affirmed the value of women in parliament. The next year there was a national election and women's groups held their breath to see if more women would be elected to parliament. These groups were to be disappointed, though, as this article will show.

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4   A further political initiative was also developed to help women achieve equality with men not just in politics but in wider society. On 19 December 2000, Presidential Instruction 9 was issued, which moved gender mainstreaming into national development programs and policies for gender equity in development. This initiative became one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 2015. In 2002, under Megawati's presidency, the State Minister for the Empowerment of Women issued *Manual for Implementation Guidelines on Gender Mainstreaming in National Development.* This manual was to facilitate gender equity. One way in which this was to be achieved was through integrating women's and men's experiences and by systematically evaluating governmental policies. The development of the manual was followed by a Minister of Internal Affairs Decision (*Kepmendagri*) 132 of 2003 on General Implementation Guidelines on Gender Mainstreaming at the Regional Level, which was mandated a five per cent allocation of national and regional budgets (Article 7:1). This *Kepmendagri* has been controversial, though, because the funding allocation is directed solely to the Women's Empowerment Unit. A revised version of *Kepmendagri* (15 of 2008), again focusing on gender mainstreaming, is far from being institutionalised, though, even ten years after the development of Presidential Instruction 9 of 2000.

In another promising move towards parliamentary equity, the election bill of 2003 was substituted in 2008 by UU 10 of 2008. This later regulation not only recommends that a minimum of thirty per cent of candidates for Assembly seats be women, but requests that each party provide a document from its National Party Board proving this to be so (Article 15, d). Parties who do not fulfil this requirement are asked by the General Election Commission to revise their candidate lists; however there are no formal sanctions for non-compliance.

The efforts of women on the ground to increase their participation in politics, particularly parliamentary politics, can also not be ignored. Indeed, with the assistance of foreign donor agents, numerous training programs have been implemented, which have enabled women to build their capacity to engage in formal political structures. For instance, during November and December 2008, the Asia Foundation worked in collaboration with the University of Indonesia's Center for Political Studies, the Indonesian Women's Genuine Partnership (MISPI) in Aceh, the University of Airlangga's Human Rights Center, and with the Makassar Institute of Public Policy Studies (LSKP) to provide candidates from Jakarta, Aceh, East Java and South Sulawesi with a series of electoral training programs. These training programs focused on such matters as the Indonesian electoral system and campaign strategies.

The Challenges for Women and Political Participation

As can be seen, there is a great deal to feel positive about in terms of women's achievements in the political field in Indonesia over the past fifteen years: a woman became president; numerous pro-women policies and initiatives were implemented; a thirty per cent quota system was ratified; and popular media began to show women as assertive and independent individuals. Unfortunately, these developments have failed to result in substantial increases in the number of women in parliament. The number of women in lower houses of parliament or in unicameral legislatures in Indonesia dropped between 1997 and 2004 from 11.4 per

cent to 11.3 per cent. By 2009, however, this figure had risen to 18.0 per cent (see Table 1).

In the context of South Sulawesi, only seven of fifty seats (14 per cent) were won by women in the 2009 election for the metropolitan House of Representatives (DPRD Makassar). These seven included two seats for the Hanura Party and one each for the following parties: Golkar, PPP, PAN, PRN and PBN. At the provincial elections (DPRD South Sulawesi), only eleven out of seventy-five seats (14.67 per cent) were won by women. So why has the number of women in lower or single house seats throughout Indonesia remained relatively low over the past fifteen years?

Table 1

**Lower or Single House Seats Occupied by Women as a Percentage of Total
(Indonesia: 1997, 1999, 2004, 2009)**

1997	*1999*	*2004*	*2009*
11.4%	8.0%	11.3%	18.0%

Source: *Women in National Parliaments*, available at:
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif251297.htm (for 1997)
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif151200.htm (for 1999)
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif310105.htm (for 2004)
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm (for 2009)

There are numerous reasons why Indonesian women find it difficult to get elected to parliament. Below, we investigate six of these reasons, although we acknowledge that further work is needed to identify the full range of obstacles hindering women's engagement in Indonesian parliamentary politics. The reasons identified below are not necessarily addressed in order of significance because these factors come together in different and dynamic ways to hinder individual women's participation in parliamentary politics. Indeed, obstacles to political participation differ depending on the status and position of the woman. For instance, a wealthy woman might be able to access the financial resources needed

to promote herself politically, but she could find that the political connections she once relied on to get elected have now become a liability, with the public potentially seeing her as someone who engages in KKN (*korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme*). Moreover, the various political parties differ in their attitudes and policies towards supporting the inclusion of women, a topic that requires further investigation.

A primary contributing factor in limiting the number of women in parliament is the strictness of national Indonesian ideals of womanhood; models of womanhood have been described in some detail elsewhere (Davies, 2006). In reference to political participation, before Indonesian women can legitimately enter politics they should marry heterosexually and bear children. All the women appointed to ministerial posts in the cabinet of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono have met these requirements. Women must also assure the citizenry that their domestic duties are taken care of and that they are able to work in the public sector in addition to their roles within the home. Indeed, a woman's commitment to her family is continually questioned. If familial problems do occur, the wife is frequently held solely responsible. Moreover, if a wife is more successful in her career than her husband, she is generally seen as a threat to the husband's position as head of the household. We were recently told by one well-educated and politically active woman, Ibu Dian, that people often assume that women who enter politics will neglect their husbands and their children. But this is definitely not the case, Ibu Dian affirmed. She continued by saying that in fact women are perfectly capable of fulfilling all of their domestic duties and still holding down political jobs. Although Ibu Dian is supportive of women engaging in parliamentary politics, she does not question the belief that women must concomitantly continue with their domestic duties. In order to successfully engage in the public arena, it seems women must be superwomen.

The model of womanhood that Indonesian women should emulate is certainly not unique. Another research project explores ways in which Helen Clark, former prime minister of New Zealand, was subjected to inquiries about her femininity and her home life during election

campaigns. The New Zealand public even demanded assurances that her heterosexual marriage was not just a charade (Devere and Davies, 2006). In Indonesia, however, the model of womanhood is even stricter and it is unlikely that an unmarried woman or a woman without children would be successful in Indonesian politics.

There are certainly advantages for women in employing the Indonesian model of womanhood; Indonesian women have strategically used stereotypical models to their political advantage. For instance, women have asserted that issues such as reproductive health, family welfare, and children's education can only be understood by women. As such, Indonesian women have demanded that more women be included in parliament (cf. Reerink, 2004; Thompson, 2003). However, although arguments based on women's roles as wives and mothers are incredibly empowering, they have their limits. The image of women as domestically focused only stereotypes them to the point that their political careers become something that they can only do once their family is cared for. Moreover, women politicians often find it hard to be taken seriously because the public frequently assumes that politics is just something they do on the side, after they have attended to the welfare of their family.

A second reason why women find it hard to get into parliamentary politics in Indonesia, and why the number of women in lower house parliamentary seats in unicameral legislatures has not grown significantly in the past fifteen years, is possibly because of the declining level of nepotism that has resulted from the democratisation of the political system. The nepotism that arguably helped Megawati (Soekarno's daughter; Soekarno was Indonesia's first president), Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (Soeharto's daughter), and Meutia Hatta Swasono (Muhammad Hatta's daughter; Hatta was Indonesia's first vice-president) get into power is no longer reliable. Moreover, the Indonesian public has become increasingly sceptical of perceived political nepotism.

Third, although more women may be standing for elections now, in accordance with the thirty per cent quota, women are being nominated for electorates where they are unlikely to win. As Mulia and Anik

(2005: 120) argue, the quota system has been implemented only half-heartedly—no sanctions are applied to political parties that do not fill the stipulated quota. Indeed, the motivation of legislators to pass the bill has often been seen in the media as coming not from a concern to ensure gender equality, but rather from pressure from a few key women activists who could have negatively influenced the careers of the legislators. Moreover, where women do get elected they mostly are given peripheral positions with little power or input to decision making.

Around election times, many of the media scrutinise parties who fail to meet the minimum thirty per cent quota for women legislative candidates. In response to such accusations of failing to meet the quota, political parties posit numerous reasons why they do not meet the quota. Some parties assert that there is a lack of good women candidates with political competence or that women are reluctant to be nominated. It has also been suggested by a number of media outlets that parties are expecting the quota requirements to be phased out. But because of media exposure, parties often quickly recruit women solely for the sake of appearing to meet the quota. As such, an increase has taken place in the number of women nominated to contest elections but this does not translate into the large numbers of women entering parliament. It seems that the introduction of a quota system, without strong political commitment to reforming the larger electoral system, will not bring about significant positive political change that will allow women to enter parliament on their merits.

Parties often claim that there is a lack of suitable women candidates, but this is often not the case. Indeed, in some instances a political party may support a less suitable man candidate over a more qualified woman, as the following case reveals. One of Golkar's most established politicians was a woman, Andi Sugiarti Mangun Karim, who had been with this political party for over twenty years and was serving as the Head of the House of Representatives (DPRD) in Bantaeng, South Sulawesi. During an election in 2008, she stood against a male colleague named Arfandi. Arfandi was also from Golkar and was at the time a member of

the House of Representatives at the provincial level (DPRD *Provinsi*). Arfandi and Karim both stood for nomination for the position of Regent of Bantaeng (*Pilkada Bantaeng*). According to one survey conducted by Golkar, Karim received 19 per cent of the nomination vote compared with Arfandi's 15 per cent. Yet Golkar did not support Karim, they supported Arfandi. As a result, Karim sought electoral support from other political parties to become vice-regent. She nevertheless lost the election. Golkar then fired Karim ostensibly because she had sought non-Golkar assistance. Yet many men Golkar politicians had also used other political parties for support and incurred no sanctions. For instance, during an election for the governor of South Sulawesi in 2008, a Golkar candidate, Syahrul Yasin Limpo, made use of other parties to increase his profile. When Limpo won the election, Golkar acknowledged him as an outstanding Golkar politician. Karim has now joined another party (the Republican Party) and is a member of the House of Representatives at the provincial level in South Sulawesi, but it would seem that the way in which men and women political candidates are treated varies greatly (Idrus, 2008a; 2008b).

A fourth reason why women find it difficult to enter parliamentary politics relates to the reputation that politics has in Indonesia, and indeed elsewhere, of being rough (*kasar*) and dirty (*kotor*) and therefore not a profession considered appropriate for women. Popular culture does present images of women as assertive and independent but these images continue to be exceptions and women receive mixed messages from the media about what they should aspire to (Aripurnami, 2000).

A fifth factor making it hard for Indonesian women to enter parliamentary politics relates to religion. Although Islam has not emerged as the barrier many people expected, there has nonetheless been debate about whether it is acceptable for Muslim women to be involved in politics (Platzdasch, 2000).

Finally, a sixth reason hindering women's election in representational politics relates to the large sums of money required to become a parliamentary candidate.

The aim of this article is at giving a brief introduction to the issues facing women in their attempts to engage in electoral politics and, as such, further research and analysis needs to be undertaken of the factors limiting women's participation in parliamentary politics.[5]

It is hard to predict what the future holds for women's political and, more specifically, parliamentary participation in Indonesia. There are moves within Indonesia to grant particular provinces regional autonomy. The effect such moves will have on women in politics is unclear. Yuli Ismartono (personal communication, 2008) has suggested that increasing regional autonomy will create a place for women in parliamentary politics. Conversely, Professor Dewi Fortuna Anwar (personal communication, 2008) fears that this system will localise power and make it more difficult for women to rise through the political ranks. Sharon Bessell (2004), in an excellent article covering the issues concerning women in Indonesia's parliaments, tends to reinforce Professor Anwar's view. If political parties are wise, they will realise the benefits of placing women in winnable seats and we will, it is to be hoped, soon see more women in parliament. Being a wife and mother are important roles, but women should also be supported to take on other positions. Women constitute more than half of all eligible voters; if they can find the confidence to support other women, Indonesia will have a bright future. Indeed, the slowly increasing number of women representatives in elected legislative institutions, nationally and regionally, is an encouraging sign.

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5   Indeed, there are numerous other factors contributing to women's low rates of participation in Indonesian parliamentary politics, and politics more generally. For instance, one further reason relates to the fact that many of the pro-women policies implemented are limited to introducing a gender mainstreaming strategy, popularly known in Indonesia as *sosialisasi*, which does not significantly help women participate in parliamentary politics. Gender mainstreaming is generally understood as a program for women's empowerment rather than as an effective strategy for gender equity. Lack of political commitment by government elites and the low enthusiasm of government officials to work towards the implementation of gender mainstreaming are among many of the obstacles that make gender affirmative strategies difficult to integrate with various programs and policies. An Indonesian popular journal, *Jurnal perempuan*, has published special editions on gender mainstreaming (2006a) and on gender budgeting (2006b), which not only detail activities related to implementing this strategy, but also express the frustration of those who get involved in such activities and see little result (see also Idrus, 2006; Idrus et al, 2006).

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Music for the *Pria Dewasa*:
Changes and Continuities in Class and Pop Music Genres

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Abstract

This paper presents *Rolling Stone Indonesia*[1] (*RSI*) and places it in an historical context to tease out some changes and continuities in Indonesian middle-class politics since the beginning of the New Order. Some political scientists have claimed that class interests were at the core of the transition from Guided Democracy to the New Order, and popular music scholars generally assert that class underlies pop genre distinctions. But few have paid attention to how class and genre were written into Indonesian pop in the New Order period; Indonesian pop has a fascinating political history that has so far been overlooked. Placing *RSI* in historical perspective can reveal much about the print media's classing of pop under New Order era political constraints, and about the ways these modes of classing may or may not have endured in the post-authoritarian, globalised and liberalised media environment.[2]

Introduction

Driving down the haphazard, traffic-choked Jalan Raya Cilandak in South Jakarta—that area of the city understood to harbour the well-to-do and the media savvy—one comes across an impressive structure that stands out from the office buildings that sprouted in the capital during the New Order period. Nestled comfortably in a generous, exquisitely manicured block, this two-story building recalls the Pompidou Centre in Paris, but for the large, glittered red letters that garishly announce it as *Rolling Stone*'s Indonesian headquarters. It features a surfeit of white piping and perspex panels. There is so much perspex that passers by can watch the mundane comings and goings inside; it is like watching somebody's digestive system.

Seeing inside is easy, but getting inside requires quite an effort. Although there is no fence and it is open to the street, this office building is guarded strictly. Even after many visits to interview writers for this piece, I had to report first to one of the security guards outside, name the person I had an appointment with, then wait for that person to come out, collect me, and escort me through the front door.

The building overstates the magazine's commercial clout. Its circulation is a mere 10,000 and, after five years of operation (the first issue was in May 2005), the magazine is yet to break even. In 2004, a team of people including the owner, Eddie Soebari, who sits on the Board of Directors of the Indonesian mining giant, PT Bumi Resources; Monika Soebari, the current President Director of *RSI* (and Eddie's wife); and Andy F Noya, the former editor-in-chief of the news channel Metro TV, puttogether a business plan to present to the editor of the New York *Rolling Stone*, Jann Wenner, as a proposal to gain an Indonesian licence for the title.

Soebari's bid was not the first from Indonesia, but it was the first to succeed, and thereby became the first Indonesian-licensed publication devoted to rock and roll. At the time of writing, it remains the only such publication—other Indonesian music magazines are local titles.

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presented. Any shortcomings, errors of fact or of interpretation remain all mine.

In 2009, *RSI*'s four-year title was renewed, and the licence agreement renegotiated. As they intimated in my interviews with them, many *RSI* staff writers breathed a sigh of relief at the news of the renewal, they are well aware of the vagaries of the Indonesian music press (Solhun, 2004), as well as the intense competition among the print media for advertisers because they generally devote the bulk of their advertising budgets to television, which has a much bigger audience.

For precisely this reason, *RSI* is no profitable venture. However, the owners claim, they did not expect it to be. Consistently, less than twenty per cent of its 120 pages have advertisements. In the original business plan that was presented to Jann Wenner in 2004, Soebari proposed subsidising the magazine with income from leasing or staging sponsored events at the *Rolling Stone* live venue, which is in the opulent backyard of the magazine's office building. Because it presents the possibility of television coverage, a live venue is likely to attract more advertising than does a magazine.

At the time of writing though, the live venue had only just begun to operate, and the four years from 2005 to 2009 was a time for the magazine to develop its local brandidentity. The business plan for *RSI* was devised with a specific market in mind. At the time of the license bid, senior editor Adib Hidayat related, a number of publications written for *pria dewasa* (adult male) were on the Indonesian market. These include magazines dedicated to national news (*Tempo*), health (*Men's Health*), fashion (*Esquire*) and women's bodies (*FHM*). But before the publication of *RSI*, there was no such magazine dedicated to music in Indonesia.

Pria dewasa directly translates as 'adult male', but a particular socio-economic positioning is implied in that notion of adulthood. Ricky Siahaan characterised *RSI*'s readers as belonging to segments 'A and B+', referring to the categorisation system employed by the media research company, Nielsen Audience Measurement (Indonesia), to estimate the confluence of media consumptions with socio-economic positioning. Adib Hidayat characterised the readers that *Tempo, Men's*

Health, *Esquire* and *FHM* conjure as 'young established executives', a characterisation that immediately brought to my mind exemplary New Order subjects, the very proof of *Pembangunan*'s success.

RSI's evolution since its inception, then, is ripe for an exploration of the ways in which ideologies of class, of pop and of print media come together in the magazine's attempts to herald the *pria dewasa*; it offers a chance to consider changes and continuities in these ideologies since the advent of the New Order.

In what follows, I argue that *RSI*'s attempts to herald the *pria dewasa* retrieve representations of 'the people' to emerge in print journalists' critiques of pop music at the dawn of the New Order and through to the early 1980s. That these representations of the people in music criticism urged a reading public to imagine itself as a 'middle' is a point already noted by some other scholars (Weintraub, 2006).[3] However, below I argue that denigrations of the popular in print at this time might be understood as something more contextual and more political than a natural product of a middle-class elitism that manifests universally, as Weintraub and others (Browne, 2000; Murray, 1991) imply.[4] Indonesian middle-class activism has a long history and many different flavours. Images of the people to emerge in *RSI* might aptly be thought of as continuous with a particular chapter of this history, in which a new kind of print capitalism, a particular vanguardist middle sensibility, and the establishment of an unequivocally pro-USA, military-dominated

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3   In this paper, to stress its mythical dimensions, I try to avoid use of the term 'middle class', prefering instead 'middle sensibility' or 'senses of middleness'. The middle sensibility that emerged in the New Order period as discussed in this essay is more than simply elitist. It betrays activism, and bears resemblance to Pandey's characterisation of the specifics of post-colonial middle classness. He (2009: 328) writes: 'As they announced their struggle and their arrival, the middle classes in the colony spoke not only for themselves or for some abstract universal—the work ethic, merit, temperance, progress—but also for their people, who had been marked as "backward" and whom the educated middle classes had to represent and lead into the modern.'

4   Browne and Murray both contend that Melayu–*kampungan* contains values that are inherently other to those of the middle class. Browne (2000: 10) contends that 'middle class values' co-opt *dangdut* and, according to Murray (1991: 10), *dangdut* provides an alternative to 'bourgeois norms'. However, neither Browne, Murray nor Weintraub elaborate on how they conceptualise class, nor engage at all with existing literature on class in Indonesia, and such omissions have the effect of naturalising and universalising 'middle class'.

regime that followed the annihilation of the left, all intersected. Further, this annihilation was particularly violent and it should not be underestimated that representations of the people in print and elsewhere were considerably constrained.

It is also important to note that *RSI* occupies an historical moment with complexities and should not be considered a typical snapshot of contemporary middle-class cultural politics. Hence, I advance this argument for *RSI* as evidence of the continuity of intersecting ideologies of class, pop and print that grew in the New Order period but with two important caveats. First, although vanguardist representations of the people who appear to aid the magazine's heralding of the *pria dewasa* are striking, they do appear beside more meekly expressed irony, suggesting that the magazine also serves as a liberal realm of experimentation and reflection. There is not space in this article to explore such irony, which complicates *RSI*'s address.

Second, vanguardist representations of the people in *RSI* seem increasingly beleaguered in the face of enormous upheavals on a number of fronts, which splinter a middle sensibility that was previously more coherent. The concurrent transformation of political and media spheres over the past two decades is far too widespread to be detailed in a single article, so in the final section of this paper, I argue that it is possible to gain a sense of such splintering by focussing on one of its facets: the changing meanings of pop music genres. Such changes include more populist representations of the people, and mean that the old ways of evincing a vanguardist middle are much more contested.

As an exploration of what *RSI* reveals of the links between class, pop music and print media, this paper is indebted to a growing scholarship on Indonesian music journalism (Mulyadi, 2009; Solihun, 2004; Sopiann, 2002; Weintraub, 2006), as well as the literature that considers the evolving relations between Indonesian print journalism, moral authority, political legitimacy and dissent (Dhakidae, 2003; Farid, 2005; Heryanto, 2003; Heryanto and Adi, 2002; Hill, 1994; Keane, 2008; Romano, 2003; Steele, 2005). In the first section of the article, and building on Mulyadi (2009) and Weintraub (2006), I seek to stress

the political significance of Indonesian pop genres by placing their evolution in the context of a budding middle sensibility in concert with a new chapter in print capitalism on the advent of the New Order. It is upon this political history that my assessment of the extent of post-authoritarian rupture is based.

The paper is also indebted to, and seeks to extend, scholarship on Indonesian pop. To clarify some terms that will be used throughout this paper, it is worth briefly noting some features of this scholarship: how Indonesian pop music relates to class has been a compelling question for a lot of writers.[5] In fact, how the genres 'Indonesia' and 'Melayu' are connected to people's position in some kind of a class-like system has been a central theme in scholarship on Indonesian pop.[6] A *kampungan–gedongan* dichotomy is quite often invoked as a description of how a class-like system manifests itself in an Indonesian context. *Kampungan–gedongan* literally refers to the built environment (of the slums—of the buildings) but signifies more widely positions of centrality and marginality in relation to the metropolis, implying vulgarity and refinement.[7] The question many writers have pursued is how and why the pop genre, Melayu, has become linked to *kampungan* but *gedongan* has become associated with *pop Indonesia*.

Yet to be analysed in this scholarship is the fact that a coherent middleness now seems increasingly beleaguered; enormous upheavals on a number of fronts splinter Melayu–*kampungan* and Indonesia–*gedongan* alike. The second section of the article sets *RSI*'s retrievals

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5   See Barendregt, 2002; Baulch, 2007; Browne, 2000; David, 2003; Frederick, 1982; Gjelstad, 2003; Heins, 1975; Heryanto, 2008; Luvaas, 2009a; Murray, 1991; Pioquinto, 1995; Piper and Jabo, 1987; Wallach, 2002 and 2008; Weintraub, 2006; Yampolsky, 1989.

6   *Pop (*and *rock) Indonesia* refers to songs usually sung in the national tongue but making use of Western pop idiom. Melayu ranges from *dangdut*, a hybrid form distinguished by consistent use of a Melayu vocal style, bamboo flute (*suling*) and twin goat-skinned drums (*gendang*), to pop Melayu, distinguished through use of iconic elements of the Melayu vocal style, but otherwise using Western instrumentation (of which more below). Melayu is generally understood as a genre somehow derivative of Indian film music but contains varying degrees of proximity to a Bollywood sound.

7   A precise translation of *kampungan* is elusive. *Kampung* evokes the masses' ephemeral urban dwellings and their rural homelands. Such imprecision has the effect of relegating all but a *gedongan* centre to marginal status.

of Melayu–*kampungan*, its redrawing of *pop Indonesia–pop Melayu* distinctions, in the context of such splintering.

Middleness, Pop Genre and Print

Throughout Indonesia's post-colonial history, genre conventions that have endured are those separating music perceived as being derived from those originating in the West (such as *pop Indonesia*) from that perceived as being derived from and paying homage to Easternness (such as Melayu). But what changes radically in the transition from Guided Democracy (1959–65) to the New Order (1966–98) is the political context that affords these genres social significance. A little over forty years ago, *pop Indonesia*, and its assumed proximity to a *gedongan* reality, came to assume positive connotations. This development cannot be divorced from attempts to paint the New Order as a new beginning.

The transformation of *pop Indonesia* from transgressive to sanctioned can only be understood in the light of the prohibitions placed on the airing of 'Western' pop music in the national public space during the Guided Democracy period. In separate writings, Mohamad Mulyadi and Agus Sopiann detail the military's use of state-prohibited Western-style pop and rock music to involve people in its new regime of governance (Mulyadi, 2009: 20; Sopiann, 2002: np). Mulyadi (2009: 3) recounts how the military sponsored an intense program of daily musical events on the radio that showcased pop musicians performing all the officially forbidden genres. These broadcasts, known as "soldier stages" were co-ordinated by an outfit called Body for Co-operation between Artists and the Army Strategic Command. According to Mulyadi, 'the Body's strategy to invite those artists who had been banned by Soekarno was part of an effort towards moral transformation' (Mulyadi, 2009: 3, 20)

Popularisation of the idea of the novelty of military rule, then, through performances of 'forbidden' music, was one of the first tasks of the leaders—a task that well preceded the flow of foreign capital for infrastructural development. At the same time, the desire for this kind of novelty often appeared as popular will, for it was sometimes

quite enthusiastically taken up by non-state elements. 'New Order, New Atmosphere, Everything is Completely New' proclaimed an advertisement for a transistor radio that appeared in the magazine of the national public radio in December, 1967 (Mulyadi, 2009: 20).

What troubles the link between aesthetic Westernisation and newness is the development of a new Melayu sound in the early 1970s. This sound, which subsequently became known as *dangdut*, became enormously popular throughout the 1970s, 80s, and 90s. Scholarship on *dangdut* is fabulously varied in its interpretations of the genre and this may be because of the diverse range of contexts in which *dangdut* is played and heard, and its endurance beyond the New Order, which has forced new political interpretations (Browne, 2000; David 2003; Frederick, 1982; Heryanto, 2008; Murray, 1991; Pioquinto 1995; Wallach, 2008; Weintraub, 2006). There seems little doubt that those who are now recognised as responsible for creating what has become known as *dangdut* set out to develop a new kind of Melayu sound (Frederick, 1982). Once carved out as a genre, *dangdut* may well have opened space for performing despair or rough communality in ways that flaunted transgression of prevailing notions of the refined, perceived as proximate to the modern. However, we should be careful not to focus our inquiries only on *dangdut*'s appeal, thereby assuming the existence of 'the people' as *dangdut*'s source.

With such an enormous variety of interpretations and of performance and consumption contexts, let me begin by specifying what I want to say about *dangdut*. First, *dangdut* was hatched, employed then re-employed in those print media that sought to evoke a sense of a reading public as a middle position, ambivalently positioned *vis-à-vis* the state, but unequivocally Other to the unknowing masses, and depicted as victims of looming forces such as Development and Mass Media. Second, that *dangdut* was able to serve as a sign of the unknowing masses says much about the political environment of the day.

'[T]he name "dangdut" is actually an insulting term used by "the haves" toward the music of the poor neighborhoods [where it originated]', explains Rhoma Irama in Weintraub's analytical piece on *dangdut*'s

representation in the print media. 'They ridiculed the sound of the drum, the dominant element in Orkes Melayu [one of *dangdut*'s musical precursors]. Then we threw the insult right back via a song, which we named "Dangdut"' (Weintraub, 2006: 414). According to Weintraub, the offending term originated in an article printed in the celebrated news magazine, *Tempo*. Certainly, Irama's statements illustrates that the term was very quickly excorporated, and this complicates the Melayu–Indonesia relation somewhat, a point Weintraub does not stress enough. The main point to be made here concerns the core argument of Weintraub's piece, and a point also touched upon (but less forcefully) by several other observers of Indonesian pop. As Browne (2000), Mulyadi (2009), Solihun (2004) and Weintraub (2006) all attest, rehabilitations of Melayu–*kampungan* have very often taken place in print media. Incidentally, all these writers cite those publications that have been key to the heralding of an Indonesian middle in the New Order period. Weintraub (2006: 413) considers most directly the matter of Melayu–*kampungan* as part of addressing the middle class, and devotes his article to the question of 'what kind of story has been told through *dangdut* about the people in popular print media?'.[8] He states (2006: 417):

> Dangdut became a social text for assigning all sorts of meanings— *kampungan* for example—through which elites could register their own class position... Dangdut fans, synonymous with the masses, were discursively produced in popular print media according to middle class and elite notions of the *rakyat* [the people] as explosive and uncontrolled.

Pop music criticism was not a particularly promising career choice in New Order Indonesia, but representations of the people in print media articles about music are relevant, and can be located in a broader context of a mythology of middleness that grew in key publications, part of a new chapter in print capitalism on the advent of the New Order. In proposing a mythology of middleness, this article goes against the

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8   Weintraub's use of the word 'popular' is confusing, because he cites *Tempo* extensively.

grain of much scholarship on the middle class in the New Order period, which posits that quantifiable growth took place as a result of New Order economic policies (Crouch, 1986; Dick, 1990; Jaya, 1999; Hadiz and Dhakidae, 2005: 21-2; Lev, 1990: 29; Tanter and Young, 1990: 7; Robison, 1986; Zulkarnain et al., 1993). This article also resists the idea that an Indonesian middle-class identity can be singularly associated with the political vision of those groups of intellectuals who supported the establishment of the regime, then became disillusioned with it.

These prevailing impressions of a New Order-period middle-class growth, and of an Indonesian middle-class political vision comparable with that of the New Order regime's early supporters, gain particular relevance for the current paper in their marking of some scholarly discussions of the Indonesian press and, obliquely, of scholarship on pop music.[9] For example, suggesting they may also be a product of New Order economic policies that gave rise to growth, Keane characterises *Tempo*'s readers as 'primarily members of Indonesia's tiny urban elite and middle classes...*reflected* in the steep cover price and the predominance of advertisements featuring luxury goods' (Keane, 2009: 51; emphasis added). In her book on *Tempo* magazine, Steele draws on Robison (1996) to stress the links between New Order-period middle classness and anti-communist intellectual activity in the early and mid-1960s. In this way, she masterfully highlights the magazine's political roots, but risks essentialising and universalising class by glossing over the various Indonesian middle sensibilities, populist and non-populist alike, which have emerged under various political conditions.[10]

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9 With few exceptions, scholars of Indonesian pop have failed to elaborate on how they conceptualise class, nor engage at all with existing literature on class in Indonesia, and such omissions have the effect of naturalising and universalising 'middle class'. To cite two examples, Browne and Murray both contend that Melayu/*kampungan* contains values that are inherently other to those of the middle class. Browne (2000: 10) contends that 'middle class values' co-opt *dangdut*, and according to Murray (1991: 10), *dangdut* provides an alternative to 'bourgeois norms'.

10 For example, we might contrast *turba* (*turun ke bawah*, literally, going down into) - the cultural organisation Lekra's program of artist-intellectuals living side by side the masses in order to attain enlightenment - with the kinds of New Order period representations of the people that *kampungan-gedongan* distinctions evince. Both conjure an activist middleness, but *turba* motions to the idea of the suffering masses as a vanguard in the struggle to realise a particular modernity, but New Order period pop genre distinctions, as discussed

Rather than as a reflection of existing social entities or naturally occurring middle-class a-populism, pop genre distinctions and their attendant *kampungan–gedongan* dimensions are more usefully considered in a context in which print media have played a crucial role in building, and continuously reinforcing, a myth of class. As a number of observers have documented, several publications that developed later into conglomerates began to flourish during the New Order regime, which limited licenses and therefore competition (Hill and Sen, 2005: 18–19). Also notable is the image, gleaned from scholarship on the New Order-period press, of print journalists as ambivalent scribes whose writings often contributed to a particular sense of Indonesian middleness by appearing to support the rulers, but upheld a myth of the press as a rights defender (Dhakidae, 2003: 366; Heryanto and Adi, 2002: Hill, 1994; Keane, 2009: 48; Steele, 2005: 169; Lev, 1990: 29). The news magazine, *Tempo*, established in 1971, has been the subject of particularly intensive analyses (Dhakidae, 2003: 379–382; Hill, 1994: 88–91; Heryanto, 2003; Steele, 2005).

Steele's book on the magazine offers an especially vivid depiction of this ambivalent positioning. In her chapter discussing depictions of the nation in *Tempo*, she points out that 'the contents of *Tempo*'s National section followed what is widely understood to be the pro-development agenda of the New Order' (Steele, 2005: 152). But she holds to her interpretation of dominant depictions in *Tempo* of the masses as victims of economic development as evidence of the magazine's mission as a rights defender and cites Liddle, who characterises that mission as 'to defend those who cannot defend themselves' (Steele, 2005: 157).

As Heryanto (2003; see also Pandey, 2009 for a more general discussion) points out, myths of the press and of class are interlocking. Intellectuals in many post-colonial countries often serve as torchbearers for middle-class activism, and enjoy an influence that exceeds what their numbers would suggest; influence that is partly realised in and through the press.

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by Weintraub, suggest a-populism. Weintraub, however, does not discuss the broader, a-populist political environment in which these representations appear, hence also intimates a naturally-occurring middle class a-populism.

It is therefore not surprising that the mythical dimensions of the press and class by no means preclude their implications for political action protesting against the rulers. For example, Dhakidae highlights how New Order-period middleness was ambivalently positioned *vis-à-vis* the rulers but nevertheless stayed proximate to a myth of the press as rights defender. He (2003: 371) notes how, despite its legacy as a magazine that documented the New Order successes, *Tempo* inspired unprecedented public protests when it was banned in 1994. Keane suggests that the protests reveal how *Tempo* incorporated a global ideology of the press as the embodiment of freedom and voice, part of the valorisation of a secular modernity. But Heryanto and Adi (2002) point out that an Indonesian myth of the press rests not just on its role in the struggle for independence. In a context where formal literacy levels remain low, it also contains sacred dimensions, and feeds into a myth of middle-class, intellectual activism. In the New Order period, the genesis of the press, in concert with that of nationalism, was often invoked to valorise particular kinds of middle-class, intellectual activism, albeit under changed conditions and for different ends.

The ideological transformation that took place in the transition from Guided Democracy to the New Order is well known, but few have offered as detailed a perspective as Farid's (2005) on how such transformation was achieved. In an article in which he argues that there is a crucial link between state ('bureaucratic, vertical') violence (Farid, 2005: 4) perpetrated in 1965–6 and a new chapter in Indonesian capitalism, he discusses the new conceptions of class that emerged during this period. Specifically, he argues that the killings prompted the extensive alienation of people from their means of subsistence, further reinforced by the scrapping of land reform and the introduction of the Green Revolution. This process, Farid asserts, may be described as one of 'primitive accumulation', whereby the idea of a labour force became justified. Previously, Indonesian capitalism was severely compromised by widespread non-capitalist and anti-capitalist social practices (Farid, 2005: 13).

Although others have gestured to ideas that resemble his thesis (for instance, Tanter and Young 1990: 7), Farid is the first to launch a thorough critique of the enduring idea that the New Order provided the conditions conducive to a quantifiable middle-class growth, and that quantifying such growth is a scholarly activity of utmost importance. More important, in Farid's view, is the link between state violence and a new chapter in Indonesian capitalism. It is basic that the annihilation of language and ideas associated with anti-imperialism and democracy was achieved partly through the speedy establishment of new systems for state control of the press, which entailed extensive sackings and bannings (Farid, 2005: 6). Notably, the state's wishful and forceful vision of the people's depoliticisation—a hope expressed in the term 'floating masses'—impresses the political constraints imposed on the evolution of a middle sensibility during this time.

Farid's discussion of the transformation of the material conditions and of prevailing perceptions of the masses on the advent of the New Order is of great relevance to this paper. The use of *pop Indonesia–gedongan* to herald the New Order's newness has already been discussed and, with Farid, we might characterise this too as a facet of primitive accumulation. Such performances were highly suggestive of the ideological transformation, including the transformation of prevailing state-sanctioned images of the people, which was to take place. As mentioned, images of the people as disempowered and unknowing emerge repeatedly in press articles about popular music, and may be seen to aid the sense of middleness that grew with a new chapter in Indonesian print capitalism. As also mentioned, this middle was conjured in ambivalent relation to the rulers, but as an unequivocal Otherness to the unknowing or floating masses. It is this aspect of middleness, as a relation of unequivocal Otherness to the floating masses, that Melayu–*kampungan* evinces.

In the current discussion, the intersecting myths of the press, of middleness, and of pop genres, are of vital importance to an understanding of the contemporary developments in class as revealed in an analysis of *RSI*. However real their influence on events, such myths elude quantifiables,

such as notions of the growth of particular societal sectors or the kinds of consumer products members of some classes favour. Below, I shall argue that *RSI* is revealing of attempts to rehabilitate and continue the role pop music genres have played in a mythology of class that evolved with the advent of the New Order. Such efforts at continuity are evident in key content that marks the magazine as a class position. But let us first turn to some of the changes that have taken place in pop genres since the fall of the New Order in 1998.

Local Music Boom

In the years between the establishment of the New Order regime (1966) and that of *RSI* (2005), *pop* (including rock) *Indonesia*, a genre to which *RSI* is devoted, has undergone considerable transformation. Above, I have argued that an Indonesia–Melayu distinction can be inferred from attempts to evoke a sense of a print media-reading public as a middle position. I have also drawn attention to how such distinctions involved particular representations of the people that are usefully understood in a political context. But recently there have been changes, including those in media ownership, media content and in the intensity of peoples' engagement with particular media technologies. Such changes were first sparked by media deregulation policies in the late-1980s but increased in momentum after Suharto's fall in 1998. As a consequence, ways in which the genres, Indonesia and Melayu, relate to the categories, 'the people' and 'the middle', has become indeterminate. The line distinguishing Indonesia from Melayu has also blurred.

The widespread changes that gave rise to this blurring are too various to be documented here.[11] Suffice to say, although appearing to resist them, *RSI* is very much part of many of these changes, which include the proliferation of Bahasa Indonesia versions of foreign magazine titles under license agreements and the striking rise in the production and consumption of *pop Indonesia,* making a glossy magazine devoted to

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11 On media deregulation see Sen and Hill (2000) and Baulch (2007a). On the globalisation of
    the recording industry, see Baulch (2007b). On developments in the intensity of Indonesians
    engagements with new technologies, see Heryanto (2010) and Hill and Sen (2005).

pop Indonesia a viable business venture. Further, the recording industry has structurally globalised since the deregulation of some sections of the Indonesian media, beginning in 1988. Over the past fifteen years, several multinational recording companies have established branches in Jakarta.

Paradoxically, over the same period, and in contrast to the foreignness that has traditionally been assigned to the genre, *pop Indonesia* has gradually assumed the mantle of 'local music'. Not only have sales of *pop Indonesia* overtaken by far those of Anglophone pop, the meaning of *pop Indonesia* itself has also changed in more qualitative ways, which a sole focus on sales statistics will leave unnoticed. For example, attention to the ways in which Indonesian fifteen to twenty-year-olds now encounter music suggests an entirely different experience from that of fifteen years ago, when any discussion of *pop Indonesia* inevitably involved currently popular American or English acts. This is no longer the case, as highlighted by a recent conversation with an amateur Balinese musician, seventeen-year-old Komang.

Komang is a talented guitarist and vocalist and has been in a number of amateur pop bands. She is an avid fan of the *pop Indonesia* acts Cokelat and Afgan, but her broad active listening crosses genre lines: she claims a deep appreciation of the *dangdut* vocal style and of the (*pop Melayu*) Kangen Band's tunes. This is not someone with limited musical interests and horizons. One day, as I chatted to her, a song by the band Dewa filled the air. It reminded me of a Beatles song and I asked her if she had made the same association. Given her deep musical involvement, I was taken aback by her reply: 'Who are the Beatles?'.

Ten years previously I conducted some research among Balinese men around the same age as Komang, also amateur musicians. I had found that among them, questions similar to the one I had posed to Komang— comparing *pop Indonesia* sounds with those from Anglo-America— were prominent in their imaginings of the field of pop music production. Questions about *pop Indonesia* composers' Anglo-American influences were highly important to those amateur musicians' consumptions of *pop Indonesia*. Perhaps we may interpret this compulsion as a reinforcement

of *pop Indonesia*'s status as derivative, and as evidence of yet another of the burdens modernity imposes upon post-colonial people; the burden of responding to the idea that modernity originates in Euro-America and can only be imperfectly copied by the rest of the world. The young men among whom I conducted research in the late-1990s seemed to assume this proposition as truth. (Paradoxically, they strategically employed this assumption to empower themselves, but that is another matter.)

But in Komang's reply, we see a different way of imagining the field of pop production. Her ignorance of the Beatles illustrates a profound change in the way Indonesian consumers of *pop Indonesia* perceive the world of cultural production. Although some *pop Indonesia* musicians continue to cite Anglo-American acts as sources of inspiration, in the minds of many *pop Indonesia* consumers, the genre has nothing to do with the West. It is produced in Jakarta, for a national audience, and most often sung in Bahasa Indonesia.

It may not be surprising that *RSI* celebrates this boom in production and consumption of *pop Indonesia*—it provides, after all, one material reason for *RSI*'s existence. That said, *RSI* is no mere reflection of the material conditions that make its existence plausible. In fact, the very ubiquity of *pop Indonesia* renders the task with which *RSI*'s writers have been charged—that of heralding the *pria dewasa*—rather tricky. In the face of the genre's omnipresence, the value of *pop Indonesia* becomes quite uncertain. Since the turn of the century, for recording companies, composers, producers and performers, *pop Indonesia* has come to represent promising commercial opportunity. But it is also more available than ever before to the masses; the *gedongan* mould is no longer a comfortable fit for *pop Indonesia*. What kinds of writing, then, might enable this increasingly mundane, dispersed cultural text to address an extraordinary group of people, the *pria dewasa*?

Below, I suggest *RSI* does so in two ways. First, it infers a male (*pria*) reader by conflating the *kampungan* with feminine consumption, thereby adding overtones of femininity to the *kampungan* in new ways. Below, I shall briefly discuss how critiques of feminine consumption in

RSI may be read as a reaction to a generalised feminisation of the public sphere that has accompanied the rise of consumerism in Indonesia. Second, it addresses a *dewasa* reader by recovering Melayu–Indonesia distinctions.

'Leave All That for Your Maid's Entertainment'

In their separate studies of *dangdut kampungan*, Browne and Pioquinto discuss *kampungan* as a case of being gender assigned (Browne, 2000: 1; Pioquinto, 1995: 60). As these two writers state, *dangdut kampungan* is so partly because it involves female performers asserting their sexuality on stage—performances largely viewed by men. It is no surprise that *RSI*'s sense of its own authenticity also derives partly from conflations of vulgarity and femininity. After all, as we have mentioned, the magazine is devoted to *pria dewasa*. But *RSI*, images of the vulgar feminine indicate some differences with the *kampungan* feminine that Pioquinto and Browne describe. In their writings, *kampungan* refers to female performers, but in *RSI*, *kampungan* is evoked through representations of feminine consumption.

This kind of fusion appears in Wendi Putranto's feature on Glenn Fredly, a composer and singer who is known for the syrupy ballads he composes and sings. Before the appearance of Putranto's feature, Fredly had been the subject of the many television shows that are dedicated to the love lives of Indonesian celebrities because he was divorcing his wife, Dewi Sandra, also a singer. Putranto uses the news of Fredly's divorce as a hook to contrast with his own article, which is about the singer's political concerns. In so doing, he assumes his readers are people who employ female domestic workers but belong to a completely different cultural realm from their employees. He allows the readers to relegate Fredly's marital woes to the cultural realm of female domestic workers, a realm of television and of frivolous consumption, and urges them to focus on more serious issues: that of Glenn's concern for the environment, corruption and the state of the music industry (Putranto, 2008a: 101).

Glenn confesses that he's been feeling restless lately. Trust me, this has absolutely nothing to do with his domestic affairs with his wife, Dewi Sandra. Leave all that for your maid's entertainment. Glenn is restless because of global warming, because of a country full of corruption, and because of the disastrous state of the music industry.

In the beginning of this article, I offered a translation of *kampungan*–*gedongan* that suggests it depicts class as a relation to the metropolis. But in this above-cited appeal, Putranto paints a slightly different picture. Here, he stresses gender, intimating *kampungan*'s close associations with the frivolous, and with feminine consumptions, but *gedongan* describes the world of serious male pursuits, which betray activism, a concern for social justice and truth.

Putranto's gendering betrays a new context in which consumerist ideologies are fast being knitted into prevailing notions of Indonesian modernity, giving rise to the increasing presence of the feminine consumer in the national public space. As well as in the proliferation of soap operas, such feminisation is also manifested in the rapidly increasing number of shopping malls (which harbour countless experimentations with the feminine) and in the expansion of the Muslim fashion industry. Feminisation may also be seen in the increasing visibility of the feminine pop consumer, a trope that emerges with intensity in images of Indonesian pop since the aforementioned boom in the production and consumption of so-called local music.

By identifying those who employ female domestic workers with a concern for truth and justice, Putranto's statement calls forth a middle reader who resists such feminisation, and draws *RSI* into a legacy of intellectual activism, hence continuing mythologies of class and print media already established. He returns to what Heryanto refers to as a 'familiar division' that plagues understandings of modernity; a division 'between the masculine world of news, scholarship and conferences versus the feminine world of soap opera, gossip, magazines and family matters'. Such gendering, Heryanto notes, is reiterated in Indonesia in the 'quality' media's chronicling of the proliferation of soap opera on television, as well as interpretations of their enthusiastic consumption

(Heryanto, 2010: 193; see also Baulch, 2007b).[12] Putranto's characterisation of Glenn Fredly ought to be seen to fall in with this pattern of chronicling, which has a deeper history, as I have argued.

One other important facet of *RSI*'s classing, through its chronicling of developments in popular music, is the magazine's treatment of an old genre with new connotations: *pop Melayu*. Over the last two or three years, all the major, Jakarta-based recording companies have developed *pop Melayu* repertoires. The genre is known for its lyrical explorations of sexual infidelities and love relationships, and for its use of the *cengkok* vocal style reminiscent of the *dangdut* style. In contrast to *dangdut* though, *pop Melayu* compositions generally make use of Western instrumentation, not a bamboo *suling* (flute) or a *gendang* (paired hand drums). *Pop Melayu*'s nods to *dangdut* can be very slight and barely noticeable. In recent years, in terms of sales, *pop Melayu* has emerged as an enormously successful genre.

The matter of *pop Melayu*'s quality or lack thereof is quite a hotly debated issue. Despite these debates, the idea that *pop Melayu* bands are universally lacking in musical quality is something of a house position among staff writers at *RSI*. For example, in March 2009, as part of its regular profiles on the music industry, *RSI* ran an article titled, 'This is Indonesian Music Today', which Wendi Putranto (2009: 65) introduced thus:

> Pop Melayu bands have suddenly attacked the capital and have suddenly become superstars, with their uniform music. The people are given no choice in the matter because the mass media fully supports Melayunization. [The indie band] Efek Rumah Kaca is one of the only bands to rise up in protest, with their [ironically titled] song 'Nothing but Love', which became a minor hit.

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12 Heryanto cites articles in the daily newspapers, *Kompas* and *Jakarta Post*, as well as surveys of media consumption by the media research firm Nielson Audience Measurement (Heryanto, 2010: 193).

But most people don't seem to care and can't be bothered debating the issue. Most of the people enjoy buying pirate CDs or pirate MP3s, or picking out their 30-second ring back tone, enjoy celebrating or rioting at free concerts. Many of them feel that cheating on their lover qualifies them to write a song. Recently, these phenomena have begun to clearly manifest in our society.

Unlike Putranto's characterisation of Glenn Fredly, this critique of *pop Melayu* accords not gender, but the metropolis, a determining role in assessments of degrees of vulgarity and refinement. Such concerns are not just expressed in Putranto's article. In striking contrast to the variety of opinions concerning the validity of *pop Melayu*'s emergence on national stages, *RSI*'s writers unequivocally scorned *pop Melayu*. Although high profile criticism of *pop Melayu* has not been limited to *RSI* writers, their positions seem especially paradoxical; for self-professed investigative music writers, they showed a baffling lack of curiosity about this genre.[13] Echoing Wendi Putranto's introduction, *RSI* writers, Ricky Siahaan and Hasief Ardiesyah, separately iterated similar positions. When I asked why *pop Melayu* bands, whose compositions enjoyed healthy sales records, were rarely discussed in *RSI*, Ardiasyah replied: 'None of us consider their music good… [It's] a quality issue', and Siahaan said: 'All those champions of the ring back tone, [*Pop Melayu* bands] ST 12, Kangen Band, Hijau Daun… In our opinion we are now at the lowest peak of the music industry, quality-wise. And we are not going to give over to them a portion of our magazine, *RSI*.'

Drawing on Hobart, who argues that Indonesian reality shows on television about criminality serve to scrutinise and humiliate the masses, we might characterise *RSI*'s treatment of *pop Melayu* as a rite of class. This treatment, that is, can be seen to continue the kinds of ritual maintenance of Melayu–*kampungan* through print, begun in the early

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13 The pop composer and producer Erwin Gutawan (who epitomises a pop music intellectual), and Ridho Hafiedz, the guitarist for Slank, the enormously successful blues–rock band, were quoted in separate articles on an entertainment website lamenting the absence of quality in pop Melayu compositions (http://artis.inilah.com/berita/2009/05/08/105434/erwin-gutawa-anggap-pop-melayu-jadul/; http://artis.inilah.com/berita/2009/05/08/105331/ridho-slank-malu-musik-melayu/)

New Order period when the press and a particular middle sensibility were enjoying consolidation. Certainly, this treatment betrays the defining features of ritual, with its stress on restricted, intellectual knowledge and on maintaining dangerous border zones (Appadurai, 1996), such as the one the *kampungan–gedongan* dyad sets up, but then can neither be avoided nor denied. *Kampungan–gedongan* proposes the idea of the unknowing, vulgar masses, but may be thought of as one of the many 'neat [and]...fanciful predeterminations' that entertainment enables (Hobart, 2006: 394). Such predeterminations identify, regulate and survey the masses, but contain the spectre of other possibilities: either that of the masses' illegibility or the threat of commercial expropriation of the *kampungan*, such as that undertaken by Rhoma Irama himself. Hence the need for ritual maintenance that *RSI*'s treatment of *pop Melayu* makes apparent.

However forcefully it is promoted in the pages of *RSI*, the fact remains that this *pop Indonesia–gedongan* realm is one that appears increasingly fragile. The distinction between Western-derived *pop Indonesia* and Indonesian-derived *pop Melayu* is more difficult to maintain because there is a convergence of styles and stages and a divergence of opinion within *pop Indonesia* institutions. As I have mentioned above, *pop Melayu* acts do not, generally, make use of the *suling* and *gendang* that are prominent features of *dangdut*. They make use of a Western-style drum kit and their compositions most often do not include a *suling*. Moreover, although *pop Melayu* bands might not appear in *RSI*, they do appear side by side with *pop Indonesia* bands on live and televised stages. They also share producers and managers at recording companies. Finally, and most important, there is increasing uncertainty about what that *kampungan* signifies, revealing a fragmentation of an Indonesian middleness.

New Developments in Melayu

In the middle years of this decade, a group of youths from Lampung in Southern Sumatra gathered together and began busking in the time they

had free from their day jobs (as pushcart traders, construction workers), and later staging more formal performances at music festivals in their home town. By mid-2005, this group had named itself Kangen Band, and recorded a demonstration compact disc of original compositions by its guitarist, Dodhy. Over the course of the rest of the year, and because of orchestrations by band members as well as events beyond their control, Dodhy's compositions could be heard and bought in various strategic public places around Lampung: on the radio, on the bemo, in malls and in the form of compact discs sold by the roadside. By 2006, Kangen Band's popularity manifested itself in similar form on Java (Sujana, 2009).

In 2006, a former print journalist, Sujana, who had recently established an artist management company, Positive Art, discovered Kangen Band and invited its members to pioneer Positive Art's strategy for pop production. When incorporated into the publishing and distribution systems of a major recording label, Kangen Band proved to be commercially successful. But once part of such official systems of musical reproduction, Kangen Band began to assume new form. On signing with Positive Art, Kangen Band became known as a *pop Melayu* band. The band's commercial success beneath the auspices of major recording label was, then, the event that gave rise to the re-employment of this term, Melayu, to describe an emerging pop genre. Subsequently, in Kangen Band's wake, all of the Jakarta-based, major recording labels have begun to develop 'Melayu' repertoires, and a number of these *pop Melayu* bands—all of them are boy bands—have also been commercially successful.[14] As briefly mentioned above, the virtues or otherwise of the emergence on the national stage of these *pop Melayu* boy bands were hotly debated in some circles. In particular, the coming to national prominence of Kangen Band, whose appearance on television was much to the chagrin of a considerable number of critics, served as a kind of watershed, revealing profound changes in prevailing

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14 An instance of such commercial success, Wali's song 'Baik Baik Sayang', has been activated in ring-back-tone format a record thirteen million times (Solihun, 2010). (In comparison, the record number of officially recorded digital downloads for any one song internationally is 9.8 million: Lady Gaga's 'Poker Face' in 2009.)

representations of class and prompting people to adopt various positions in new fields of class.

One spectacular example of such changes is provided by Kangen Band's response to criticism. Rather than distancing themselves from the image of provincial vulgarity associated with the term *kampungan,* the band's publicity machine began to make much of its humble, marginal beginnings. In cinematic and literary form, narratives of the band's rags to riches story appear in chain bookstores and on television. Here is an inspirational story of the *wong cilik* (little people) battling against the odds. In 2007, for example, after Kangen Band signed with Warner Music, RCTI broadcast a film, titled '*Aku Memang Kampungan*' (Proud to be a hick), that recounted the band's rise to fame. The title implies a reclaiming of the term *kampungan,* a reclaiming that is not without precedent, but which now inhabits a new context.

Such a new context is strongly evoked by the heated debates among *pop Indonesia* practitioners and intellectuals concerning the quality of Kangen Band's compositions and, more broadly, of all *pop Melayu* bands' compositions, suggesting that those who inhabit the middle can no longer agree on the cultural position and value of the *kampungan.* In contrast with the *RSI* writers, some esteemed *pop Indonesia* composers have even suggested that many *pop Melayu* compositions are musically sound. Fariz RM, a pop composer and performer whose heyday in the 1980s is now being re-celebrated with substantial support from *RSI,* is cited as contributing the following comment to a meeting of experts to discuss the music industry, and published in *RSI*: 'Don't be sceptical about Kangen Band. Who says Kangen Band is not creative?... Don't forget they have keyed into the spirit of the people, and that is no easy task' (Putranto, 2009: 68). Backstage at the AMI (*Akademi Musik Indonesia*: Indonesian Music Academy) awards in April 2009, Yovie Widianto (co-winner of Best Recording Producer category and whose band, Yovie and the Nuno, won the AMI award for the best Best of Album) commented: 'Pop Melayu songs are not universally lacking in quality. It's better to perform original compositions than to be a Western wannabe performing plagiarized compositions' (Sulaksono, 2009: 10).

There are other defences still, such as those that emerge as comments on the YouTube site dedicated to Kangen Band's clip of the song 'Selingkuh' ('Cheating'). Like Fariz RM's comments, some of those who contribute their views betray their willingness to mull over, re-spin and even explode some of the concepts (quality, the metropolis) that *pop Melayu*'s critics reveal as key to their rehabilitation of *gedongan*'s vanguard dimensions.

I am sure all music lovers actually like Kangen Band's songs. It's just that they are pretentious. They are just copying and echoing those who deride Kangen Band as provincial hicks. Look at P Project's song 'Bukan Superstar'. Rhythmically it ispractically the same as Kangen Band's song 'Doy', but because it is sung by P Project, whose members are crazy and cool, everyone thinks it is cool.

wiyanataende

Don't just protest and whinge all the time. This is precisely why Indonesia cannot advance and is still a poor country, because people can only protest all the time, instead of doing something for themselves. Were your ancestors of hundreds of years ago modern, or cool? For those Kangen Band members reading, don't take any notice of those critics. They do not deserve to be given breath by God. Go forward Kangen Band!

VAN3Z20

To my reading, as is Fariz RM's above-cited comment, the exchanges on YouTube concerning Kangen Band are deeply reflexive.[15] Much seems up for discussion here: the question of how an interest in the vocalist's physical appearance reflects on consumers, the role of the metropolis in cultural production, the Melayuness or otherwise of

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15 The abovecited comments do not reflect the tone of the discussion about the videoclip as a whole. There is considerable disagreement as to the quality of the song and its relationship to *kampungan*. Notable also is the fact that a number of those to comment on the song clearly delight in exchanging obscenities and in naming the male genitals, highlighting the possibilities this medium offers for spontaneous, interactive, ludic and carnivalesque exchanges and performances; all these qualities are certainly lacking, although not entirely absent, in older text-based media such as the press.

Kangen Band's music and its implications for the affective qualities of consumption, to name a few. Indeed, the term *kampungan* is not unpacked here. Nevertheless, the responses to Selingkuh on YouTube do evidence a kind of inquiring, reflexive mode that, it could be argued, disagreements about *pop Melayu*'s quality seem to provoke.

It is highly significant that these inquiries and doubts about the relationship between 'quality', a variant of knowledge, and the *kampungan*, emerge in a context in which the national public space fills with narratives of upward mobility. One of the memorable ways this optimism forces its ways into domestic space is in the form of multi-level marketing, founded on the very promise of upward mobility. In my own ethnically and socially diverse neighbourhood in Denpasar, growing numbers of my neighbours of various backgrounds spend more and more of their time at multi-level marketing meetings, or refuse to relent in urging other neighbours to either buy their wares or join their meetings.

Another example of the prevalence of narratives of upward mobility is provided by the trilogy of novels based on the novelist Andrea Hirata's childhood in a family in provincial Belitung that had few financial and minimal educational resources but who went on to win a scholarship to the Sorbonne. These novels, which have been made into films to enormous critical and mass acclaim by an esteemed production company, Miles Productions, have proved to be a very powerful explication of the idea that economic hardship allows the possibility for advance. The particular films that exemplify this idea are *Laskar Pelangi*, made in 2007, and *Sang Pemimpi*, in 2009.

It is also significant in this context that the greatest profits from the exchange of music are currently generated not by digital downloads of songs, live or televised performances, advertising jingles or album sales, but by ring-back tones. These are thirty-second excerpts of songs that callers hear when they call the number of whoever has purchased a ring-back tone. They are coded and cannot be pirated, and constitute an industry monopolised by large recording labels and telecommunications companies. What is significant about ring-back tones in the context of

the pervasiveness of narratives of upward mobility, which depict this trajectory as one from the *kampung* to the metropolis, is that these musical products are, according to telecommunications companies that can track sales by region, most intensively consumed by those living in provincial second-tier and third-tier cities, especially those cities on islands other than Java, therefore most squarely beyond the fringes of Jakarta (Solihun, 2010: 36).

Conclusion

This article has argued that the matter of *RSI*'s attempt to address the *pria dewasa* can be understood in a context in which a myth of class evolved in tandem with a new chapter in print capitalism on the advent of the New Order. As such, it has drawn heavily on those writings that stress the ways in which Indonesian myths of class and the press intersect. Indeed, the idea emerges in a number of recent studies (Ferry, 2003; Leichty, 2003; Mazzarella, 2003; Wang, 2008) that other countries of the Asian region feature a middle space, between a looming, imposing or modernising force (such as 'the state', 'the global' or 'capital') and the (unmodern) masses, and this space is inhabited by those empowered to manipulate media in (the name of) the masses' best interests. However, departing from scholarly discussions of the role of print in the imagining of national communities, newer studies explore how this middle space has evolved in globalised media environments, which have important post-industrial features for the importance advertising images play in them.

These studies of middle classness in image economies of the Asian region offer new tools for reading contemporary developments in Indonesian pop and class; tools that allow other interpretations of the slew of publications that place an Indonesian middle class in the context of a structural modernisation, and of those that stress a crucial link between myths of class and the press. In his book on India, Mazzarella explores the cultural implications of that country being subjected to a global trend in media deregulation. Such deregulation,

he argues, allowed a middle class to occupy a hinge position, creating local content in the context of global media firms. In this way, such hinge occupants contribute to aspirational consumerism: the idea of the nation as a collection of sovereign consumers, all aspiring to a uniform middleness, generously imaged. Leichty (2003: 37) argues that Nepali consumerism is similarly hegemonic, and contends that '[y]outh act as the vanguard of an emerging middle class consumerculture. Constituting youth as consumers is the same cultural project as constituting middle class subjects. Producing youth is producing the middle class.'

In a separate article (Baulch, 2007b) I have argued that in media-deregulated Indonesia too, youth culture, specifically pop music culture, newly imaged on new, advertising-funded television with national reach, has served as a convenient default position for public constructions of middleness. By appearing to pertain primarily to youth, not class, pop music obscures the ideological connotations of such constructions, hence helps naturalise them. I have also argued that consumerism must adopt modes of address that assume the homogeneous middleness of the Indonesian citizenry, newly defined as a collection of sovereign consumers. Notably, such modes of address gloss over *kampungan–gedongan* distinctions.

But as it turns out, Indonesian aspirational consumerism's moment was only fleeting, and the advent of *pop Melayu* signals something new. As we have seen above, *pop Melayu* is a metropolitan construction, but no longer does a Jakarta-based eye survey the provinces and recreate them in its own image. *Pop Melayu* retrieves, to an extent, the *kampungan–gedongan* dyad. But it does so in a context in which the *kampungan*, that marker of Otherness that has been so important to the evocation of an Indonesian middleness, is increasingly unstable. Moreover, it is being incorporated into narratives of upward mobility, such as one finds in the way in which *pop Melayu* has been spun and pitched as a genre to consumers.[16] No longer just the waste, the un-modern, the vulgar

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16 This development in itself is by no means unique to Indonesia; in the idea that third-tier cities represent lucrative markets now emerge in the imaginings of advertisers in other countries at comparable stages of market development (Wang, 2008), and in this sense contemporary pop Melayu is heavily laden with globally-circulating marketing discourses.

(although these significations endure), *kampungan* can now also signify the possibility of bettering oneself.

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Crouch, Harold. (2010). *Political Reform in Indonesia after Soeharto.*

Tri Ratnawati
Indonesian Institute of Sciences

This book deals with political reform in Indonesia since Soeharto and covers in detail the fall of the New Order and the travails of its successor, the *Reformasi* government; reforming the constitution and the electoral system; its struggles over regional government; military reform; politics, corruption and the courts; resolving communal violence in Maluku; resolving the separatist challenge in Aceh; and reform in unpromising circumstances.

Harold Crouch begins the story with the fall of Soeharto in May 1998 and describes the chaotic circumstances in Indonesia after the New Order collapsed. He tells at length how Soeharto's cronies survived during the transition period and thereafter. This leads him to question how political reform can proceed in such unpromising circumstances.

Crouch explains the transitional period and the development of political reform in Indonesia using several theories, such as O'Donnell and Schmitter's theory of political transition, which referred to transitional politics in Latin America. Crouch paraphrases their arguments by saying that

Too rapid democratization, which threatens established interests, can endanger the transition process. They [O'Donnell and Schmitter] note that 'an active, militant, and highly mobilized upsurge may be

an efficacious instrument for bringing down a dictatorship but may make subsequent democratic consolidation difficult and under some circumstances may provide an important motive for regression to an even more brutal form of authoritarian rule'.

In Crouch's view, this theory explains adequately the circumstances of Indonesia in transition, which was characterised by the interests of the remaining *Orde Baru* (New Order) elite that continued to rule the country after Soeharto that competed with the pro-democracy activists and supporters who were not solid and had different interests.

Crouch disagrees with the theory of state failure to describe Indonesia in transition. He states

Indonesia, however, never descended to the depths of full state failure. The concept of the 'failed state' had been applied to several countries in Africa in the 1990s where government barely existed and civil conflict became ubiquitous.

Crouch also borrows Joel S Migdal's theory about a weak state *vis-à-vis* a strong society. A 'weak state', in Migdal's perspective, is one where 'the institutions of government exist but are unable to impose their will on powerful vested interests in a "strong society"'. However, Crouch does not fully agree with Migdal's perspective. Rather, he believes that the post-authoritarian governments were not solid and were captured by elements of the state, such as rival parties and bureaucratic factions. In this he supports Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz who stated that

> ...the crisis failed to sweep away the very interests and forces incubated within the Soeharto regime, which underpinned and defined it. These survived to re-establish the economic and political power relationships within new institutional arrangements.

Furthermore, Grindle and Thomas' concept of '"crisis-ridden" reforms and those conducted in a "politics-as-usual" environment' is also used by Crouch to describe actions taken by competing elites in the Reform era in Indonesia.

Chapter 2 contains descriptions of the New Order and the fall of Soeharto; the chaotic transition under Habibie; the erratic rule of Abdurrahman Wahid; Megawati's holding operation; and political consolidation under Yudhoyono. In this chapter, he describes the leadership of those figures, their policies and actions. Soeharto's authoritarian regime and its fall are described at length. What is more interesting in this chapter is how Crouch reveals BJ Habibie——President Soeharto's successor——as 'an "accidental" president who lacked a strong political base outside the discredited New Order regime and had been thrust unexpectedly into a position for which he was inadequately prepared'.

Nonetheless, the writer acknowledges what Habibie did. President Habibie was able to propose the release of political prisoners, he reformed the anti-subversion law, lifted restrictions on the press, developed new political parties within a multi-party system, held new general elections, carried out the drastic decentralisation of regional government, and freed East Timor from Indonesia. In that regard, the writer notes

> Despite the chaotic circumstances and the unpromising composition of his government, President Habibie initiated significant reforms during his brief presidency. In the terminology of Grindle and Thomas, the Habibie government's reforms were largely 'crisis-ridden'.

But, according to Crouch, Habibie failed to combat the KKN (*korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme*) problem and investigate the Soeharto family's wealth. So, it was not surprising that Habibie continued to be perceived by people as an extension of the New Order regime.

In 1999, Habibie was replaced by Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly known as Gus Dur). Abdurrahman was backed by his party, the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), and by Amin Rais and *Poros Tengah* (Central Axis) to compete with Megawati in the presidential election held by the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* [MPR]) in October 1999. Gus Dur defeated Megawati by 373 votes to 313 in the indirect president election in the MPR.

In relation to President Abdurrahman Wahid's *politik balas budi*

> Gus Dur's immediate priority was to win back Megawati and the PDI-P. Megawati, who felt betrayed by her former friend, was persuaded to accept the vice presidency and her party was awarded four cabinet posts. The military was rewarded with six posts, including General Wiranto as Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, while Golkar got five. The support of the Central Axis was acknowledged with eight posts divided between four parties while Abdurrahman's own PKB received four. The remaining positions went to non-party ministers. The result was a cabinet that lacked political coherence, a condition that was soon aggravated by the president's erratic behaviour.

Abdurrahman's political strategy, outlined above, was detrimental in its effect, and it was aggravated by his lack of solid support from the parliament. Crouch describes it as follows:

> Apart from the erratic personal style of the president, the fundamental weakness of the Abdurrahman presidency lay in its lack of solid parliamentary support in a presidential system with parliamentary features that had become increasingly significant. Abdurrahman...had won the presidency through deal-making in the MPR. His coalition partners joined him not because they shared his political vision but because he offered them patronage opportunities.

During Gus Dur's presidency, the military oppression in Aceh and Papua increased and the Maluku communal conflict was neglected. President Abdurrahman Wahid was finally dismissed by the MPR in 2001. As a consequence, vice-president Megawati succeeded him as the new president.

Indonesia under President Megawati Soekarnoputri was relatively stable. She was friendly to the military and had a similar vision to several conservative generals, mainly in maintaining NKRI (*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*). Despite her weaknesses, some progress related to political reform was made under her rule. Crouch explains that

Nevertheless, the stability Megawati's government, in contrast to the nineteen months of upheaval under Abdurrahman, provided space for the MPR and DPR to adopt important legislation. Although hardly driven by the president herself, the MPR adopted fundamental reforms which transformed the constitution.

Megawati's government also prepared draft legislation which resulted in incremental steps toward reform in other areas. New electoral laws were adopted, the regional autonomy laws were revised, laws on national defence, the police and military were passed and a new anti-corruption commission and court were established.

However, according to Crouch, President Megawati unfortunately was not able to improve the Indonesian economy significantly. Economic progress was an important factor to attract people to vote for her party, the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P), in the legislative election as well as to support her in the direct presidential election in 2004. As a result, in the 2004 legislative election, PDI-P saw a drastic decline in its support from 33.8 per cent in 1999 to 18.5 per cent in 2004. Golkar got more votes, 21.6 per cent but this share of the votes was a Golkar decline also compared with the 22.5 per cent it received in 1999. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), with his Democrat Party, defeated Megawati in the 2004 direct presidential election. He won it convincingly with 60.6 per cent of the votes compared with Megawati's 39.4 per cent after the elimination of the other three candidates.

Crouch considers that the 2004 direct presidential election was a landmark in the reform of Indonesia's political institutions. He quotes Aspinall, writing, 'the elections of 2004 brought to an end the "transitional period" in Indonesia's politics that began in 1998'.

President SBY and the vice-president, Jusuf Kalla (JK), ruled Indonesia for a full term of five years. The Democrat Party–Golkar coalition and SBY's control of the armed forces *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI) was one of the main factors in maintaining the power of the Yudhoyono–Kalla administration. The successful resolution of the Aceh separatist movement's demands and an anti-corruption campaign was a big

achievement. Political consolidation under SBY boosted political and economic stability in the country.

Chapter 3 describes reform of the constitution and the electoral system. Crouch refers to Andrew Ellies' statement that the amendments changed 'a state with a single all-powerful highest institution of state to become a state with constitutional checks and balances'. Megawati's PDI-P, which was backed by some military conservatives, initially rejected the amendment to the 1945 Constitution and the direct election for presidents. But at the end, she agreed because of pressure from her party and from the public. The DPD (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah* [Regional Representative Council]) and the Constitutional Court were developed in the 2001 round of constitutional amendments.

It was agreed that the DPD in the 'new constitution' would have limited power to prevent it becoming similar to a senate in a federal system. Crouch notes, 'The amended constitution provided that elections to the DPR (and the regional DPRDs) would only be contested by political parties while the DPD elections could only be contested by non-party individuals'. The main function of the new Constitutional Court was to assess whether laws were in line with the constitution. The court also had a final say over disputes between state institutions, the dissolution of political parties, disputes over general election results, and to respond to the DPR's request to decide whether a president's or a vice-president's behaviour merited dismissal. Other amendments were related to regional autonomy, defence and security, human rights, and so on. The four sessions of the MPR between 1999 and 2002 had changed the 1945 Constitution fundamentally. Another sign of progress was the withdrawal of a proposal which would place Muslims under Islamic law.

The new election law was also passed by the DPR. It changed the closed list system of general elections in the New Order system to an open list system to enable voters to vote for their preferred candidates more freely. The open list system undermined the power of the party's leader to determine legislative candidates.

A major emphasis on decentralisation was taken by Habibie's government to cope with the problem of national disintegration after Soeharto. Pressure from regions outside Java for a wider regional autonomy, even federalism, was strong. Golkar had no serious objection to the new decentralisation law in order to get support from the regions and the public for the coming general election in 1999.

Because of its difficulties in controlling the chaotic circumstances after the fall of Soeharto, the military also had no serious objection to Habibie's decentralisation programmes that were the subject of law 22 of 1999. This law was drafted by Ryaas Rasyid and his 'Tim Tujuh'. The Law on Regional Government (22 of 1999) had a federalist flavour; it transferred authority and resources to the district level directly, bypassing the provinces. The hierarchy of regional governments was abolished. Governors tended to become coordinators of the district heads, rather than their superiors. This was different from the local government structure set up in law 5 of 1974. Nonetheless, under law 22 of 1999, the position of governor remained unclear, it was the central government's instrument and the region's representative as well. This dual position copied the New Order model of regional government.

The Habibie government's law 25 of 1999 also devolved financial matters to the regions. His decentralisation policies were greeted enthusiastically by the regions and disintegration tendencies decreased. However, the implementation of decentralisation policies was confusing because of the lack of legal instruments. Crouch explains that 'Administrative preparations for autonomy proceeded very slowly. Ryaas estimated that effective decentralization would require 120 legal instruments—5 laws, 47 government regulations, 7 presidential degrees and various other regulations'. Furthermore, in following the decentralisation big-bang approach of laws 22 and 25 of 1999, local conflicts, money politics, and corruption grew rapidly in many regions in Indonesia.

Megawati's government replaced law 22 of 1999 with law 32 of 2004 to recentralise some government functions. Of law 32 of 2004, Crouch writes

> Overall, the new law shifted the balance of authority from the regions towards the central government. The hierarchy abolished by Law No. 22/1999 was restored and, in a formal sense, ultimate authority was now placed in the hands of the central government in accordance with the concept of the unitary state.

He sees this as a move from 'crisis-ridden' politics to 'politics-as-usual'. Although the new regional government law developed a base for democracy at local levels, it did not lead to better quality regional governments.

Chapter 5 examines efforts toward judicial independence, combating corruption, court failure, big corruption cases (1999–2004), the Soeharto family, Bank Indonesia and the Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia scandal, Golkar and the 1999 elections, the Bank Bali and Akbar Tanjung cases, dropped cases, Yudhoyono's anti-corruption drive, conflict between agencies, and anti-corruption politics in regional government. One of the New Order legacies was corrupt courts which served the regime's needs. In this chapter Crouch argues that under the post-authoritarian regime, the judicial system experienced only minimum reform; the courts were freed from the control of the Department of Justice and the Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi*) was established. The courts failed with big corruption cases because of the defendants patronage ties with the regime.

Chapter 6 discusses the reform in part of the military. The reform was clearly seen as being the military's withdrawal from day-to-day politics, such as from the government (as *bupati*s, governors, etc.) and from the parliament. A step toward civilian control over the military came with the success of Yudhoyono and Kalla in imposing on a reluctant military a peace agreement with Aceh in Helsinki on 15 August 2005. For further military reform, Crouch notes that 'major areas remained largely unreformed including the army's territorial structure, military financing, and the 'impunity' of military officers before the law'. The limited military reform in the writer's view was largely initiated by some reformist members of the military, rather than the president or parliament members responding to public pressures.

Chapter 7 explains communal conflict in Maluku and its resolution. Communal conflicts in Maluku began on 19 January 1999 (the date of *Lebaran* after the *Ramadhan* fasting month) when a quarrel occurred between a Christian Ambonese minibus driver and a Muslim Bugis youth at a bus terminal in Ambon. This triggered fighting and spread throughout Ambon Island and beyond. 'The initial fighting involved Christian Ambonese and Muslim BBP [Butonese, Bugis and Makassarese] youths but its ethnic character became religious especially when mosques and churches began to be destroyed.' This conflict ended two years later after thousands of people had been killed or wounded.

The Malino peace agreement, which was signed by Christian and Muslim Ambonese in Malino (South Sulawesi) on 11–12 February 2002, ended the horrifying communal conflicts. Before the peace, the conflict escalation was caused mainly by the poor performance or the lack of professionalism by the military, and by the involvement of radical militias from in and outside Ambon. Moreover, the weak president's leadership also contributed to the worsening circumstances in Ambon before peace talks in Malino were taken.

Chapter 8 examines resolving the separatist challenge in Aceh. The Indonesian government of Yudhoyono and Kalla was able to cope with problems of GAM's (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* [Free Aceh Movement]) separatism in Aceh. The Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 15 August 2005 between GAM and a representative of the Indonesian government. This peace agreement was reached only after the tsunami at the end of 2004 that destroyed much of Aceh. In that agreement, GAM members got some concessions from the Indonesian government: an 'integration' fund, land and jobs. GAM was also permitted by the Indonesian government to build local political parties in Aceh, as well as, take part in the direct gubernatorial election in Aceh in 2006. As many local people predicted, Irwandi Jusuf, one of the GAM officers, won that *pilgub langsung* (direct election for governor). Moreover, nearly half the district headships were also won by GAM candidates. In terms of this the writer argues that

> In 2005 the government in Jakarta, following the convincing victory of President Yudhoyono in the direct election of 2004, enjoyed much more legitimacy than the Abdurrahman and Megawati governments and was more capable of implementing its goals in a coherent way. ... While his vice president, Jusuf Kalla, was making secret contact with GAM, Yudhoyono was cementing his own base of support within the TNI that would enable him to curb attempts to disrupt the Helsinki negotiations.

As many observers witnessed, Aceh was stable under the Yudhoyono–Kalla government. GAM reduced its demand for full independence to self-government. This progress was well accepted by the Indonesian authorities.

Crouch's question about reform in unpromising circumstances in his introductory chapter is answered in the concluding chapter. The answer is clear, that is, an uneven reform. He concludes that, of six sectors under his examination, minimal reform occurred in the courts. Crouch states

> Reform, however, did not proceed evenly across different fields. The most thorough reforms were in governing institutions—the architecture of governance. The constitution had been thoroughly amended and now approximated to formal international democratic standards... Centre-region relations had also been drastically overhauled... The previously dominant military had stepped back from direct political participation although it continued to exercise informal political influence and full civilian control had not been achieved. The least progress was made in the judicial sector...

It is my opinion that this book is a kind of history of *Reformasi*, a reflection as well as an evaluation of political reform in Indonesia after and authoritarian regime. In *Reformasi*, Crouch explains at length, six main sectors had been reformed: the national constitution (UUD 1945), electoral laws, centre-regional relations, courts, the military, communal conflicts in Maluku and separatism in Aceh. Crouch supports his explanations with data, interviews with key figures, and a broad range

of theoretical frameworks. As a senior Indonesianist, who has a long experience with Indonesia and Indonesians, it is not surprising that his deep knowledge and understanding of Indonesian politics is very convincing and this can be seen clearly in this book and is its great strength.

Nonetheless, I see several weaknesses of this book. First, the author has a bias to President SBY; he does not dwell on SBY's weaknesses, but he does mention several times weaknesses of previous presidents. Second, the author does not explore whether political reform in Indonesia has positive effects on the Indonesian economy. I mean the author should also explore the economy of Indonesia since Soeharto. I believe that poverty and unemployment in Indonesia after Soeharto worsened because SBY's 'neo-lib' policies had marginalised small farmers, small traders, labourers, and the 'weak' as a whole. The wide gap between the rich and the poor in the New Order era, was maintained by SBY's *Reformasi* regime.

Third, the great increase of *pemekaran daerah* (formation of new regions) as an effect of decentralisation policies after Soeharto does not appear in this book. *Pemekaran daerah* is a meeting point of many interests: local elites, political parties, business communities, government officials, NGOs and universities. Several studies show how collusion, corruption, manipulation, and mobilisation coloured the process of 'district multiplication', which involved local and national elites. Good governance and law enforcement is largely still absent in this Reform era in Indonesia. So, can a deliberative democracy be born from a 'transactional' and 'free market' political system in Indonesia in this *Reformasi* era?

I am of the belief up to now that Indonesia is still in a transition period, which is indicated by the re-birth of old practices in new forms. The 'criminalization' of the Anti-Corruption Commission, SBY's weak leadership, the government's 'soft censoring' of the press, the restrictions to freedom of religion and the increasing poverty since 1998, according to me, can jeopardise the reform agendas that were introduced by students and pro-democracy supporters in 1998–99. In terms of this,

I suppose that Crouch's book is too optimistic in seeing reform and progress in Indonesia under President SBY.

This book is interesting and important. Above all, it is Crouch's big contribution to the discussion of political reform and the development of political science in Indonesia.

The Construction of History under Indonesia's New Order: the Making of the *Lubang Buaya* Official Narrative

Yosef M Djakababa[1]

This study examines the emergence of the New Order's official narrative of the *Lubang Buaya* killings, focusing above all, on the origins of the story. Despite the unclear, controversial nature of the event, which for years has sparked controversy among foreign and domestic scholars, several fundamental facts are certain. Those facts among others were the killings of the top Indonesian army leadership at *Lubang Buaya* on 1 October 1965, which triggered a process that led to President Sukarno's [2] downfall, the killings of around 500,000 or more alleged communist supporters, the mass incarceration of thousands of people, and the emergence of General Soeharto's New Order military regime, which would dominate Indonesia for the next thirty-two years.

As well as silencing the competing narratives, Soeharto's New Order invested heavily in promoting their version of what happened on 1 October 1965. For over 30 years, the New Order regime utilised public trials, films, monuments and commemorations that were carefully created and that maintained the regime's official version of the *Lubang Buaya* killings. By using those instruments, the regime instilled a deeply

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1 This dissertation on the construction of the *Lubang Buaya* official history was presented at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA, in 2009 as part of the requirements to obtain a PhD degree in history.

2 2 I am using the spelling of Sukarno with "u" instead of the old spelling of "oe" to be consistent with all the documents and primary sources that I encountered during the writing of this dissertation.

held, popular belief that the killings were instigated by the Thirtieth September Movement and, most important, by its creator, the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), as the mastermind. The creation of this official narrative about the coup attempt was first and fundamentally an instrument for fostering and maintaining the legitimacy of the regime. However, in the process, this official narrative also evolved into a means for the regime to stage its triumph over communism and at the same time to glorify General Soeharto's role in leading the anti-communist purge.

Despite years of intensive purging and silencing other views about this tragic event, different and sometimes opposing narratives about what happened on 1 October 1965 nonetheless continue to exist. These other versions remain in the minds of many individuals especially those who witnessed and survived the purging and incarceration. The method that the regime used was to create an official narrative that reduced and simplified the complexity of the event and to ignore other tragic events that happened in the aftermath of the killings of the generals. By doing so, the regime transformed the confusing events of *Lubang Buaya* into a clear, definitive, official narrative. Through the power of the New Order regime, this official narrative has, in the decades following its initial articulation, been reinforced by the construction of a massive marble monument, the production of a film, *Pengkhianatan G30 S/PKI*, and it permeates the fabric of society with the annual rituals of the 1 October commemoration day.

To understand the nature of the construction of the official *Lubang Buaya* narrative, several questions need to be addressed. First, how did the New Order regime manipulate the memory of *Lubang Buaya* and make it the major tenet for the regime's legitimacy and triumphal displays? Second, what were the reasons behind the New Order's efforts to insert the *Lubang Buaya* narrative into the established historiography of Indonesia? Third, how did the official narrative gain wide public acceptance in the early years following its initial construction?

The killing of the generals at *Lubang Buaya* resulted from the actions of the Thirtieth September Movement in the wee hours of 1 October

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1965. Since then, the event has become the source of controversy and endless debates among scholars and the public alike. Many studies have been done trying to explain what actually happened on that fateful day. There are many theories about the origins and motives for the Thirtieth September Movement, and the possible masterminds behind the abduction and killing of the army generals. From all the theories available, one can draw up a list of suspected possible masterminds, which are as follows: the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), Major General Soeharto, President Sukarno, the CIA and the People's Republic of China. Each of these suspected masterminds has its followers who present compelling arguments, trying to convince others why their theory is the most valid.

The persistence of these widely divergent interpretations arises from the vague, even confusing, nature of the event itself, which at the end produced wide-ranging reactions from many parties in response to the confusion. However, oftentimes these theories about the architect of the incident always seem to be based on unexamined assumptions that there were particular mastermind(s) behind the debacle. After examining the origins and nature of the event, this dissertation argues that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to find a single convincing explanation about the perpetrators of the incident. This argument becomes clearer when we examine the multifaceted dynamics that drove the Thirtieth September Movement's decisions and actions.

Despite the evident complexity, the New Order would ignore this to establish a simple, good-versus-evil narrative that is convincing and easy enough to grasp. At the same time, the official narrative was reproduced with particular goals in mind: to eliminate the army's political arch enemy, the communist party, and to cement the regime's legitimacy. This study will show how a particular New Order, official narrative would emerge as a convincing, definitive history, using devices that not only presented the narrative but also ensured its lasting preservation.

The importance of understanding the origins and driving force behind these massive efforts to construct an official narrative is that it allows clearer understanding about how a military regime works to establish

a particular account that serves its needs in seizing and holding power. This particular case study will show the extraordinary effectiveness of the official narrative, its persistence can still be seen and felt even after the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998.

Weaving the vast amounts of information, ranging from primary, secondary and oral interviews data, and then writing it into a coherent narrative and argument was indeed a challenge. However, there is something that I and perhaps most historians feel necessary to have in writing an historical narrative, which is establishing the historical context that led to the events at *Lubang Buaya*. Chapter I discusses the research questions, their importance, and the theoretical and methodology framework for this study. In chapter II and, to a certain extent, in each of the following chapters, considerable attention was devoted to writing the background that led to the killings. The background historical context not only describes and discusses the gravity of political events at that time, but it also includes a section that talks specifically about the effect of politics in daily Indonesian social life in the 1960s.

As previously mentioned, it is imperative to establish the historical context before we delve into the events that we want to discuss because the context would provide us with a more solid understanding of why particular things happened when they did. Furthermore, it will be more difficult to understand the logic of the regime's construction of the official narrative without knowing and understanding the contemporary historical and political contexts, which will explain, if you will, the raw materials and motivation for the fabrication of the official history.

In addition, chapter II contains new information about the Catholic groups though small in number they played crucial roles in the struggle against the Communist Party in the mid-1960s, especially in the aftermath of the killings. Their roles during the transition from Sukarno to Soeharto require a closer examination and could be a dissertation topic in itself.

In chapter III, the analysis shifts focus and examines the accounts of what happened on the day when the events began to unfold. This chapter

concludes that 1 October 1965 was indeed a chaotic and confusing day, which leads into a needed extended discussion about the dynamics of that day. Drawing from multiple sources, it was evident that there was much speculation and confusion among different groups and individuals who lived through that day.

This chapter demonstrates that the events of 1 October 1965 were unclear, vague, and mysterious from the very beginning. Therefore, confusion could not be avoided in producing a variety of views and interpretations of the event. The repercussions from this confusing event would continue to be the source of debates for years to come. Chapter III discusses how the initial confusion generated an opportunity for a particular official narrative to become the reigning narrative in explaining what took place before, during and after the killings.

Chapter IV describes the early evolution of the official narrative through the policies to systematically purge the communists and other enemies of the New Order. This chapter also briefly discusses the beginning of the exaltation of the nation's ideology, *Pancasila*, and describes how it was appropriated to serve as part of the legitimisation for the regime. The description of the regime's systematic purges and the mechanisms it used are important to tell because, I would argue, they helped contribute to the formation of the perception of the PKI's guilt and treachery at every level of Indonesian society.

Chapter V examines an important but often ignored aspect of the 1965 tragedy, which is the *Mahmillub* or the Special Military Tribunals (SMT). Using heavy media coverage, the public trials of prominent communists and coup leaders was part of the New Order's effort to show the people that the pursuit of justice was being respected and properly served. For years, scholars have labelled these proceedings simply as show trials. Despite its massive magnitude and negative, even dismissive, labelling, there is almost no study of the SMTs other than the one done by the activists from *TAPOL bulletin*, which described and analysed the trials from human rights and judicial perspectives. However, this study omits the larger political ramifications.

A close study of the trial transcripts and press coverage of the trials revealed that the SMTs served much more than as adjudicators at mere show trials. A careful reading of the court documents indicates the SMTs had in fact larger political ramifications; they were a public arena for dissension among competing narratives on the *Lubang Buaya* killings and, most importantly, served as a perfect stage for legitimising the New Order regime in staging its public triumph over its defeated enemy.

Chapter VI examines the background ideas behind the representation of the regime's triumph embedded in the monument, the annual commemoration day, and the infamous film, *Pengkhianatan G30 S/ PKI* (The treachery of the Thirtieth September Movement/PKI). This chapter draws data from a wealth of information related to the making of these symbols, showing the ways they complement, strengthen and finally set in concrete the regime's official narrative of *Lubang Buaya.*

Finally, Chapter VII concludes this study by answering the research questions and explaining the consequences of the official narrative and its contribution to a myth making that will continue to dominate the nation's perception of the event for years, even after its principal creator has gone.

This dissertation concludes that Indonesia's traumatic past that originated from the killings at *Lubang Buaya* resulted in the New Order's construction of the *Lubang Buaya* official narrative and it was done using various symbolic materials such as monuments, film, as well as the Special Military Tribunals and purging policies. The effort was so successful that it shaped the country's collective memory of this event.

This study also demonstrates the nature of the event, which turned out to be far from the simplified story of good versus evil that is in the official narrative. In fact, the nature of the event and thus the story's origins are full of uncertainty, controversy, and even mystery. Nonetheless, a dominant narrative emerged from this complex situation and was intentionally constructed and maintained; first to serve General Soeharto in claiming his legitimacy for power, and later to facilitate his regime's sense of triumph and, finally, to insert the narrative into the history of the nation's journey.

The New Order's official narrative did not rely on critiques, explications or evaluation of sources that follow the accepted rules of historical scholarship. Instead the narrative pursues an immediate claim of 'truth', using established themes of *Pancasila* ideology and discourses about godless communism. Hence, these themes strengthened a version of history that proved to be emotive, pious and affirmative in forming the symbols of lasting collective memory

The chapters in this dissertation demonstrate the process, themes and, to a lesser extent, the effect of this official historical narrative. With a striking consistency, a particular narrative was embedded within the state's efforts at making certain artefacts, thereby inducing a version of history that would influence Indonesian public perspectives on the *Lubang Buaya* killings—and do this so successfully that it would shape perception of the 1965 tragedy for years to come.

Business Opportunities for *Halal* Products in the Global Market: Muslim Consumer Behaviour and *Halal* Food Consumption[1]

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Introduction

Halal products, *halal* confectionary and food ingredients, and the *syari`ah* system have attracted much attention among members of Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) countries. It has been estimated that the trade value of *halal* products in the global market has reached more than $US600 billion[2] and the trade will keep increasing at 20 to 30 per cent annually[3] The potential market for *halal* products is the world's Islamic population, which is of the order of 1600 million people. Of this total, Indonesia contributes 180 million; India, 140 million; Pakistan, 130 million; the Middle East, 200 million; Africa, 300 million; Malaysia, 14 million and North America, 8 million.[4] Apparently, the availability of *halal* products is still limited; as a consequence, to meet consumer demand some Islamic countries have to even import *halal* goods from non-Muslim countries. For instance, Middle Eastern countries import *halal* meat from non-Muslim countries, especially

1 This paper is based on a research report of Center for Economic Research, 2009. The research team comprised Endang S Soesilowati, Jusmaliani, Umi Karomah, Yani Mulyaningsih and Diah Suhodo.

2 As mentioned by the previous Ministry of Agriculture, Anton Apriyantono, *Antara News*, 17 December 2007.

3 Stated by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the opening ceremony of the 3rd World Islamic Economic Forum, 'Islam and the Challenge of Modernization', Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 28 May 2007.

4 Indonesia International Halal Exhibition - Halal Indonesia, 2006. (http://www.mastic.gov. my/servlets/sfs)

from Australia and Brazil (Sungkar, 2007). It is, then, a lucrative market and there are huge business opportunities for *halal* food in the domestic and international markets.

As the world's most populous Muslim country, Indonesia has the potential to become not only a major market but also a major producer of *halal* products. Therefore the study will be a valuable aid to help assess Indonesian capability in seizing market opportunities in the global *halal* food trade.

Large numbers of Muslims do not always make the decision to buy *halal* food. Being a Muslim does not guarantee that an individual's behaviour will always be Islamic, especially in consuming *halal* foods. The philosophy and the implementation of Islamic *syari'ah* is, to some extent, constructed through individual learning and socialisation, that is, in formal and informal education. It is the religious education experiences that will also determine the level of awareness of *halal* food consumer behaviour.

The result of the study of the behaviour of *halal* food consumers is expected to give valuable insight and knowledge and to help forecast the demand for *halal* food, as well as to help formulate an appropriate market strategy for *halal* food entrepreneurs. If Indonesia is to increase its economic growth by investing in and developing *halal* products, it will require a study of Muslim behaviour as consumers of *halal* products. To what extent Indonesian Muslims are concerned with *halal* products is not known yet. It was interesting to study what are the criteria for assessing *halal* foods in terms of consumer perceptions, whether *halal* refers only to the food's content or does it also include food preparation and so on. Furthermore, it will be valuable to discover the extent to which the degree of religiosity determines the awareness of *halal* food and affects consumer behaviour.

Literature Review

Consumer behaviour, like any other behaviour, is affected by cultural, social, personal and psychological characteristics. Cultural factors are

assumed to be dominant in influencing the intentions and behaviours of consumers. It is claimed in some of the literature that religion is the key cultural element that determines behaviour and decisions to buy (Assadi, 2003; Esso and Dibb, 2004; Delener, 1994; Babakus, 2004; Cornwell, 2005). Cited Cloud (2000), Fam et. al (2004) stated that a religion can be described as '...the habitual expression of an interpretation of life, which deals with ultimate concerns and values. Institutional religion formalises these into a system which can be taught to each generation' 'Islam is more than a religion as it controls the ways of society and factors associated with family, dress, cleanliness and ethics' (Fam, 2004). A religious person has a value system that differs from an unreligious person.

Meanwhile, religiosity is the extent of a person's commitment to his or her religion (cited Johnson et al., 2001, Mokhlis (2006). Religiosity is very important because it determines individual cognition and behaviour (Sitasari, 2008). It is highly likely that religiosity will govern an individual's behaviour, including behaviour as a *halal* food consumer.

A religion may influence consumer behaviour and behaviour in general (Delener, 1994, Pettinger, 2004), especially in decisions to buy meals and in establishing food habits (Bonne, 2007). As also stated by Schiffman and Kanuk (1997), is that decisions to buy are dependent on religious identity (cited in Shafie and Othman, 2006). Religious control of food consumption patterns is in terms of restrictions on particular foods: Jews, for example, are prohibited from eating pig meat; and beef is prohibited for Hindus. Muslims are prohibited from eating pork, blood, and animals that have not been killed in the way prescribed by *syari`ah* law, and they may not drink alcoholic beverages. Muslims have a religious obligation to consume *halal* food (Bonne et al., 2007).

Because this study focuses on consumer behaviour of Muslims in relation to *halal* food, a theory of planned behaviour is used as a conceptual framework. The theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) proposes that there are at least three dominant factors influencing behaviour; attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioural control (see Diagram 1).

Attitude is a psychological propensity to evaluate whether something is liked or disliked. It is an individual's positive or negative evaluation of self-performance of a particular behaviour. A subjective norm is an individual's perception of social pressure of what to do or not to do. At this level, the culture of the society people live in may control their behaviour. A perception of behavioural control is an individual perception to the extent that particular behaviour would be controlled. The extent to which an individual understands and follows his or her religion is a perception that may control their behaviour.

Diagram 1: Conceptual Framework of Consumer Behaviour

Source: Adapted from Ajzen (1991)

These three factors (attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control) will determine individual intentions to consume *halal* food and will be shown in their consumption behaviour. The intention is a motivational situation prior to behaviour and it indicates an individual's readiness to perform a given behaviour.

Although religion mandates strict laws in terms of food consumption, the extent to which its adherents follow those *halal* laws is highly likely to vary (Bonne, 2007) and this variation will be affected by those three dominant behavioural factors that are listed in the previous paragraph. The degree to which an individual is religious, that is, their religiosity, is part of their self-identity as a Muslim, and to that extent they will have Muslim attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control

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that determines their intention to consume *halal* foods. However, the extent to which an individual consumes *halal* food will also depend on other related factors, such as availability of *halal* food, chance, knowledge, and sources including money.

Research Methods

This research is to analyse Muslim consumer behaviour in regard to *halal* food, especially the behaviour of those who live in urban areas. The study will also examine how different degrees of religiosity might affect consumer behaviour. Quantitative methods were mainly used, that is, gathering primary data by surveying a hundred Muslim respondents in Banten, an area chosen because it has a predominantly Muslim population.

A structured Likert-scale questionnaire in self-report form was used in this study; the respondents were asked directly about their knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and feelings about particular objects or activities (Churchill, 1995). To get more comprehensive data, the study also used qualitative methods; conducting in-depth interviews with several key persons and religious leaders in the field.

To measure the behaviour of consumers of *halal* food, a number of variables were selected, including level of education, religious education background (*pesantren* or other), understanding of *halal* products, socioeconomic strata, and gender. The SPSS program was used for data entry and to analyse the data gathered through questionnaires. To get more meaningful findings, comparisons between groups of respondents and variables were applied using the analyses technique. The comparisons were of the average scores of group respondents or variables that are usually known as the cut off point (COP). Descriptive analyses in the form of graphics, cross tabulation, and simple statistical techniques were also applied to examine the correlation between the variables.

Research Findings

This research found several major issues that showed relatively inter-related factors influencing Muslim behaviour in their consumption of *halal* foods. First, the research found that the awareness of Muslims in Banten concerning *halal* and *haram* food was considerably high, especially in selecting foods that need to be further processed before they are eaten, items such as meat, fish and vegetables. They consistently put a high priority on the *halal* issue when they purchase food, buy meat, or select a restaurant.

Second, the role of government to promote and control religious behaviour in terms of *halal* food consumption was considered slightly insensitive Most respondents claim that the religious laws of conduct and religious leaders force their decision to consume *halal* food.

Third, a Pearson correlation score, between the degree of individual religiosity and *halal* food consumption shows that the higher the degree of a respondent's religiosity, the greater their concern to consume *halal* food ($r = 0.565$). Because the degree of respondents' religiosity was also influenced by their religious experience and education background, respondents with a pesantren education tended to have more control and concerns about their *halal* food consumption. However, the correlation score of education level and *halal* food consumer behaviour was extremely weak ($r = 0.012$), which means there is no parallel relation between a respondent's education and their predisposition to consume *halal* food. It does not follow that the higher an individual's education, the more will be their concern to ensure that the food they eat conforms to *halal* requirements. In addition, it (the predeliction for *halal* food) was not dependent on the degree of a respondent's religiosity; the respondents tended first to control and ensure their family ate *halal* food before any other related religious obligations. It was a striking feature that those who had the highest degree of religiosity were highly likely to remind their religious leaders of their obligations to consume *halal* food.

Fourth, the most important criteria for *halal* food for Muslim respondents in Banten are that their food must free of pig meat and alcohol; the *halal*

certificate from the Majlis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) [Indonesian Ulama Council] was not so important.[5] However, numbers of respondents still believe that the *halal* label on food packaging and in restaurants is important. The *halal* label from the MUI was more trusted than any other *halal* label. The long process and procedures in obtaining *halal* certification were considered costly, and because of this, small and medium businesses were reluctant to register their products. Most respondents declared that the higher prices of *halal* products would not lessen the amount of their purchases of *halal* food products.

Although it was sensed by Muslims in the Banten area that the role of the MUI in the Banten region tends to be limited, and that it tends to have poor coordination with the Health and the Religious Affairs Departments concerning *halal* matters, and that there is disagreement between the MUI and the Religious Affairs Department about which institutions may issue *halal* certificates—despite all these causes for misgivings, several respondents' enthusiasm for the MUI's *halal* endorsement and labels was not diminished when it came to selecting and buying *halal* foods.

Finally, to measure and understand how aware Banten Muslims were of *halal* food consumption, researchers tried to examine the effectiveness of attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control on the food consumption patterns between groups of respondents based on two kinds of COP. The first COP was calculated from the average of those three dominant behavioural factors (consisting of 21 variables), and the second COP was derived from the average of total variables (covers 84 variables). The first COP score was 5.807, and the second COP score was 5.890.

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5   MUI is an institution authorised to publish *halal* certificates in Indonesia.

Table 1

Comparison of three dominants behavioural factors COP by segment of respondents

Segment of Respondent	Attitudes	Subjective norms	Perceived control	Respondents (%)
Income				
Lowest income	*5.962*	5.619	5.667	22
Lower income	*6.422*	5.333	*6.104*	38
Middle income	*6.422*	*5.868*	*6.236*	19
Higher income	*6.417*	4.469	*6.052*	13
Highest income	5.467	4.194	5.458	9
Type of work (profession)				
Teacher	*6.593*	5.117	*6.367*	27
Employee	*5.929*	5.085	5.677	31
Trader	*6.200*	5.702	*6.038*	12
Housewife	*6.412*	*5.868*	*6.176*	2
Others	*5.911*	5.056	5.042	17
Age Group				
Below 26	*6.920*	*5.850*	*6.450*	5
26 to 35	*6.165*	5.143	5.776	34
36 to 45	*6.344*	5.160	*5.969*	36
46 to 55	*6.056*	5.736	*5.993*	18
Over 55	*6.114*	5.339	*6.357*	7
Education				
Elementary	*6.467*	5.792	*6.417*	3
Junior High School	5.880	5.788	*6.013*	10
Senior High School	*6.029*	5.475	5.686	35
Diploma (D1 – D3)	*6.067*	4.458	5.125	3
First grad (S1)	*6.452*	5.052	*6.152*	46
Post grad (S2)	*6.733*	*5.958*	*6.375*	3
Gender				
Male	*6.130*	5.085	5.802	63
Female	*6.438*	5.679	*6.226*	37
Religious Educational Background				
Non-*Pesantren*	*6.000*	5.438	5.701	46
Pesantren	*6.452*	5.192	*6.178*	54
Average Score (COP)	*6.244*	5.305	*5.959*	100

Source: Analyses primary data, P2E team, 2009

Table 1 illustrates the comparison of those three factors by each segment group of respondents. The score that was higher than the first COP is in italic, and for that higher than the second COP is in bold. It is clearly seen that the subjective norms, which demonstrate the social pressure on the Muslims of Banten to consume *halal* food, was slightly weak. Unlike the subjective norm, the attitude and perceived behavioural control COP scores were adequately high (> 5.890).

Although, with closer observation, it can be seen that the only one cell in the table of respondents in the higher income group has neither italic nor bold. It can be inferred that the highest social level of Muslims in Banten tend to have less concern on *halal* consumption behaviour compared with other social groups. In contrast, respondents with higher education, middle class incomes, housewives, and younger age groups tend to be relatively more concerned to consume *halal* food; not only is this determined by their attitudes, but also by their subjective norms and perceived behavioural control.

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Social Transformation in the Northern Coastal Cities of Java: a Comparative Study in Cirebon and Gresik[1]

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Introduction

Java, the most densely populated island of insular Southeast Asia—the Indonesian archipelago—is a well known historical site for its embracing of world civilisations: Indic, Sinic and Western. The important commodities produced in this region, cloves and pepper among many other spices, attracted the contemporary global powers of the seventeenth century (the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch and the British) to conquer and eventually partition the region as their far eastern colonies. From this global commercial competition, cities in Java, particularly its northern coastal cities, developed into significant trading ports as well as military posts. The failures of local rulers in Java to defend their territories from the European powers resulted in the long period of colonisation that left strong historical legacies that continue until today. The contemporary social transformations in the cities along the northern coast of Java is, however, still generally under researched and since independence there have been many urban and spatial changes in the area, which have not been always beneficial to the people living there. Problems, such as poverty, crime and environmental degradation seem to be increasing side by side with the process of urbanisation and infrastructure development.

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1   This is an extraction of a research report prepared by Riwanto Tirtosudarmo (team leader), Thung Julan, Soewarsono, Abdul Rachman Patji, Imelda, Aulia Hadi and Alie Humaedi; all are researchers at the Research Center for Society and Culture, Indonesian Institute of Sciences.

We observed in Cirebon, for instance, the striking decline of a formerly well-known harbour city. A new toll road at the city's outskirts has brought profound changes to the city's environs and its people. The people have to reconstruct the future of their city, either as a 'religious' city as it was known in the past, or as a commercial city able to meet the needs of modern capitalist development. The growth of Gresik as an industrial support city for Surabaya has caused it (Surabaya) to lose its traditional reputation as a religious city. From the literature on urban studies, such problems originate from the fact that even though, historically, cities along the north coast of Java developed as a result of the growth of inter-city networks, many recent developments have tended to destroy the previous social networks. There is almost no space for the people living in the cities to express their interpretation and expectations of their city. Looking at the city from several aspects, this study is an attempt to explore how the people of Cirebon and Gresik articulate their views on their cities and how they interact with the city governments and the economy in order to make the city a better social living space.

Scope, Approach and Focus of the Study

The scope of the study is limited to two dimensions of the relation between a city and its people, that is, a physical dimension (for example, city infrastructures) and a social dimension (for example, symbolic meaning of the city). The study adopted a qualitative approach that focuses on the perception of various communities in relation to the physical arrangement of the cities, particularly the harbour and the railways as the main gate(s) for interactions with the outside world. This is the first year, we hope, of a research study over many years on social transformations in Java's northern coastal cities. In the first year, Cirebon and Gresik have been selected for three reasons: first, they are, historically, important trading ports; second, historically, they have been centres of Islamic teaching in Java; and, third, they are places where the inhabitants are culturally heterogeneous, especially with the dominant role of the Chinese and the Hadramis. As well as from the literature

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reviews and other secondary sources, a series of workshops was held before a short fieldwork study was conducted in Cirebon and Gresik in July 2009. Unstructured interviews with the key resource persons were conducted by the team members. In addition, focus group discussions were also conducted in Cirebon and in Gresik, among other reasons to reconcile the often divergent views among the key informants.

Urban studies in developing countries generally concentrate on the development of the mega-cities; such as Jakarta, Surabaya, Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Manila, Cebu and Ho Chi Min City. Medium-size and small cities are no less important to be observed because these cities are where the flow of goods, labour and capital often originate and are transferred. Michael Leaf (2008) describes these medium and small cities as 'the transition zone, or interaction zone, where urban and rural activities are juxtaposed, and landscape features are subject to rapid modifications, induced by anthropogenic activity'.[2] As transition zones, medium and small cities are often geographically close to the big cities—satellite cities you could say—and constitute the urban space in which urban and rural forms of human activities co-exist, which in turn bring the social and political implications to the spatial formation and social transformation of the city's inhabitants.

The cities along the north coast of Java were chosen for this study because they exemplify social transformation in urban areas of contemporary Indonesia. A knowledge and understanding of how the social and cultural patterns of such cities are changing has implications for planners and policy makers. The area has a long history as the centre of trading and civilisation and constituting the hybrid and plural societies in Indonesia. The study also hoped to contribute to the still limited number of social research projects on medium-size cities as transitional zones, as argued by Michael Leaf above. Currently, the spatial development of urban areas along the north coast of Java has been strongly dominated by the three megacities, namely, Jakarta in the west, Semarang in the middle,

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2   Michael Leaf, 2008, 'New Urban Frontiers: Periurbanization and (re) territorialization in Southeast Asia', paper presented at the Regional Conference, Trends in urbanization and periurbanization in South-East Asia, CEFURDS/IRD, Ho Chi Minh City, 9 to 11 December 2008.

and Surabaya in the east. The medium and small cities spreading along the north coast are in between these three megacities: Anyer, Serang, Tanggerang, Bekasi, Subang, Karawang, Cikampek, Indramayu, Cirebon and Losari (West Java); Brebes, Tegal, Pekalongan, Batang, Weleri, Kendal, Kudus, Jepara, Pati, Juwana, Rembang and Lasem (Central Java); Tuban, Gresik, Probolinggo, Pasuruan, Panarukan and Banyuwangi (East Java).

For this study, social transformation is defined as 'rapid social change that is assumed to be the main character of urban areas'. Generally, at least three indicators are used for the designation of an urban area: (1) the significant role of trading, industries and services in the economy, (2) the social and cultural diversity of its population that reflects a high rate of in-migration, and (3) a large proportion of population engaged in the informal sectors of the economy. This study adopted a socio-cultural perspective in which social transformation is perceived as the outcome of interactions between citizens, state and market. Urban areas and cities are not only understood as a physical space but also as social space with its embedded symbolic meanings. Interactions and competition that occurs between the citizens, the state and the market are assumed not only to contribute to the development of physical space and the city's infrastructures (ports, transport systems, settlement pattern) but also in the social construction of a city's identity and its symbolic meanings that represent historical imprints of its constituent societies. The social transformation of urban areas is a long and complex process in which continuity and change occurs along the course of their history.

Structure of the Report

The report begins with an historical description of the 'social space' of the two cities, Cirebon and Gresik, as perceived from political and economic perspectives, demonstrating how the harbours in those two cities were gradually detached from the social space where they are located. The second and third parts talk about 'outside forces' that control city development, particularly the harbour and railways, making it 'a

city without people'; the fourth part discusses the symbolic meaning of Cirebon and Gresik as 'religious' cities; the fifth part exposes the grass root people's 'social network' that creates a cross-cultural strategy of adaptation to the difficulties of urban life. The two final chapters talk about urban life based on the experiences of the Arabs and the Chinese as two long-established migrant communities. Although economic development has not always improved the welfare of most of the people, the study shows the continuation of rapid social transformation and the hybrid nature of urban areas in the north coast cities of Java. As the focus of this research is multidimensional, complex and on related social and cultural aspects, it was agreed, and found more practical, that each team member concentrate and focus on one aspect of the social transformations in Cirebon and Gresik. Those aspects are: (1) social history, (2) symbolic meaning, (3) urbanisation and marginalisation, (4) railways, (5) Hadrami community, (6) Chinese community, and (7) cultural encounters. The following are extracts of the main findings of the exploration of each aspect.

Social history

In the first chapter, Soewarsono, based on various historical sources, argues that every political regime, from pre-colonial to post-colonial; has influenced the spatial design and infrastructure of the cities. The different political regimes affected the political and economic functions of the city's infrastructures as well as the pattern of population residence. The changing features of city governments that follow the changing of a political regime, often repeating the previous pattern or in other cases representing the new inventions that inspired by the previous patterns. Whether militaristic or administrative, centralisation and decentralisation of power have always had a significant effect on the changing landscape and the infrastructures in order to support the economic and political interests of the dominant political regime. The international demand for agricultural commodities that are produced mostly in the hinterland of Java has had strong influences on the development of transport systems, including the construction of harbours, roads and the railways along the

coast as well as to the interior of Java. Technological change and the development of industries have also created new economic processes that, in turn, influence the spatial design and settlement patterns of the cities.

Symbolic meanings

In the second chapter, Aulia Hadi traces the social and cultural processes in the construction of the cultural identities constructed by each city's inhabitants. Cirebon and Gresik are both known as centres for the teaching of Islam in Java; so undoubtedly, Islamic nuances are strongly felt in the contestation for constructing identities and symbolic meanings of the city. By identifying different groups in the societies, according to their role in the discourse of symbolic meaning of the city, it is possible to understand then how the contest is manifested and what cultural tendencies are revealed. The interesting finding is related to the fact that the label given to Cirebon and Gresik is *Kota Wali* or 'Saint City', originating from their histories, which is apparently changing, because now the emphasis is more on the instrumentalisation of religion to strengthen the Islamic characteristic of the cities. The label that is given to the city depends on the desires of the city's elite, rather than the common inhabitants, in constructing their city's symbolic meaning. The different elite groups in the society tend to dominate and hegemonise the society through their constructed discourses. The increasing pressures coming from the market economy outside the society, however, began to be felt through the flows of capital, goods and information. Understanding the new role of a market economy in the construction of a symbolic meaning of the city is therefore very important for future research.

Urbanisation and marginalisation

In the third chapter, Riwanto Tirtosudarmo found that urbanisation in Gresik and Cirebon are not following what has occurred in the West where improvement in economic welfare of the citizens is part of the

urbanisation process. In Gresik it was found that rapid industrialisation has produced more destitute workers and in Cirebon, trade expansion only produced a burgeoning number of people engaged in the informal economic sector, which is perceived to be the source of the city's public disorder. The increasing gap between the upper and lower economic classes could potentially be the source of social tensions and conflict in Cirebon and Gresik. In conflicts that are caused by economic disparities between classes, the governments and civil societies of both cities apparently have very little role in finding resolutions to the conflict and in defending the cities' marginalised inhabitants. The proposition that is put forward in this study, that urban space is determined more by city government, apparently is not supported by the realities as observed in Gresik and Cirebon. The urban space, physically or symbolically, is transformed not by design by city government or citizens, but is more influenced by external intervention, particularly by the central government and trans-national capital. Cirebon and Gresik, following the idea of Lefebvre's on the production of space, show that citizens have little role in contributing to the construction of the urban space compared with other forces, such as capital and the market. From the perspective of urban studies, Cirebon and Gresik followed the general pattern where the sub-urbanisation and rural–urban migration is the dominant paradigm. The burgeoning numbers of urban proletariat, mostly engaged as low-wage industrial workers or as part of the informal economy, strongly characterise the development of both cities.

Railways and city economics

In chapter four, Imelda analyses the city's economy through the lens of railway infrastructural development in Cirebon and Gresik. From her analysis, it has become clear that the development of business, trade and industry can not be isolated from the development of railway transport. In Cirebon, in the past, trading was very lively and now this city is the location for trading company head offices that represent the foreign states and that coordinate the import and export of goods and commodities. Railway transport plays a vital role in distributing agricultural products

from the hinterland to other places. In Gresik, railways also contributed significantly to the transport of industrial products from factories to various destinations. The current condition of the railway system, unfortunately, has deteriorated drastically. Observations have shown that the railway system in Cirebon now functions primarily for passengers rather than goods. In Gresik, the railways are almost totally dead. The current state of railway development observed in Gresik and Cirebon should be the concern of all parties; if nothing is done then railways will not be able to survive.

The Hadramis and the spread of Islam

In part five of this research report, Abdurachman Patji focused his investigation on Hadrami society. Although, when they first settled, the Hadramis played limited roles because they were immigrants but they slowly gained a special niche in the urban social space of Cirebon and Gresik. The Hadramis were especially skilled traders but they also developed a special position in education, particularly in spreading Islamic teaching. Currently, in Cirebon and Gresik, Hadramis are more recognised for their development of Islamic education institutions than as traders, because the Hadrami leaders are consistently able to transfer their knowledge and interpretation of Islam as needed by the wider society. There are, however, slight differences in the way the Hadramis organised the Islamic education in Cirebon and Gresik. In Cirebon, the Hadrami education institutions are divided into the Sayyid and non-Sayyid group, but in Gresik there is no such division. The two groups, Sayyid and non-Sayyid, in Cirebon were also reflected in two different education institutions; Darul Hikam belongs to the Sayyid, and Al-Irsyad belongs to the non-Sayyid. Although the two streams of Islamic teaching, represented by Darul Hikam and Al-Irsyad, are also present in Gresik, they did not give rise to separate education institutions. The other aspects of Hadrami society, such as their settlement pattern, social and economic lives, are similar in Gresik and Cirebon. Beyond their internal differences and similarities, the role and place of Hadrami societies in Cirebon and Gresik area important in the urban social

transformation, yet as far as the literature is concerned, little has been written of their formal history.

The declining role of the Chinese

Thung Julan reveals her findings on the Chinese communities in part six of the report. There is much evidence that the Chinese had a significant role in transforming the city's social space in the past, in Cirebon and in Gresik. Apart from the fact that they were historically known in Java as urban dwellers, the Chinese also have a significant place in the local economy. The Chinese are also recognised as playing a role in spreading Islam in the north coast cities of Java; for example, in Cirebon, one wife of Sunan Gunung Jati, Nyi Ong Tien, was of Chinese descent. Also there is a strong belief that Admiral Cheng Ho, a Muslim, played a very influential role in promoting the spread of Islam in Gresik. The role of the Chinese communities, however, began to decline after Indonesian independence. The influential role of the Chinese in the economy, especially their control of big companies, has steadily deteriorated and this in turn reduced the social space that the Chinese communities previously enjoyed. In Gresik, the role of the Chinese is deteriorating rapidly and currently there are no Chinese organisations to be found except for those to do with funeral arrangements. In Cirebon, although the Chinese role is also declining, there seem to be indications of regeneration; some Chinese organisations still exist and recently a number of Chinese began to be involved in local politics. In general though, the role of the Chinese in Cirebon and Gresik is becoming less significant.

Encounters with local cultures

In part seven, Alie Humaedi explores the social relations between different local cultural identity groups. Apart from the fact that intercultural relations have generally produced new hybrid cultures, yet, as he observed in Gresik and Cirebon, they also produced a redrawing of cultural boundaries whose limits are often unrecognised. The

influence of mainstream or dominant cultural practices, in vernacular languages and the rituals of social life, cannot be underestimated; particularly Sundanese customs and traditions in the case of Cirebon and the Javanese in the case of Gresik. The minority groups, formed usually from immigrants settling in an area, have had to merge their cultural identities with the larger dominant cultures. These intercultural relations between dominant and minority groups eventually affected the social transformation in several locations, which in turn influenced the pattern of social space in Cirebon and Gresik.

Conclusion and Further Research

Because it is the longest urban corridor in Indonesia, perhaps in Southeast Asia, the cities along the northern coast of Java should be studied seriously; rapid social change is undoubtedly shaping and reshaping the societies in this region. The rapid development of urban infrastructures, strongly related to the concentration of economic activities, has affected the pattern of settlements as well as the social and cultural dynamics of the population. Various aspects of the societies in Cirebon and Gresik, as the study has reported, clearly indicate the complex processes of social change that, economically and politically, do not always benefit citizens. The interaction of society, state and markets, exposes the relatively weak position of the citizens vis-a-vis the state and the market. The market is becoming more influential in determining the construction of the physical dimension of the cities as well as the symbolic meanings of the city. In general, the study concludes that a better understanding of the social and cultural dynamics in the cities is vital, especially for city governments in anticipating the negative effects of future development. Given the centrality of the location, further research on the social transformation of cities along the northern coast of Java is important because these urban corridors have significant social and economic influences on the future of Java and Indonesia as a whole.

Local Government Responses to HIV and AIDS in the Border Areas: a Case Study of Batam[1]

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Introduction

Improving the welfare of the people who live in the border areas has been a concern of the Indonesian government for the past few years. Compared with other areas, most of the border areas are relatively less developed, especially in terms of human resources development. *Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah/RPJM 2005–2009* [National Development Plan of 2005–2009] noted the shift of development priorities in the border areas from security approach to the prosperity approach.

One of the key indicators of social welfare is health, particularly reproductive health. This term covers maternal and child health, family planning, adolescent services, abortion, and the prevention and treatment of sexually transmitted infections (STI), which include HIV and AIDS. Previous studies (Situmorang, 2006; 2007) indicated that STIs (including HIV and AIDS) are one of the emerging health problems in the border areas of Indonesia. Data show that incident rates of HIV and AIDS in these provinces are higher than in other provinces and higher than the national rates (see Diagram 1).

The high rates of STI, HIV and AIDS in the border areas are influenced by the demographic characteristics of these areas. Border areas are often

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1   This summary is based on research conducted by Augustina Situmorang, Sri Sunarti Purwaningsih, Widayatun and Zaenal Fatoni of the Research Centre for Population, Indonesian Institute of Sciences.

considered as transit places for emigrants and immigrants. Skelton (cited by Hugo, 2001: 37) noted that population mobility may put people in situations of high risk in relation to STIs (including HIV and AIDS); this applies especially to transients, that is, to those who intend to move on. This is because the transients are less likely to have their families with them. Non-permanent migrants and people in transition, who are away from their families and communities, where social and sexual norms are prescribed and followed, may take risks and engage in activities they would not engage in at home, including casual sexual encounters.

Apart from being transit places, border areas are often a destination used by people trafficking chains. Darwin *et al.* (2003: 253) noted that many young women from various parts of Indonesia who intended to, and were promised, work in Malaysia, ended up working in Batam and surrounding areas as sex workers, serving Singaporean and Malaysian sex tourists. Border areas, such as Batam, are also considered to be centres of industrial development by multinational companies. Thus, many young people come to such places for jobs as labourers in various factories. The highly mobile population, along with industrial development, to some extent has encouraged the growth of various places of entertainment and of sex-related industries. This, then, is a reason why people in border areas are more vulnerable to the spread of STIs, including HIV and AIDS. To make the matter worse, migrants and transient people are often neglected or overlooked in government health policies and programs (UNAIDS, 2001).

Many studies have been done to measure government responses in combating the HIV and AIDS epidemic, especially in countries where the prevalence of these infections is extremely high (UNAIDS, 2005; 2006; 2007). These studies, in the main, have been funded by international agencies such as UNAIDS, UNDP and WHO. The studies use various indicators that have been agreed internationally to ensure statistical consistency and to enable valid comparisons. Numerous guidelines have been produced and technical assistance given, especially by UNAIDS (a United Nations body, which specifically focuses on HIV and AIDS) to help governments respond to the spread of these infections that

derive from local contacts. UNAIDS, for example, has endorsed the implementation of 'Three Ones' (one national AIDS framework, one national AIDS authority, and one system for monitoring and evaluation) as a principle guideline for improving national responses to these epidemics (UNAIDS, 2005). Other UN agencies, such as UNDP and the World Bank, have also produced guidelines to assist local governments to respond to HIV and AIDS. The guidelines include five key elements to achieve the expected responses: leadership and team building, understanding the local situation, developing a local government HIV/AIDS response strategy, implementing the local government HIV/AIDS response strategy, and monitoring and evaluation (UNDP and the World Bank, undated). These guidelines and the technical assistance were aimed especially at monitoring the extent of the implementation of the 6th goal of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), which were established in 2000 and the implementation of the Commitment Declaration and the Political Declaration which were ratified by most UN member states in 2001 and 2006.

In Indonesia, numerous studies of HIV and AIDS have been conducted by government institutions (Departemen Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia RI, 2007; Departemen Kesehatan RI, 2007) and independent institutions such as the National Commission on AIDS Eradication (KPAN), research institutes and universities (Isna, 2005; KPAN, 2008). The studies focused on various aspects of HIV and AIDS including prevention and treatment of people living with these illnesses (care, treatment and support), data and information (estimations and behaviour surveillance) and social aspects (stigma, discrimination and controversial issues). Over the last few years, there have also been studies of local government policies and the implementation of HIV and AIDS programs. Nevertheless, comprehensive studies that examined local government responses to the specific conditions surrounding outbreaks of STIs were limited. For example, despite the high incidence rates of HIV and AIDS in the border areas of Indonesia, there is no study yet exploring the links between this epidemic and the social and economic conditions in border areas and government responses.

To bridge the gap, this study examines local government responses to HIV and AIDS in the border areas, especially in the city of Batam, Riau Islands Province. The framework utilised in this study was modified from *Local government responses to HIV/AIDS; a handbook,* which was developed by the Alliance of Mayors' Initiative for Community Action on AIDS at the Local Level (AMICAALL). Nevertheless, this summary limits its focus to describing the knowledge and views of local authorities, including government officers and members of local parliaments, regarding HIV and AIDS issues in Batam. The government's policy, strategy and programs are also discussed, as well as non-government organisation (NGO) programs related to HIV and AIDS in Batam. The information for the study is mostly derived from open-ended interviews and focus group discussions with various respondents from government institutions, NGOs, members of the local parliament, as well as private institutions that work with HIV and AIDS in Batam and in Jakarta. Fieldwork in Batam was conducted for two weeks in April and May 2008.

HIV and AIDS in the Border Areas

Up to June 2008, the prevalence of AIDS cases in Indonesia was 5.59 per 100 000 of population. Interestingly, four of the ten provinces with the highest AIDS incident rates were provinces that border neighbouring countries; namely, Papua, Riau Islands (*Kepri*), West Kalimantan (*Kalbar*) and North Sulawesi (*Sulut*) (see Diagram 1). Riau Islands Province was in the fourth rank, with an AIDS prevalence rate of 20.5 per 100 000. This means that for every 100 000 people in this province, approximately 21 people were infected with AIDS. This rate was four times higher than the national average.

Diagram 1:

Ten provinces with the highest AIDS prevalence in Indonesia (Data to June 2008)

Source: DitJen PPM dan PL, Depkes RI, 2008

Riau Islands Province, on the border of Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, comprises 1248 big and small islands, and 96 per cent of the province is coastal. Its geographical position has caused the high population mobility for job seekers or for those who are in transit before entering Singapore or Malaysia (documented and non-documented migrants). Some of the non-documented migrants, who have been repatriated to Indonesia through the international ports in Tanjung Pinang or Batam, remain in Batam permanently and work in various sectors, mostly entertainment and leisure industries (including sex industries).

Since 1992, of the cities and regencies in Riau Islands Province, the highest incidence of HIV and AIDS cases is in Batam. The first HIV case was a female sex worker who worked in the Mat Belanda brothel. Since then, HIV and AIDS have spread to other brothels, such as Samyong, Bukit Girang and Tanjung Sengkuang. The number of cases then increased significantly up to 2007; the highest increase occurred

between 2004 and 2006, from 277 cases to 738. From 1992 to 2000, the additional new HIV cases range from 8 to 20 every year (see Diagram 2). However since 2001, AIDS cases increased rapidly to more than 25 cases every year. Up to 2007, there were 979 HIV cases found in this city. In line with the incidence of HIV, the cases of AIDS in Batam have also been increasing over the past five years. Diagram 3 shows that in 2000 there were only nine cases of AIDS in Batam, then it increased to 262 cases in 2007.

Diagram 2

HIV cumulative cases reported in Batam City (Data to 2007)

Source: Dinas Kesehatan Kota Batam, 2008

Diagram 3

AIDS cumulative cases reported in Batam City (Data to 2007)

Source: Dinas Kesehatan Kota Batam, 2008

The official data for HIV and AIDS cases in Indonesia mostly are based on reported cases from hospitals and health clinics. Keeping in mind that what we see of an iceberg is not quite all of it, we should be cautious in accepting that the reported number of AIDS and HIV cases is accurate; we can be more confident that the number of cases will be much higher than the statistics suggest. The National AIDS Commission (NAC) predicted that in 2006 the number of HIV at-risk adults in the population in Batam would reach to 69 970.[2]

The rapid increase of HIV and AIDS cases in Batam is related to several factors. Among them are risky sexual behaviours especially by migrants, the growth of the sex industry and the increase in human trafficking. The risky sexual practices began to increase in Batam when the industrial areas developed and these industries attracted job seekers

2   The HIV—AIDS-risk population comprises women who are directly or indirectly employed in the comercial sex industry, their clientele, injecting drug users and their spouses, homosexuals and prisoners (KPAN, 2006).

from other parts of the country. These migrants mostly are young people who have not been sexually active for long. The high numbers of migrants with no families, to some extent, has fuelled the growth of places of entertainment and increased the demand for sexual services, which explains the presence of sex workers around the factories. The high number of male migrants with no family has caused an increase in demand for female entertainers who may be expected to give sexual services. Industrial development in Batam has played an important part in the rise of prostitution, either legally in brothel complexes or illegally, that is, by those who work in the streets, shopping malls and other places. These circumstances have caused a greater likelihood that people in this city will be infected with sexually related infections, including HIV and AIDS.

The development of Batam as an industrial centre has also attracted foreign visitors, especially from Singapore and Malaysia, who visit the nightclubs and other places of nocturnal entertainment. Some visit Batam for business but while they are there they look for entertainment as well. Batam is appealing to such visitors because it is not too distant and the services are cheap. Also appealing to many visitors is the beauty of Batam's natural resources and the surrounding areas, such as Tanjung Pinang and Tanjung Balai Karimun. Usually, the tourists stop off in Batam before going to Tanjung Pinang and Karimun. It is predicted that approximately 5000 tourists from neighbouring countries come to Batam at the weekend.

In addition, the increase in the number of regular visitors from neighbouring countries for work and for pleasure has created a new phenomenon in Batam, that of *isteri simpanan* (mistress or kept woman). Some of these visitors maintain relationships with local women and treat them as kept women. The kept woman usually lives in a rented house or apartment and is visited by the man at the weekends only. They are also provided with some money weekly or monthly by their man. Compared with their peers, these women are relatively well off. During the week, when they are not with their 'foreign husband' these women often seek younger men to accompany them and may engage in

sexual relations. These young men are known as *brondong* or *bronces*. Several respondents from local NGOs stated that this phenomenon has tended to increase lately. This has contributed to the spread of STIs, including HIV and AIDS, in Batam.

Local authority knowledge related to HIV and AIDS in Batam

It has been acknowledged globally that HIV and AIDS are not merely health problems but also link to socio-cultural aspects, such as poverty, cultural, traditions and beliefs. Thus, combating HIV and AIDS problems requires a broad, multisector approach. At the national level, various attempts have been made in terms of prevention, treatment and care in response to HIV and AIDS, but these have been inadequate and insufficient. A more systematic approach is needed to improve local capacity to manage and sustain a comprehensive response to the epidemic. Local government plays a key role for such comprehensive responses by creating a more enabling or encouraging environment for community-based initiatives.

In this study, the local government response is examined through the local authority's knowledge of the HIV–AIDS syndrome. The availability of policies and programs related to this epidemic in Batam is also explored. Local government responses to HIV and AIDS outbreaks depend on the knowledge of policy makers including legislators. Adequate knowledge on the part of local authorities about HIV and AIDS in their region will affect government responses to this epidemic. This knowledge includes their understanding of the vulnerability of high risk people, such as migrants and transients. Sufficient knowledge of the circumstances of this epidemic may increase the awareness of the urgent need to deal with this problem.

In general, the local authorities in Batam have inadequate knowledge about HIV and AIDS in their area. In-depth interviews with several respondents from government institutions as well as members of the local parliament revealed that most authorities tend to see HIV and AIDS as a migrant issue. They believe that HIV and AIDS are suffered

by migrants, not local people, and thus combating this epidemic was not considered a priority and, as a consequence, the availability of funding and programs is limited. Furthermore, HIV and AIDS are considered to be the responsibility of the District Office of Health only. As a result, other sectors and district offices tend to be passive not active in developing policies and programs to combat the spread of HIV and AIDS.

Similar to their counterparts in the government agencies, the legislators' knowledge is limited too, especially members of the Commission IV, which is in charge of people's welfare programs. Most legislators interviewed for this study said they were not aware of the situation in their city regarding HIV and AIDS. Some even said that they had never heard about national or local AIDS commissions in which parliamentarians, national and local, are members. When we mentioned that according to the Batam mayoral decree 87 of 2007, that legislators are to be included as members of local AIDS commission, they looked surprised. One legislator said she thought that the diseases were suffered by commercial sex workers or homosexuals only.

In addition, when asked their opinion about promoting the use of condoms to prevent sexually transmitted infections (STI), most respondents in government agencies and in parliament were hesitant to agree. An official in the District Office of Health (DOH) said that they do not include recommendations to use condoms in their HIV and AIDS program because they are afraid of opposition by religious and *adat* leaders. Some members of parliament interviewed, believed that promoting condom use is not appropriate for the people of Batam because it is not in line with religious preaching and will encourage people to be promiscuous

The limited background knowledge of HIV and AIDS on the part of local authorities in Batam has affected policies and programs regarding this epidemic. Dealing with HIV–AIDS is not considered to be a program priority. Thus there is no specific budget line in local government funding for this epidemic. In the DOH budget, for example, funds for an HIV–AIDS prevention program is allocated from the transmitted

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diseases prevention program but the current priorities of that program are combating dengue fever and malaria. Therefore, the funds allocated for health promotion are used mostly for the prevention of these two diseases; very little is for HIV and AIDS.

STI and HIV–AIDS prevention policies and programs

During the course of this study we found that Batam has few local policies explicitly for the prevention and combating of STIs (including HIV and AIDS) and this is shown by the minimum political commitment and the program's inadequate funding. In line with the Letter of the Ministry of Home Affairs 443.1/990/SJ, dated 16 May 2002, regarding local government support for the national movement to prevent HIV–AIDS, Batam City has formed a Local AIDS Commission (LAC). The formation of this commission based on the Mayoral Decision Letter (*Surat Keputusan Walikota*) of 23 April 2007. An LAC is an institution formed to coordinate local AIDS prevention programs. Considering the complexity of HIV–AIDS problems, an LAC is expected to coordinate health and social aspects as well as counselling people living with AIDS.

Similar to LACs in other Indonesian cities, the Batam LAC involves government and private organisations, NGOs, academicians as well as health professionals. The Batam LAC is headed by the mayor, the daily leader is the vice-mayor and the head of the DOH acts as the executive leader. These appointments were made based on an assumption that the involvement of the mayor as well as the head of government institutions as *ex-officio* will provide better access and environment for HIV and AIDS-related activities.

Nevertheless, the LAC has yet to contribute to any HIV–AIDS program. In-depth interviews with several respondents revealed that the LAC in Batam City has no clear work agenda. One respondent from the LAC secretariat said, 'until today [May 2008] there has been no meeting that involves all of the LAC committee members'. The mayor has never attended any HIV or AIDS-related activities. In addition, funds that have

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been specifically allocated for LAC activities are very limited; they are not sufficient even for the daily operations of a secretariat. Thus, it is not surprising to find out that there is no regular LAC meetings that would let the members of committees share updated data or information about activities.

Considering the limited funding allocated by the local government, most programs for HIV–AIDS-related issues in Batam were funded by international funding agencies such as Family Health International (FHI) and the Global Fund. Government programs were limited to inspections, and funded by the Ministry of Health (MOH) in collaboration with the DOH of Batam. The inspections are every three months and are especially for those who work in places where there is a high risk of STIs, such as the brothel in Tanjung Uncang. An inspection is limited to data identification with no comprehensive follow up action even though the data indicate that a substantial number of people were infected by HIV or AIDS. The Global Fund, in collaboration with DOH has developed a health clinic in the brothel complex of Tanjung Uncang.

The Family Health International (FHI) organisation has also funded several HIV–AIDS-related programs in Batam. Collaborating with DOH and local NGOs, such as Yayasan Batam Tourism Development Board (YBTDB), FHI funded the development of a special clinic for HIV–AIDS in the Primary Health Center complex in Lubuk Baja, which arranged voluntary counselling and treatment (VCT). The YTBDB has worked on HIV and AIDS-related programs since 2003 and conducted several such programs on outreach and assistance for people living with HIV and AIDS. One current YBTDB program is to make mandatory the introduction of 100 per cent condom use for clients of brothels. The management of the brothel in Tanjung Uncang has agreed to implement the policy that the use of condom is a must for clients. The 100 per cent use of condoms in brothels has been initiated at the provincial level under Riau Islands Provincial law. Nevertheless it has yet to be enforced in Batam. Because there is no specific regulation, the implementation of mandatory use of condoms in the brothels of Batam is limited to those places where specific agreements have been made. As a result, the

implementation of this regulation is limited to the legal brothels: illegal or unorganised brothels remain unaffected.

Another important local NGO in Batam that deals with HIV and AIDS-related programs is Pembina Asuhan Bunda. This organisation has social awareness programs for schools, youth clubs and youth organisations (the youth of mosques and churches) that relate to all sexually transmitted infections. This program is funded by the UNFPA. Since 2004, Yayasan Pembinaan Asuhan Bunda has run a reproductive health clinic, which gives counselling services and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases; the main target was commercial sex workers who work freelance in pubs and karaoke bars. The clinic is in a very strategic place—the city centre—where most of the commercial sex workers work. Beside the provision of health services for commercial sex workers, this NGO also facilitated socialisation and medical tests every month for female commercial sex workers in the pubs and karaoke bars. For the past few years, Yayasan Pembinaan Asuhan Bunda has expanded its services to cover prisons and to build or organise clinics for VCT and to provide medical assistance for those infected with HIV or AIDS.

The involvement of international funding agencies with HIV–AIDS programs basically aims at stimulating local governments to enable funds for developing policies and programs to combat the spread of these epidemics. Nevertheless, the study found that the local government budgeting for these programs was still limited. Most HIV–AIDS-related programs are still conducted by NGOs that do not have adequate funds and capability. In addition, coordination between government and NGOs as well as among NGOs was weak. There was a tendency among institutions to give priority to their own programs or activities and they were unwilling to share data with others, which then resulted in overlapping programs or activities. Because most HIV–AIDS programs were conducted by NGOs that are limited in terms of funds and human resources, program coverage of HIV–AIDS-related issues in Batam was inadequate.

Conclusion

Being a city in the border area that is commonly considered a 'transit place', has put the population of Batam at a higher risk of infection with sexually related diseases, including HIV and AIDS. Living 'temporarily', far from their family and community where social and sexual norms are prescribed and followed, migrants and transient people may be tempted to visit entertainment and other facilities and to engage in unsafe sexual activity. The national data indicated that provinces in the border areas have higher rates of HIV and AIDS than do other provinces. Nevertheless, there are no policies or programs to combat this epidemic that is specific to the demographic characteristics of people in border areas. Despite the high rates of HIV and AIDS infections in Batam, the local authorities have not considered this to be urgent. This is partly because of lack of knowledge on the part of the local authorities of the effect of HIV and AIDS on the health and welfare of the people of Batam. HIV and AIDS were considered to affect migrants but not to affect local people. The misperception among local authorities that HIV and AIDS only infect promiscuous people was still in evidence. In addition, the program to promote the use of condoms to prevent HIV and AIDS was still under debate.

Programs for HIV–AIDS treatment and prevention in Batam depend heavily on international funding agencies and NGOs, which have limited resources, thus the program coverage was limited. To develop and implement comprehensive policies and programs for HIV–AIDS, the local government needs to work hand in hand with the international funding agencies as well as local NGOs. To do this the local government through its LAC should have a comprehensive, strategic plan to deal with HIV–AIDS-related issues, a plan that takes into account specific local circumstances and needs.

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Nationalism, Democratisation and Primordial Sentiment in Indonesia: Problems of Ethnicity versus Indonesian-ness (the cases of Aceh, Riau, Papua and Bali)[1]

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Background

Indonesia has been dealing with ethnicity issues since the early days of independence. A local uprising in 1950 in South Maluku, initiated by Republik Maluku Selatan, is evidence of an early serious attempt at separatism on behalf of a particular ethnic group in the new republic. Since then in this multi-ethnic state that is Indonesia, there has been no reduction in efforts or movements that promote ethnic identity. This continuing situation perhaps supports Ernst Geller's contention that there is a big possibility that a strong primordialist sentiment will continue in a post-colonial society. The disproportionate ethnic representation in the central government is assumed to be the trigger in encouraging primordialist or ethnic sentiments, which were best reflected in the Java versus non-Java debate at the time that Geertz (1973: 273–277) wrote, that is, the 1970s. There are other contributing factors to primordialist sentiment, for instance; economic disadvantage, ideological confrontation or the interests of local elites.

The historical progress of this nation shows the rise of ethnic-based movements in Aceh, Riau, West Java, the North Celebes, the Moluccas,

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Bali and Papua, which, in one way or another, have challenged the concept of Indonesian-ness up to the end of the Old Order (*Orde Lama* or the Soekarno regime). During the New Order period, with strong support from the military, the government suppressed any attempt inspired by ethnic sentiment that could cause social or political fissures. As the central government's economic and political modernisation programmes progressed, which tended to produce uniformity and to reduce the influence of ideology, any matters that had attributes the government considered would lead to disharmony or unrest (including ethnic unrest) were not allowed to see the light of day. The government took strong measures to counter any opinions and actions that might be seen to be against the state's official interpretation of 'nationhood'. Under these conditions, primordialist sentiments tended to atrophy. In general, the New Order was seen as having been successful in reconstructing the political, economic and social infrastructures and this success in many ways mitigated disappointment with other government actions and it also reduced the potential for ethnic dissatisfaction. Nonetheless, the New Order's *pembangunan* (development) programmes did not eliminate ethnicity concerns. The main cause of the rise in support for ethnic sentiments during the New Order was not solely ideological nor was it political (for example, the ethnically disproportionate filling of public or government positions), but it was more to do with economic disadvantage and the unregulated exploitation of natural resources that brought no benefits to the local people and over which they had little control.[2] These last two reasons have frequently been the tipping point for radicalising ethnic groups that regard themselves as victims of the treatment from the majority or the central government. This dominant control by the central government, unfortunately, was followed by cultural hegemony and cultural uniformity that marginalised particular ethnic identities. This situation was also complicated by the application of authoritarian and repressive measures by the central government, which, specifically, caused the crystallisation of ethnicity—within limits they led to a collective resentment—but also, in general, they caused distortions in the construction of a united nation (Pabottingi, 2000).

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2   According to Burhan D Magenda (1990), the New Order was supposed to be able to settle those issues.

The Reform era (*Reformasi*) has been marked by democratisation and provides a glimmer of hope that the many ethnic groups in Indonesia will be acknowledged and their differences appreciated. The move to regional autonomy has caused the central government to devolve authority to local or regional governments, which allows those governments more scope for policy making at their local level but also gives them some influence over central government policies. Later developments in the trend to devolve authority to the regions led to increased concessions from the central government. Aceh and Papua were granted special autonomy status in response to demands, among others, for more equitable central–regional financial arrangements; the Regional Representatives Council (DPP) was established in the national legislature though it does not have legislative functions; and local political parties are allowed to contest elections, first in Aceh and later in other areas such as the coal district in North Sumatra and in Rote Ndao (NTT). Until Aceh demanded and was given the right to have its own political parties, the only parties allowed by the central government were national, such as Golkar or the PKB (National Awakening Party) to name two and they were subject to control from Jakarta.

To give a theoretical framework to the research, the research team assumed a working hypothesis that a link between democratisation and ethnic revival is highly likely. There are pros and cons to this connection: on the one hand it allows opportunities to strengthen democracy: on the other hand, it allows the strengthening an exclusive identification with *keetnisan* (ethnicity), which is not a step in the direction of national unity. It would seem that democratisation in Indonesia has a paradox at its heart. One observer, Baladas Ghoshal (2004), said that in the context of Indonesia '...the removal of the lid on politics has opened up a Pandora's box, fomented ethnic and religious conflicts, and even encouraged regional separatism, thereby creating political and economic uncertainties...'. Democratisation can provide an arena for the rise of anti-immigrant prejudice (for instance in Bali it is resented that there are Javanese meatballs in Klungkung and Bali meatballs elsewhere) but it can also provide a way of channelling the aspirations of local ethnic groups, separatist or not, by giving them the means to engage

politically, whether it be an election for a regional head or a legislative election (as in Papua, where provinces and districts were expanded and followed by local elections in which Papuans participated. By creating new regions, some actors and sympathisers of the Papuan Morning Star movement will become members of the new elite.

Along with the development of democratisation, the traditions of ethnicity still remain as a reality at the heart of the Indonesian nation. The impression is that the weaker central government is in the Reform era, and the more accommodating and inclusive it is, these are circumstances that will lead to ethnic revival recovering its momentum. Generally, evidence for this ethnic revival is the perceived increase in the use of ethnic terminology or jargon, such as *bumiputra* (sons of the soil or indigenous Indonesians); the more extensive use of local languages; and the series of efforts on behalf of governments to set up separate territories or regions based on ethnicity; and the widespread public discourse in some areas, such as in Riau and Bali, to establish independence. In regions such as Aceh and Papua these changes have led to increased efforts by separatist movements, although perhaps on the surface the level of intensity has started to decline.

There are various statements made and expressions used by some ethnic groups that are a form of self-affirmation of their group existence and at the same time, within limits, are a reflection of their opposition to the concept of a national, shared destiny and show a reduced commitment to future ideals as a nation. This shows that the phenomenon of ethnic sentiment, which can lead to total independence or to separatism is not something that can be ignored in the efforts to encourage Indonesian-ness and nation building.

In this context, the emergence of separatist movements in Aceh is an expression of rejection of *keindonesiaan* (Indonesian identity). The spread and strengthening of *keindonesiaan* in the Veranda of Mecca (a metonym for Aceh) is seen instead by some of the people of Aceh as a process of Javanisation or even secularisation. The process of 'cultural hegemony' through the manipulation of violence and coercion was, unfortunately, also followed by unfair central government economic

policies. The central government not only ignored the cultural aspirations to implement Islamic Law but also imposed major projects in Aceh as cash cows where the profits went to the central government. As a result, most Acehnese lived in poverty. Their disadvantaged position raised awareness that their political, economic and social entitlements were being bypassed. Thus the Acehnese rebelled, which started with the special request by David Beureueh to Soekarno in the 1950s and lasted until the Hasan di Tiro movement in 1976. The government curbed the separatist movement that emerged later in Aceh by the promulgation of a Military Operation Area (DOM) and imposing martial law. However, within limits, it reinforced the emergence of an increasingly ethnic sentiment in Aceh.

Meanwhile, as in Aceh, a strengthening of ethnic sentiment also appeared widely in Papua. In fact, this awareness has been manifested in attempts to secede from Indonesia. For some people of Papua, the option for independence is a goal that is not negotiable. In the case of Papua, Edward Aspinall and MT Berger believe that internal factors, the way the Soeharto government treated the Papuans, and external factors, such as international perceptions of the existence of minority groups within a country, played an important role. Aspinall and Berger (2001: 139–169) believe that the extensive use of coercion and violence by the central government, particularly during the New Order era, indeed contributed to the strengthening of a local ethnic sentiment.

External factors, mainly after the collapse of the Communist world, gave encouragement to the flourishing separatist movements, and especially increased the tendency of large countries to give more consideration to the rights of their indigenous communities. Some lessons can be drawn from the perspective presented by Aspinall and Berger, that promoting nationalism by using heavy-handed military measures is clearly is not a clever step in maintaining the integrity of the nation and in restoring national self-confidence as can be witnessed in Papua and Aceh. Meanwhile, JA Denny's (2003) analysis showed that economic inequality, ethnic particularity, historicity and exploitation of natural resources played major roles in strengthening the Papuan community's

aspirations for independence. Ethnic distinctiveness is something that really distinguishes the Papuans from the Indonesian community in the Western hemisphere but Denny's assertion that the rise of ethnic sentiment, which in the term's extended meaning is associated with repressed longings or desires in term's extended meaning, not only in economic and political contexts and also in matters of ethnic identity, is something that can not be ignored. Meanwhile, a possible reason why Riau has not rebelled is that their ethnic traditions are not too strong, at least, if compared with Papua and Aceh.

In line with developments in the two provinces mentioned above, structural problems, especially economic disadvantage played an important role in awakening Riau people about their identity. Protracted poverty, ascribed to mismanagement by past governments, became the main reason a 'Riau-ness' sentiment developed, which was backed by several prominent local intellectuals and youth, even by some who had been keen supporters of the New Order government. Riau ethnic sentiment was later shown by the emergence of a *Riau Merdeka* discourse, which, until recently, was still consistently supported. As it developed, supporters divided into several groups; the moderates and radicals who stressed the spirit of independence, and those who insisted on Riau independence in the context of territoriality.[3] The Riau case has tended to be seen as being without precedent. However, there is nothing new about issues such as nationalism and the revival of ethnicity. Taking, as an example, the conflict between the ethnic majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamil groups in Sri Lanka shows how a bloody ethnic conflict can occur in a country without historical precedents for such a damaging dispute.

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3 Petikan Deklarasi Riau Merdeka. *Sudah lebih setengah abad kami menggantungkan hidup pada republik ini, selama itu pula minyak kami dijarah. Tak setitik pun menetes di tanah kami. Sungai dan tanah kami tak lagi memberi hidup karena polusi. Sudah lebih dari seperempat abad tanah kami dijarah sebagai konspirasi pusat dan konglomerat. Maka hari ini, kami putuskan untuk menentukan nasib kami sendiri. Kami telah mulai menukilkan sejarah kami dalam lembaran yang baru akan hak-hak kami, identitas dan tradisi kami dengan jalan damai.* We are beginning to think, we are writing a new chapter of history to demand our right[s], take on our duties, and defend our identity and our tradition, with peace. Pekanbaru, 15 March 1999.

The emergence of a *Bali Merdeka* discourse just after the start of the Reform era was surprising. As time went on, the Balinese people saw the public discourse more as a strengthening of the *Ajeg Bali* concept. This concept and its public discussion and acceptance were a consequence of social and economic changes in Bali over which the people felt they had little control. These changes stem from the massive influx of capital that largely ignored indigenous rights and environmental carrying capacity. One theme of the *Ajeg Bali* discussion was to urge the Balinese people to consider the meaning of Bali-ness and to strengthen the ethnic independence of the Land of the Gods. The *Ajeg Bali* idea can be interpreted as an attempt to reconstruct Balinese identity based on tradition, culture and religion. According to I Nyoman Dharma Putra (2003), within its comprehensive expression, *Ajeg Bali* illustrates a strong desire for the cultural and political independence, within limits, of the Balinese. In another sense, *Ajeg Bali* as a concept reflects to a much greater extent than at present the resentment and rejection of efforts by the central government to dictate policies to the locals, policies that are felt not to be in line with the values of the Balinese. In addition to the discourse around *Ajeg Bali* and *Jagadita* at the paradigmatic level and in the actual movement, local government policies have been transparently and extensively based on Balinese values. Although there was a *Bali Merdeka* movement that protested against a ministerial declaration and waves of mass protests against the central government's Pornography Bill, generally it is difficult to imagine 'armed movements' in Bali or ones that are similar to *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (Free Aceh Movement) or *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (Free Papua Movement), at least for the next few years. But it seems that identity politics is coming to the forefront in Bali today.

In this study, the researchers have come to understand that ethnic boundaries can change over time to cover, reduce or amalgamate the various sub-ethnic groups that might exist in some areas and periods. This is especially so when there is a collective interest prompted by insecurity because of the pattern of relations with other parties. In other words, awareness of a group's ethnicity emerges within the scope of more general, unspecified circumstances after an interaction with other communities, in a capacity

as a majority or a minority group. In this case, as Amartya Sen (2007) mentioned, there will appear another dimension of ethnic awareness in the form of defining 'us' and 'them' that can be illusory, subjective and often irrational. Ethnicity in Aceh, Papua, Bali and Riau is a phenomenon that has emerged in the midst of weakening central state control. There is no single factor that will explain why the ethnic consciousness has risen. Among other factors in its rise are the emerging pseudo-political representation, economic inequality, or artificial promotion of a particular local culture, which all to some extent contributed to the strengthening of identity in Bali, Aceh, Papua and Riau. Meanwhile democratisation possibly works as a catalyst for the emergence of ethnic sentiments. However, this needs to be tested further. Against this background, the extent to which ethnicity increases and becomes a threat to national identity is an interesting topic that needs more research. It is possible that the emergence of ethnic sentiment is a natural consequence in a state where democracy is advancing without it necessarily turning into threat to the nation. The central question of this study is to reveal to what extent ethnic sentiment and ethnic identity has strengthened in some areas in Indonesia that are currently experiencing democratisation and political openness. How does it affect Indonesian-ness?

Theoretical Overview on the Emergence of Ethnic Sentiments

In the context of emerging nation-states, Geertz (Geertz, c1973: 269–277) believes that the opportunities for strengthening ethnic sentiment remains largely in line with the strengthening of primordial sentiments. This is related to the participation of all elements of society into a new country. However, later in development, several factors contribute to the rise of ethnic sentiment. This is particularly relevant if the government that replaced the colonial rulers deliberately creates policies that are disadvantageous to one or more ethnic groups or that differentiates between groups.

Joseph Rothschild (2007: 29), writing on the resurgence of ethnic sentiment, noted two reasons an ethnic group that originally intended

to be part of a nation later loses its nationalist orientation. First, because there is inequality or discrimination in the fields of politics, the economy, society and culture, which contributes to the strengthening of the identity of an ethnic group. Second, the influence of an leader who is able to mobilise members of a particular ethnic group so that it has an ethnic awareness that later will lead to the formation of an independent nation.

The first reason mentioned above is the essence of an approach, known as the contextual approach, to understanding nationalism. The contextual approach is based on the premise that an increasing ethnic sentiment is associated with injustice in various fields; economic, political, social and cultural, that is faced by an ethnic group, whether through neglect, exploitation, domination, repression or discrimination (Rothschild, 2007: 29). There are three theoretical standpoints in attempting to explain injustice (Rothschild, 2007: 5–7). The first theory is called 'revised modernisation', which explains that changes in resource distribution, urbanisation and industrialisation in a country encourage increased competition among community members. In this competition, the group that has little capital, education or skills will be eliminated. This group will later feel alienated and no longer feel as able to continue to identify with the current political system. To compensate, the excluded group looks for a new identification with reference to other symbols, where the nearest, most familiar and easiest to be found is ethnic identity.

The second theory is the theory of internal colonisation. According to this theory, the injustice causes the losers, the excluded group, to determine to break away from the current state structure. This is caused by the feelings of inferiority by an ethnic group that regards itself as a victim of oppression and exploitation by the current system of government or by other ethnic groups.

The third theory is the relative deprivation theory developed by Ted Robert Gurr (2005), which posits that the gap between ideals and the facts leads to the rise of ethnic group frustration. Gurr stated that if the increase in an expectation is not accompanied by the capability to achieve it, it can lead to dissatisfaction, which, if politicised, will

give birth to a social movement that will be in the direction of national disintegration (Gurr, 2005: 12–13).

In general, the contextual perspective that emphasises injustices as the main reason is enough to explain the structural factors behind the rise of ethnic sentiment. However, this perspective cannot satisfactorily explain why some groups that experience discrimination and injustice have not developed a sense of ethnicity or even nationality. It is here that the constructivist perspective finds relevance, which posits that there is social engineering by elite groups at work in exploiting ethnic sentiments and this is a second factor in explaining the rise in the spirit of ethnic identity.

According to this constructivist viewpoint, social engineering by a particular entity is the cause of the rise of ethnic sentiment. By exploiting primordial legacies, combined with the current political, economic, social and cultural environment, these engineers affect the collective memory and convince ethnic groups of ideal conditions in the future. There are two important elements in manifesting this effort; leadership as a guide in the struggle and an organisation as an agent that directs and mobilise the masses. This approach is quite capable of capturing the role of political elites in exploiting and utilising ethnic sentiments for a particular purpose. However, this approach seems to be too elitist and deterministic so that it often discounts the ability and dynamics of a society in determining its political development; even where there was a spontaneous revival of ethnic attitudes, as happened in Assam, this approach is not convincing.[4]

In the meantime, still associated with the causes of the rise of ethnic sentiment, David Brown (2004: 56–62) implicitly suggests that democratisation has a role. According to Brown, a political change from an authoritarian regime to democracy allows an ethnic group an opportunity to gain their identity again and then separate from the old political system. Weak transitional government structures, in addition to the emergence of diversity of interests and conflicts among new

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4   See, for example, a similar point of view to this in Connor (1994: 73—74).

political elites, can encourage the creation of chaotic conditions that lead to disintegration. However, Brown has not always been pessimistic about democratisation. According to Brown (2004) and Ghia Nodia (1998), democratisation can establish a new identity that is tolerant to ethnic communities that are neglected and able to establish a collective identity that is the ideal of citizenship identity, and that emphasises tolerance, equality and rationality.

Unlike the diverse points of view above, Jacques Bertrand (2004a), in his study of nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia, looks at past Indonesian government policies and the development of the current government institutions as factors that play a role in matters of ethnicity. According to Bertrand, the repressive policies of past authoritarian regimes leave scars that cannot easily disappear and ethnic self-awareness is able to emerge when there are changes of regime or political system. Support by a regime for the benefit of a particular ethnic group or a system that is at the expense of other secondary ethnic groups will rebound to the detriment of the favoured group when there is a change of regime. On the other hand, the secondary group or groups have an opportunity to improve their positions in the political system when there is a change of regime. Meanwhile, the political institutions that have been altered with a change of regime also affect the political dynamics. These political dynamics in turn provide opportunities for some ethnic groups to be more involved in the new system. In such situation, when the circumstances are conducive, it is not impossible for an ethnic group, which feels it has been at a disadvantage to use the opportunity to break away.

About this study

From such a diversity of views it can be concluded that there are several factors leading to an ethnic revival within a nation-state. Those factors of ethnic revival in general have implicitly been addressed in the conclusions of the research team's findings in previous years. These factors include, first, the presence of a consciousness of a primordial

unity that has particularities that are different from other public entities; second, the existence of social and economic inequality; third, the emergence of an awareness that is encouraged by leadership, by actors or by particular organisations; fourth, the opportunity opened up by democratisation and regime change; and fifth, past government policies, including the effect of governance structures and practices from the colonial administrations that are discriminatory. Thus, this research is based on the exploration of these factors and at the same time has been testing the determinants of these factors.

The author used qualitative research methods with in-depth interviews and a literature study. The interviews were in four research areas (Bali, Papua, Riau and Aceh) were with several source persons at each of the research sites. Those people who were interviewed came from various background: there were government officials, politicians, academics, community leaders, traditional leaders, activists and students, entrepreneurs, representatives from civil society organisations and the press. The resource persons were chosen for their knowledge, experience and expertise related to the topics of the research. To get comprehensive and balanced outcomes from the field research, the set of interviewees comprised those who were known publicly to be a supporter of the unity of Indonesia; those identified as critical of unity or even supporters of separatism; and those who could be viewed as neutral.

Research areas for this study are Papua, Aceh, Riau and Bali. The first three locations are regions rich in natural resources. Aceh, Riau and Papua can be treated as regions that have a similar background and similar economic characteristics. Bali is studied for the sake of comparison because it does not rely on natural resources as the core support for its economy. Second, all four regions have historical experience and folk memories of being a nation. Third, the four regions are facing problem stemming from the rise of ethnic sentiment in the Reform era and although there are similarities there are also differences. Fourth, in responding to Indonesian-ness, these four regions reacted differently one from the other, the reactions being from expressing ethnic sentiments

in a public dialogue or discourse to initiating movements demanding justice or demanding independence.

Those factors mentioned above have been the background for our comparative fieldwork. With a variety of significant characteristics in each respective research area, we hope to understand much better the constituents of the problem. The basic achievement of the research is in understanding the phenomenon of the rise of ethnic identities in the areas and regions that have experienced it in this era of contemporary Indonesia. In the meantime, we realise that each area of study has a unique and rich cultural diversity, as well as having a variety of sub-cultures or sub-ethnic groups that cannot be easily generalised. Therefore researchers need to be more sensitive to the cultures of various communities in each region.

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The Social Life of Reconciliation: Religion and the Struggle for Social Justice in Post-New Order Indonesia[1]

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Introduction

Anthropologists of law have long studied reconciliation to understand how people resolve disputes. Studies on conflict resolution and on reconciliation examine a general process of reconciliation deployed to restore harmony and prevent retaliation. This role of reconciliation often becomes a significant part of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedure that seeks to include local actors and local institutions in dispute resolutions. Studies of ADR often assume that reconciliation takes place between individuals or groups of individual over issues related to, among others, property, domestic violence or inheritance.

My research wants to bring the state back into the analysis of reconciliation by introducing the state, or those representing the interests of the state, as a party to the reconciliation process. The research sheds light on reconciliation as a discursive imagination, while still maintaining a general perspective that reconciliation is a method people use in or outside the courts to resolve disputes. The research investigates proliferations of reconciliation discourse as it enters national political space. The analysis of transnational proliferation of discourse relies on the notion of 'critical disjuncture' (Appadurai, 1996) to examine discursive shifts that produce a specific political and legal constellation

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to come to terms with the legacy of New Order violence. The research maintains that 'critical disjuncture' emerges when state apparatuses, human rights activists, public intellectuals and victims of violence resort to the transnational discourse of reconciliation to negotiate their engagement with the legacy or the memory of violence. This 'critical disjuncture' constitutes the social life of reconciliation that is the focus of my research. My interest rests less on analysing different forms of reconciliation than on *following the processes* that make reconciliation what it is, whatever form it takes.

Reconciliation: Its First Life as a Political Reconciliation

Social scientists studying legal processes have often demonstrated how people resort to reconciliatory practices to resolve disputes over property rights, inheritance or domestic violence. However, only in the 1990s did people resort to reconciliation to resolve state violence or communal conflict, even though violence committed in the name of state ideology has been as old as the concept of the state itself. Reconciliation as a political concept deployed to resolve conflicts between state apparatuses and citizens of the state is a recent practice, enabled by the changing function of the state as an arbiter of social justice. The function of the state often changes after a period of massive violence or during the transition from an authoritarian regime. I demonstrate in this research that the changing function does not always invoke reconciliation as a major political discourse to deal with past violence.

The ending of an authoritarian political regime could drive a politically calculated move to create a commission with a mandate to investigate the alleged violence of the former regime. However, the existence of a commission does not necessarily strengthen human rights values. The most blatant instance is Uganda, where a commission of inquiry on missing people was created in 1974 by President Idi Amin, but at the same time the president committed the most brutal human rights violation the world has ever seen (Hayner, 2002: 51–52).

The period 1982 to 1990 witnessed the establishment of at least six

commissions of inquiry in Latin America, Africa and Asia. As the names of the commissions indicate, they are created usually to investigate people's disappearance. In so doing, they had limited jurisdictional reach and failed to touch upon the larger context of human rights violation (Hayner, 2002: 305–206), let alone promote a stronger democratic climate in their countries.

In 1990, President Patricio Alywin of Chile introduced an unprecedented policy to establish a commission with dual responsibilities. The Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation was given a mandate to investigate extrajudicial killings and at the same time to think about a strategy for compensating the victims without going through a difficult trial. This was also the first time a political leader expressed the need for 'forgiveness and reconciliation' in the context of an investigative commission's work.

Chile has pioneered a new direction in the transnational politics of human rights and this discourse of reconciliation appeared five years earlier than the famous South African Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC). However, the Chilean reconciliation effort failed to capture public attention. Instead, it was the South African TRC that has served as a model for subsequent reconciliation commissions. Part of the explanation of why the South African TRC was relatively more successful than the Chilean commission was the active and direct involvement of Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the Catholic Church in South Africa in facilitating the reconciliation program. In so doing, the active role played by the South African Catholic Church has strengthened the moral and ethical cause of the reconciliation.

The success story of the South African TRC in creating a working platform for a national reconciliation has inspired many human rights activists and post-authoritarian governments to consider a similar policy in dealing with past violence. Such policies offer another way to resolve the traumas of human rights violations without involving judicial systems that might be still influenced by the legacy of an authoritarian past. The work of the South African TRC highlights a shared concern on national identity and national harmony, presented

beyond a rational legal discourse or beyond painstaking efforts to uncover suppressed historical facts. The South African reconciliation work privileges the discourse of national ethics over the need for judicial inquiry or historical investigation. By incorporating the ethics of a good and harmonious citizenship into the project of reconciliation, South Africa has shaped the transnational human rights 'ideascape'. The ethical framing transforms the South African reconciliation into a 'transportable' discourse, appropriated further by similar initiatives for reconciliation in other countries.

Indonesia's Encounter with Reconciliation

Indonesia has been part of the transnational traffic of the human rights idea since long before *Reformasi* (Reform) started. However, prior to 1998, the security organisations allowed only a limited space for human rights advocacy. When the New Order regime crumbled, the state lost its control of the human rights movement and many activists responded by forging international connections to strengthen their political bargaining position.

Some non-governmental organisations, pioneered by Elsam (*Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat* [Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy]) and Kontras (*Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan* [Commission for 'The Disappeared' and Victims of Violence]), began to work with former political detainees from the tragic events 1965–66 and called on the post-New Order regime to resolve two matters. First, the state should initiate a thorough investigation of the extrajudicial killings that took place in 1965–66. Second, the state should end political and social discrimination against former political detainees and rehabilitate their political and citizenship rights. This was the time when the ideas of reconciliation entered the public discourse of human rights in Indonesia, even though since then human rights activists have had different thoughts on how the initiative of reconciliation should proceed. Some acknowledge that reconciliation can help resolve the legacy of the 1965–66 violence, but the activists insist that the

state must first initiate a thorough investigation and establish an ad hoc human rights court to bring the masterminds of the tragedy to justice. Other activists voice a more modest demand: they believe that the human rights court is a lesser priority than a general public statement by the government that acknowledges the involvement of the New Order security organisations in the massacres. This latter group puts more stress on rehabilitating the political, social and economic rights that the New Order regime denied to the former political detainees.

In 2000, the former political detainees and their families received a nice surprise. President Abdurrachman Wahid offered an apology for the suffering and discrimination the detainees had experienced. Even though the president mentioned nothing about investigation and historical clarification, his statement was a strong symbolic gesture. Because he was the most respected leader of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Wahid's statement could be interpreted as a symbolic offer of reconciliation between the NU and the detainees. It gained more important political value when recent studies of the 1965 tragedy reveal that the youth wing of the NU, the Banser, played an active role in supporting the army's part in the massacres.

President Wahid offered his unprecedented apology at the time when human rights politics in Indonesia entered a new stage. The period 1999–2000 saw the development of new legal processes that affected the politics of reconciliation. The first development was the enactment of the law 39 of 1999 on human rights. Even though Indonesia had already established Komnas HAM (*Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia*), the national commission on human rights in 1993, only in 1999 did Indonesia enact a human rights law. The second development was the enactment of law 26 of 2000 to establish the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court. The law opened a new legal procedure that complements the Indonesian penal code by supporting the establishment of a specific court for criminal acts that can be categorised as a 'gross human rights violation'. However, law 26 of 2000 makes no mention of reconciliation, which means that the state legal system recognised the ad hoc human rights court as the only mechanism to resolve human rights violations.

Elsam drew attention to the juridical limitation of law 26 of 2000. The NGO sought another way to overcome this limitation by preparing a legal draft for an Indonesian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (*Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi* or KKR) and presented it to the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. The ministry later submitted the draft to the parliament but it was different from the one prepared earlier by Elsam. After long and complex negotiation, the parliament eventually enacted, in 2004, law 27 of 2004 on the Indonesian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (UU KKR). The law, however, did not remain in force long. In responding to a judicial review, requested by a coalition of human rights NGOs, the Constitutional Court revoked the law in 2007. Since then, the discourse of reconciliation has lost its place in the state legal system.

The idea that Indonesia should have a truth commission has faced a strong resistance from state officials, security organisations and nationalist groups. Of the two major elements of the truth commission, that of truth-seeking (*kebenaran*) has provoked more reactions than the element of reconciliation (*rekonsiliasi*). The reactions coalesce in the discourse of *malu* (shame), which suggests that exposing past violence would bring shame (*memalukan*) to alleged perpetrators. Each time their self-esteem was violated, the perpetrators would feel uneasy about, or even refuse to discuss, reconciliation with the victims. In this research I suggest that the emotional debate over *malu* demonstrates how the discourse of reconciliation in Indonesia resorts to social ethics to shape human rights politics.

In studying human rights politics outside the realm of the state legal system, this research follows an assumption, developed in the study of legal pluralism, that legal processes should not be limited only to the state judicial realm. In so doing, the research places less emphasis on the analysis of legal documents and court processes and pays more attention on the ethical and religious dimensions of reconciliation as a cultural practice. Studies on human rights carried out by legal scholars and activists tend to conceptualise human rights as a secular project. However, some Asian human rights activists have criticised the

separation of religious and secular categories in understanding human rights politics and practices. They argue that many Asian and African societies still rely on religions to animate public life. As a consequence, religion affects human rights norms, politics and practices in one way or another. This research supports that view and draws on the plural constellation of normative frameworks to understand *islah* reconciliation effort in Tanjung Priok and an attempt to reconcile the former political detainees with the Nahdlatul Ulama community in Central Java.[2]

Tanjung Priok Islah

In 1984, there were tragic events in Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta. The army's excessive response when trying to disperse Muslim protesters led to a bloody massacre with more than 50 people killed. For fifteen years the New Order regime managed to suppress the facts related to the killings but after 1998 the families of the killed and 'disappeared' people began to organise in order to break the official silence. In so doing, they have received institutional and financial assistances from Elsam and Kontras. The NGOs facilitate a network, organise public rallies, issue public statements and call for the government to re-open the case.

At the same time, some military officers, allegedly involved in the tragedy, launched an initiative to contact and organise a meeting with the victims. On 1 March 2001, a public gathering, called *islah*, was held at Sunda Kelapa Mosque in Central Jakarta. As well as the Tanjung Priok people and the military officers led by retired General Try Sutrisno, also present at the *islah* gathering were the Commander of Jakarta Military Command and Dr Nurcholish Madjid, a Muslim intellectual. The military officers suggested *islah* to serve as a reconciliation forum, drawing on an ethical discourse that emphasises a shared obligation to act as good citizens. A good citizen is someone who is able to overcome resentment and forget the past for the sake of the nation.

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2   *Islah* derives from Arabic, literally means "forgetting the past to achieve peace."

The *islah* gathering concluded with a ceremonial signing of *Piagam Islah* (Islah Charter). The charter is not an ordinary legal document. It invites one to interpret it as a material representation of a moral discourse that shapes the *islah*. The document includes several Qur'anic verses that talk about God's calling for Muslims to make peace with fellow Muslims. By incorporating the verses into the Islah Charter, the military as the initiator of the *islah* has delivered a strong moral that God and Islamic norms demand communal harmony. The discourse of reconciliation put forward by the Islah Charter presents the reconciliation not only as an ethical project of good citizenship but also a moral project to sustain a religious norm of Muslim brotherhood (*umat*).

The 1965–66 Reconciliation

In 2000, young activists affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama set up a non-governmental organisation called Syarikat. This organisation's priority is to bridge a social and communication gap between former Banser militia members and former political detainees. In 2003, Syarikat held 'grass-root reconciliation meetings' in Bondowoso and in Cirebon, attended by local NU *kiai*s from East and West Java, former members of Banser militia groups and by former political detainees.

Syarikat adopted two major strategies in its reconciliation work. First, it organised gatherings such as those held in Bondowoso and Cirebon. Second, it published memoirs written by some former members or sympathisers of the Indonesian Communist Party; people who were also prominent Islamic leaders in the 1960s. This was part of Syarakat's advocacy strategy, that is, to highlight the fact that no 'natural connection' exists between communism and atheism. This is to counter the argument that conservative *kiai*s and the Banser militia always put forward, which is to label the communists as atheists. Syarikat activists see that an ideological barrier separates the NU community and the political detainees and, for reconciliation to succeed, someone must breach the wall. Without taking into account the religious nuance, the reconciliation initiative would face a strong resistance because the *kiai*s

and the Banser would insist on the belief that the killing in 1965–66 was a religiously sanctioned act.

Conclusion: the Social Life of Reconciliation in Indonesia

The discourse of reconciliation goes back to no earlier than the 1990s, when the Chilean government sought a proper means to end the cycle of tension between the military and relatives of the 'disappeared'. The Chilean alternative departed from the common procedure used at the Nuremberg Trials to resolve human rights abuses. The Chilean initiative of reconciliation is a crucial development because it draws attention to the moral and the ethical dimension overlooked in the post-war human rights trial.

The moral and the ethical aspects of reconciliation direct the work of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The South African TRC work has served as a model for later reconciliation projects in Asia, Latin America and Africa. The involvement of Archbishop Desmond Tutu in South Africa, and later Archbishop Bello in East Timorese reconciliation, has strengthened the notion of reconciliation as a moral and ethical project by emphasising that the reconciliation is less a judicial mechanism than a project to revive the images of good citizenship and an enduring social collectivity. In this research, I propose that this particular kind of moral and ethical project renders reconciliation as a transnational 'transportable' ideascape that has also shaped the discourse of reconciliation in Indonesia.

This research highlights critical disjunctures emerging from the encounters of the transnational ethic of forgiveness with the reconciliation norm that draws on the social ethic of good conduct and the religious ethic of Muslim brotherhood. In the Tanjung Priok *islah*, the military involves a moderate religious figure and incorporates specific Qur'anic verses in the Islah Charter to place the reconciliation initiative in the imagination of good citizenship and of a religious fold. Although the *islah* forum draws its authority from Qur'anic verses, the Syarikat's attempt to reconcile the political detainees with the NU community depends

on the authority held by the local NU *kiai*s. Syarikat appropriated the idea of reconciliation to rehabilitate the social and political rights of the detainees and at the same time it addresses an ethical project to bring the former detainees back to the Muslim fold.

This project maintains that in Indonesia reconciliation projects emerge from the critical disjunctures formed when the global ideascape of justice and rights encounters a specific moral and ethical predicament. I would like to emphasise that the analysis of reconciliation should pay more attention to various 'projects' that do not necessarily support the concept of reconciliation as an alternative judicial mechanism. In post-1998 Indonesia, the military and the Syarikat have incorporated religious norms into political reconciliation, situated in a larger discursive imagination to constitute the post-authoritarian fold of ethical citizenry.

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